JUDGMENT : Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. This writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs: “(A) Issuance of a writ of, or in the nature of, a certiorari for quashing the order dated 27.03.2009 (annexure-11) passed by Shri Mahesh Prasad Sinha, learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi in Reference Case No. 8 of 2005 whereby the enquiry held into the charges against the respondent workman culminating in finding of guilt and leading to termination of service of the respondent has been held to be invalid. (B) Issuance of an appropriate writ of, or in the nature of, a certiorari for setting aside the award dated 29th July, 2009 (Annexure-15) pronounced on 01.10.2009 in Reference Case no. 8 of 2005 by Shri Mahesh Prasad Sinha, the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi by holding that the termination of respondent workman was without any proper enquiry and was thus a nullity and directing reinstatement of the workman respondent in service with 50% back wages. (C) Any other relief or reliefs to which the petitioner may be found to be entitled in law, be also granted for doing conscionable justice to the petitioner.” Arguments of the petitioner. 3. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the present writ petition the order passed by the Labour Court declaring the domestic enquiry as invalid, as well as, the final award, are under challenge. The learned Senior counsel has submitted that merely because the charge-sheet was not formally drawn, the same by itself cannot be a ground to vitiate the departmental enquiry. 4. The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgement passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 1957 (1) LLJ 226 (Burn & Co. Ltd. Vs. Their Employees) (para 4) and also the judgement reported in AIR 1973 SC 1227 (Para 30, 32 and 33). 5. The learned Senior counsel further submits that another point involved in the present case is that immediately after the domestic enquiry was held to be invalid, the petitioner, within a couple of days, had filed an application seeking leave to adduce evidence, but the same was declined by referring to the judgement passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Shambhu Nath Goyal Vs. Bank of Baroda and Others” reported in (1983) 4 SCC 491 . Bank of Baroda and Others” reported in (1983) 4 SCC 491 . The learned Senior counsel has submitted that in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal, the facts and circumstances were totally different. The same was decided prior to coming into force of Section 11-A in the Industrial Disputes Act. He has also submitted that there was considerable delay in exercising power by the management of the said case to seek permission to adduce evidence and the ratio of the said judgement is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. He has submitted that the bonafide of the petitioner is apparent from the fact that the moment the domestic enquiry was held to be invalid, immediate steps were taken to file an application which was arbitrarily rejected by the learned court below causing great prejudice to the petitioner. 6. The learned Senior counsel submits that in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, if the domestic enquiry is held to be valid, then under such circumstances, the matter is to be remanded for consideration by the learned court below in accordance with law. He submits that even if the domestic enquiry is held to be invalid, then opportunity be given to the petitioner to adduce evidence in support of the action taken by the petitioner against the respondent –workman. 7. The learned counsel has relied upon the judgements passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (1999) 1 SCC 517 (Neeta Kaplish Presiding Officer, Labour Court and Another) (para 18); (1979) 3 SCC 371 (Shankar Chakravarti Vs. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd. and Another) (para 27 and 28) and (2018) 4 SCC 483 (Kurukshetra University Vs. Prithvi Singh) (para 18 to 20). Arguments of the Respondent workman. 8. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent- workman has advanced his argument and has submitted that the case of the respondent is squarely covered by the judgement passed in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal (Supra) which was subject matter of Constitution Bench judgement reported in (2001) 5 SCC 433 [Karnataka State Road Transport Corpn. Vs. Lakshmidevamma (Smt) and Another] and the view expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal has been upheld. Vs. Lakshmidevamma (Smt) and Another] and the view expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal has been upheld. The learned counsel submits that the stage at which the petitioner should have sought permission to adduce evidence in case the domestic enquiry is held to be invalid, is at the time of filing of the written statement itself. He submits that the petitioner admittedly did not make any averment in the written statement that they seek leave to adduce evidence, therefore, it was not permissible in law for them to file such an application after the domestic enquiry was held to be invalid. The learned counsel submits that the domestic enquiry was rightly held to be invalid; even a charge-sheet was not issued; no enquiry was actually conducted in the eyes of law and therefore, the impugned order holding the domestic enquiry invalid does not call for any interference. 9. Upon being asked by this court, the learned counsel for the workman has also submitted that the workman has already attained the age of superannuation on 31.01.2015. Findings of this court. 10. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of this case, this court finds that following two orders are under challenge: - a. Order dated 27.03.2009 by which the learned Labour Court held that domestic enquiry was invalid. b. The Award dated 29.07.2009 holding that the termination of the respondent workman was without any enquiry and was a nullity directing reinstatement of the workman in service with 50% back wages. 11. The case of the petitioner is that the respondent workman was appointed on 01.12.86 as Photographer and was transferred to Ranchi on 19.07.2001. The respondent workman made a complaint to Editor-in-chief of the Newspaper regarding some wild and reckless allegation against his superior officer i.e. a Resident Editor. Consequently on 25.04.2005, the Chief Personal Manager was directed to enquire into the allegations made by the workman who submitted a report against the workman that the allegation was unfounded. The enquiry report was forwarded to the workman on 01.05.2005 along with covering letter dated 25.04.2005 to which he submitted a reply dated 01.05.2005 and ultimately the workman was terminated from service on 09.05.2005. 12. The enquiry report was forwarded to the workman on 01.05.2005 along with covering letter dated 25.04.2005 to which he submitted a reply dated 01.05.2005 and ultimately the workman was terminated from service on 09.05.2005. 12. It is the case of the petitioner that the workman was terminated after holding an enquiry and merely because no formal charge sheet was issued to the workman, the same does not vitiate the order of termination. It is their case that natural justice was duly complied in as much as the enquiry was conducted and the workman was asked to respond to the enquiry report vide covering letter dated 25.04.2005 to which the workman duly replied by giving his explanation dated 01.05.2005. It is further case of the petitioner that the workman did not choose to challenge the order of termination and accepted his full and final amount by receiving two cheques amounting to Rs. 58,958/- dated 13.09.2005 and cheque for Rs. 1,92,135/- dated 15.09.2005 and in spite of receiving his full and final settlement, the workman raised industrial dispute pursuant to which the case was instituted being Reference Case No. 8 of 2005 challenging the order of termination from service in which the petitioner (management) also filed written statement. 13. The learned Labour Court framed the preliminary issue regarding validity of the domestic enquiry. It is the case of the petitioner that the workman appeared as witness and admitted that he had received the charge sheet, an enquiry has been held, admitted his signature in the enquiry proceedings and the workman subsequently absented himself from the enquiry proceedings. 14. The learned court below vide order dated 27.03.2009 held that the domestic enquiry was invalid as there was no charge sheet and no enquiry. 15. Immediately thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition on 29.04.2009 praying for adducing evidence to justify the action taken against the workman but the learned Labour Court rejected the said petition in liminie vide order dated 03.07.2009. 16. Thereafter the petitioner filed petition for early disposal by fixing the case straightway for argument and submitted their written argument on 10.07.2009 and consequently the impugned award dated 29.07.2009 was passed. 17. 16. Thereafter the petitioner filed petition for early disposal by fixing the case straightway for argument and submitted their written argument on 10.07.2009 and consequently the impugned award dated 29.07.2009 was passed. 17. The case of the workman is that the workman made a complaint against the Resident Editor that the workman was physically assaulted and subjected to intimidation and consequently a preliminary enquiry committee was constituted to check the veracity of the allegation. The workman was noticed by the Authority to depose before the Committee. The workman appeared once but he was intimidated and therefore he refused to participate in the proceedings and sent a mail. The Management issued show cause to the workman on 25.04.2005 asking for his reply as to why he should not be terminated and the show cause accompanied an enquiry report. In the meantime, the workman raised an industrial dispute and District Labour Commissioner, Ranchi initiated conciliation proceedings and notices were issued. The management appeared once but did not choose to appear thereafter and during the pendency of the conciliation proceedings, the workman was terminated from his service. Industrial Dispute was raised and reference was numbered as Ref. Case No. 8 of 2005. The Reference was registered on 10.09.2005 pursuant to Notification issued by the Government of Jharkhand dated 09.09.2005 and the terms of reference was as follows: - “Whether not to joining in service from dated 22.02.2005 and to deprive (dismissal) of Shri Ashok Karan, staff photographer from service from 09.05.2005 is justified? If not, what relief he is entitled to.” 18. After receipt of notification, notices were issued to the workman as well as management to file written statement. Workman as well as the management filed their respective written statement. The management filed an application to hear both the parties on the validity of domestic enquiry. By order dated 8.8.2006, the court allowed the prayer of the management to hear on the point of validity of domestic enquiry. 19. The validity of the domestic enquiry was decided vide impugned order dated 27.03.2009. At the stage of the decision regarding validity of the domestic enquiry, three management witnesses were examined and documents were also exhibited. Further, only one witness was examined on behalf of the workman i.e., the workman himself. He also exhibited a large number of documents. The witnesses were also cross-examined. At the stage of the decision regarding validity of the domestic enquiry, three management witnesses were examined and documents were also exhibited. Further, only one witness was examined on behalf of the workman i.e., the workman himself. He also exhibited a large number of documents. The witnesses were also cross-examined. The learned court below referred to the stand taken by the management in the written statement, wherein a specific statement was made that the enquiry officer was holding an enquiry into the allegation which was levelled by the workman against some of the senior executives and it was not a case where the management had issued any charge sheet alleging misconduct or any domestic enquiry based on the refusal to accept the charge. The purpose of the enquiry was to find out the correctness of the allegation and not of any charge levelled by the management. The learned court below also considered the exhibit of the management M-1, which was issued to the workman after the enquiry. The exhibit M-1 clearly mentioned that the enquiry was with reference to the complaint made by the workman dated 01.10.2004, wherein the workman made allegation of assault and criminal intimidation against the Resident Editor, Hindustan Times, Ranchi and also Bureau Chief, based on the allegation, the Senior Manage-HRD (Bihar and Jharkhand) HT Media Limited was directed to make a preliminary enquiry at Ranchi itself and to submit report. Consequently, the report was submitted and as per the finding, the workman was given reasonable opportunity to prove the allegations made by him which he failed and as per the report, the workman was found guilty on more than one count. It was mentioned in the exhibit M-1 itself that the findings of the enquiry report showed that it was not desirable in the interest of the company and also in the interest of ethics of journalism to retain the workman in service. By virtue of Ext.-M1, the workman was directed to show cause as to why his services be not terminated and he was granted three days’ time to file a reply failing which it would be presumed that he had nothing to say. 20. The entire content of exhibit M-1 has been quoted in the impugned order dated 27.03.2009 by which the domestic enquiry was held to be defective and not valid. 20. The entire content of exhibit M-1 has been quoted in the impugned order dated 27.03.2009 by which the domestic enquiry was held to be defective and not valid. The finding of the impugned order dated 27.03.2009 is quoted as under: - “Considering the deposition of M.W.1 in para 13,deposition of M.W. 2 in para 7 and deposition of M.W.3 in para 9 and 10 as also the plea of the management in para 13 of the written statement filed by the management, and the contents of Ext. M-1 I find that the enquiry vas a preliminary enquiry to know the truth about the allegation made by the concerned workman against his higher officer and after preliminary enquiry no charge sheet was issued against the concerned workman rather a show cause notice vide Ext. M-1 was issued asking the concerned workman as to why he would not be punished by way of termination of his services. I further find that no domestic enquiry has been conducted after issuance of show cause notice as contained in Ext.--1. under the above facts and circumstances of the case I find and hold that only a show cause notice was contained in Ext.M-1; Under the above facts and circumstances of the case I find and hold that only a show cause notice as contained in Ext. M-1 was issued, after issue of said show cause notice which was presumed as charge sheet as stated by the M.W.3 in para 10 no enquiry was made and without any enquiry the concerned workman has been dismissed from service as such the domestic enquiry is defective and not valid.” 21. The first point for consideration is – Whether the learned Labour court was justified in holding that the domestic enquiry is defective and not valid vide impugned order dated 27.03.2009? 22. Before the learned court below evidences were led on the point of the legality and validity of the enquiry and termination of the service of the workman. Learned court below recorded the findings as follows:- “Considering the deposition of M.W.1 in para 13,deposition of M.W. 2 in para 7 and deposition of M.W.3 in para 9 and 10 as also the place of the management in para 13 of the written statement filed by the management, and the contents of Ext. Learned court below recorded the findings as follows:- “Considering the deposition of M.W.1 in para 13,deposition of M.W. 2 in para 7 and deposition of M.W.3 in para 9 and 10 as also the place of the management in para 13 of the written statement filed by the management, and the contents of Ext. M-1 I find that the enquiry vas a preliminary enquiry to know the truth about the allegation made by the concerned workman against his higher officer and after preliminary enquiry no charge sheet was issued against the concerned workman rather a show cause notice vide Ext. M-1 was issued asking the concerned workman as to why he would not be punished by way of termination of his services. I further find that no domestic enquiry has been conducted after issuance of show cause notice as contained in Ext.--1. under the above facts and circumstances of the case I find and hold that only a show cause notice was contained in Ext.M-1; Under the above facts and circumstances of the case I find and hold that only a show cause notice as contained in Ext. M-1 was issued, after issue of said show cause notice which was presumed as charge sheet as stated by the M.W.3 in para 10 no enquiry was made and without any enquiry the concerned workman has been dismissed from service as such the domestic enquiry is defective and not valid.” 23. It is the specific case of the petitioner that domestic enquiry was conducted, a number of witnesses were examined, the workman initially participated in the enquiry and subsequently, did not choose to participate and ultimately, the enquiry report was forwarded to the workman and after giving an opportunity of hearing to the workman, the workman was terminated. It is the argument of the petitioner that even if no formal charge sheet is issued, the domestic enquiry cannot be said to be invalid if proper opportunity is given to the workman to defend his case. For this, the learned course for the petitioner has relied upon the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 1957 (1) LLJ 226 (Burn & Co. Ltd. Vs. Their Employees) (para 4). 24. For this, the learned course for the petitioner has relied upon the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 1957 (1) LLJ 226 (Burn & Co. Ltd. Vs. Their Employees) (para 4). 24. From perusal of para 4 of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Burn vs. Their Employees reported in 1957 (1) LLJ 226 , relied upon by the petitioner, it has been held that even if no charge-sheet was formally drawn against the workman, the same would not vitiate the order of termination if the workman knew that what was the charge against him and had an opportunity of giving his explanation. This Court is of the considered view that the said judgment reported in 1957 (1) LLJ 226 (supra) does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. in the present case, the enquiry conducted by the management was admittedly for the purposes of finding out the correctness of the allegation made by the workman against his superior and it was upon enquiry and as per the enquiry report, the workman was found guilty on the following counts: - 1. Lodging a false, baseless and fabricated complaint against his superiors. 2. Violation of office norms and decorum. 3. Maligning image of organization in the eyes of junior Colleagues by his casual and careless approach and also by entering into verbal, duel with seniors. 4. Polluting the office environment by not attending to his duties/assignments without any sufficient cause. 5. Casual approach towards his job. 6. Not providing worthwhile photographs being the senior most photographer. 7. Disobeying the proper and bonafide instructions of his seniors and RE. Admittedly, no charge sheet was issued to the workman with respect to the aforesaid findings recorded in the enquiry report after conducting an enquiry regarding the correctness of the allegations levelled by the workman against his superiors. 25. Then the workman was granted time to show cause as to why his services be not terminated on the basis of the findings recorded in the enquiry report; the workman duly responded and denied the allegations which was straight away followed by his termination order issued by the management. 26. 25. Then the workman was granted time to show cause as to why his services be not terminated on the basis of the findings recorded in the enquiry report; the workman duly responded and denied the allegations which was straight away followed by his termination order issued by the management. 26. This court finds that admittedly the allegations made against the workman for the first time in the enquiry report arising out of the enquiry done to find out the correctness of the allegations levelled by the workman against his superiors. The workman denied the allegations but no enquiry was conducted to enable the workman to defend himself with regards to such allegations. Thus, the termination of the workman was without any enquiry with regards to the aforesaid allegations and the workman was terminated by the management as has been held by the impugned order dated 27.03.2009 which was the reason to hold that the domestic enquiry was defective and not valid. 27. This court is of the considered view that the enquiry which was conducted by the management was for finding out the veracity or correctness of the allegations levelled by the workman against his higher authority and not for any allegation levelled against the petitioner. This court also finds that the enquiry report not only levelled the allegation that the workman had filed a false complaint against his superiors but was coupled with other allegations dealing with regards to discharge of his duties. In such circumstances it cannot be said that even if no formal charge-sheet was issued to the workman, he was given due opportunity to defend himself. In the aforesaid circumstances, the judgment relied upon by the petitioner reported in 1957 (1) LLJ 226 (supra) does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 28. In view of the aforesaid discussions and findings, this court is of the considered view that the learned court below, by a well-reasoned order dated 27.03.2009, has rightly held that no enquiry was made and the concerned workman has been dismissed from service without any enquiry and as such the domestic enquiry is defective and not valid. 29. This court finds no illegality or perversity in the impugned order dated 27.03.2009. The first point mentioned above is accordingly decided against the petitioner and in favour of the Workman . 30. 29. This court finds no illegality or perversity in the impugned order dated 27.03.2009. The first point mentioned above is accordingly decided against the petitioner and in favour of the Workman . 30. The second point for consideration is – Whether the learned labour court, vide order dated 03.07.2009, was justified in rejecting the petition filed by the petitioner on 29.04.2009 praying for adducing evidence to justify the action taken against the workman, by relying upon the judgement passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal (supra) ? 31. This court finds that neither the order dated 03.07.2009 has been filed in the writ records nor the same has been specifically challenged in the writ petition but arguments have been advanced with regard to legality and validity of order dated 03.07.2009 by both the parties by referring the operative portion of the order dated 03.07.2009 as quoted in para 6 of the impugned final award dated 01.10.2009. 32. The operative portion of the order dated 03.07.2009 indicates that the petition dated 11.04.2009 filed by the management seeking to adduce evidence in support of the action taken by the management against the workman was rejected by referring to the judgement passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal (supra) and by recording that the management should have sought permission to lead fresh evidence on the point of merits in the written statement itself but did not choose to do so and the petition filed by the management was a belated one and not maintainable in the light of the decision rendered in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal (supra). 33. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the judgement passed in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal (supra) was relating to the period prior to introduction of section 11-A in the industrial disputes Act, 1947 and has relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case reported in AIR 1973 SC 1227 (Workman of M/s Firestone, Tyre and Rubber Co. of India vs. Management & Others). of India vs. Management & Others). On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the Constitution bench judgement passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2001) 5 SCC 433 (supra) which has considered and upheld the correctness of the view taken by the Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal (supra). It is also the case of the petitioner that the petitioner had filed the petition dated 11.04.2009 seeking to adduce evidence in support of the action taken by the management against the workman immediately after the domestic enquiry was declared to be defective and not valid vide order dated 27.03.2009 and therefore appropriate steps were taken at the appropriate time and there has been no delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in filing the petition. 34. In the judgment reported in (1973) 1 SCC 813 (Workman of M/s Firestone, Tyre and Rubber Co. of India vs. Management & Others), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the insertion of Section 11-A in Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as inserted in 1971, and has dealt with the power of the Tribunal to interfere with the order of dismissal. It has been held in the said judgment that even where the dismissal of a workman by an employer on ground of misconduct is preceded by a proper and valid domestic enquiry, Section 11-A now empowers the Labour Court or Tribunal to reappraise the evidence and examine the correctness of the finding of the domestic enquiry. Section 11-A further empowers the Tribunal to interfere with the punishment and alter the same. It has also been held that the mere fact that no enquiry or defective enquiry has been held by the employer does not by itself render, the dismissal of workman illegal. The right of the employer to adduce evidence justifying his action for the first time in such a case is not taken away by the proviso to Section 11-A. The Legal position as existing prior to coming into force of Section 11-A and changes effected thereby were duly explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 33 to 41A of the report Workmen v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd., (1973) 1 SCC 813 : “33. of India (P) Ltd., (1973) 1 SCC 813 : “33. The question is whether Section 11-A has made any changes in the legal position mentioned above and if so, to what extent? The Statement of Objects and Reasons cannot be taken into account for the purpose of interpreting the plain words of the section. But it gives an indication as to what the legislature wanted to achieve. At the time of introducing Section 11-A in the Act, the legislature must have been aware of the several principles laid down in the various decisions of this Court referred to above. The object is stated to be that the Tribunal should have power in cases, where necessary, to set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement or award any lesser punishment. The Statement of Objects and Reasons has specifically referred to the limitations on the powers of an Industrial Tribunal, as laid down by this Court in Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. case. 34. This will be a convenient stage to consider the contents of Section 11-A. ……………………… 35. We cannot accept the extreme contentions advanced on behalf of the workmen and the employers. ……………………….. 36. We will first consider cases where an employer has held a proper and valid domestic enquiry before passing the order of punishment. Previously the Tribunal had no power to interfere with its finding of misconduct recorded in the domestic enquiry unless one or other infirmities pointed out by this Court in Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. case existed. The conduct of disciplinary proceedings and the punishment to be imposed were all considered to be a managerial function with which the Tribunal had no power to interfere unless the finding was perverse or the punishment was so harsh as to lead to an inference of victimisation of unfair labour practice. This position, in our view, has now been changed by Section 11-A. The words “in the course of the adjudication proceeding, the Tribunal is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified” clearly indicate that the Tribunal is now clothed with the power to reappraise the evidence in the domestic enquiry and satisfy itself whether the said evidence relied on by an employer establishes the misconduct alleged against a workman. What was originally a plausible conclusion that could be drawn by an employer from the evidence, has now given place to a satisfaction being arrived at by the Tribunal that the finding of misconduct is correct. The limitations imposed on the powers of the Tribunal by the decision in Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. case, can no longer be invoked by an employer. The Tribunal is now at liberty to consider not only whether the finding of misconduct recorded by an employer is correct; but also to differ from the said finding if a proper case is made out. What was once largely in the realm of the satisfaction of the employer, has ceased to be so; and now it is the satisfaction of the Tribunal that finally decides the matter. 37. If there has been no enquiry held by the employer or if the enquiry is held to be defective, it is open to the employer even now to adduce evidence for the first time before the Tribunal justifying the order of discharge or dismissal. We are not inclined to accept the contention on behalf of the workmen that the right of the employer to adduce evidence before the Tribunal for the first time recognised by this Court in its various decisions, has been taken away. There is no indication in the section that the said right has been abrogated. If the intention of the legislature was to do away with such a right, which has been recognised over a long period of years, as will be noticed by the decisions referred to earlier, the section would have been differently worded. Admittedly, there are no express words to that effect, and there is no indication that the section has impliedly changed the law in that respect. Therefore, the position is that even now the employer is entitled to adduce evidence for the first time before the Tribunal even if he had held no enquiry or the enquiry held by him is found to be defective. Of course, an opportunity will have to be given to the workman to lead evidence contra. The stage at which the employer has to ask for such an opportunity, has been pointed out by this Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. case. No doubt, this procedure may be time consuming, elaborate and cumbersome. Of course, an opportunity will have to be given to the workman to lead evidence contra. The stage at which the employer has to ask for such an opportunity, has been pointed out by this Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. case. No doubt, this procedure may be time consuming, elaborate and cumbersome. As pointed out by this Court in the decision just referred to above, it is open to the Tribunal to deal with the validity of the domestic enquiry, if one has been held as a preliminary issue. If its finding on the subject is in favour of the management, then there will be no occasion for additional evidence being cited by the management. But if the finding on this issue is against the management, the Tribunal will have to give the employer an opportunity to cite additional evidence justifying his action. This right in the management to sustain its order by adducing independent evidence before the Tribunal, if no enquiry has been held or if the enquiry is held to be defective, has been given judicial recognition over a long period of years. 38. All parties are agreed that even after Section 11-A, the employer and employee can adduce evidence regarding the legality or validity of the domestic enquiry, if one had been held by an employer. 39. Having held that the right of the employer to adduce evidence continues even under the new section, it is needless to state that, when such evidence is adduced for the first time, it is the Tribunal which has to be satisfied on such evidence about the guilt or otherwise of the workman concerned. The law, as laid down by this Court that under such circumstances, the issue about the merits of impugned order of dismissal or discharge is at large before the Tribunal and that it has to decide for itself whether the misconduct alleged is proved, continues to have full effect. In such a case, as laid down by this Court, the exercise of managerial functions does not arise at all. In such a case, as laid down by this Court, the exercise of managerial functions does not arise at all. 40.Therefore, it will be seen that both in respect of cases where a domestic enquiry has been held as also in cases where the Tribunal considers the matter on the evidence adduced before it for the first time, the satisfaction under Section 11-A, about the guilt or otherwise of the workman concerned, is that of the Tribunal. It has to consider the evidence and come to a conclusion one way or other. Even in cases where an enquiry has been held by an employer and a finding of misconduct arrived at, the Tribunal can now differ from that finding in a proper case and hold that no misconduct is proved. 41. …………………………………Such a power to appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion about the guilt or otherwise was always recognised in a Tribunal when it was deciding a dispute on the basis of evidence adduced before it for the first time. Both categories are now put on a par by Section 11-A. 41-A. Another change that has been effected by Section 11-A is the power conferred on a Tribunal to alter the punishment imposed by an employer. ………………………………………… The power to interfere with the punishment and alter the same has been now conferred on the Tribunal by Section 11-A.” 35. It has been held in the aforesaid judgement that the right of the employer to adduce evidence continues even under the new section 11 A. The aforesaid paras of the judgement clearly reflects that there has been no change with regard to the right of the employer to adduce evidence for the first time before the Tribunal. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the judgement passed in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal (supra) will not apply as because the incident in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal (supra) was relating to the period prior to coming into force of section 11 A is not sustainable and hence rejected as the legal position with regard to adducing evidence before the tribunal for the first time was always available i.e. even prior to coming into force of section 11 A. 36. This court finds that the judgement passed in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal (supra), interalia, deals with the stage when such a prayer can be made by the employer to adduce evidence to justify the action taken against the employee. In fact, the judgement passed in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal (supra) has been approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Constitution bench Judgement relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent reported in (2001) 5 SCC 433 [Karnataka State Road Transport Corpn. Vs. Lakshmidevamma (Smt) and Another], where the correctness of the judgment passed in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal (supra) was directly under consideration and it has been held that the judgement passed in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal (supra) still holds the field. 37. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (1979) 3 SCC 371 (Shankar Chakravarti Vs. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd. and Another) it has been held that the right which the employer has in law to adduce additional evidence in a proceeding before the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal either under Section 10 or Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act questioning the legality of the order of termination must be availed of by the employer by making a proper request at the time when it files its statements of claim or written statement or makes an application seeking either permission to take a certain action or seeking approval of the action taken by it. If such a request is made, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal must give such an opportunity. It has been further held that if the request is made before proceedings are concluded, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal should ordinarily grant the opportunity to adduce evidence. It has also been held that there is no duty cast on the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court while adjudicating the penal termination of service of a workman to call upon the employer to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the charge of misconduct by giving some specific opportunity after deciding on the preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry was at all held, or if held, was defective in favour of the workman. In the said case, on facts, there was neither any pleading by which such claim for adducing additional evidence was made nor any request was made before the Industrial Tribunal till the proceeding was adjourned for making the award and till the award was made. It was raised for the first time in Letters Patent Appeal and it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the High Court erred in allowing it at that stage. So far as the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2018) 4 SCC 483 , is concerned , it has followed the judgment passed in the case of Shankar Chakravarti (supra).In the said case, the Labour Court had committed error in not framing a preliminary issue for deciding the legality of the domestic enquiry and further having found fault in the domestic enquiry committed another error when it did not allow the appellant to lead independent evidence to prove the misconduct/charge on merit and straightaway proceeded to hold that it was a case of illegal retrenchment. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (1999) 1 SCC 517 (Neeta Kaplish) supra, the appellant workman was dismissed from service after domestic enquiry and the Labour Court came to a conclusion that the enquiry conducted by the Management was not fair and proper and therefore called upon the Management to produce its evidence on merits. But the Management informed the Labour Court that it wanted to rely upon the evidence already recorded during enquiry proceedings and therefore it did not want to produce any evidence before the Labour Court. Consequently, the appellant workman too decided not to produce any evidence before the Labour Court and the Labour Court dismissed the workman’s claim. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while setting aside the award of the Labour Court considered the entire circumstances and remanded the matter to Labour Court for taking fresh decision after requiring to parties to lead fresh evidence on merits. 38. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal (supra) wherein the judgement passed in the case reported in (1979) 3 SCC 371 (Shankar Chakravarti Vs. Britannia Biscuit Co. 38. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal (supra) wherein the judgement passed in the case reported in (1979) 3 SCC 371 (Shankar Chakravarti Vs. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd. and Another) was also considered, it was held that where a dispute is referred to Tribunal/Labour Court, the Management must seek opportunity to adduce further evidence, if any, to justify its action in its reply statement itself and not by any belated application. Para 15 and 16 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted as under: -. “15. Regarding the other main question of opportunity being afforded to the management to substantiate the charges before the Tribunal, Mr Damania invited our attention to two decisions of this Court in Workmen v. Motipur Sugar Factory and Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd. to the latter of which one of us was a party. In the first of those decisions, it is observed as follows: “Then we come to the question whether it was open to the tribunal when there was no enquiry whatsoever by the respondent to hold an enquiry itself into the question of go-slow. It was urged on behalf of the appellants that not only there was no enquiry in the present case but there was no charge either. We do not agree that there was no charge by the respondent against the workmen concerned. The first part of the notice of December 15, 1960 which was served on each individual workman was certainly a charge by the respondent telling the workmen concerned that they were guilty of go-slow for the period between November 27 and December 15, 1960. It is true that the notice was not headed as a charge and it did not specify that an enquiry would follow, which is the usual procedure when a formal charge is given. Even so, there can be no doubt that the workmen concerned knew what was the charge against them which was really responsible for their discharge from December 18, 1960. It is now well-settled by a number of decisions of this Court that where an employer has failed to make an enquiry before dismissing or discharging a workman it is open to him to justify the action before the Tribunal by leading all relevant evidence before it. It is now well-settled by a number of decisions of this Court that where an employer has failed to make an enquiry before dismissing or discharging a workman it is open to him to justify the action before the Tribunal by leading all relevant evidence before it. In such a case the employer would not have the benefit which he had in cases where domestic inquiries have been held. The entire matter would be open before the tribunal which will have jurisdiction not only to go into- the limited questions open to a tribunal where domestic inquiry has been properly held (see Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen) but also to satisfy itself on the facts adduced before it by the employer whether the dismissal or discharge was justified.... A defective enquiry in our opinion stands on the same footing as no enquiry and in either case the tribunal would have jurisdiction to go into the facts and the employer would have to satisfy the tribunal that on facts the order of dismissal or discharge was proper.” In the second decision it is observed as follows: [SCC para 28, p. 387: SCC (L&S) p. 295] “Earlier clear-cut pronouncements of the Court in R.K. Jain case and Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. case that this right to adduce additional evidence is a right of the management or the employer and it is to be availed of by a request at appropriate stage and there is no duty in law cast on the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court suo motu to give such an opportunity notwithstanding the fact that none was ever asked for are not even departed from. When we examine the matter on principle we would point out that a quasi-judicial Tribunal is under no such obligation to acquaint parties appearing before it about their rights more so in an adversary system which these quasi-judicial Tribunals have adopted. When we examine the matter on principle we would point out that a quasi-judicial Tribunal is under no such obligation to acquaint parties appearing before it about their rights more so in an adversary system which these quasi-judicial Tribunals have adopted. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the rights which the employer has in law to adduce additional evidence in a proceeding before the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal either under Section 10 or Section 33 of the Act questioning the legality of the order terminating service must be availed of by the employer by making a proper request at the time when it files its statement of claim or written statement or makes an application seeking either permission to take a certain action or seeking approval of the action taken by it. If such a request is made in the statement of claim, application or written statement, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal must give such an opportunity. If the request is made before the proceedings are concluded the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal should ordinarily grant the opportunity to adduce evidence. But if no such request is made at any stage of the proceedings, there is no duty in law on the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal to give such an opportunity and if there is no such obligatory duty in law failure to give any such opportunity cannot and would not vitiate the proceedings.” 16. We think that the application of the management to seek the permission of the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal for availing the right to adduce further evidence to substantiate the charge or charges framed against the workman referred to in the above passage is the application which may be filed by the management during the pendency of its application made before the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal seeking its permission under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to take a certain action or grant approval of the action taken by it. The management is made aware of the workman’s contention regarding the defect in the domestic enquiry by the written statement of defence filed by him in the application filed by the management under Section 33 of the Act. The management is made aware of the workman’s contention regarding the defect in the domestic enquiry by the written statement of defence filed by him in the application filed by the management under Section 33 of the Act. Then, if the management chooses to exercise its right it must make up its mind at the earliest stage and file the application for that purpose without any unreasonable delay. But when the question arises in a reference under Section 10 of the Act after the workman had been punished pursuant to a finding of guilt recorded against him in the domestic enquiry there is no question of the management filing any application for permission to lead further evidence in support of the charge or charges framed against the workman, for the defect in the domestic enquiry is pointed out by the workman in his written claim statement filed in the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal after the reference had been received and the management has the opportunity to look into that statement before it files its written statement of defence in the enquiry before the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal and could make the request for the opportunity in the written statement itself. If it does not choose to do so at that stage it cannot be allowed to do it at any later stage of the proceedings by filing any application for the purpose which may result in delay which may lead to wrecking the morale of the workman and compel him to surrender which he may not otherwise do.” (emphasis supplied) 39. The correctness of the law laid down in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal (supra) was subject matter of consideration in Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court (5J) reported in (2001) 5 SCC 433 (supra) and the view taken in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal has been affirmed by the majority of the judges. Para 8, 16 to 20 of the said judgment are quoted as under: - “8. Before we proceed to examine this question any further, it will be useful to bear in mind that the right of a management to lead evidence before the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal in justification of its decision under consideration by such tribunal or court is not a statutory right. Before we proceed to examine this question any further, it will be useful to bear in mind that the right of a management to lead evidence before the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal in justification of its decision under consideration by such tribunal or court is not a statutory right. This is actually a procedure laid down by this Court to avoid delay and multiplicity of proceedings in the disposal of disputes between the management and the workman. The genesis of this procedure can be traced by noticing the following observations of this Court in Workmen v. Motipur Sugar Factory (P) Ltd.: (SCR pp. 597 G-H and 598 A)……………………………………………………. 16. While considering the decision in Shambhu Nath Goyal case we should bear in mind that the judgment of Varadarajan, J. therein does not refer to the case of Cooper Engg. However, the concurring judgment of D.A. Desai, J. specifically considers this case. By the judgment in Goyal case the management was given the right to adduce evidence to justify its domestic enquiry only if it had reserved its right to do so in the application made by it under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or in the objection that the management had to file to the reference made under Section 10 of the Act, meaning thereby that the management had to exercise its right of leading fresh evidence at the first available opportunity and not at any time thereafter during the proceedings before the Tribunal/Labour Court. 17. Keeping in mind the object of providing an opportunity to the management to adduce evidence before the Tribunal/Labour Court, we are of the opinion that the directions issued by this Court in Shambhu Nath Goyal case1 need not be varied, being just and fair. There can be no complaint from the management side for this procedure because this opportunity of leading evidence is being sought by the management only as an alternative plea and not as an admission of illegality in its domestic enquiry. At the same time, it is also of advantage to the workmen inasmuch as they will be put to notice of the fact that the management is likely to adduce fresh evidence, hence, they can keep their rebuttal or other evidence ready. At the same time, it is also of advantage to the workmen inasmuch as they will be put to notice of the fact that the management is likely to adduce fresh evidence, hence, they can keep their rebuttal or other evidence ready. This procedure also eliminates the likely delay in permitting the management to make belated application whereby the proceedings before the Labour Court/Tribunal could get prolonged. In our opinion, the procedure laid down in Shambhu Nath Goyal case is just and fair. 18. There is one other reason why we should accept the procedure laid down by this Court in Shambhu Nath Goyal case. It is to be noted that this judgment was delivered on 27-9-1983. It has taken note of almost all the earlier judgments of this Court and has laid down the procedure for exercising the right of leading evidence by the management which we have held is neither oppressive nor contrary to the object and scheme of the Act. This judgment having held the field for nearly 18 years, in our opinion, the doctrine of stare decisis requires us to approve the said judgment to see that a long-standing decision is not unsettled without a strong cause. 19. For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that the law laid down by this Court in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda1 is the correct law on the point. 20. In the present case, the appellant employer did not seek permission to lead evidence until after the Labour Court had held that its domestic enquiry was vitiated. Applying the afore stated principles to these facts, we are of the opinion that the High Court has rightly dismissed the writ petition of the appellant, hence, this appeal has to fail. The same is dismissed with costs. The concurring view of the two Hon’ble Judges is as under with the aforesaid view, is as under: - “43. After going through the draft judgment prepared by N. Santosh Hedge, J., we respectfully agreed with the same. Having gone through the draft judgment prepared by Y. K. Sabharwal, J., received later, we felt the necessity of adding the following few lines. 44. After going through the draft judgment prepared by N. Santosh Hedge, J., we respectfully agreed with the same. Having gone through the draft judgment prepared by Y. K. Sabharwal, J., received later, we felt the necessity of adding the following few lines. 44. The question as to at what stage the management should seek leave of the Labour Court/Tribunal to lead evidence/additional evidence justifying its action is considered in the draft judgment of Hedge, J., and not the power of the court/tribunal requiring or directing the parties to produce evidence if deemed fit in a given case having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case. As per Section 11(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short “the Act”) a court/tribunal can follow the procedure which it thinks fit in the circumstances of the case subject to the provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder and in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Under Section 11(3), the Labour Court/Tribunal and other authorities mentioned therein have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit in respect of certain matters which include enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath and compelling the production of documents and materials objects.” 40. Thus, the law is well settled by virtue of the Constitution Bench judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court (5J) reported in (2001) 5 SCC 433 (supra) that the management has to exercise its right of leading fresh evidence at the first available opportunity and not at any time thereafter during the proceedings before the Tribunal/Labour Court. 41. However, at the same time, it is certainly to be seen in the present case as to whether the action of the Management seeking opportunity to adduce additional evidence to justify its action against the workman was in accordance with the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court (5J) reported in (2001) 5 SCC 433 (supra). 42. In the present case, the Management has exercised its option for the first time only after the domestic enquiry was held to be invalid and it is also the case of the management that the management had exercised its right to adduce additional evidence to justify the action against the workman by filing a petition at the earliest possible opportunity. 43. 43. As already observed above, the petitioner has not annexed a copy of the order dated 06.06.2009, whereby the petition of the Management to allow the management to lead evidence on the merits of the case was rejected nor the management has brought the application dated 11.04.2009, which was an application to allow the management to lead evidence nor the said order dated 06.06.2009 has been specifically challenged in this writ petition. However, the parties have advanced elaborate arguments on the point. The operative portion of the order of rejection of petition dated 11.04.2009 vide order dated 06.06.2009 has been quoted in paragraph 6 of the impugned award as under: - “considering the above facts & circumstances and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sambhu Nath Goyal’s case, I am of the view that the management should have sought permission to lead fresh evidence on the point of merit in the written statement itself but the management did not choose to do so and petition filed by the management to seek permission to adduce fresh evidence is belated one and not maintainable in the light of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sambhu Nath Goyal’s Case as discussed above. In the result, I find no merit in the petition dated 11.4.09 filed on behalf of the management. Accordingly, the petition dated 11.4.2009 is rejected.” 44. This court finds that as per order dated 06.06.2009, Since the management did not seek permission to lead fresh evidence on the point of merit in the written statement itself therefore in the light of the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sambhu Nath Goyal Case reported in 1983 L.I.C. 1697 (S.C) the prayer of the management to adduce afresh evidence has been rejected on 06.06.09. 45. This court is of the considered view that the present case is to be guided by the constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court (5J) reported in (2001) 5 SCC 433 (supra) as referred to above wherein the point was directly is issue as to when the prayer for adducing fresh evidence can be said to be a belated application and in the said judgment, the earlier view of the Supreme Court reported in Shambhu Nath Goyal (1983) 4 SCC 491 has been upheld. In the said Constitution Bench judgment, the appellant employer did not seek permission to lead evidence until the Labour Court had held that its domestic enquiry was vitiated. The Hon’ble Supreme Court applied the principle of Shambhu Nath Goyal held that the High Court had rightly dismissed the writ petition of the appellant. It has been clearly held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Constitution Bench judgment (supra) in order to avoid unnecessary delay and multiplicity of proceedings, the management has to seek leave of the Court/ Tribunal in the written statement itself to lead additional evidence to support its action in the alternative and without prejudice to its right and contentions. 46. In the present case, the learned court below had relied upon the judgment passed in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal and had rejected the petition of the Management seeking leave to adduce fresh evidence in support of the action taken against the workman by holding that no such plea was taken in the written statement. This Court has gone through the written statement filed by the workman which was filed prior to written statement of the management and the workman had taken specific plea in the written statement that there has been no charge-sheet and no enquiry in connection with the allegations levelled against the workman. The written statement of the workman was filed as back as in the year 2006 ; the written statement of the management was filed in the year 2006 and the rejoinder to the written statement of management was also filed by the workman in the year 2006 itself, but no steps were taken by the management to amendment of the written statement or to take an alternative plea seeking leave to lead additional evidence before the labour court to justify the action taken against the workman till the year 2009. The application seeking leave to lead additional evidence was filed much belatedly and only in the year 2009 when the domestic enquiry was held to be improper. 47. Thus, the argument of the petitioner that the management took steps to lead additional evidence to justify its action against the workman at the earliest possible opportunity is not correct. The application seeking leave to lead additional evidence was filed much belatedly and only in the year 2009 when the domestic enquiry was held to be improper. 47. Thus, the argument of the petitioner that the management took steps to lead additional evidence to justify its action against the workman at the earliest possible opportunity is not correct. The petitioner failed to take the plea in the written statement filed as back as in the year 2006 which was the earliest opportunity to take an alternative plea to lead additional/fresh evidence to justify the action of the management against the workman. The facts in the present case is similar to that of the facts of the case decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid Constitution Bench judgement reported in (2001) 5 SCC 433 (supra) which has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the workman. Moreover, the present case is squarely covered by the ratio of the Constitution Bench judgement in reported in (2001) 5 SCC 433 (supra) and is binding upon this court which has upheld the view taken in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal (supra). Further considering the limited scope of interference in the award passed by the learned court below under writ jurisdiction, there being no illegality or perversity in the order passed by the learned court below in rejecting the petitioner’s application to adduce fresh evidence, no interference is called for to the said order. It is over and above the fact that the order by which the petition for filing additional evidence was rejected has not been specifically challenged by the petitioner before this court. 48. As a cumulative of the aforesaid findings, this court is of the considered view that vide order dated 03.07.2009, the learned labour court, was justified in rejecting the petition filed by the petitioner on 29.04.2009 praying for adducing evidence to justify the action taken against the workman, by relying upon the judgement passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal (supra). 49. Accordingly, the second point is also decided against the petitioner and in favour of the workman. The third point. Whether the final award suffers from any illegality or perversity? 50. 49. Accordingly, the second point is also decided against the petitioner and in favour of the workman. The third point. Whether the final award suffers from any illegality or perversity? 50. The findings of the learned court below in the final award are as follows: - “As per para 13 of written statement fired on behalf of the management no chargesheet was issued against the concerned workman no domestic enquiry was held to establish the charge against the concerned workman and as per statement of M.W.1 in para l3, M.W.-2 in para 7, M.W-3 in para 9 and 10 the alleged enquiry was to find out the truth about the allegation levelled by concerned workman against higher officials of the management and without issuing any chargesheet of misconduct against the concerned workman a show cause notice vide Ext. M-1 was issued against the concerned workman to show cause as why he should not be terminated and ultimately concerned workman was not allowed to work and removed from service which is unfair, arbitrary, illegal and against the principles of natural justice as such I find and hold that the management neither issued charge sheet against the concerned workman nor held any domestic enquiry nor proved the charge of any misconduct against the concerned workman. I, therefore, find and hold that not allowing the concerned workman to join in service from 22.2.05 and to dismiss him from service w.e.f. 9.5.05 without issuing any charge-sheet against him is unjustified and not sustainable in law and concerned workman is entitled to be reinstated with 50% back wages as because in para 84 of written statement, concerned workman has clearly stated that he is not gainfully employed. This statement has not been denied by the management. Accordingly, the reference is awarded in favour of the concerned workman.” 51. This court has gone through the final award which gives the entire background of the case and the domestic enquiry having been held invalid and further that there has been no enquiry against the workman in connection with the allegations which was levelled against the workman for the first time in the enquiry report which the workman denied by filing reply to the show cause. Therefore, the order to reinstate the workman was fully justified which does not call for any interference in writ jurisdiction. 52. Therefore, the order to reinstate the workman was fully justified which does not call for any interference in writ jurisdiction. 52. So far as the award of back wages is concerned, it was specifically pleaded by the workman before the learned court below that he was unemployed after his termination to which the management had simply stated that the workman being a professional photographer must have been engaged, but neither any proof nor any specification was given with regard to the employment of the workman. This statement of the management was also denied by the workman by filing reply to the written statement of the management. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances this court finds that there is nothing on record that the workman was gainfully employed during his period of termination from service. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the award of 50% back wages also does not call for any interference by this court. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any illegality or perversity in the final award. 53. This court finds no illegality or perversity in the impugned Award. The third point is also decided against the petitioner and in favour of the workman . 54. It is important to note that the workman has already attained the age of superannuation during the pendency of the present case and therefore the workman would only be entitled for monetary benefit arising out of the impugned award. 55. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid findings, the impugned orders do not call for any interference by this court. This writ petition is accordingly dismissed. 56. Interim order, if any, is vacated. 57. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is closed.