JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. The instant appeal, under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against judgment/order dated 11.11.2020 passed in W.P. (L) No. 5412 of 2019 by learned Single Judge whereby and whereunder order dated 22.08.2019 passed by learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur in B.S. Case No. 2 of 2013 has been refused to be interfered with, by dismissing the writ petition, holding that the award passed by the Labour Court suffers from no infirmity. 2. The brief facts of the case, as per pleadings made in the writ petition, read as under: The case of the petitioner – Management is that the respondent – employee was appointed to the post of Assistant Vice President, who joined the services of Petitioner-Management on 28.07.2008 at its Jamshedpur office. After satisfactory completion of probation period, the services of the employee-respondent was confirmed vide letter dated 09.02.2009. The concerned employee-respondent was thereafter transferred to Dhanbad vide Personnel Transfer Letter dated 23.02.2009 where he joined on 25.02.2009 and started taking necessary initiatives for opening of the proposed new City Centre Branch at Dhanbad. However, while posted at Dhanbad, the concerned employee-respondent was taken into judicial custody on 07.03.2009 by the Gujarat Police and was taken to Valsad in connection with Vapi GIDC P.S. Case No. 18 of 2009 for the offence under Sections 406, 420, 465, 467, 471, 474, 484, 485, 114, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. In view of detailed enquiry pending against the concerned employee-respondent for the act of alleged misconduct done by him during his previous employment for which he was taken into custody, order of suspension dated 29.04.2009 was passed by the Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner-Bank and the concerned employee-respondent was duly informed that during the period of his suspension, his headquarter shall be at Dhanbad. The order of suspension was duly received by his father-in-law. The concerned employee-respondent was also granted liberty to file appeal within 15 days, but he chose not to file the same and as such the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority attained finality. Thereafter, the petitioner-Management, vide its letter dated 24.11.2009 (acknowledged on 01.12.2009), intimated the employee-respondent (through Sub-Jailer, Sub Jail, Valsad, Gujarat to provide necessary explanation within 7 days of receipt of the letter as to why Bank should not discharge him from the services in terms of Clause 11.1(6) of the Staff Rules. Thereafter, the petitioner-Management, vide its letter dated 24.11.2009 (acknowledged on 01.12.2009), intimated the employee-respondent (through Sub-Jailer, Sub Jail, Valsad, Gujarat to provide necessary explanation within 7 days of receipt of the letter as to why Bank should not discharge him from the services in terms of Clause 11.1(6) of the Staff Rules. The employee-respondent sent his explanation on 07.12.2009 requesting therein for 45 days’ time for submitting proper explanation after receiving the FSL report over his disputed signature giving rise to attribution of criminal liability under various Sections of the Indian Penal Code. Again vide letter dated 12.01.2010, the employee-respondent informed the petitioner-Management that he is still awaiting the report of the FSL to prove his innocence. However, despite substantial time granted to him, the employee-respondent could not furnish the detailed explanation and he continued to remain in jail. Due to continuous judicial custody, the employee-respondent remained absent for long time and as such, he was discharged from service in terms of the Discharge Order issued vide letter dated 07.12.2010. However, in terms of the said Order, despite the fact that services of the employee-respondent was not available to the petitioner-Management/Bank, he was paid 75% of the salary as subsistence allowance. After the bail being granted by Hon’ble Supreme Court, the employee-respondent was released from the judicial custody on 29.04.2011, Thereafter, he sent email to the HR Team of the Management-Bank along with letter dated 28.05.2011 seeking reinstatement in service, which was duly responded by the petitioner-Management vide email dated 29.05.2011 replying therein that the petitioner-Management has acted as per the applicable Staff Rules and discharged him after providing ample opportunity. It was categorically stated that the request for reinstatement in service cannot be considered by the petitioner-Management. Being aggrieved with the action of the petitioner-management, the employee-respondent filed a Complaint Case before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court at Jamshedpur under the provisions of Section 26 of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953 challenging the Discharge Order issued by the petitioner-Management. Thereafter, notices were issued to the petitioner-Management directing them to appear and file written statement. The petitioner-Management appeared and filed their written statement stating therein that the said Complaint filed by the employee-respondent was barred by Limitation of 706 days and as such the same could not have been entertained without any plausible explanation. Thereafter, notices were issued to the petitioner-Management directing them to appear and file written statement. The petitioner-Management appeared and filed their written statement stating therein that the said Complaint filed by the employee-respondent was barred by Limitation of 706 days and as such the same could not have been entertained without any plausible explanation. It has further been pleaded that the concerned Labour Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as the last posting of the concerned employee-respondent was Dhanbad and not Jamshedpur. However, vide Order dated 22.08.2019, the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur held that action of the petitioner in discharging the concerned employee-respondent from service on the ground of long absence without permission and information and without sufficient cause, to be not valid and further has been pleased to direct the Petitioner-Management to reinstate him in service with continuity in service with 25% back wages. Aggrieved thereof, the petitioner-bank has approached this Court by filing writ petition being W.P. (L) No. 5412 of 2019, which was disposed of vide order 11th November, 2020, which is the subject matter of instant intra-court appeal. 3. The fact, as referred hereinabove, is based upon the pleading made in the paper-book, is that the respondent who happens to be the employee of the appellant-bank, namely, Axis Bank was proceeded departmentally in which he was dismissed from service. The respondent-employee preferred a complaint under Section 26 (2) of the Jharkhand Shops and Establishment Act, 1953, as adopted by the State of Jharkhand (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act, 1953). The learned Labour Court has called upon the appellant-Bank and on consideration of the reply award dated 22.08.2019 was passed holding the dismissal of the respondent-employee to be unjustified and directed for re-instatement in service with 25 % back wages. The petitioner-bank aggrieved with the said order approached this Court by filing W.P. (L) No. 5412 of 2019 raising the issue of jurisdiction apart from merit. The jurisdictional issue of the Labour Court has been questioned on the ground that the day when the occurrence took place i.e., on 07.12.2010, the Labour Court was having no jurisdiction in view of notification dated 14th November, 2002 issued in exercise of power conferred under Section 4(2) of the Act, 1953. The jurisdictional issue of the Labour Court has been questioned on the ground that the day when the occurrence took place i.e., on 07.12.2010, the Labour Court was having no jurisdiction in view of notification dated 14th November, 2002 issued in exercise of power conferred under Section 4(2) of the Act, 1953. The learned Single Judge has proceeded and refused to interfere with the award by taking into consideration the scope of judicial review in the matter of award which is to be exercised by the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and dismissed the writ petition, against which, the present appeal has been preferred. 4. Mr. Ashok Kumar Yadav, learned counsel for the appellant-bank has submitted by referring to the impugned order as also the pleading as has been made in the memo of appeal that the issue of jurisdiction was agitated before the learned Single Judge but the same has not been considered rather in one line the aforesaid issue of jurisdiction has been discarded, as would be evident from paragraph 10(i) of the impugned order. It has been contended that the question of jurisdiction since goes to the root of the forum who is to exercise the power regarding the lis pending for its adjudication which is to be seen on the basis of date of occurrence, herein, the date of occurrence is the date of issuance of order of dismissal, i.e., 07.12.2010 and admittedly on 07.12.2010, the Labour Court was having no jurisdiction in view of schedule (I) of Section 4(2) of the Act, 1953 but the aforesaid issue has not been appreciated by the learned Single Judge, therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from illegality and hence not sustainable in the eye of law. 5. While on the other hand, Mr. Amitabh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-employee has submitted that the issue of jurisdiction was never been raised before the Labour Court and for the first time it was raised before the writ Court and as such questioning the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge on the ground of issue of jurisdiction cannot be said to be proper since the issue of jurisdiction ought to have been raised for its consideration by the Labour Court. It has been submitted that it is also incorrect on the part of the writ petitioner-bank that the Labour Court was having no jurisdiction rather the Labour Court has decided the issue which is well within its jurisdiction in view of the fact that the day when the Labour Court was approached i.e., sometimes in the year 2013, by virtue of notification dated 13.07.2011 issued under Section 4(2) of the Act, 1953, which was in supersession to the earlier notification dated 14.11.2002 the Labour Court was having jurisdiction to decide the lis and accordingly if the lis was adjudicated the same cannot be said to suffer from any lack of jurisdiction in adjudicating the issue. The argument has also been advanced that the learned Single Judge has considered the order passed by the Labour Court on the basis of appreciation of the fact i.e., on merit and by taking aid of judicial pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court regarding the scope of judicial review for showing interference with the fact finding recorded by the Labour Court and hence the point which was not before the Labour Court is now being made as emphasis to show that the impropriety of the order passed by the Labour Court is not fit to be entertained. Learned counsel on the aforesaid premise has submitted that order impugned may not be interfered with. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 7. The fact, which is not in dispute, is that the issue of dismissal fell for consideration before the Labour Court, who was to exercise power under Section 26(2) of the Act, 1953. It is evident from Section 26(2) of the Act, 1953 that any order of discharge/dismissal or termination is to be filed before the Labour Court and is to be entertained if filed within the period of 90 days. It further appears from perusal of Section 26(4) of the Act, 1953 that the prescribed authority has been conferred with the power to condone the delay in filing such a complaint if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not making application within the prescribed period of time. It further appears from perusal of Section 26(4) of the Act, 1953 that the prescribed authority has been conferred with the power to condone the delay in filing such a complaint if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not making application within the prescribed period of time. For ready reference, Section 26(2) and 26(4) of the Act, 1953 is quoted as under : (2) Every employee, dismissed or discharged or whose employment is otherwise terminated, may make a complaint in writing in the prescribed manner, to a prescribed authority within 90 days of the receipt of the order of dismissal or discharge or termination of employment on the one or more of the following grounds, namely : — (i) there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his services; or (ii) no notice was served on him as required by sub-section (1); or (iii) he has not been guilty of any misconduct as held by the employer ; or (iv) no compensation as prescribed in sub-section (1) was paid to him before dispensing with his service.] (4) The prescribed authority may condone delay in filing such a complaint if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed time. The writ petitioner although was dismissed from service on 07.12.2010 but the prescribed authority who happens to be Labour Court was approached after lapse of about three years, however, with the strength of separate application filed under Section 26(4) for condonation of delay. Delay was condoned and the matter was decided on merit in favour of respondent-workman. It is also admitted that the fact about jurisdiction was not raised before the prescribed authority and, therefore, there was no occasion for the prescribed authority to deal with the aforesaid issue and accordingly the issue on merit was dealt with and the award was passed in favour of respondent. However, the writ petitioner-bank being aggrieved with the said Award preferred writ petition being W.P. (L) No. 5412 of 2019 assailed the award of reinstatement dated 22.08.2019. In the writ petition, apart from raising the issue on merit, the issue of jurisdiction was also made a ground to interfere with the aforesaid Award. 8. However, the writ petitioner-bank being aggrieved with the said Award preferred writ petition being W.P. (L) No. 5412 of 2019 assailed the award of reinstatement dated 22.08.2019. In the writ petition, apart from raising the issue on merit, the issue of jurisdiction was also made a ground to interfere with the aforesaid Award. 8. The learned Single Judge, however, has taken note of the issue of jurisdiction, as would appear from the impugned order but the said issue has been discarded and by taking aid of the various judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court regarding the scope of judicial review, the award has been refused to be interfered with by dismissing the writ petition. 9. Admittedly, the issue of jurisdiction ought to have been raised before the original authority but not raised. The question will be that if the issue of jurisdiction is there and if it has not been raised before the prescribed authority, the original authority, then whether the parties can be restrained from raising the said issue before the higher forum, is required to be considered. The law is settled in this regard that the issue of jurisdiction can well be raised at any stage of proceeding since the jurisdiction issue goes to be root. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in Balvant N. Viswamitra & Ors. Vs. Yadav Sadashiv Mule (Dead) through LRs & Ors. [ (2004) 8 SCC 706 ], in particular paragraph 9, which reads as under : “9. The main question which arises for our consideration is whether the decree passed by the trial court can be said to be “null” and “void”. In our opinion, the law on the point is well settled. The distinction between a decree which is void and a decree which is wrong, incorrect, irregular or not in accordance with law cannot be overlooked or ignored. Where a court lacks inherent jurisdiction in passing a decree or making an order, a decree or order passed by such court would be without jurisdiction, non est and void ab initio. A defect of jurisdiction of the court goes to the root of the matter and strikes at the very authority of the court to pass a decree or make an order. A defect of jurisdiction of the court goes to the root of the matter and strikes at the very authority of the court to pass a decree or make an order. Such defect has always been treated as basic and fundamental and a decree or order passed by a court or an authority having no jurisdiction is a nullity. Validity of such decree or order can be challenged at any stage, even in execution or collateral proceedings.” (emphasis supplied) It is further settled position of law that even right decision by a wrong forum is no decision as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in Pandurang & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra [ (1986) 4 SCC 436 ]. 10. The fact about not raising the said issue before the prescribed authority therefore cannot deprive the party concerned to raise the issue of jurisdiction for its consideration before the higher forum. The issue of jurisdiction has been raised by taking the ground that the power has been conferred upon the prescribed authority to look into the legality and propriety of the decision taken by the establishment in view of provision as contained under Section 4(1) and 4(2) of the Act, 1953, which reads as under : (1) The provisions of this Act shall not apply to any precinct or premises of a mine as defined in clause (j) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (XXV of 1952). (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the provisions thereof specified in the third column of the Schedule shall not apply to the establishment, employees and other persons referred to in the corresponding entry in the second column: Provided that the State Government may, by notification, add to, omit or alter any of the entries in the Schedule in respect of one or more areas of the State and on the publication of such notification, the entries in either column of the Schedule shall be deemed to be amended accordingly. 11. 11. The jurisdiction which is to be exercised by the Tribunal is to be on the basis of the statutory mandate as contained under Section 4(1) of the Act, 1953 wherein it has been provided that the provisions of this Act shall not apply to any precinct or premises of Mines Act as defined under Section 2(j) of the Mines Act, 1952 (XXV of 1952) and Section 4(2) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the provisions thereof specified in the third column of the Schedule shall not apply to the establishment, employees and other persons referred to in the corresponding entry in the second column provided that the State Government may, by notification, add to, omit or alter any of the entries in the Schedule in respect of one or more areas of the State and on the publication of such notification, the entries in either column of the Schedule shall be deemed to be amended accordingly. For ready reference, provision of Section 4 is being referred herein : 4. Exceptions.— (1) The provisions of this Act shall not apply to any precinct or premises of a mine as defined in clause (j) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (XXV of 1952). (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the provisions thereof specified in the third column of the Schedule shall not apply to the establishment, employees and other persons referred to in the corresponding entry in the second column: Provided that the State Government may, by notification, add to, omit or alter any of the entries in the Schedule in respect of one or more areas of the State and on the publication of such notification, the entries in either column of the Schedule shall be deemed to be amended accordingly. In terms of the power conferred under Section 4(2), Schedule I has been made, wherein reference of all branches of all schedule commercial banks including public sector undertaking and Regional Rural Banks (RRBs) situated in the State of Bihar has been omitted for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction in view of provision of Section 26(2) of the Act, 1953. Subsequent to the same, again the State has come out with a new notification in exercise of power conferred under Section 4(2) as on 13.07.2011 wherein as under serial no. Subsequent to the same, again the State has come out with a new notification in exercise of power conferred under Section 4(2) as on 13.07.2011 wherein as under serial no. 33 it has been notified that all branches of the nationalized scheduled commercials banks, RRBs situated in the State of Jharkhand has been ousted from the purview of exercise of power conferred under Section 26(2), save and except the Section 33(1). For ready reference the Schedule as contained in serial no. 33 of the notification dated 14.11.2002 and notification dated 13.07.2011 are being reproduced herein : Notification dated 14.11.2002 Schedule I [See Section 4(2)] Serial No. Establishments, Employees or Other persons Provision of the Act 33 All Branches of the Scheduled Commercial Bank, including Public Sector Banks and Regional Rural Banks situated in the State of Bihar. All Provisions Notification dated 13.07.2011 Schedule I [See Section 4(2)] Serial No. Establishments, Employees or Other persons Provision of the Act 33 All Branches of the Nationalized Scheduled Commercial Bank and Regional Rural Banks situated in the State of Jharkhand. All Provisions It is, thus, evident that by virtue of notification dated 14.11.2002 the prescribed authority was deprived of power from exercising jurisdiction with respect to all branches of the Scheduled Commercial Bank. 12. It is admitted position that here the writ petitioner is coming under the fold of Scheduled Commercial Bank. However, subsequent to the aforesaid notification assertion has been made in view of Section 4(2) that all branches of nationalized commercial bank and rural bank situated under the territory of State of Jharkhand have been brought under the purview of Act, 1953 13. This Court is to examine the rival submission on the basis of aforesaid premise of the legal position regarding availability of jurisdiction of the Labour Court based upon notification dated 14.11.2002 and 13.07.2011. 14. The question which requires to be considered by taking into consideration the order of dismissal which is dated 07.12.2010 as to - (i).Whether the notification dated 14.11.2002 will be applicable conferring power upon the Labour Court to exercise the power under Section 26(2); or (ii).Whether the notification dated 13.07.2011 will be applicable based upon approaching the authority on the basis of date of filing of application? 15. Since both the issues are inter-linked as such they are taken up together. 15. Since both the issues are inter-linked as such they are taken up together. The law is well settled that the jurisdiction is to be considered by the authority concerned on the basis of cause of action. The cause of action has been defined by several judicial pronouncements, which means that the day when the party will be said to be aggrieved with any decision taken by any authority concerned. 16. The aggrieved party has been dealt with by Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of K. Ajit Babu And Ors. Vs. Union of India And Ors. reported in (1997) 6 SCC 473 , wherein at paragraph 4 it has been held as under : “4. ….. Ordinarily, right of review is available only to those who are party to a case. However, even if we give wider meaning to the expression “a person feeling aggrieved” occurring in Section 22 of the Act whether such person aggrieved can seek review by opening the whole case has to be decided by the Tribunal. The right of review is not a right of appeal where all questions decided are open to challenge. The right of review is possible only on limited grounds, mentioned in Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Although strictly speaking Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure may not be applicable to the tribunals but the principles contained therein surely have to be extended. Otherwise there being no limitation on the power of review it would be an appeal and there would be no certainty of finality of a decision. Besides that, the right of review is available if such an application is filed within the period of limitation. The decision given by the Tribunal, unless reviewed or appealed against, attains finality. If such a power to review is permitted, no decision is final, as the decision would be subject to review at any time at the instance of the party feeling adversely affected by the said decision. A party in whose favour a decision has been given cannot monitor the case for all times to come. Public policy demands that there should be an end to law suits and if the view of the Tribunal is accepted the proceedings in a case will never come to an end. A party in whose favour a decision has been given cannot monitor the case for all times to come. Public policy demands that there should be an end to law suits and if the view of the Tribunal is accepted the proceedings in a case will never come to an end. We, therefore, find that a right of review is available to the aggrieved persons on restricted ground mentioned in Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure if filed within the period of limitation.” Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gopabandhu Biswal Vs. Krishna Chandra Mohanty And Ors. reported in (1998) 4 SCC 447 at paragraphs 12 and 13 held as under : “12. Undoubtedly when the Tribunal interprets service rules and regulations, the interpretation so given may affect other members of that service — past, present or future. One can understand a wider meaning in this context being given to the phrase “person aggrieved”, thus enlarging the right of persons to intervene either at the hearing before the Tribunal, or in appeal, or for filing a review petition. Nevertheless, this right must be exercised at the appropriate time and in accordance with law. A review petition must be within the scope of Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act read with Order 47 Rule 1 and must comply with the Rules framed under the Administrative Tribunals Act. The present review applications are not within the principles laid down in Order 47 Rule 1. They also do not comply with the relevant Rules. Rule 17 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 prescribes, inter alia, that no application for review shall be entertained unless it is filed within thirty days from the date of the receipt of a copy of the order sought to be reviewed. In the present case the review petitions were filed one and a half years after the main judgment was delivered and one year after the special leave petition was dismissed. We do not find any explanation for this delay. 13. …. However leniently one may construe the term “party aggrieved”, a person not directly affected cannot be so considered. Otherwise for years to come, every person who becomes eligible for promotion will be considered a “party aggrieved” when the Tribunal interprets any service rule such as in the present case. We do not find any explanation for this delay. 13. …. However leniently one may construe the term “party aggrieved”, a person not directly affected cannot be so considered. Otherwise for years to come, every person who becomes eligible for promotion will be considered a “party aggrieved” when the Tribunal interprets any service rule such as in the present case. Only persons who are directly and immediately affected by the impugned order can be considered as “parties aggrieved” under Section 22(3)(f) read with Order 47 Rule 1.” Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Nalakath Sainuddin Vs. Koorikadan Sulaiman reported in (2002) 6 SCC 1 has held at paragraph 17 as under : “17. We agree with the view taken by the High Courts of Madhya Pradesh and Madras. We are of the opinion that: (i) There is no reason to read and interpret Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 narrowly and limit the scope of revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court thereby. (ii) Once a revision petition is entertained by the High Court, whichever be the party invoking the revisional jurisdiction, the High Court acquires jurisdiction to call for and examine the records of the authority subordinate to it. The records relating to “any order” and/or any proceedings, are available to be examined by the High Court for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the (a) legality, (b) regularity, or (c) propriety of the impugned order, including any part of the order, or proceedings. The only limitation on the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction is that the order or proceedings sought to be scrutinized must be of the subordinate authority. Any illegality, irregularity or impropriety coming to its notice is capable of being corrected by the High Court by passing such appropriate order or direction as the law requires and justice demands. (iii) “Any aggrieved party”, the expression employed in Section 20(1), means a person feeling aggrieved by the ultimate decision, that is, the operative part of the order. A party to the proceedings, who has succeeded in securing the relief prayed for, is not a party aggrieved though the order contains a finding or two adverse to him. (iii) “Any aggrieved party”, the expression employed in Section 20(1), means a person feeling aggrieved by the ultimate decision, that is, the operative part of the order. A party to the proceedings, who has succeeded in securing the relief prayed for, is not a party aggrieved though the order contains a finding or two adverse to him. The respondent can support the order and pray for the ultimate decision being sustained, without filing a revision of his own, and for achieving such end he may seek reversal of any findings recorded against him. However, if the non-petitioning party feels entitled to a more beneficial or larger order in his favour but was allowed a lesser or smaller relief then to the extent of claiming the more beneficial or larger relief he should have filed a revision petition of his own as he was “an aggrieved party” to that extent.” Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in Shobha Suresh Jumani v. Appellate Tribunal, Forfeited Property, (2001) 5 SCC 755 “5. First we would reiterate that the words “any aggrieved person” are found in several statutes. However, the meaning of the expression “aggrieved” may vary according to the context of the enactment in which it appears and all the circumstances. In Sidebotham, Re, ex p Sidebotham [(1880) 14 Ch D 458 : (1874-80) All ER Rep 588 (CA)] (Ch D at p. 465) it was observed by James, L.J.: “But the words „person aggrieved? do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A „person aggrieved? must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something.” 6. The said passage was referred to and relied upon by this Court in Thammanna v. K. Veera Reddy [ (1980) 4 SCC 62 ] and Northern Plastics Ltd. v. Hindustan Photo Films Mfg. Co. Ltd. [ (1997) 4 SCC 452 ]” 17. The ‘cause of action’ and ‘aggrieved party’ are co-related to each other. In absence of any cause of action the party cannot be said to be aggrieved and the aggrieved party will have locus to challenge the cause of action. Co. Ltd. [ (1997) 4 SCC 452 ]” 17. The ‘cause of action’ and ‘aggrieved party’ are co-related to each other. In absence of any cause of action the party cannot be said to be aggrieved and the aggrieved party will have locus to challenge the cause of action. The jurisdiction was to be exercised by the Labour Court in view of provision of Section 26(2) which is to be considered on the basis of date of approaching the Tribunal by taking into consideration the date of cause of action. 18. The matter would have been different if the party aggrieved would have approached within the period of limitation prescribed, herein, as per the provision of Section 26(2) the complaint is required to be made within a period of 90 days and if in the period of 90 days the complaint is made and in the meanwhile if there is any change in the rule then matter can be argued that within the period of limitation since the jurisdiction has been carved out, therefore, the same is to be exercised if in that circumstance jurisdiction is to be exercised then it can be said that exercising the jurisdiction suffers from no error. But herein admitted case is that the complaint has been filed beyond the period of 90 days sometimes in the year 2013 and on that pretext the respondent has taken the plea that since on the day when the Labour Court was approached therefore, the Labour Court was having jurisdiction by virtue of notification dated 13.07.2011 but we are not in agreement with such argument reason being are in two folds. Firstly, the prescribed authority was approached beyond the period of 90 days as per the provision made under Section 26(1), rather, it has been filed sometimes in the year 2013 i.e., after lapse of about more than 3 years. Secondly, the filing of an application cannot be said to be accrual of cause of action since cause of action is said to be an action by which a party is aggrieved. 19. Here the grievance of the writ petitioner is against the order of dismissal which was passed on 07.12.2010 and hence the cause of action by which the writ petitioner has become aggrieved is the order of dismissal which was passed on 07.12.2010 which will be said to be cause of action. 20. 19. Here the grievance of the writ petitioner is against the order of dismissal which was passed on 07.12.2010 and hence the cause of action by which the writ petitioner has become aggrieved is the order of dismissal which was passed on 07.12.2010 which will be said to be cause of action. 20. The respondent since will be said to be aggrieved with order dated 07.12.2010 and hence exercise of jurisdiction as per the statutory command of the prescribed authority is to be looked into on the basis of date of cause of action. The admitted position herein is that as on the date of cause of action the day when the order of dismissal was passed i.e., 07.12.2010 the notification dated 14.11.2002 was in-vogue, as per which the prescribed authority has not been conferred with the power to exercise power conferred under section 26(2) so far it relates to scheduled commercial banks are concerned under which the writ petitioner bank falls. 21. However, subsequent to the said notification another notification was issued on 13.07.2011 by which the scheduled commercial bank has been ousted and in its place nationalized scheduled commercial bank has been inserted but the fact remains that the said notification has been issued on 13.07.2011 which is subsequent to the date of cause of action and hence the same will not have any effect regarding jurisdiction of the prescribed authority as to be exercised by adjudicating the issue of legality and propriety of the order of dismissal dated 07.12.2010. The notification dated 13.07.2011 will not be applicable for the simple reason that any notification will have its prospective effect that too conferment of power upon a forum. 22. The law of retrospectivity is very much clear that the same can only be said to be applicable if expressly in the statute in express way otherwise the effect of such notification will always be prospective. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in P. Mahendran & Ors v. State of Karnataka & Ors., [ (1990) 1 SCC 411 ], in particular paragraph 5, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under : “5. It is well settled rule of construction that every statute or statutory rule is prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. It is well settled rule of construction that every statute or statutory rule is prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. Unless there are words in the statute or in the Rules showing the intention to affect existing rights the rule must be held to be prospective. If a rule is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation it ought to be construed as prospective only. In the absence of any express provision or necessary intendment the rule cannot be given retrospective effect except in matter of procedure. The amending Rules of 1987 do not contain any express provision giving the amendment retrospective effect nor there is anything therein showing the necessary intendment for enforcing the rule with retrospective effect. Since the amending Rules were not retrospective, it could not adversely affect the right of those candidates who were qualified for selection and appointment on the date they applied for the post, moreover as the process of selection had already commenced when the amending Rules came into force, the amended Rules could not affect the existing rights of those candidates who were being considered for selection as they possessed the requisite qualifications prescribed by the Rules before its amendment moreover construction of amending Rules should be made in a reasonable manner to avoid unnecessary hardship to those who have no control over the subject matter.” 23. This Court, after having discussed the legal position along with the factual aspect is reverting back to the order passed by the learned Single Judge whereform it is evident that the fact of jurisdiction has been taken by the writ petitioner-bank but as would appear from paragraph 10(i) that the same has been discarded without any reason that is by making an observation “the objection raised on behalf of petitioner with regard to lack of jurisdiction of the Tribunal stands eschewed and does not merit consideration at this juncture.” 24. The learned Single Judge while coming to such conclusion has not assigned any reason as to why it has been eschewed, however, it appears that the learned Single Judge has not considered since the jurisdictional issue even though was not raised before the prescribed authority and since has been raised for the first time before the writ Court, that might have prevailed upon the learned Single Judge not to consider the said issue of jurisdiction but the law is well settled that the issue of jurisdiction since goes to the root of the case has to be decided at any stage of the proceeding if raised, as has been referred by Hon’ble apex Court in the case of Balvant N. Viswamitra & Ors. Vs. Yadav Sadashiv Mule (Dead) through LRs & Ors. 25. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the settled issues that the issue of jurisdiction is required to be considered at any stage of the proceeding. Even otherwise also since the issue of jurisdiction has been taken note of by the learned Single Judge it was incumbent upon the learned Single Judge and as such to consider it by giving specific finding and discarding the said ground merely by taking reference does not merit consideration at this juncture, according to our considered view, cannot be said to be sufficient reason of discarding the plea taken on behalf of a party. The consideration always means the active application of mind, as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. Vs. A. Masilamani, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 530 wherein at para-19 it has been held which reads as hereunder:- “19. The word “consider” is of great significance. The dictionary meaning of the same is, “to think over”, “to regard as”, or “deem to be”. Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that there must be active application of mind. In other words, the term “consider” postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. The order of the authority itself should reveal such application of mind. In other words, the term “consider” postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. The order of the authority itself should reveal such application of mind. The appellate authority cannot simply adopt the language employed by the disciplinary authority and proceed to affirm its order.” This Court, therefore, is of the view that licensing authority without any application of mind has found the charge proved and as such, the said order is not sustainable in the eye of Law. 26. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the jurisdiction cannot be carved upon on the basis of date of application of approaching the concerned authority rather the jurisdiction is to be seen the day when the cause of action took place. 27. Accordingly, the aforesaid issue has been answered. 28. This Court, after answered the aforesaid issue, is of the view that the order passed by learned Single Judge requires interference, hence, the same is hereby quashed and set aside. 29. In the result, the instant intra-court appeal stands allowed. 30. In view thereof, the writ petition also stands allowed. 31. At this juncture, Mr. Amitabh, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the litigant cannot be made remediless. 32. In response thereto, reply has been given that it is not the fact that the respondent has become remediless rather remedy is available by approaching the competent Court of civil jurisdiction for declaration of legality and propriety of order impugned. 33. In that view of the matter and considering the same, this Court is of the view that observation is required to be made by granting liberty to the respondent to search out the remedy for redressal of his grievance. 34. Accordingly, the instant appeal stands disposed of. 35. Pending Interlocutory Applications stand disposed of.