ORDER 1. By the instant petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is asking for following relief:- “(i) That, the Hon’ble Court may kindly quash the FIR dated 13.4.2022 and also quash the resulting charge sheet no.264 of 2022, dated 20.5.2022 pending in the court of Xth Add. Sessions Judge, Bhopal. (ii) That, the Hon’ble Court may kindly quash all the proceedings taken up in S.T. No.527/2022 on the file of Xth Add. Sessions Judge, Bhopal. (iii) Any other relief/reliefs, order/orders, direction/directions which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper may kindly be granted to the petitioner.” 2. The facts in compendium leading to filing of this petition are as follows:- (2.1) A complaint was filed by the complainant/respondent No.2 at Police Station Bagsevaniya, District Bhopal, in pursuance to which, the offence got registered on 13.4.2022 vide FIR/Crime No.263/2022 for the offence punishable under sections 376(2)(n) and 506 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner. (2.2) The complainant met with the petitioner first time in the year 2015 at Global Hospital, Arera Colony, where the petitioner was running a pharmacy store and the complainant used to visit the hospital as her family friend was getting treatment in the said hospital. The complainant used to purchase medicines from the shop of the petitioner and as such, they came closer and thereafter, their relationship converted into affair. The petitioner used to visit the house of the complainant and physical relation developed between them. (2.3) As per the complainant, the petitioner assured her to get married and because of that assurance, she has not objected to continue with the said physical relationship, but when assurance given by the petitioner could not be completed for long, the family members of the complainant got her married with some other boy, despite that the petitioner used to come to the house of the complainant and insisting her to get divorce from her husband and then he would marry to her. (2.4) In the year 2019, the petitioner entered into marriage with some other girl and in the meantime, he had developed relation with the husband of the complainant and continued with physical relation to the complainant. (2.5) In the year 2020, the husband of the complainant was sent to jail as convicted in one of the criminal cases, but relationship between the petitioner and the complainant was continued. (2.5) In the year 2020, the husband of the complainant was sent to jail as convicted in one of the criminal cases, but relationship between the petitioner and the complainant was continued. According to the complainant, the petitioner was continuously asking her to get divorce from her husband and last in April, 2022, the petitioner has developed physical relation and when the complainant asked him to get married to her, he threatened her and also shown photographs saying if she would follow him, the photographs would be shown to her husband. (2.6) Thereafter, she narrated the story to her parents and they visited the house of the petitioner to make them understand to ask their son not to behave in such a manner and stop relationship with the complainant. A written complaint was made by the complainant at Police Station Bagsevaniya and as such, the offence got registered. (2.7) The petitioner had also purchased a house situated over Khasra No.143 and 144, Krishna Enclave, Hoshangabad Road, Bhopal. A saledeed was executed in the name of petitioner by one Paramjeet Singh and in the said house, the complainant started living as a tenant. The complainant and her husband were involved in one criminal case, in which, the husband of the complainant was convicted. The petitioner thereafter asked the complainant to vacate his house, but it was refused by the complainant/respondent No.2 and she also threatened the petitioner saying that if she is asked to vacate the house, he would be implicated in such offence. (2.8) A civil suit i.e. RCSA No.573/23 has also been filed by the complainant against the petitioner at Civil Court, Bhopal, for permanent injunction and also seeking direction that the petitioner be directed not to disturb the possession of the complainant/respondent No.2 and that after clearing the installment of the loan, which had been taken for purchasing the said house, the same would be transferred in the name of the complainant. (2.9) The complainant has also filed a complaint case i.e. UNCRC No.2183/23 under section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhopal, for registering an offence against the petitioner under sections 420 and 406 of Indian Penal Code saying that the petitioner fraudulently got registered a sale-deed in his name of the house situated at Krishna Enclave where she is residing. 3. 3. As per the facts and circumstances as existing in the present case, the petitioner has filed this petition for quashing of criminal proceeding initiated against him in pursuance to FIR/Crime No.263/2022 and also for quashing of charge-sheet No.264/22 filed on 20.5.2022 before the Court of Xth Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the challenge is based mainly on the ground that it is nothing, but a malicious prosecution and even considering the contents of FIR, which are the foundation of registering the FIR, sufficient ingredients for constituting the offence of section 376 are not available and as such, offence is not made out. He has further submitted that, in fact, it is a case of honey trap. The complainant trapped the petitioner just to grab his property. A civil suit has also been filed by the complainant/respondent No.2 asking relief therein that the petitioner be directed to transfer the house, in which, she is residing as a tenant by executing a sale-deed in her favour. He has submitted that in the ends of justice, the proceeding pending against the petitioner is required to be quashed. He has submitted that in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or exercising the inherent power provided under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., the Court can quash the proceedings if it is found that the alleged story of rape is false and if proceedings are allowed to continue, that would be nothing but an abuse of process of Court. To bolster his submission, the counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2017) 13 SCC 369 parties being Vineet Kumar and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another. 5. Per contra, the counsel appearing for the State has opposed the submission made by the counsel for the petitioner and submitted that developing physical relation on a false promise of marriage amounts to committing rape and as such, nothing illegal has been doneregistering the offence against the petitioner. He has also submitted that the FIR is not an encyclopedia and everything in detail is not shown in the FIR. According to the counsel for the State, from the contents of written complaint, the offence of section 376 is made out and as such, the petition being without any substance, is liable to be dismissed. He has also submitted that the FIR is not an encyclopedia and everything in detail is not shown in the FIR. According to the counsel for the State, from the contents of written complaint, the offence of section 376 is made out and as such, the petition being without any substance, is liable to be dismissed. 6. The counsel for the objector has supported the submission made by the counsel for the State and also prayed for dismissal of the petition. 7. Considering the submissions made by the counsel for the parties and after perusal of record, it is clear that the offence vide FIR/Crime No.263/22 got registered on 13.4.2022. The date of incident, as per the FIR, is 5.8.2015 and 16.12.2021. The contents of FIR are as under:- “12. 7. Considering the submissions made by the counsel for the parties and after perusal of record, it is clear that the offence vide FIR/Crime No.263/22 got registered on 13.4.2022. The date of incident, as per the FIR, is 5.8.2015 and 16.12.2021. The contents of FIR are as under:- “12. First Information contents ¼çFke lwpuk rF;½ eSa Fkkuk v'k¨dk xkMZu esa mfu d¢ in ij inLFk gw¡ vkt fnukad 13-4-22 d¨ Fkkuk ckxlsofu;k esa efgyk lacaèkh fji¨VZ g¨us ls Fkkuk vken vkà vkosfndk xqatu p©dls iq=h lqjsUæ p©dls fuoklh vkB nqdku¨a d¢ ikl IykV uacj 160 ckxeqxkfy;k Ò¨iky us ,d gLr fyf[kr vkosnu i= fu'kkar tSu }kjk ekufld o 'kkjhfjd :i ls çrkfM+r djus ckor is'k fd;k vkosnu i= d¢ voy¨du ij ls vkj¨ih fu'kkar tSu d¢ fo#) çFke n`"V;k vijkèk èkkjk 376¼2½ ,u- 506 Òknfo dk ik;k tkus ls vijkèk iathc) dj foospuk esa fy;k uoy vkosnu gLo tsy gSA çfr Fkkuk çHkkjh egksn; Fkkuk ckxlsofu;k Hkksiky ¼e-ç-½ fo"k; fu'kkr tSu nkjk ekufld ok 'kkjhfjd çrkfM+r djus okyk eg¨n; esjk uke xqatu p©dls iq=h lqjsUæ p©dls fuoklh vkB nqdku d¢ ikl IykV uacj 160 ckxeqxkfy;k Ò¨iky gSA eg¨n; yxÒx 2015 esa esjk ifjp; fu'kkar tSu iq= jktsUæ dqekj tSu ls Xy¨cy vLirky vjsjk dky¨uh esa gqvk Fkk ogk¡ mldk esMhdy LV¨j Fkk ogk¡ mlus eq>s n¨Lrh djus d¨ dgk v©j èkhjs&èkhjs esjs Äj ij vkus tkus yxkA ,d lky esjs Äj ij vkrstkrs tjkus eq>s v©j esjs Äjoky¨a esa fo'okl esa j[kdj vPNh n¨Lrh j[kh ,d fnu tc esjs Äj ij d¨Ã ugÈ Fkk og Äj vk;k esjs lkFk tcjnLrh 'kkjhfjd lacaèk cuk;k v©j eSaus tc esjs Äj oky¨a d¨ crkus dk c¨yk r¨ pqi jgus dk c¨yk v©j fo'okl fnyk;k fd 'kknh Òh djsxk ysfdu n¨ rhu lky tc Vkyrk jgk r¨ esjs Äj oky¨a us esjh 'kknh dgÈ v©j dj nh ysfdu fu'kkar tSu viuh gjdr¨a ls ckt ugÈ vk;k v©j eq>s yxkrkj vkt rd iqu% lacaèk cukus d¢ fy, ijs'kku djrk jgkA eg¨n; esjs Äj oky¨a us mld¢ Äj tkdj mld¨ o mld¢ Äj oky¨a d¨ le>k;k r¨ mUg¨asus Òh fu'kkar tSu dk i{k ysdj esjs Äj oky¨a d¨ xkyh xy©p dh v©j dgk fd eSa rqEgsa >wBs vijkèk esa Qalk dj tsy fÒtok nw¡xkA eg¨n; esjs Äj esa esjh ek¡ gkVZ is'ksaV gS v©j esjh N¨Vh cgu gS t¨ vÒh ,y,ch dh i<+kà dj jgh gSA ge lÒh Mjs o ijs'kku gSaA Ñik fu'kkar tSu iq= jktsUæ dqekj tSu fuoklh à 7@12 ,lvkj vkÃth cSad dky¨uh vjsjk dky¨uh Ò¨iky e¨- ua- ¼9893898043½ d¢ f[kykQ l[r dkuwuh dk;Zokgh djd¢ eq> efgyk d¨ U;k; fnyk,aA èkU;okn çkFkÊ gLrk{kj vaxzsth esa viBuh; xqatu p©dls iq=h lqjsUæ p©dls mez 28 lky fuoklh IykV ua- 160 ckxeqxkfy;k Ò¨iky e¨- ua- 8643089108 Ò¨iky fnukad 13-4-2022^^ 8. The written complaint, which is the foundation of FIR, made by the complainant contained following:- ^^çfr] Fkkuk çÒkjh eg¨n; Fkkuk ckxlsofu;k Ò¨iky ¼e-ç-½ fo"k; & fu'kkar tSu }kjk ekufld o 'kkjhfjd çrkfM+r djus ckor~A eg¨n;] esjk uke xqatu p©dls iq=h lqjsUæ p©dls fuoklh vkB nqdku d¢ ikl IykV uacj 160 ckxeqxkfy;k Ò¨iky gSA eg¨n; yxÒx 2015 esa esjk ifjp; fu'kkar tSu iq= jktsUæ dqekj tSu ls Xy¨cy vLirky vjsjk dky¨uh esa gqvk Fkk og mldk esMhdy LV¨j Fkk ogk¡ mlus eq>s n¨Lrh djus d¨ dgk v©j èkhjs èkhjs esjs Äj ij vkus tkus yxkA ,d lky esjs Äj ij vkrstkrs mlus eq>s v©j esjs Äj oky¨a d¨ fo'okl esa j[kdj vPNh n¨Lrh j[kh ,d fnu tc esjs Äj ij d¨Ã ugÈ Fkk og Äj vk;k esjs lkFk tcjnLrh 'kkjhfjd lacaèk cuk;k v©j eSaus tc esjs Äj oky¨a d¨ crkus dk c¨yk r¨ pqi jgus dk c¨yk v©j fo'okl fnyk;k fd 'kknh Òh djsxk ysfdu n¨ rhu lky tc Vkyrk jgk r¨ esjs Äj oky¨a us esjh 'kknh dgÈ v©j dj nh ysfdu fu'kkar tSu viuh gjdr¨a ls ckt ugÈ vk;k v©j eq>s yxkrkj vkt rd iqu% lacaèk cukus d¢ fy, ijs'kku djrk jgk gSA eg¨n; esjs Äj oky¨a us mld¢ Äj tkdj mld¨ o mld¢ Äj oky¨a d¨ le>k;k r¨ mUg¨aus Òh fu'kkar tSu dk i{k ysdj esjs Äj oky¨a d¨ xkyh xy©p dh v©j dgk fd rqEgsa >wBs vijkèk esa Qalk dj tsy fÒtok nw¡xkA eg¨n; esjss Äj esa esjh ek¡ gkVZ is'ksaV gSa v©j esjh N¨Vh cgu gSa t¨ vÒh ,y,ch dh i<+kà dj jgh gS ge lÒh Mjs o ijs'kku gSaA Ñi;k fu'kkar tSu iq= jktsUæ dqekj tSu fuoklh à 7@12 ,lvkj vkÃth cSad o dky¨uh vjsjk dky¨uh Ò¨iky e¨- ua- ¼9893898043½ d¢ f[kykQ l[r dkuwuh dk;Zokgh djd¢ eq> efgyk d¨ U;k; fnyk,aA èkU;oknA çkFkÊ gLrk{kj xqatu p©dls iq=h lqjsUæ p©dls mez 28 fuoklh IykV uacj 160 ckx eqxkfy;k Ò¨iky e¨- ua- & 8643089108 Ò¨iky fnukad 13-4-2012 9. A copy of statement of the complainant/respondent No.2 recorded in the Court has also been produced before the Court, in which the relevant paragraphs are as follows:- ^^03& o"kZ 2019 esa vkj¨ih us Òh Lo;a fdlh v©j yM+dh ls 'kknh dj yhA esjs ls vkj¨ih ;g Òh c¨yrk jgk fd vius ifr ls c¨yuk fd eSa rqEgkjk csLV Ýs.M gw¡ v©j vkj¨ih us esjs ifr ls Òh n¨Lrh dj yhA o"kZ 2020 esa ,d >wBs çdj.k esa esjs ifr d¨ tsy g¨ x;hA vkj¨ih rc Òh esjs Äj vkrk&tkrk jgk v©j eq>ls dgus yxk fd rqe vius ifr ls rykd ys y¨] eSa viuh iRuh ls rykd ys yw¡xkA o"kZ 2021 esa Òh vkj¨ih eq>ls 'kkjhfjd lacaèk cukus d¢ fy, dgrk jgk] ysfdu eSaus dgk vc t¨ dqN Òh g¨xk] 'kknh d¢ ckn g¨xkA 04& fQj vçSy 2022 esa vkj¨ih us esjs lkFk tcjnLrh xyr dke ¼cykRdkj½ fd;k fQj dgk fd vkj¨ih us esjs lkFk xyr dke djus ls igys eq>s dkj esa fcBk dj voèkiqjh lkbM ys x;k Fkk] ogk¡ ij eSaaus vkj¨ih ls dgk fd rqeus esjs lkFk fQj xyr dke dj fy;k] r¨ vkj¨ih us eq>ls dgk fd lqu esjh ckr eSa rq>ls 'kknh ugÈ d:¡xk v©j T;knk ukVd djsxh] r¨ esjs ikl rsjs Q¨V¨&ohfM¨ gSa] eSa rsjs ifr d¨ fn[kk nw¡xk] r¨ u rqe ifr dh jg¨xh v©j u gh fdlh v©j dh jg¨xh] v©j eq>s voèkiqjh esa N¨M+dj pyk x;k] tc eSa vkWV¨ ls Äj x;h] rc eSaus viuh eEeh ,oa cgu d¨ lkjh ckr crkÃA 10& ;g dguk xyr gS fd esjs çdj.k d¢ t¨ foospd gSa] mUgsa eSa igys ls tkurh gw¡A ;g dguk xyr gS fd eSaus latho p©dls ls feydj Fkkuk ckx lsofu;k esa fji¨VZ ntZ djkà gS] tcfd eSa felj¨n Fkkus d¢ {ks= esa jgrh gw¡A esjk vkj¨ih fu'kkar tSu ls o"kZ 2008&09 ls ifjp; Fkk] tcfd esjh n¨Lrh vkj¨ih ls o"kZ 2015 esa gqà FkhA ;g dguk lgh gS fd eSaus vius çn'kZ ih&1 d¢ vkosnu esa vkj¨ih fu'kkar tSu ls viuk ifjp; o"kZ 2015 esa g¨uk crk;k gSA 11& lk{kh d¨ Q¨V¨ fn[kkdj iwNk x;k fd vkj¨ih fu'kkar tSu d¢ Òkà d¢ o"kZ 2011 d¢ fookg d¢ Q¨V¨ esa vki fn[k jgh gSa] r¨ lk{kh us Lohdkj fd;k fd fu'kkar tSu d¢ Òkà d¢ fookg d¢ le; d¢ gSaA lk{kh us ;g Òh Lohdkj fd;k fd mä Q¨V¨ esa yky x¨ys ls n'kkZ;h x;h Q¨V¨ mld¢ gh gSaA mä Q¨V¨ çn'kZ vkfVZdy ,&1 yxk;r vkfVZdy ,&5 gSaA 13& ;g dguk lgh gS fd eSaus çn'kZ ih&6 èkkjk 164 na-ç-la- d¢ dFku nsrs le; ;g crk;k Fkk fd esjk vkj¨ih ls vafre ckj fnlacj 2021 esa 'kkjhfjd lacaèk cus FksA ;g lgh gS fd eSaus iqfyl d¨ çn'kZ ih&1 dk vkosnu] çn'kZ ih&2 dh ,Q-vkÃ-vkj- ,oa èkkjk 164 d¢ eftLVªsV dFku çn'kZ ih&6 rFkk iqfyl dFku çn'kZ ih&7 esa ;g crk;k Fkk fd vkj¨ih ls vçSy 2022 esa 'kkjhfjd lacaèk cus Fks] ;fn mä ckr çn'kZ ih&1 dk vkosnu] çn'kZ ih&2 dh ,Q-vkÃ-vkj- ,oa èkkjk&164 d¢ eftLVªsV dFku çn'kZ ih&6 rFkk iqfyl dFku çn'kZ&ih&7 esa u fy[kh g¨ r¨ eSa dkj.k ugÈ crk ldrhA 15& esjk vius ifr ls rykd ugÈ gqvk gSA ;g dguk xyr gS fd eSa orZeku esa ftl edku esa jg jgh gw¡] og edku vkj¨ih fu'kkar tSu dk gS v©j mä edku dh jftLVªh fu'kkar tSu d¢ uke ls gS] ftldh Nk;kçfr çn'kZ Mh&1 gS] ;g dguk lgh gS fd eSa ftl edku esa fuokl dj jgh gw¡] ml edku dk irk& edku ua- 143&144] T;¨fr uxj] d¢Uæh; Ldwy Ø-&3] g¨'kaxkckn j¨M] Ò¨iky gSA ;g dguk lgh gS fd mä edku vkj¨ih fu'kkar tSu d¢ uke ls gS] Lor% dgk mä edku esa eSa o"kZ 2017 ls jg jgh gw¡ rFkk fiNys 2 lky ls y¨u d¢ fy, ç;kl fd;k] fdarq esjk y¨u u g¨us d¢ dkj.k eSaus vkj¨ih fu'kkar tSu d¢ uke ls y¨u djk;k] mä edku dh jftLVªh 2019 esa gqÃ] ftlesa 10 yk[k #i, dk Vª~katsD'ku vkj-Vh-th-,l- d¢ ekè;e ls fd;k x;k rFkk fd'rsa esjs }kjk Lo;a d¢ d¨Vd efgUæk cSad d¢ ,dkmaV ls vnk dh tk jgh gSa v©j esjs }kjk vkj¨ih d¨ uxn yxÒx 8 ls 10 yk[k #i, Lo;a tkdj fn, gSaA ;g dguk xyr gS fd mä jkf'k esjs }kjk vnk ugÈ dh x;h gSA^^ 10. The complaint filed by the complainant/respondent No.2 under section 200 was registered vide Case No.UNCR 2183/23, in which she claimed relief that offence under sections 420 and 406 be registered against the petitioner. The complaint is dated 29.4.2023. 11. A civil suit i.e. RCSA 573/23 has also been filed by the complainant/respondent No.2, in which, she has claimed decree in the following manner:- ^^d- ;g fd çfroknh Øekad 1 d¨ vknsf'kr fd;k tk, fd og oknuh d¢ vckèk dCts esa gLr{ksi u djsa v©j u gh fdlh v©j ls djk, v©j u gh mä oknxzLr lEifÙk d¨ fdlh vU; d¨ foØ; vkfn djsA ;g fd çfroknh Øekad 1 d¨ vknsf'kr fd;k tk, fd mä oknxzLr lEifÙk dh lEiw.kZ fd'r¨a d¢ Òqxrku g¨ tkus d¢ i'pkr~ mä oknxzLr lEifÙk oknuh d¢ uke gLrkarfjr dj nsosaA [k- ;g fd çfroknh Øekad 1 d¨ vknsf'kr fd;k tkos fd mä oknxzLr lEifÙk dh lEiw.kZ fd'r¨a d¢ Òqxrku g¨ tkus d¢ i'pkr~ mä oknxzLr lEifÙk oknuh d¢ uke gLrkarfjr dj nsosaA x- ;g fd çfroknh Øekad 1 d¨ funsZf'kr djsa fd mä oknxzLr lEifÙk dh y¨u dh fd'rsa çfroknh Øekad 1 vius cSad [kkrs esa gh oknuh ls çkIr djsaA Ä- ;g fd çfroknh Øekad 1 oknuh dk laiw.kZ okn O;; ogu djsaA ;g fd çfroknh Øekad 1 d¨ vknsf'kr fd;k tk, fd oknuh }kjk nh xà lEiw.kZ jkf'k ,d eq'r e; dCtk d¢ oknuh d¨ okil djsaA M+- ;g fd çfroknh Øekad 1 d¨ vknsf'kr fd;k tk, fd oknuh }kjk nh xà lEiw.kZ jkf'k ,d eq'r e; dCtk d¢ oknuh d¨ okil djsaA p- oknh d¨ vU; vuqr¨"k t¨ çdj.k d¢ rF;¨a ls vuqj¨èk g¨ og oknh d¨ U;k;fgr esa çnku fd;k tkosA^^ 12. Considering the aforesaid circumstances and in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Vineet Kumar (supra), in which the petitioner has placed reliance, I am also of the opinion that the case in hand is a clear case of malicious prosecution and if the proceedings are allowed to continue, it would amount to an abuse of process of law. The Supreme Court while dealing with the case of quashing of FIR under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has observed as under:- “19. The Supreme Court while dealing with the case of quashing of FIR under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has observed as under:- “19. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that criminal proceedings initiated by the complainant in the facts of the present case were mala fide and falsely initiated to save the complainant, her husband and son from making repayment of the amount taken by them with regard to which complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by the accused were already filed and pending. After registration of case on application filed by the complainant under section 156(3) CrPC, the IO conducted thorough investigation by recording the statements of the complainant, her husband as well as husband's brother and brother's wife. Various affidavits were also received by the IO and after conducting investigation there were sufficient materials to come to the conclusion that a story of alleged rape was wholly false and no such incident had taken place as alleged by the complainant. He has submitted a final report in the case which ought to have been accepted by the learned Magistrate. It is contended that protest petition has been allowed without adverting to the material collected by the IO. The fact that the application under section 156(3) CrPC itself was filed after 8 days of alleged rape, there is no medical report to prove the alleged rape, these were sufficient to discard the allegations made by the complainant. Summoning of the accused of such serious offence cannot be a mechanical exercise in the facts and circumstances of the case and materials collected during investigation which were part of the final report were required to be adverted to by the Court while rejecting the final report. The learned counsel submits that the prosecution in the present case is a clear abuse of the process of the court and deserves to be set aside in exercise of jurisdiction under section 482 CrPC by the High Court. 23. This Court time and again has examined the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under section 482 CrPC and laid down several principles which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under section 482 CrPC. 23. This Court time and again has examined the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under section 482 CrPC and laid down several principles which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under section 482 CrPC. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404] held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. In para 7 of the judgment, the following has been stated: (SCC p. 703) “7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.” 28. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.” 28. In Sunder Babu v. State of T.N. (2009) 14 SCC 244 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1349] , this Court was considering the challenge to the order of the Madras High Court where application was under section 482 CrPC to quash criminal proceedings under section 498-A IPC and section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. It was contended before this Court that the complaint filed was nothing but an abuse of the process of law and allegations were unfounded. The prosecuting agency contested the petition filed under section 482 CrPC taking the stand that a bare perusal of the complaint discloses commission of alleged offences and, therefore, it is not a case which needed to be allowed. The High Court accepted the case of the prosecution and dismissed the application. This Court referred to the judgment in Bhajan Lal case [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] and held that the case fell within Category 7. The apex Court relying on Category 7 has held that the application under section 482 deserved to be allowed and it quashed the proceedings. 30. From the material on records, the following facts are disclosed from the sequence of events which preceded the registration of FIR on 6.11.2015. The complainant, her husband and son had taken different amounts totalling Rs 22 lakhs 50 thousand in the month of May 2015 for business/shop purposes from the accused. Three agreements were written on non-judicial stamp papers on 29.5.2015, 1.6.2015 and 31.8.2015 wherein the complainant, her husband and son have acknowledged receipt of the money in cash as well as by cheque. Cheques of Rs 6 lakhs, Rs 14 lakhs 50 thousand were given to the accused for ensuring the repayment. Cheques were drawn on Prathama Bank, Kanth Branch, District Moradabad. Cheques were deposited in the bank which were returned with endorsements “No Sufficient Balance”. Cheques of Rs 6 lakhs, Rs 14 lakhs 50 thousand were given to the accused for ensuring the repayment. Cheques were drawn on Prathama Bank, Kanth Branch, District Moradabad. Cheques were deposited in the bank which were returned with endorsements “No Sufficient Balance”. After cheques having been dishonoured, complaints under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act were filed by the accused against the husband and son of the complainant which were registered in the month of September/October and were pending before alleged incident dated 22.10.2015. 38. There was sufficient material on record to indicate that there were financial transactions between the accused and the complainant, her husband and son. On dishonour of cheques issued by the complainant's husband and son, proceedings under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act were already initiated by the accused. All family members of the complainant were living in the same house. The brother of the complainant's husband and his wife, in their statements before the IO have admitted monetary transactions of his brother with the accused. The statements before the IO of both Nikesh Kumar and Smt Bina Vishnoi have already been extracted above, which were part of the case diary and was material which ought to have been looked into which was submitted by the IO in the final report. 40.4. Thus, the above was the case where despite statement under section 164 CrPC by the prosecutrix the Court referring to material collected during investigation had held that the case was fit where the High Court ought to have quashed the criminal proceedings.” 13. Considering the aforesaid, this Court has no hesitation to quash the proceedings when Court comes to the conclusion that a person is being harassed by implicating him in a case of false promise of marriage because for the complainant/prosecutrix, it is very easy to say when a male comes in her connection and relationship developed between them and that culminated into physical relation only because he has promised to get married to her. 14. In the present case, as per the existing facts, promise was made by the petitioner as per the statement of the complainant/respondent No.2 and he failed to fulfill that promise, both the complainant and the petitioner got married to somewhere else, but a complaint was made by the complainant. Even after marriage, both were in physical relationship. 14. In the present case, as per the existing facts, promise was made by the petitioner as per the statement of the complainant/respondent No.2 and he failed to fulfill that promise, both the complainant and the petitioner got married to somewhere else, but a complaint was made by the complainant. Even after marriage, both were in physical relationship. The complainant was already married, despite that she was accepting the assurance of marriage from the petitioner and was continued with him in physical relationship. As narrated by the complainant, she came into contact with the petitioner only in the year 2015, whereas as per the statement and material produced, they were knowing each other much prior to year 2015. In a suit filed by the complainant, she has not only claimed permanent injunction, but also claimed decree that the petitioner be directed to clear the installments and execute the sale-deed of the house in the name of complainant, it shows that the complainant was after the property of the petitioner. The background of the complainant is also not clean. She was facing a criminal case of fraud in which her husband is convicted. 15. The Supreme Court in number of cases has observed that on the basis of promise of marriage if prosecutrix remained in relationship with the same person for long and not raising any objection, the same would not amount to commission of rape. The Supreme Court in a case reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 89 [Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi)], has observed as under:- “20. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of law and the case fell under the Clause - Secondly of section 375 IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise by the accused. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfill his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under section 376. As stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts before the Court.” 16. Further, in case of Dr. Dhruvram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra and others reported in (2019) 18 SCC 191 , the Supreme Court has observed as under:- “23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very carefully examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a distinction between mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made the promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not amount to rape. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused and not solely on account of the misconception created by accused, or where an accused, on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated differently. If the complainant had any mala fide intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape. Such cases must be treated differently. If the complainant had any mala fide intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence under section 376 IPC.” 17. Thus, I am of the opinion that under the existing facts and circumstances of case, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the abovecited cases, such prosecution which is apparently malicious, cannot permitted to be continued. As such, the FIR registered vide Crime No.263/2022 is quashed. The proceedings of sessions trial initiated in pursuance to the charge sheet No.264/22 are also quashed. 18. With the aforesaid observations, this petition is allowed. No order as to cost.