JUDGMENT : The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order as contained in letter no. 410/D dated 09.11.2016 (Annexure-13 to the writ petition) issued by the Inspector General of Police (Training), Jharkhand, Ranchi, whereby Memorial Appeal filed by the petitioner has been rejected being time barred. Further prayer has been made for quashing the order as contained in memo no. 409/Go. dated 27.05.2016 (Anneuxure-11 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent no. 4 – the Deputy Inspector General, Coal Range, Bokaro, whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order passed by the respondent no. 5 – the Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad being the disciplinary authority has been dismissed. The petitioner has also prayed for quashing the order as contained in memo no. 954/Go. dated 18.02.2015 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent no. 5, whereby punishment of three black marks was imposed upon him (equivalent to forfeiture of two annual increments) observing that the same would not affect the future increment with a further direction to forfeit the salary and allowance payable to the petitioner for the dismissal period (i.e., 09.01.2004 to 19.08.2009) on the basis of ‘no work no pay’ and the said period has been ordered to be adjusted against extraordinary leave making further observation that during the suspension period, nothing would be payable to the petitioner except the subsistence allowance already paid to him. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner while working as constable under the respondent no. 5 was served with a chargsheet dated 13.03.2003 alleging that when he was posted at Sadar Court, Dhanbad, he helped in escaping a dreaded criminal namely, Md. Rinku from Court Hazat, Dhanbad on 11.03.2003 by deliberately conniving with him and untying his handcuffs, which showed his gross negligence, dereliction of duty, indiscipline and dubious conduct. On the basis of the said charges, Dhanbad District Departmental Proceeding No. 35/2003 was initiated against the petitioner and vide order passed by the respondent no. 5 was finally dismissed from service with effect from 09.01.2004. The petitioner preferred appeal before the respondent no. 4 and thereafter, memorial appeal before the respondent no. 3 – the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand which were dismissed. However, the order of dismissal was set aside by the respondent no. 5 was finally dismissed from service with effect from 09.01.2004. The petitioner preferred appeal before the respondent no. 4 and thereafter, memorial appeal before the respondent no. 3 – the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand which were dismissed. However, the order of dismissal was set aside by the respondent no. 2 vide order dated 05.03.2008 remanding the matter to the disciplinary authority i.e., the respondent no. 5 with a direction to reinitiate the said departmental proceeding against the petitioner and to pass a fresh order after affording an opportunity to him to cross-examine the departmental witnesses as well as to produce his own witnesses. It was further directed that the petitioner would be deemed to be under suspension for the period he remained dismissed from service and a final decision in that regard would be taken on the basis of the final order to be passed in the said departmental proceeding. 3. It is submitted that during pendency of the Memorial Appeal, the petitioner filed a writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 1982 of 2009 which was allowed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 06.08.2009 to the extent that the petitioner would be reinstated for the limited purpose of facing a fresh enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice upon his reporting for duty before the relevant officer along with a certified copy of the said order. Pursuant to the said order of this Court as well as of the respondent no. 2, the respondent no. 5 issued Dhanbad District Order No. 2509 of 2009 as contained in memo no. 3664 dated 26.08.2009, reinstating the petitioner with immediate effect and directing to re-start the departmental enquiry against him. 4. Thereafter, fresh enquiry was conducted against the petitioner and vide Dhanbad District Order No. 4940 of 2010, the petitioner was compulsorily retired from service with effect from 17.11.2010. The said order of punishment was set aside in appeal by the respondent no. 4 vide memo no. 580/Confidential dated 07.05.2011 directing the respondent no. 5 to re-conduct the departmental proceeding afresh. The petitioner was again taken back in service with effect from 17.11.2010 vide Dhanbad District Order No. 1497/11 dated 08.06.2011 and a departmental proceeding was again initiated against him. The respondent no. 4 vide memo no. 580/Confidential dated 07.05.2011 directing the respondent no. 5 to re-conduct the departmental proceeding afresh. The petitioner was again taken back in service with effect from 17.11.2010 vide Dhanbad District Order No. 1497/11 dated 08.06.2011 and a departmental proceeding was again initiated against him. The respondent no. 6 – the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Law and Order, Dhanbad was appointed as enquiry officer who conducted enquiry and provided opportunity to the parties to examine and cross-examine the witnesses. The respondent no. 6 finally submitted the enquiry report dated 31.10.2013 to the respondent no. 5 observing that the petitioner cannot evade his responsibility of discharging the assigned duty to produce the prisoner safely in the court and held him guilty of the same. 5. Thereafter, the respondent no. 5 vide memo no. 5479 dated 30.08.2014 asked the petitioner to submit his explanation within 15 days which he submitted on 15.09.2014 along with the relevant documents. However, the respondent no. 5 vide Dhanbad District Order No. 558/15 dated 19.02.2015 passed the order of punishment of three blackmarks being equivalent to forfeiture of two annual increments with a further direction to forfeit the salary and allowance for the period he remained out of service (i.e., from 09.01.2004 to 19.08.2009) due to order of dismissal and the said period was ordered to be adjusted against extraordinary leave with further observation that during the suspension period, the petitioner would not be paid any amount except already paid subsistence allowance. Thereafter, the petitioner filed appeal before the respondent no. 4, however, the same was dismissed upholding the order of punishment passed by the respondent no. 5. Aggrieved with the said order, the petitioner filed Memory Appeal in the office of the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand, however, the same was also dismissed vide letter no. 410/D dated 09.11.2016 issued under the signature of the Inspector General of Police (Training), Jharkhand, Ranchi being time barred. 6. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned orders have been passed ignoring the statutory provisions of Rule 557-A of Police Manual which provides that under ordinary circumstance, the strength of escort shall be two constables for 1 to 3 prisoners in order to produce them before the court, however, the petitioner was solely assigned the duty to produce two detenues before the court due to which one detenue namely, Md. Rinku escaped from the custody by putting chilly powder in the eyes of the petitioner. The said aspect was already before the disciplinary as well as the appellate authority for consideration, however, they ignored the same while passing the impugned orders. 7. It is also submitted that a co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 06.08.2009 had directed the respondents to hold a fresh enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice which has not yet been complied by them. Since the petitioner has been reinstated in service, he is entitled for salary and other consequential benefits which has not been paid to him. 8. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the order of punishment has been passed against the petitioner after providing him sufficient opportunity of hearing and as such, the same does not require any interference of this Court. The charge of dereliction of duty has been proved against the petitioner in the departmental proceeding no. 35 of 2003 and the quantum of punishment is proportionate to the charges levelled against him. After reinstatement in service, the petitioner was promoted from the post of Literate Constable to the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police vide memo no. 1287/P dated 24.06.2015. The petitioner thereafter represented the respondent authorities to shift his date of promotion on the post of A.S.I and also to grant him promotion to the post of Sub-Inspector of Police. The petitioner also requested for grant of benefit of ACP/MACP, however, his case was not considered due to the reason that he was below in the seniority list. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The petitioner is aggrieved with the order of punishment of three blackmarks which is equivalent to forfeiture of two annual increments. 10. Before coming back to the merit of the case, it would be appropriate to refer the judgment dated 24.04.2023 rendered by this Court in the “Mahendra Prasad Choudhary Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.” [W.P.(S) No. 678 of 2015], wherein after citing few judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, has summarized the scope of interference in the disciplinary matter in following manner: 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Others Vs. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 , has held as under: “13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Others Vs. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 , has held as under: “13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (ii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iii) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 8. In the case of Chairman and Managing Director, V.S.P. & Others Vs. Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu, reported in (2008) 5 SCC 569 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “20. The jurisdiction of the High Court in this regard is rather limited. Its power to interfere with disciplinary matters is circumscribed by well-known factors. It cannot set aside a wellreasoned order only on sympathy or sentiments. (See Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal [ (2005) 2 SCC 638 ]; State of Bihar v. Amrendra Kumar Mishra [ (2006) 12 SCC 561 ]; SBI v. Mahatma Mishra [(2006) 13 SCC 727]; State of Karnataka v. Ameerbi [ (2007) 11 SCC 681 ]; State of M.P. v. Sanjay Kumar Pathak [ (2008) 1 SCC 456 ] and Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Surji Devi [ (2008) 2 SCC 310 ].) 21. Once it is found that all the procedural requirements have been complied with, the courts would not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee. The superior courts only in some cases may invoke the doctrine of proportionality. If the decision of an employer is found to be within the legal parameters, the jurisdiction would ordinarily not be invoked when the misconduct stands proved. (See Sangfroid Remedies Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1999) 1 SCC 259 ].) 22. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India also cannot, on the basis of sympathy or sentiment, overturn a legal order.” 9. (See Sangfroid Remedies Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1999) 1 SCC 259 ].) 22. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India also cannot, on the basis of sympathy or sentiment, overturn a legal order.” 9. Thus, the High Court in exercise of power under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has limited jurisdiction of interference in disciplinary matter. The High Court is not supposed to re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the conclusion of the inquiry officer if the same has been done in accordance with law. If the disciplinary proceeding has been conducted by following due procedure of law, then the High Court should not interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon the delinquent employee on the basis of sympathy or sentiment unless it is found to the court that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the charges proved against the employee. 11. The thrust of argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned orders have been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. 12. To appreciate the contention of learned counsel for the parties, I have perused the chargesheet as contained in memo no. 910 dated 13.03.2003 which has been brought on record by way of supplementary counter affidavit dated 10.01.2023 in compliance of the order dated 24.11.2022 passed by this Court. It was alleged in the chargesheet that the petitioner connived with the brothers of detenue namely, Md. Rinku, opened his handcuff for eating food due to which the said detenue escaped. It was further alleged that the petitioner encouraged crime by the act of collusion, dubious conduct and specific temptation for fulfilling his selfishness and due to the said reason, the detenue had fled away which shows his gross negligence, dereliction of duty, indiscipline, suspicious character as well as his incompetence. 13. During the fresh enquiry conducted by the respondent no. 6, the witnesses were examined and cross-examined by the parties and finally, it was observed by the said respondent that the allegation against the petitioner was found proved including the fact of putting chilly powder in the eyes of the petitioner by the detenue Md. Rinku. It was also observed by the said respondent that the petitioner cannot escape his responsibility of safely producing the detenue before the court. Rinku. It was also observed by the said respondent that the petitioner cannot escape his responsibility of safely producing the detenue before the court. The disciplinary authority, on receipt of the enquiry report, sought explanation from the petitioner, who also filed reply and thereafter, the impugned order of punishment was passed. Thus, I am of the view that sufficient opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioner before passing the impugned order of punishment and his contention of violation of the principles of natural justice is not tenable. 14. Another argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the charges against the petitioner were not proved as it did not come in the enquiry report that he had taken money from the said detenue, rather it was specifically proved by the witnesses that the detenue namely, Md. Rinku fled away by putting chilly powder in the eyes of the petitioner. 15. I am of the view that dereliction of duty as alleged in the chargesheet was proved against the petitioner since it was his duty to produce the detenue before the court, but he failed to discharge his assigned duty. When any police personnel is entrusted with the duty to take a detenue to and from the court, he/she is supposed to show extra alertness to handle any incidental situation. The said police personnel cannot be absolved from his responsiblity by merely saying that the detenue has fled away using deceitful means. Thus, if a detenue escapes from the custody of any police personnel, he/she has to be held liable for dereliction of duty though the other charges have not been proved against him/her. 16. So far as the quantum of punishment is concerned, the punishment imposed against the petitioner is the lowest in the category of major punishments, imposition of which does not appear to be shockingly disproportionate to the charges levelled against him. Moreover, the petitioner is a member of a disciplined force and there is no scope for any such negligence or dereliction of duty that too while taking the detenue to and from the court. 17. Moreover, the petitioner is a member of a disciplined force and there is no scope for any such negligence or dereliction of duty that too while taking the detenue to and from the court. 17. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstance, I am of the view that the requirements for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India explained in the case of “P. Gunasekaran” as referred in the case of “Mahendra Prasad Choudhary” (supra) is not made out in the case in hand. 18. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.