ORDER : These two revision petitions are filed by the plaintiff and the defendant, respectively, challenging the finding of the Trial Court on point Nos.1 and 2, wherein held that the jural relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and also dismissing the suit as barred by Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC vide order dated 16.07.2016 passed in S.C.No.15167/2015 on the file of XV Addl. Judge, Court of Small Causes, Mayo Hall Unit, Bengaluru (SCCH-19). 2. The parties are referred to as per their original rankings before the Trial Court to avoid confusion and for the convenience of the Court. 3. The factual matrix of the case of the plaintiff before the Trial Court is that the defendant is a tenant in respect of the petition schedule premises on a monthly rent of Rs.300/-. Earlier suit was filed for an ejectment, the same was numbered as S.C.No.15598/2011 and it was decreed. Aggrieved by the said order, the review petition was filed in Misc. Petition No.15012/2013, which was allowed and the decree of ejectment was set aside. Hence, the plaintiff has issued termination of tenancy notice dated 22.01.2015 calling upon the defendant to quit and deliver the vacant possession of the suit schedule premises within the stipulated time. The defendant gave an untenable reply. Hence, he was constrained to file a suit. 4. After issuance of summons, the defendant has appeared and filed the written statement contending that the suit itself is not maintainable. It is contended that he had constructed the house and he was in peaceful possession of the suit schedule property, and he was paying the amount towards expenses of the Pooja of the temple and not paying any rent. It is also contended that his father was in possession from 85 years back and his father was in possession by the then Dharmakartha Late Gadi Cheluvaraya Shetty and he was collecting Rs.2/-per month towards expenses of pooja in the Sannidhi Temple. His father had enjoyed the same by constructing a house and shop in the suit schedule property. After the death of his father, he has been enjoying the peaceful possession with his family as the legal heir and owner of the schedule property. His father had enjoyed the same by constructing a house and shop in the suit schedule property. After the death of his father, he has been enjoying the peaceful possession with his family as the legal heir and owner of the schedule property. There is no documentary proof with regard to the tenancy and he had renovated the building by spending more than Rs.3 Lakhs and also spent an amount of Rs.5 Lakhs for construction of the collapsed portion of the building. There was an increase of amount of Rs.2/-to Rs.70/-and thereafter Rs.300/-for pooja expenses but not as a rent and for cleaning, painting and other works every year he had spent Rs.25,000/-. It is also his contention that the plaintiff is claiming to be a trustee and he has not obtained any permission under Section 92 of CPC, which is mandatory. It is also admitted the earlier proceedings and also allowing of the misc. petition. It is also contended that in view of the Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC, the plaintiff has precluded for filing second suit on the same cause of action without leave of the Court and also in view of Section 11 of CPC res judicata will apply to the present suit. Hence, prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. The plaintiff in order to prove his case examined himself as P.W.1 and got marked the documents as Exs.P1 to P6. On the other hand, the defendant has also got examined himself as D.W.1 and got marked the documents as Exs.D1 to D10. The Trial Court having considered the pleadings of the parties formulated the points that whether the plaintiff proves that there is jural relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, whether the defendant proves that the suit is barred by Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC and whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief. The Trial Court answered point Nos.1 and 2 as affirmative, in coming to the conclusion that the suit is barred by Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC. Hence, these two revision petitions are filed by the plaintiff as well as the defendant, respectively. 6. The plaintiff in CRP No.295/2016, contended that the Trial Court while answering point No.1 stated that there is jural relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, and committed an error in invoking Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC. Hence, these two revision petitions are filed by the plaintiff as well as the defendant, respectively. 6. The plaintiff in CRP No.295/2016, contended that the Trial Court while answering point No.1 stated that there is jural relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, and committed an error in invoking Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC. The learned counsel also would vehemently contend that Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC is not applicable to the case on hand and the Trial Court erroneously proceeded that hit by Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC and the same is not applicable. The very finding of the Trial Court is erroneous and it requires interference. The Trial Court ought to have seen that the cause of action for the present suit arose on after allowing the Misc.Petition No.15012/2013 and after terminating the tenancy a fresh legal notice was issued and the suit is filed based on the fresh cause of action i.e., dated 22.01.2015 and committed an error in dismissing the suit. Hence, it requires interference. 7. The defendant in CRP No.19/2017, is challenged the finding on point No.1 contending that the Trial Court has committed an error in answering the point that there exists jural relationship between the parties and contended that the Trial Court has failed to see that under Ex.D1 clearly shows that in respect of schedule property one Smt. Muniyamma and her daughter Akkayya are the owners of the suit schedule property. Hence, the present respondent – Trust is not the owner and the Trial Court is not justified in holding that the respondent is a landlord is contrary to Section 63 of the Trust Act and the same is liable to be set aside. The Trial Court also failed to see that under Section 5 of the Trust Act, 1882, no where in the document of Trust mentioned the schedule. Hence, the Trial Court has committed an error in coming to the conclusion that there exists jural relationship between the parties. The Trial Court has failed to see that the trustees cannot claim ownership of property as held by the Division Bench of this Court. Hence, it requires interference. 8. The respective counsel in their oral submissions reiterated the grounds urged in the respective revision petitions. The Trial Court has failed to see that the trustees cannot claim ownership of property as held by the Division Bench of this Court. Hence, it requires interference. 8. The respective counsel in their oral submissions reiterated the grounds urged in the respective revision petitions. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff in his arguments would vehemently contend that the suit is filed based on the fresh cause of action since the notice was issued in the year 2015 terminating the tenancy and the defendant also given reply though the Court rightly comes to the conclusion that the jural relationship is established, committed an error in applying Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC. The learned counsel for the defendant in his arguments he vehemently contend that under Ex.P1 – Certified Copy of Deed of Trust, they cannot claim any relief and Section 5 of the Trust Act also very clear that if no schedule is mentioned, cannot seek for any order of eviction and the Trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC, is applicable. He also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Coffee Board v. Ramesh Exports Private Limited reported in (2014) 6 SCC 424 , before the Trial Court to invoke Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC. The learned counsel would vehemently contend that Ex.D1 is very clear that the property belongs to Muniyamma and she is the owner and he justifies the dismissal of the suit but prays this Court to set aside the finding on point No.1. 9. Having heard the respective counsel and also on perusal of the material available on record, the points that would arise for consideration of this Court are: (1) Whether the Trial Court has committed an error in answering point No.1 that there exists the jural relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and whether it requires interference by allowing CRP No.19/2017? (2) Whether the Trial Court has committed an error in dismissing the suit invoking Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC and whether it requires interference by allowing CRP No.295/2016? (3) What order? Point No.1: 10. (2) Whether the Trial Court has committed an error in dismissing the suit invoking Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC and whether it requires interference by allowing CRP No.295/2016? (3) What order? Point No.1: 10. It is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant is a tenant and the defendant in the written statement denies the same, but he contends that one Muniyamma is the owner of the premises by relying upon the document – Ex.D1. The Trial Court while considering the issue between the parties, whether there exists the jural relationship between the parties mainly considered the document Ex.P6 i.e., the evidence of defendant in S.C.No.15598/2011. In the cross-examination, D.W.1 has categorically admitted that he gave the evidence in the earlier proceedings in terms of Ex.P6. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that earlier there were two proceedings viz., O.S.No.2570/2009 was filed and the same was transferred to the Small Causes Court and the same is numbered as S.C.No.15598/2011 and also no dispute that in the said case, the very same defendant was examined. In his cross-examination, he categorically admitted that the copy of the depositions given in the said case is marked as Ex.P6. Now, this Court has to consider the document – Ex.P6 i.e., the evidence of defendant by way of affidavit. This Court would like to extract the very first para of the affidavit, which reads as follows:- “That I am a tenant in the suit schedule property for the last more than 60 years, residing there along with my family. Earlier my father was a tenant and after his death I have continued the tenancy in the suit schedule property and now I am paying a monthly rental of Rs.300/-per month and have paid up to date rents and I undertake that if any arrears of rent is pending legally I am willing to pay the same.” 11. Earlier my father was a tenant and after his death I have continued the tenancy in the suit schedule property and now I am paying a monthly rental of Rs.300/-per month and have paid up to date rents and I undertake that if any arrears of rent is pending legally I am willing to pay the same.” 11. In the earlier proceedings, the very defendant admitted that he is a tenant of the suit schedule property for more than 60 years and residing along with his family and his father was a tenant and after his death he continued the tenancy in respect of the suit schedule property and now he is paying a monthly rent of Rs.300/-per month and also claims that he was paid up to date rents and also undertakes that if any arrears of rent is pending legally he is willing to pay the same. When this admission was given in the earlier proceedings, now the defendant cannot blow hot and cold that he is not a tenant and owner and only he contend that he is paying the amount towards pooja and not as rent. Earlier admission is contrary to his own pleadings. He cannot take inconsistent stand in the earlier proceedings and in the present suit. The Trial Court also while answering point No.1, came to the conclusion that once he admits that he was a tenant, he cannot turn back and say that he was not a tenant. 12. The Trial Court had taken note of the material available on record in paragraph No.15, discussed the contentions of the plaintiff and also the defendant and having taken note of the sworn affidavit filed by the defendant came to the conclusion that he is the tenant of the suit schedule premises, wherein, clearly admitted that his father has taken the suit schedule premises on lease basis and after the death of his father he has been paying rent to the plaintiff. Even he categorically admitted that during the year 2002, he had agreed to pay rent at the rate of Rs.1,700/-per month. Having taken note of these materials, the Trial Court came to the conclusion that the defense cannot be accepted. Even he categorically admitted that during the year 2002, he had agreed to pay rent at the rate of Rs.1,700/-per month. Having taken note of these materials, the Trial Court came to the conclusion that the defense cannot be accepted. So also, in paragraph No.17 also discussed the evidence of the defendant and he claims that one Muniyamma wife of Appannavar has executed the Trust Deed in favour of her daughter by name Akkayya dated 29.02.1928 and also taken note of the other material and discussed both the contentions and also earlier notice, he has categorically admitted that for the past 10 years, the plaintiff has been demanding for payment of higher rents and thereby he had been refusing to receive the rents as and when tendered and also he categorically admits that he has deposited the rents in the Court in the earlier proceedings and also taken note of the deposit made in S.C.No.15598/2011, rightly came to the conclusion that there exists jural relationship between the parties. I do not find any error committed by the Trial Court in answering point No.1 as affirmative that there exists the jural relationship between the parties. Hence, I answer point No.1 as ‘negative’. The said finding does not require any interference by allowing CRP No.19/2017 filed by the defendant. Point No.2: 13. Now, the question before this Court is whether the suit is barred under Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC. No doubt, earlier, there were proceedings between the parties and no dispute that Misc.Petition was also allowed. It is important to note that the defendant himself has produced the document – Ex.D3 i.e., an order passed by the Trial Court in allowing Misc.No.15012/2013 and the same was allowed only on the ground of technicality, the same is discussed in paragraph No.16 of the order. The Trial Court came to the conclusion that Ex.P4 – Copy of the Board Meeting Resolution and assigned the reasons as the plaintiff has no authority to represent the Ramula Sannidhi to file the present suit. But also the Trial Court came to the conclusion that now this Court has observed that the Ex.P4 is given only for Bank transactions. The Trial Court came to the conclusion that Ex.P4 – Copy of the Board Meeting Resolution and assigned the reasons as the plaintiff has no authority to represent the Ramula Sannidhi to file the present suit. But also the Trial Court came to the conclusion that now this Court has observed that the Ex.P4 is given only for Bank transactions. So, now definitely, in view of the above cited provisions of law and also in view of the ratio laid down in the judgment which has been referred that there was no any resolution only on the ground that Ex.P4 was given for Bank transaction not for filing any suit and no authority was given. The Misc.Petition was allowed and set aside the decree passed earlier in favour of the plaintiff on 15.10.2014. But the Trial Court in the suit erroneously proceeded to pass an order that Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC is applicable. Admittedly, the earlier suit is also filed by causing notice against the defendant and based on the said cause of action, the earlier suit was filed and the notice was issued in the year 2009 and thereafter the suit was filed. The earlier review order is only based on Ex.P4 was issued for Bank transaction and not for initiation of case. Hence, set aside the order. The Trial Court failed to consider the material on record and erroneously proceeded that under Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC is applicable. 14. This Court would like to extract Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC, which reads as follows: “(2) Relinquishment of part of claim.-Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished.” 15. Having read the proviso of Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC, it is very clear that if the plaintiff omits to sue in respect of any claim i.e., intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. But the Trial Court failed to take note of the very proviso and misapplied Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC in dismissing the suit. Admittedly, the earlier suit is also filed for an ejectment. But the Trial Court failed to take note of the very proviso and misapplied Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC in dismissing the suit. Admittedly, the earlier suit is also filed for an ejectment. Though the suit was registered as O.S., subsequently, the same was transferred to Small Causes Court and the same was renumbered and the relief is also sought for quit and vacate the premises and the same is based on the cause of action arisen on account of issuance of termination of tenancy. When the Trial Court came to the conclusion by allowing the misc. petition that no authority was given to initiate the proceedings and on technicality set aside the earlier order. A fresh legal notice was issued in terms of Ex.P2. The reply was also given in terms of Ex.P5. When the plaintiff has issued the notice calling upon him to quit, vacate and deliver the vacant possession of the property by causing legal notice dated 22.01.2015 as earlier decree was set aside only on the ground of technicality that no authorization in terms of Ex.P4 to initiate the case, which was marked in the earlier proceedings. New cause of action was arisen to the plaintiff by causing legal notice dated 22.01.2015 and the present suit is also filed based on the fresh cause of action as contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff and proceeded to seek the relief of quit and vacate, the same has not been considered by the Trial Court. The Trial Court has misapplied Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC and not stated anything in the order how Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC is applicable and nothing was waived while filing the earlier suit. 16. The discussion made in the order while answering point No.2 is that not sought any leave of the Court to file a suit on the same cause of action and no need to seek any leave of the Court and the earlier suit was not withdrawn and an order has been set aside by coming to the conclusion that Ex.P4 does not confer any authority to file the case. The Trial Court also erroneously applied the principle reported in Coffee Board’s case (supra), which was relied upon by the learned counsel for the defendant before the Trial Court and the same is relied before this Court also. The Trial Court also erroneously applied the principle reported in Coffee Board’s case (supra), which was relied upon by the learned counsel for the defendant before the Trial Court and the same is relied before this Court also. No doubt, in the said Judgment, the Apex Court held that whether the suit is barred by Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC, must examine the cause of action pleaded by the plaintiff in his plaint filed in the relevant suits and the plaint has to be read as a whole and the cause of action has to be identified. But the Trial Court has committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff has not approached this Court by filing any revision after dismissal of the earlier suit and there was no need to approach this Court also since the judgment and decree was set aside only on the ground that there was no authorization and the authorization was given only for the bank transaction and not for initiation of case. Hence, issued fresh notice and based on the fresh cause of action, the suit was filed. The Trial Court has committed an error in coming to the conclusion that Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC is applicable and nothing on record to show that the plaintiff has claimed only a portion of the relief and relinquished his right and there is no any waiver of the claim by the plaintiff and the suit is filed based on fresh cause of action. The very approach of the Trial Court is erroneous and also committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff has not produced any lease agreement and also not mentioned, whether it is written or oral agreement. When the Court itself has given the finding that there exists jural relationship between the parties, committed an error in dismissing the suit by giving the said reasons. The other observation is that the plaintiff has not produced any lease agreement and the said finding is contrary to answering point No.1 and while applying Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC, the Trial Court misapplied Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC. Hence, it requires interference. Hence, I answer point No.2 as ‘affirmative’. The finding of the Trial Court is set aside on point No.2. 17. Hence, it requires interference. Hence, I answer point No.2 as ‘affirmative’. The finding of the Trial Court is set aside on point No.2. 17. Now, the question before this Court is with regard to whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief as sought. The Trial Court has committed an error in answering point No.3, in coming to the conclusion that the suit is barred under Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC in spite of dispute with regard to the jural relationship between the parties, as this Court and the Trial Court clearly held that there exists jural relationship. It is important to note that while seeking the relief of quit and vacate the premises, notice was issued in terms of Ex.P2 and the same is also served and an untenable reply was given in terms of Ex.P5. 18. It is also important to note that in the petition specifically pleaded that the tenancy was terminated by issuing the notice dated 22.01.2015, the same was served and the reply was given. When the notice was issued in terms of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, terminating the tenancy, the plaintiff is entitled for the relief and only the Court has to look into whether the termination of tenancy is in order. No dispute with regard to the notice was issued and the tenancy was terminated and the reply was also given in terms of Ex.P5. But the tenant has taken the false defense in the subsequent suit that Trust cannot maintain the eviction petition. Once he has admitted that he was a tenant under the plaintiff, he cannot raise such questions and the scope of tenant is very limited and he cannot even challenge the title once he admits that he is a tenant. 19. The other contention is that in terms of Section 5 of the Trust Act, not mentioned anything in the Trust Deed, which is marked as Ex.D1, as regards to the schedule is concerned. 19. The other contention is that in terms of Section 5 of the Trust Act, not mentioned anything in the Trust Deed, which is marked as Ex.D1, as regards to the schedule is concerned. The learned counsel for the plaintiff also brought to the notice of this Court that the document of Trust Deed, which is marked as Ex.D1 in clause 10, it is stated with regard to vesting of assets: All properties, assets, effects, funds of the Trust shall vest with the Trust Sri Ramula Sannidhi perpetually and irrevocably for the due fulfillment and effectuation of the objects of the Trust and also with regard to the Management, which is stated in clause 11. The powers and privileges of the Trustees is mentioned in clause 19 of the Trust Deed and to institute, prosecute and defend and compromise in terms of clause (j) of clause 19, where the powers and privileges of the Trustees are given. In clause No.25, it is mentioned that the Trust shall sue and be sued in the name of Sri Ramulu Sannidhi by Yajaman Dharmakartha and Dharmakartha jointly. When such powers are given in the Trust Deed and the same is also in respect of the plaintiff, now the defendant cannot contend that no schedule is mentioned. Ex.D1 has to be read together. The said contention of the defendant also cannot be accepted. The parties are one and the same both in the earlier suit and the present suit. 20. Having perused both oral and documentary evidence available on record and also considering the pleadings of the plaintiff in the suit and also based on the fresh cause of action, when the suit is filed and the prayer is also with regard to quit and deliver the vacant possession of the property and directing the defendant for a Decree for future mesne profits by awarding damages at the rate of Rs.10,000/-per month. Admittedly, the rate of rent is paid is Rs.300/-per month but in the earlier proceedings itself, the defendant had admitted that the rate of rent was enhanced and he has agreed to pay the rate of rent of Rs.1,700/-per month and the same has been discussed in paragraph No.16 and he had admitted that during the year 2002, he had agreed to pay the rent Rs.1,700/-per month and the same is found in the evidence of the defendant in S.C.No.15598/2011. When there is an admission that in 2002, he had agreed to pay the rent of Rs.1,700/-per month as enhancement and the suit is filed in the year 2015, it is appropriate to direct the defendant to pay damages of Rs.5,000/- per month as he continued in an authorized occupation after the termination of tenancy and from the date of termination of tenancy he is liable to pay damages at the rate of Rs.5,000/- per month. Point No.3: 21. In view of the discussions made above, I pass the following: ORDER (i) CRP No.295/2016, filed by the plaintiff, is hereby allowed. (ii) The impugned order dated 16.07.2016 passed in S.C.No.15167/2015 on the file of XV Addl. Judge, Court of Small Causes, Mayo Hall Unit, Bengaluru (SCCH-19), is hereby set aside. Consequently, the suit is decreed. (iii) The defendant is directed to quit and vacate and deliver the vacant possession of the premises within three months and directed to pay damages of Rs.5,000/- per month from January 2015 i.e., from the date of termination of tenancy till vacating the premises. (iv) CRP No.19/2017, filed by the defendant, is hereby rejected. (v) The Registry is directed to transmit the TCR, forthwith.