ORDER : 1. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Dakshesh Mehta on behalf of the appellants. 2. By way of this appeal, the appellants have sought to challenge an order passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kalol, dated 30.09.2022, rejecting the plaint preferred by the present appellants in Special Civil Suit No. 41 of 2017, under the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short “the CPC”). 3. It appears that the appellants herein were the original plaintiffs in the Special Civil Suit 41 of 2017 preferred before the Court of Principal Civil Judge, Kalol, wherein the plaintiffs had inter-alia prayed for declaration as regards land bearing Survey No. 776 Paiki, Survey No. 776/1 being Block No. 981 is of their ownership, more particularly received by the plaintiffs by way of inheritance, and a declaration against the defendants that they do not have any right, title or interest in the property in question is sought for and it is also prayed to set aside a registered sale deed, whereby the suit property had been sold by the defendant Nos. 1 to 13 in favour of the defendant Nos. 13 and 14. It appears that upon summons being issued to the defendants, the defendants having appeared through their learned Advocate had submitted an application under Order 7 Rule 11 (a) and (d) of the CPC praying for rejection of the plaint. It would further appear that the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge vide the order impugned had allowed the application below Exh.28 preferred by the defendants and had rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 (a) and (d) of the CPC. The said order is sought to be assailed by way of the present appeal. 4. Learned Advocate Mr. Mehta for the appellants would take this Court through the averments made in the plaint as well as the impugned order and would submit that the learned Civil Court had committed a grave error inasmuch as though a specific cause of action has been made in the plaint, the learned Civil Court had rejected the suit under Order 7 Rule 11(a) of the CPC and whereas it is further submitted that though the suit was filed well within limitation, the learned Civil Court without considering the same, had rejected the suit as being barred by limitation. Learned Advocate would further submit that the plaintiffs and the defendants are residents of Village Raacharda, Taluka Kalol, District Gandhinagar and whereas both the sides were holding agricultural lands which were situated adjacent to each other. It is submitted that the plaintiffs’ ancestor was one Jivabhai Motibhai Dhanabhai Patel and whereas the defendants had an ancestor who had similar sounding name Jivabhai Motibhai Prabhubhai Patel. It is submitted that upon demise of father of Jivabhai Motibhai Dhanabhai Patel, his legal heirs Jivabhai and Tribhovanbhai and their respective families were show as co-owners of the land bearing Survey No. 776/1 and 776/2 vide entry No. 1297 dated 24.09.1961. It also appears that the land bearing Survey No. 776/1 came to the share of Jivabhai and land bearing Survey No. 776/2 came to the share of Tribhovanbhai. Learned Advocate would further contend that there was an amalgamation made of Survey No. 776/1 and Survey No. 776/2, which were converted into Block No. 981 and Block No. 982, respectively. It was contended that on conversion of the land from survey numbers to block numbers, by inadvertence, instead of the ancestor of the plaintiffs i.e. Jivabhai Motibhai Dhanabhai being shown as owners of the land, ancestor of the defendants i.e. Jivabhai Motibhai Prabhubhai was shown as owner of the land and whereas upon demise of the said Jivabhai Motibhai Prabhubhai in the year 1975, names of his legal heirs were entered into the revenue record. Learned Advocate would submit that in was in context of such a situation where the land though belonged to the family of the plaintiffs, yet on account of mistake, name of ancestor of the defendants had been entered into the revenue record that the suit had been preferred. 4.1 Learned Advocate would further submit that furthermore, the defendants No. 1 to 13 by virtue of sale deed dated 13.09.2017 had sold the land to defendants No. 13 and 14 and whereas the said sale had also been challenged by way of the Civil Suit. 4.1 Learned Advocate would further submit that furthermore, the defendants No. 1 to 13 by virtue of sale deed dated 13.09.2017 had sold the land to defendants No. 13 and 14 and whereas the said sale had also been challenged by way of the Civil Suit. 4.2 Learned Advocate would submit that without considering the above aspects, more particularly the aspect of declaration being co-relatable to the fact that the plaintiffs infact had a cause of action to file the suit and further considering the fact that the challenge to the registered sale deed dated 13.09.2017 by way of a suit of the year 2017 itself could not have in any manner led the suit to be dismissed on the ground of the suit being filed after the period of limitation. Learned Advocate would under such circumstances request this Court to interfere and set aside the impugned order and direct the learned Civil Court to decide the suit on merits. 5. Considering the submissions made by learned Advocate for the appellants following questions arise for consideration of this Court: (1) Whether the suit discloses a cause of action? (2) Whether the suit was liable to be rejected as being barred by the statute of limitation? (3) What order? 5.1 My answers to the issues framed hereinabove are as follows: (1) In Affirmative. (2) In Negative. (3) As per final order. 6. The reasons for coming to the conclusion on the issue No. 1 i.e. whether the suit discloses a cause of action and on the issue No. 2 i.e. whether the suit was liable to be rejected as being barred by the statute of limitation, are as follows: Issue No. 1: 7. The plaintiffs have averred in the suit, more particularly where the cause of action had been described that the suit land was of the ownership of the ancestor of the plaintiffs and on account of mistake while entering the name of the owner in the revenue record, more particularly on account of similarly sounding names, the name of ancestor of the defendants came to be entered into the revenue record as against the name of ancestor of the plaintiffs. It is also averred that while the plaintiffs had preferred an appeal before the Deputy Collector in the year 2016 questioning the entries made in the revenue record, the defendants had through their Advocate issued a public notice for getting title clearance of the land in question and whereas the plaintiffs had objected to the same and inspite of such objection, the land had been sold vide registered sale deed dated 13.09.2017. It is submitted that the suit land was the ancestral property of the plaintiffs and the defendants having taken disadvantage of a bona fide mistake by the revenue authorities have inspite of knowing about the error sold the property of the plaintiffs causing loss to the plaintiffs. 7.1. Before discussing further it would be relevant to discuss the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as far as the aspect of cause of action and rejecting the suit under Order 7 Rule 11(a) of the CPC is concerned. The said issue has been elaborately decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Liverpool and London S.P. and I Association Limited vs. M.V. Sea Success-I and Another, (2004) 9 SCC 512 and whereas paragraphs No. 139, 140, 146, 147, 149, 151 and 152 being relevant for the present purpose are being quoted herein-below for benefit. REJECTION OF PLAINT: 139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in its entirety, a decree would be passed. CAUSE OF ACTION: 140. A cause of action is a bundle of facts which are required to be pleaded and proved for the purpose of obtaining relief claimed in the suit. For the aforementioned purpose, the material facts are required to be stated but not the evidence except in certain cases where the pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default, or undue influence. 146. For the aforementioned purpose, the material facts are required to be stated but not the evidence except in certain cases where the pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default, or undue influence. 146. It may be true that Order 7 Rule 11(a) although authorises the court to reject a plaint on failure on the part of the plaintiff to disclose a cause of action but the same would not mean that the averments made therein or a document upon which reliance has been placed although discloses a cause of action, the plaint would be rejected on the ground that such averments are not sufficient to prove the facts stated therein for the purpose of obtaining reliefs claimed in the suit. The approach adopted by the High Court, in this behalf, in our opinion, is not correct. 147. In D. Ramachandran vs. R.V. Janakiraman and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 267 , this Court held: “It is well settled that in all cases of preliminary objection, the test is to see whether any of the reliefs prayed for could be granted to the appellant if the averments made in the petition are proved to be true. For the purpose of considering a preliminary objection, the averments in the petition should be assumed to be true and the court has to find out whether those averments disclose a cause of action or a triable issue as such. The court cannot probe into the facts on the basis of the controversy raised in the counter.” 149. In D. Ramachandran vs. R.V. Janakiraman and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 267 , it has been held that the Court cannot dissect the pleading into several parts and consider whether each one of them discloses a cause of action. 151. In ascertaining whether the plaint shows a cause of action, the court is not required to make an elaborate enquiry into doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact. By the statute the jurisdiction of the court is restricted to ascertaining whether on the allegations a cause of action is shown. In Vijay Pratap Singh vs. Dukh Haran Nath Singh, AIR 1962 SC 941 this Court held: “By the express terms of r. 5 clause (d), the court is concerned the ascertain whether the allegations made in the petition show a cause of action. In Vijay Pratap Singh vs. Dukh Haran Nath Singh, AIR 1962 SC 941 this Court held: “By the express terms of r. 5 clause (d), the court is concerned the ascertain whether the allegations made in the petition show a cause of action. The court has not to see whether the claim made by the petitioner is likely to succeed: it has merely to satisfy itself that the allegations made in the petition, if accepted as true, would entitle the petitioner to the relief he claims. If accepting those allegations as true no case is made out for granting relief no cause of action would be shown and the petition must be rejected. But in ascertaining whether the petition shows a cause of action the court does not enter upon a trial of the issues affecting the merits of the claim made by the petitioner. It cannot take into consideration the defences which the defendant may raise upon the merits; nor is the court competent to make an elaborate enquiry into doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact. If the allegations in the petition, prima facie, show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact, or whether the petitioner will succeed in the claims made by him.” 152. So long as the claim discloses some cause of action or raises some questions fit to be decided by a Judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed is no ground for striking it out. The purported failure of the pleadings to disclose a cause of action is distinct from the absence of full particulars.” [See Mohan Rawale (supra)] 7.2 From the above observations it becomes clear that while examining whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not, the test being that whether a decree would be passed in favour of the plaintiffs, if all the averments made in the plaint are to be taken as correct in their entirety. It further becomes clear that the Court would not reject a plaint on the ground that though the plaint or the document upon which reliance has been placed discloses a cause of action, yet such averments are not sufficient to prove the facts stated therein for the purpose of obtaining relief claimed in the suit. It further becomes clear that the Court would not reject a plaint on the ground that though the plaint or the document upon which reliance has been placed discloses a cause of action, yet such averments are not sufficient to prove the facts stated therein for the purpose of obtaining relief claimed in the suit. The Court, while considering whether the averments disclose a cause of action or a triable issue the Court cannot consider the same on the basis of the averments made in the written statements. The Court cannot also dissect the pleadings into several parts to consider whether each one of them discloses a cause of action or not. The Court is also not required to make an elaborate inquiry into doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact. The Court is only required to ascertain whether on the allegations a cause of action is made out or not. While ascertaining whether the plaint shows a cause of action or not, the Court cannot enter into a trial, taking into consideration the defence which the defendant may raise on merits, nor an elaborate inquiry into the doubtful or complicated question is envisaged. If a prima facie cause of action is made out, then the Court is not required to enter into an inquiry as to whether the allegations are true or whether the petitioner will succeed in the claim made by him. The Court while ascertaining the cause of action cannot hold that the case is not likely to succeed. In the considered opinion of this Court, as appearing from the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the essence of Order VII Rule 11(a) would be whether on a plain reading does the plaint disclose a cause of action or not and whereas the provision could not be extended to mean that the Court while considering the said question is entitled to looking into the evidentiary value of the documents relied upon in the suit and come to a conclusion that since the documents, according to the Court, at that stage do not have much of an evidentiary value, therefore, the plaint which relies upon such documents should be rejected as lacking any cause of action. 7.3 Having regard to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as explained hereinabove, it would appear that if the averments made in the plaint were to be treated as correct, then a decree would certainly be passed in favour of the plaintiffs since the case of the plaintiffs as per the plaint was that the suit property belong to their ancestor and the defendants had taken disadvantage of a bona fide mistake in the revenue record. It would also required to be mentioned here that the learned Civil Court, corelated the aspect of delay with the aspect of cause of action and had come to a conclusion that the plaint did not disclose a cause of action. In the considered opinion of this Court, more particularly having regard to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as discussed hereinabove, the finding of the learned Civil Court is erroneous on this count. Hence, the issue No. 1 is answered in the affirmative. Issue No. 2: 8. Insofar as the second issue is concerned, the issue would stand on a different footing. The plaintiffs had prayed for two separate prayers namely the first prayer being for declaration i.e. to declare that the plaintiffs were owners of the suit property received by them through inheritance and that the defendants do not have any right over the suit property and secondly for setting aside of the sale deed executed by the defendants No. 1 to 13 in favour of the defendants No. 13 and 14. In this regard, it would be relevant to mention that the plaintiffs in the plaint were essentially attempting to question entries which were mutated in favour of the defendants showing the ancestor of the defendants as owner of the property and later on an entry of inheritance whereby names of the legal heirs of Jivabhai Motibhai Prabhubhai i.e. ancestor of the defendants had been entered upon demise of the said person. From the plaint it appears that the name of ancestor of the plaintiffs had continued from the year 1962-63 to 1976-77. From the plaint it appears that the name of ancestor of the plaintiffs had continued from the year 1962-63 to 1976-77. It would also appear that from the year 1977 onwards, the names of ancestors of the plaintiffs were not there in the revenue record and whereas the plaintiffs had preferred RTS Appeal before the Deputy Collector challenging various entries in the year 2016 and whereas it would also appear that pending such challenge the defendants had sold the property in question. 8.1 In the considered opinion of this Court, a plain reading of the plaint would clearly reveal that the plaintiffs had relied upon ‘clever drafting’ to bring their suit within the ambit of period of limitation. While this Court is conscious of the fact that the defence of the defendants is not required to be considered and only the averments in the plaint are required to be seen, yet, more particularly for the purpose of relying upon the date which has been conveniently not mentioned by the plaintiffs and specifically mentioned by the defendants in their application for rejecting the plaint, more particularly since the date relates to the fact which is mentioned in the plaint itself, the same is taken into consideration by this Court. In the plaint the plaintiffs had averred that amongst the other entries the plaintiffs had challenged revenue entry No. 567. In the application for rejecting the plaint Exh.28 the defendants have mentioned that the revenue entry No. 567 was entered in the revenue record on 09.05.1980, more particularly the same being entered in the revenue record for mentioning legal heirs of late Jivabhai Motibhai Prabhubhai Patel, ancestor of the defendants. From the plaint it would also appear that name of the ancestor of the plaintiffs had been removed from the revenue record in the year 1976-77 and whereas in the year 1980 names of legal heirs of the ancestor of the defendants were mutated in the revenue record. It would thus appear that the cause of action for the plaintiffs to have prayed for a declaration as regards the property having been inherited by the plaintiffs and thus being of their ownership would start from the year 1976-77 or at least from the year 1980. Admittedly the plaintiffs have questioned the same after 36 years. It would thus appear that the cause of action for the plaintiffs to have prayed for a declaration as regards the property having been inherited by the plaintiffs and thus being of their ownership would start from the year 1976-77 or at least from the year 1980. Admittedly the plaintiffs have questioned the same after 36 years. 8.2 It would also be relevant to mention here that the learned Advocate for the appellant had inter-alia submitted that as far as the bar of law of limitation is concerned, while it could be applied insofar as the prayer with regard to declaration was concerned, whereas, the plaintiffs had also prayed for setting aside a registered sale deed in favour of the defendants of the year 2017, which would definitely bring the suit within the period of limitation. Learned Advocate would also rely upon a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Sri Biswanath Banik and Another vs. Sulanga Bose and Others, (2022) 7 SCC 731 , to submit that since the prayers were interconnected as per the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the plaint ought not to have been rejected. In this regard, it would be pertinent to mention that in the case before the Hon’ble Apex Court, the plaintiffs had claimed that by way of an agreement of the year 1995, more particularly as part performance thereof, the plaintiffs were put in possession and whereas since the defendant was not executing a registered sale deed as per the agreement of 1995 and since the defendant was attempting to sell the property, more particularly by issuance of public notices in newspaper in the year 2010 that a suit had been preferred in the same year, more particularly for declaring the plaintiffs therein having right, title and interest over the suit property and for confirmation of the plaintiffs’ possession over the suit property. The plaintiffs had also prayed for confirmation of plaintiffs possession as part performance of the contract under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. 8.3 In the considered opinion of this Court, since the facts of the case before the Hon’ble Apex Court and the facts of the present case being completely different, reliance placed by the appellants upon the said decision would be of no avail. 8.3 In the considered opinion of this Court, since the facts of the case before the Hon’ble Apex Court and the facts of the present case being completely different, reliance placed by the appellants upon the said decision would be of no avail. Furthermore, it is also required to be mentioned that the Hon’ble Apex Court has not laid down any law which could mean to state that if the reliefs are interconnected, a plaint could not be rejected in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. In the humble opinion of this Court, the Hon’ble Apex Court at Paragraph No. 11 had made observations with regard to fact situation and whereas the said observations could not be stated to be the ratio decidendi of the said decision. 8.4 At this stage, this Court seeks to refer to decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Khatri Hotels Private Limited and Another vs. Union of India and Another, (2011) 9 SCC 126 . Paragraph No. 30 of the said decision being relevant for the present purpose is reproduced herein-below for benefit. “30. While enacting Article 58 of the 1963 Act, the legislature has designedly made a departure from the language of Article 120 of the 1908 Act. The word ‘first’ has been used between the words ‘sue’ and ‘accrued’. This would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. To put it differently, successive violation of the right will not give rise to fresh cause and the suit will be liable to be dismissed if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the day when the right to sue first accrued.” 8.5 The above dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court, would be aptly applicable in the facts of the present case, more particularly since it is the claim of the plaintiffs that by virtue of the fact that a prayer for cancelling the registered sale deed of the year 2017 has been sought for, therefore the suit would not be barred by the law of limitation. As against the same, it would appear that the Hon’ble Apex Court has very clearly laid down the law that successive violation of the right will not give rise to fresh cause and the suit will be liable to be dismissed if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the day when the right to sue first accrued. Having regard to the said proposition of law, it would appear that the right to sue first accrued in favour of the plaintiffs in the 1976-77 when the name of the ancestor of the plaintiffs had been removed from the revenue record and name of the ancestor of the defendants had been incorporated or at least from the year 1980 when the names of legal heirs of the ancestor of the defendants had been entered by way of an entry of inheritance. By not exercising right to sue by the plaintiffs at the relevant point of time after around 36 years when the defendants sales the property, the same could not be treated as the starting point of cause of action i.e. when the right to sue first accrued, and hence the suit is clearly barred by the law of limitation. 8.6 At this stage, it would also be relevant to refer to Paragraph No. 29.19 of a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Dahiben vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) Dead through Legal Representatives and Others, (2020) 7 SCC 366 , which reads as under. “29.19 Reliance is placed on the recent judgment of this Court rendered in Raghwendra Sharan Singh vs. Ram Prasanna Singh wherein this Court held that the suit would be barred by limitation under Article 59 of the Limitation Ac, if it was filed beyond three years of the execution of the registered deed.” 8.7 Having regard to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, explained hereinabove, it would appear that if a suit is preferred after the period of limitation under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, then the suit would be barred by limitation. In the instance case, since the appellants-original plaintiffs have prayed for a declaration and for cancellation of instrument, Articles 58 and 59 both would be relevant and whereas Article 58 with regard to obtaining any other declaration prescribes a period of limitation of three years and the time from which the period begins to run would be the day when the right to sue first accrues and whereas since it appears that the plaintiffs have preferred the suit approximately 36 years after the right to sue had accrued in their favour, therefore the suit is clearly barred by the law of limitation. Hence, on this count, this Court does not fine any error committed by the learned Civil Court, and hence the issue No. 2 is answered in negative. Issue No. 3: 9. Having regard to the fact that while this Court has held that a cause of action is definitely made out, but at the same time this Court has also held that the suit was clearly barred by law of limitation, therefore this Court does not find any reason for interfering with the impugned order passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kalol and hence the issue No. 3 answered accordingly. 10. In view of the above observations, discussion and findings, the present appeal being meritless is hereby dismissed in limine. 11. In view of the order passed in the main appeal, the captioned Civil Application would not survive, hence the same is disposed of accordingly.