JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Ram Singh the counsel for the petitioner. 2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 27.01.2023 whereby the claim petition filed by the petitioner under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been dismissed as being beyond the limitation prescribed under section 166 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as amended with effect from 01.04.2022. 3. The facts, in brief, are that the legal heirs of Late Chetan Kumar filed a petition under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act claiming compensation on account of the death of Late Chetan Kumar in a motor accident on 01.05.2022. The said claim petition was filed on 27.01.2023. As the same was beyond the limitation of six months prescribed under section 166 (3) of the Act, the same was dismissed by means of the impugned order. 4. The submission of the counsel for the petitioner is that there was a delay of about fifty seven days' and the Act being a beneficial piece of legislation should be interpreted liberally and the delay should be condoned. He relies upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Swaran Singh; (2004) 3 SCC 297 . 5. To analyze the submission made at the bar, the scheme of claiming compensation as prescribed under the Motor Vehicles Act (herein after referred to as MV Act) is to be read as a whole. The relevant chapters for the case in hand are chapter XI and Chapter XII of the Act and Sections 159 and Section 166 and the Rules framed by the Central Government and the State Government. 6. It is relevant to note the provisions as contained in Section 166 of the Act, which is as under : "166. Application for compensation. The relevant chapters for the case in hand are chapter XI and Chapter XII of the Act and Sections 159 and Section 166 and the Rules framed by the Central Government and the State Government. 6. It is relevant to note the provisions as contained in Section 166 of the Act, which is as under : "166. Application for compensation. (1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 165 may be made (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent duly authorized by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be : Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. [Provided further that where a person accepts compensation under section 164 in accordance with the procedure provided under section 149, his claims petition before the Claims Tribunal shall lapse.] (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made, at the option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed:) (3) No application for compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident. (4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under section 159 as an application for compensation under this Act. (4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under section 159 as an application for compensation under this Act. (5) Notwithstanding anything in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, the right of a person to claim compensation for injury in an accident shall, upon the death of the person injured, survive to his legal representatives, irrespective of whether the cause of death is relatable to or had any nexus with the injury or not." 7. In terms of the provision of Section 166 (3) of the Act, it is clear that the legislature in its wisdom prescribed that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal shall not entertain any application for grant of compensation, if the same is not filed within six months of the occurrence of the incident, thus, starting point of limitation is the date of occurrence of the incident. Relying upon the said provision, the order impugned has been passed by the Tribunal rejecting the claim petition. 8. The said view of the Tribunal, in the opinion of this court, is not justified as the court has interpreted the provisions of section 166 in a narrow and pedantic manner, whereas, the Act being a socio beneficial piece of legislation, needs to be interpreted purposively and the various sections have to be interpreted harmoniously. 9. Section 166(3) of the Act cannot be read in isolation disjunct with Section 166 (4) which makes it mandatory for the Claims Tribunal to treat any report of the accident forwarded to it under section 159 as an application for compensation. 10. Section 159 of the Act which is quoted herein below, mandates the Police Officer, investigating the accident to necessarily prepare an accidental information report to facilitate the settlement of claim within a period of three months and containing such particulars to the Claims Tribunal or any other agency that may be prescribed. Section 159 of the Act is quoted as under: "159. Information to be given regarding accident -The police officer shall, during the investigation, prepare an accident information report to facilitate the settlement of claim in such form and manner, within three months and containing such particulars and submit the same to the Claims Tribunal and such other agency as may be prescribed." 11. Information to be given regarding accident -The police officer shall, during the investigation, prepare an accident information report to facilitate the settlement of claim in such form and manner, within three months and containing such particulars and submit the same to the Claims Tribunal and such other agency as may be prescribed." 11. Section 164C of the Motor Vehicle Act confers power on the Central Government to frame rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provision of Chapter XI of Motor Vehicle Act which includes Section 159. 12. In terms of the powers under Section 164C, the Central Government has framed rules known as Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. Rule 150 of the said rules provides as under: "150. Furnishing of copies of reports to Claims Tribunal.—(1) The police report referred to in section 159 shall be in Form 54 and the accident information report shall be submitted to the Claims Tribunal, insurer and such other agency as may be notified by the Central Government. (2) A registering authority or a police officer who is required to furnish the required information to the person eligible to claim compensation under section 160 or insurer against whom a claim has been made and such other person as may be notified by the Central Government, shall furnish the information in Form 54, within seven days from the date of receipt of the request and on payment of a fee of rupees ten." 13. On a conjoint reading of section 166 (4) read with section 159 of the Act read with Rule 150 of Central Motor Vehicle Rules, it is clear that on the occurrence of any accident, a duty has been cast upon the Police Officer, investigating the accident, to send an information containing the particulars to the Claims Tribunal in Form No.54 and the Claims Tribunal is bound to accept the said report as an application for settlement of the Claim. 14. Section 176 of Motor Vehicle Act empowers State Government to frame rules for the Tribunals and in exercise of the said powers State Government has framed rules Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicle Rules 1998. 14. Section 176 of Motor Vehicle Act empowers State Government to frame rules for the Tribunals and in exercise of the said powers State Government has framed rules Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicle Rules 1998. Rules 204 A of the said rules is quoted as under : 204-A. Police report submitted under Section 158(6)-(1) On receipt of report of Investigating Police Officer submitted under sub-rule (4) of Rule 202-A, the Claims Tribunal shall go through the same and may call for such further information or material as considered necessary for proper and effective action in accordance with sub-section (4) of Section 166. (2) The Claims Tribunal after examining the report and further information material, if called for, shall register the claim case thereon and, then, issue notice for appearance to all the parties concerned which would include the victims the accident, of the legal representatives of persons deceased, as the case may be driver, owner and insurer of the Vehicle involved in the accident. (3) On receipt of notice, the parties mentioned in sub-rule (2) would be required to appear and declare through affidavit, if any claim case had been preferred, or was being preferred in respect of the same cause of action, and if so, the report of Investigating Police Officer, treated as Claim case, would be tagged to such claim case preferred independently by the parties. (4) If the persons injured, or legal representative of the persons deceased do not appear in response to the notice issued under sub-rule (2) in the manner indicated in sub-rule (3) the Claims Tribunal may presume that the said parties were not interested in pursuing the same for, any compensation in such proceedings, and on such presumption the case shall be closed. (5) Unless the Police report treated as claim case stands tagged to independent claim case preferred by the parties themselves, the Claims Tribunal shall call upon the person, injured or legal representatives of the person deceased as the case, may be, and the persons who have appeared in response to the notice, to submit statements of facts regarding compensation, if claimed by them. (6) If statements of facts about compensation claimed and basis thereof are furnished by the parties. The case shall be further proceeded in the same manner as required to deal with applications moved by the parties for compensation directly before the Claims Tribunal. (6) If statements of facts about compensation claimed and basis thereof are furnished by the parties. The case shall be further proceeded in the same manner as required to deal with applications moved by the parties for compensation directly before the Claims Tribunal. (7) If statements of facts about the compensation claimed, has been furnished by the parties and subsequently commits default in appearance, the provisions of Order-IX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 would apply" 15. On a conjoint reading of Section 166(3) read with Section 166(4) read with the rules as referred to above ,the inescapable conclusion is that two modes of claiming compensation are prescribed, one under sub section 3 of Section 166 and other under sub-section 4 of section 166.The duty to file the claim is cast upon the Police Authorities under Section 166(4) read with Rule 150 of Central M.V Rules coupled with an obligation cast upon the tribunal to treat the same as claim application under Section 166(4) read with Rule 204A of the UP M.V Rules. 16. In fact, in terms of the Rule 204A(3) any claim filed by the claimant in addition to the report of Police Authorities is to be tagged with the first report and is to be heard and decided simultaneously. 17. In view of there being two modes prescribed for making claim under sub-sections 3 and 4 of section 166 and both have a same purpose and both are aimed at the same objective i.e. to expeditiously register a claim for damages sustained in the accident, both have to be harmoniously reconciled so as to promote the object of the Statute and not to frustrate it. 18. The Supreme Court has laid down principles that govern the doctrine of harmonious constructions in (2003)3 SCC 57; CIT vs. Hindustan Bulk Carriers wherein it was observed and laid down in paras 14 to 21 as under: “14. A construction which reduces the statute to a futility has to be avoided. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat i.e. a liberal construction should be put upon written instruments, so as to uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect the intention of the parties. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat i.e. a liberal construction should be put upon written instruments, so as to uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect the intention of the parties. [See Broom's Legal Maxims (10th Edn.), p. 361, Craies on Statutes (7th Edn.), p. 95 and Maxwell on Statutes (11th Edn.), p. 221.] 15. A statute is designed to be workable and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable. (See Whitney v. IRC [1926 AC 37 : 10 Tax Cas 88 : 95 LJKB 165 : 134 LT 98 (HL)] , AC at p. 52 referred to in CIT v. S. Teja Singh [ AIR 1959 SC 352 : (1959) 35 ITR 408 ] and Gursahai Saigal v. CIT [ AIR 1963 SC 1062 : (1963) 48 ITR 1 ].) 16. The courts will have to reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there may be some inexactitude in the language used. (See Salmon v. Duncombe [(1886) 11 AC 627 : 55 LJPC 69 : 55 LT 446 (PC)] AC at p. 634, Curtis v. Stovin [(1889) 22 QBD 513 : 58 LJQB 174 : 60 LT 772 (CA)] referred to in S. Teja Singh case [ AIR 1959 SC 352 : (1959) 35 ITR 408 ].) 17. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility, and should rather accept the bolder construction, based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility, and should rather accept the bolder construction, based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. (See Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries [(1940) 3 All ER 549 : 1940 AC 1014 : 109 LJKB 865 : 163 LT 343 (HL)] referred to in Pye v. Minister for Lands for NSW [(1954) 3 All ER 514 : (1954) 1 WLR 1410 (PC)].) The principles indicated in the said cases were reiterated by this Court in Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India [1992 Supp (1) SCC 594 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 455 : (1992) 19 ATC 881 : AIR 1992 SC 1 ] . 18. The statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. 19. The court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with other parts of the law and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs. (See R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka [ (1992) 1 SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 286 : (1992) 19 ATC 507 : AIR 1992 SC 81 ].) Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between two different sections or provisions of the same statute. It is the duty of the court to avoid a head-on clash between two sections of the same Act. (See Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain [ (1997) 1 SCC 373 : AIR 1997 SC 1006 ].) 20. Whenever it is possible to do so, it must be done to construe the provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise. It should not be lightly assumed that Parliament had given with one hand what it took away with the other. 21. The provisions of one section of the statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them. It should not be lightly assumed that Parliament had given with one hand what it took away with the other. 21. The provisions of one section of the statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them. Thus a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a “useless lumber” or “dead letter” is not a harmonised construction. To harmonise is not to destroy.” 19. The rule of interpreting two provisions of a statute was considered by the Supreme Court in (2007) 9 SCC 179 ; P. Raghava Kurup and another vs. V. Ananthakumari and others and the Supreme Court in paras 7, 9 and 10 has recorded as under : 7. Therefore, the intention of the rule-framing authority can be brought forth by reading these two provisions harmoniously. The settled principle of interpretation of statute is that if two rules can be read harmoniously and the object sought to be achieved can be achieved without violation of any rule then it should be so read. Secondly, it may also be relevant to mention that Note (1) to Rule 1 was inserted in 1982 subsequently knowing fully well that Rule 43-B starts with non obstante clause. Therefore, the note which is subsequent to the Rules of 1959 can be read harmoniously without doing any violence to Rule 43-B. 9. Mr Rao placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar [ AIR 1953 SC 148 : 1953 SCR 533 ] their Lordships observed as follows: (SCR p. 534) “In construing a statute it is not competent to any court to proceed upon the assumption that the legislature has made a mistake and even if there is some defect in the phraseology used by the legislature, the court cannot aid the defective phrasing of an Act or add and amend, or by construction, make up deficiencies which are left in the Act.” 10. No attempt is made in this case to add or subtract any word. It is only after reading the two provisions of the Rules harmoniously the result can be achieved without any violence to any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules. The object as already indicated above, was to provide promotional avenues to the non-teaching staff for the post of teacher provided they fulfil requisite qualifications. It is only after reading the two provisions of the Rules harmoniously the result can be achieved without any violence to any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules. The object as already indicated above, was to provide promotional avenues to the non-teaching staff for the post of teacher provided they fulfil requisite qualifications. Therefore, this case is of no help to the appellants.” 20. Scope of Section 166(3) which empowers the claimant to apply under Section 166(3) within 6 months on conjoint reading with Section 166(4) of the Act and on the basis of analysis referred above, has to be referable to cases of motor accidents in which no FIR could be registered for any reason or where he chooses to file a claim before the Police Authorities send the report to the Claims Tribunal. 21. In the present case, the Tribunal has not considered this aspect and has failed to record any material fact in respect of the accident report being on record and/or steps taken thereon by the Tribunal in terms of Rule 204 A and has proceeded to reject the claim petition ignoring the said aspect, as such, the impugned order dated 27.01.2023 is not sustainable and is liable to be set aside. 22. The Claims Tribunal is directed to process and decide the claim in accordance with law as it was the duty of the Police Officer investigating the accident to sent the information and it was also mandatory on the Claims Tribunal to accept the said report as a claim application which appears to have not been done, for no fault of the petitioner. 23. In case the police officer has failed to fill/send his report, the Tribunal will be well within its powers to call for the same and register it as a Claim Petition and then take steps as prescribed under Rule 204A of the Rules. 24. Thus, the order dated 27.01.2023 is set aside. It is further directed for guidance of Tribunals functioning under the Act, that the mandate of Section 159 and Section 166(4) of the Act has to be considered before rejecting any claim application under section 166 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act on grounds of limitation. 25. The writ petition stands allowed. 26. It is further directed for guidance of Tribunals functioning under the Act, that the mandate of Section 159 and Section 166(4) of the Act has to be considered before rejecting any claim application under section 166 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act on grounds of limitation. 25. The writ petition stands allowed. 26. The Registrar General is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to all the Claims Tribunal functioning in the State of U.P.