JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. This appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 24.11.2017 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 999 of 2011, whereby and whereunder, the order of punishment as contained in Annexure-4 dated 29.09.2007 passed by the original authority; order of appellate authority as contained in Annexure-6 dated 09.04.2010 and; the order of reviewing authority as contained in Annexure-10 dated 31.01.2011, have been quashed and set aside by remitting the matter before the disciplinary authority for taking a decision afresh on the quantum of punishment. 2. The brief facts as per the pleading which require to be enumerated herein read as under: It is the case of the writ petitioner that considering his past service, he was given out of turn promotion and was posted at the new SSI Branch of Canara Bank, Adityapur, Jamshedpur. He was given target and was directed to take immediate steps to achieve the target vide letter as contained in Ref. No. PRD/AFPS/76/2004-05 RNP dated 10.03.2005 issued by the Regional Office, under the signature of Assistant General Manager. According to the writ petitioner, he has successfully achieved the target given by the Regional Office in which the Management of Canara Bank congratulated him as would be evident from the appreciation letter issued by the Management. It is the further case of the writ petitioner that a regular inspection of Adityapur Branch was made and in the said inspection, certain technical lapses were found and accordingly, the writ petitioner was asked to explain and reply to the same which was submitted by the writ petitioner vide his explanation dated 08.03.2006. The Management having not been satisfied with the explanation had put the writ petitioner under suspension and a chargesheet was issued to him vide chargesheet dated 03.05.2006. The writ petitioner has submitted his explanation to the charges levelled against him but the disciplinary authority having not been satisfied with the explanation has decided to initiate a departmental proceeding. An enquiry officer was appointed and the writ petitioner has fully participated in the departmental proceeding and placed his defence to the charges levelled against him. The writ petitioner has submitted his explanation to the charges levelled against him but the disciplinary authority having not been satisfied with the explanation has decided to initiate a departmental proceeding. An enquiry officer was appointed and the writ petitioner has fully participated in the departmental proceeding and placed his defence to the charges levelled against him. The enquiry officer, after considering the evidences and documents, and other material on record found the writ petitioner not guilty of most of the charges but found him guilty of committing technical fault in sanctioning the loan to the borrowers in order to achieve the target given by the Bank. The disciplinary authority, after receipt of the copy of the enquiry report, has issued second show cause notice which had been responded by the writ petitioner. The said explanation having not been found to be satisfactory, the order of punishment for compulsory retirement in view of the provision under Regulation 4(h) of the Canara Bank Officer Employee’s (Discipline and Appeal) Regulation, 1976 has been passed on 29.09.2007. The writ petitioner being aggrieved with the said order, has challenged the same before this Court by filing writ petitioner being W.P.(S) No. 3845 of 2008. The writ petitioner, however, during pendency of the aforesaid writ petition has preferred departmental appeal and the co-ordinate learned Single Judge of this Court while disposing of the aforesaid writ petition on 12.11.2009 has directed the appellate authority to dispose of the appeal within a period of four months from the date of presentation of the order. The appellate authority, in compliance of the aforesaid order, has modified the order of punishment of compulsory retirement to the order of reduction to a lower grade, i.e., MMG Scale-III to JMG Scale-I and basic pay scale has been fixed at Rs. 18,240/- and further punishment has been imposed by debarring him from promotion for a period of two years from the date of order and interregnum period, i.e., from the date of compulsory retirement, the date of joining shall not be reckoned for any purposes and the period of suspension shall not be treated on duty. The order of the appellate authority was communicated to the General Manager vide reference letter dated 09.04.2010. The order of the appellate authority was communicated to the General Manager vide reference letter dated 09.04.2010. The writ petitioner, thereafter, has joined his service of the Bank on 29.04.2010 and on the same date filed an application to reconsider the order of reducing scale and also for considering the period of suspension and the period of compulsory retirement to the date of reinstatement to be treated as a regular service for the purpose of all service benefits. However, no response was received and the writ petitioner again filed a writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 999 of 2011 challenging the order by which he has been reduced to lower grade, i.e., from MMG Scale-III to JMG Scale-I and debarment from promotion for a period of two years. Learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the ground raised on behalf of the respondent-Bank has disposed of the writ petition by quashing the order dated 29.09.2007; 09.04.2010 and; 31.01.2011 passed by the original authority; appellate authority and; reviewing authority, respectively and has remitted the matter to the disciplinary authority for taking a decision afresh on the quantum of punishment, which is the subject matter of the instant intra-court appeal. 3. Mr. Pratyush Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant-Bank has submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from patent illegality which according to him has been passed without taking into consideration the limited scope of the High Court in exercising the power of Article 226 of the Constitution of India to show interference in the decision taken by the administrative authority in the departmental proceeding. It has been submitted by referring to the nature of allegation that the allegation is serious in nature as would appear from the memorandum of charge wherein several charges have been levelled, whereby and whereunder it has been alleged about commission of irregularities in sanctioning the loan. The nature of irregularity would be evident from the imputation of charge wherein it has been alleged that the loans have been sanctioned by way of granting cash credit facility but without ensuring availability/delivery of machinery. The stocks available are not sufficient to cover the liability so far as it relates to the loan sanctioned in favour of the Indica Composite Private Limited and as such, irregularity has been committed in sanctioning the loan pertaining to different consumers. 4. The stocks available are not sufficient to cover the liability so far as it relates to the loan sanctioned in favour of the Indica Composite Private Limited and as such, irregularity has been committed in sanctioning the loan pertaining to different consumers. 4. The writ petitioner has been asked to respond in defence to the allegation imputed against him in the memorandum of charge and the enquiry officer has found the charge proved so far as it relates to commission of irregularity in sanctioning the loan without supported by the proper documents. The report of the enquiry officer has been accepted by the disciplinary authority and thereafter, after issuing the show cause notice the order of punishment of compulsory retirement has been passed, however, the said order was subsequently been recalled and the writ petitioner was reinstated in service by imposing punishment of reduction to a lower grade, i.e., from MMG Scale-III to JMG Scale-I as also debarment for promotion for two years. 5. The contention has been raised that when the enquiry officer has found the charge proved and there is no procedure lapses rather the writ petitioner was given due opportunity in course of enquiry, as such, in that circumstances, there was no occasion to interfere with the impugned order as has been interfered by the learned Single Judge by passing the impugned order. Further contention has been raised that the learned Single Judge while quashing the impugned order of punishment has remitted the matter for taking a decision afresh on the quantum of punishment but the learned Single Judge has not recorded any reason that how the order of punishment has been considered to be disproportionate taking the nature of charge, as such, the order impugned suffers from patent illegality and is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 6. Mr. J.P. Jha, learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner-respondent has taken the ground that the said irregularity has been committed by the writ petitioner only for the purpose of achieving the target as per the instructions of the higher authority and when the target was achieved, the same was appreciated by the higher authority by issuing appreciation letter and even then if the departmental proceeding has been initiated which culminated into the order of punishment, the same cannot be said to be justified. 7. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 8. The undisputed fact in this case is that the writ petitioner while working as Senior Manager at SSI Branch, Adityapur, Jamshedpur has sanctioned the loan with respect to borrowers and as per the allegation levelled in the memorandum of charge the procedure has not been followed which ought to have been followed prior to sanctioning the loan, i.e., partnership letter which ought to have been signed by all the partners as per the guidelines of the Bank, the same has not been found to be signed by all the partners. Likewise, allegation has been levelled that while sanctioning the loan, there is no proper documentation and even the collateral security has not been kept. It has also been found that the collateral security has also been found to be fake in some cases. 9. It is evident from the material available on record that some of the charges have been found to be proved and some of the charges have not been found to be proved, extract of which reads as under: CHARGES PROVED PARTLY PROVED NOT PROVED CHARGE I (M/S NAG AUTO TESTING STATION) APPRAISAL PART. DOCUMENTATION PART. DISBURSEMENT PART. FOLLOW UP PART. UNIT VISIT. CHARGE II (M/S VIJAY FOOD PRODUCTS) APPRAISAL PART. Except point 8. DISBURSEMENT PART. UNIT VISIT. DOCUMENTATION PART. FOLLOW UP PART. CHARGE III (M/S INDICA COMPOSITE PVT LTD) DISBURSEMENT PART. FOLLOW UP PART. UNIT VISIT. APPRAISAL PART. DOCUMENTATION PART. CHARGE IV (M/S BANT ENTERPRISE) DISBURSEMENT PART. FOLLOW UP PART. UNIT VISIT. APPRAISAL PART. DOCUMENTATION PART. CHARGE V (M/S MAHANAGAR FORGING & CASTINGS (P) LTD) UNIT VISIT. APPRAISAL PART. DOCUMENTATION PART. DISBURSEMENT PART. FOLLOW UP PART. CHARGE VI 1. M/S AUTO THERMAL. 2. M/S KUMAR POLY UDYOG. 3. M/S TIPL. 4. M/S PRAGATI UDYOG. 5. M/S PERFECT ELECTRICALS. 6. M/S VIVEK BODY BUILDING & COMPANY. 7. M/S V K CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES. 8. M/S GAYATRI UDYOG. 9. M/S PASARI STEELS PVT, LTD. 10. M/S ASSOCIATED ENGINEERING CONCERN. 11. M/S KING MINERALS. 12. M/S SABERA ENTERPRISES. 13. M/S P C ENTERPRISES. 14. M/S RAJ AUTO & ENGINEERING INDUSTRY. 15. M/S SRI SAI ENGINEERING & MANUFACTURING WORKS. 16. M/S BIKASH INDUSTRIES. 1. M/S SANJAY KUMAR – CHARGE WAS NOT PROCEEDED BY PO. 2. M/S TURNO INDIA PVT. LTD. 9. M/S PASARI STEELS PVT, LTD. 10. M/S ASSOCIATED ENGINEERING CONCERN. 11. M/S KING MINERALS. 12. M/S SABERA ENTERPRISES. 13. M/S P C ENTERPRISES. 14. M/S RAJ AUTO & ENGINEERING INDUSTRY. 15. M/S SRI SAI ENGINEERING & MANUFACTURING WORKS. 16. M/S BIKASH INDUSTRIES. 1. M/S SANJAY KUMAR – CHARGE WAS NOT PROCEEDED BY PO. 2. M/S TURNO INDIA PVT. LTD. 3. M/S INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES. 4. M/S SHIVANI STEEL. 5. M/S TURNING POINT. 6. M/S CLEAN-N-CHEM CHARGE VII 1. M/S MAA AMBEY BRICKS. 2. M/S ALP COLOUR LAB. 3. M/S JYOTI CERRO RUBBER. 4. M/S R.C.SATI ENTERPRISES. 5. M/S RANI SATI PIPE INDUSTRY. 6. M/S PRAKASH SHELLAC FACTORY. 1. M/S FABRIC INDIA. 2. M/S S.K.M MINERALS. 3. M/S HUNDRU MILK FOOD PVT. LTD. 4. M/S USHA ENGINEERING WORKS. 5. M/S PAWAN AUTO. 6. M/S JAI GURU RICE MILL. 7. M/S KUMAR POLY UDYOG 1. M/S N K PLASTICS. 2. M/S DURGA ENTERPRISES. 3. M/S ASHA AUTOMOBILES. The enquiry officer has forwarded the report before the disciplinary authority and the disciplinary authority on its acceptance has issued second show cause notice. The writ petitioner has responded to the same and on being found dis-satisfactory the order of punishment of compulsory retirement was passed vide order dated 29.09.2007. The writ petitioner challenged the aforesaid order by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 3845 of 2008 and while the same was pending, an appeal was preferred and the writ petition was disposed of by directing the appellate authority to decide the appeal within stipulated period. The appellate authority decided the appeal by quashing the order of compulsory retirement and converted it to the order of reduction by reverting the writ petitioner from MMG Scale-III to JMG Scale-I as also with a direction of debarring the writ petitioner from promotion for two years. 10. The writ petitioner being aggrieved with the said order has filed review petition before the appellate authority and simultaneously filed W.P.(S) No. 5293 of 2010 in which the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition directing the reviewing authority to decide the review petition within the stipulated period. In pursuance of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, the review petition was rejected finding no reason to interfere with the same. In pursuance of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, the review petition was rejected finding no reason to interfere with the same. The writ petitioner being aggrieved with the aforesaid orders, filed writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 999 of 2011 which has been disposed of vide order dated 24.11.2017 quashing the order of original authority, appellate authority as also the reviewing authority, which is the subject matter of the instant intra-court appeal. 11. The issue of jurisdiction of the High Court is the primary objection which has been raised on behalf of the appellant-Bank. It has been contended that the scope of High Court to exercise the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited so far the power of judicial review is concerned. While on the other hand, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner has contended that it is a case in such a nature where interference is required by the High Court in exercise of power of judicial review and considering the facts of the case, if the learned Single Judge has quashed the impugned orders remitting the matter before the authority for taking decision afresh on the quantum of punishment, the same cannot be said to be suffer from error. 12. This Court, before appreciating the aforesaid argument, deems it fit and proper to refer the judicial pronouncement of showing interference by the High Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of order passed by the administrative authority in the disciplinary authority. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India Vs. P. Gunasekaran, AIR 2015 SC 545 , in particular to paragraph 13, laying down following guidelines which are self explanatory: “13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in Management of State Bank of India vs. Smita Sharad Deshmukh and Anr., (2017) 4 SCC 75 , has laid down that it is equally settled position of law that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can certainly interfere with the quantum of punishment, if it is found disproportionate to the gravity of offence. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali, AIR (2017) SC 200, has laid down following guidelines at paragraph 8 for interference by the High Court in the matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, which is quoted herein below: “8. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali, AIR (2017) SC 200, has laid down following guidelines at paragraph 8 for interference by the High Court in the matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, which is quoted herein below: “8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to reappreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 : ( AIR 2011 SC 1931 , Para 6), this Court held as follows: "7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. In Union of India and Ors. v. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 this Court held as follows: "12. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. In Union of India and Ors. v. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 this Court held as follows: "12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the inquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the inquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the inquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the inquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience." It is equally settled that in the departmental proceeding, the opportunity of hearing is required to be provided to the delinquent employee and if no such opportunity has been provided, certainly, the order of punishment will stand vitiated. 13. It is evident that the guidelines have been formulated by the Hon'ble Apex Court as referred hereinabove, whereby and whereunder, the High Court is to exercise the power of judicial review in showing interference with the order passed on conclusion of departmental proceeding only on following grounds, i.e., a. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; b. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; c. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; d. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; e. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; f. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; h. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 14. It is, thus, evident that the Hon'ble Apex Court has formulated the guidelines, as such, the power of judicial review is only to be exercised showing interference with the order passed in departmental proceeding by the administrative authority only if such ground is available otherwise not. 15. It is, thus, evident that the Hon'ble Apex Court has formulated the guidelines, as such, the power of judicial review is only to be exercised showing interference with the order passed in departmental proceeding by the administrative authority only if such ground is available otherwise not. 15. One of the guideline is that interference can also be shown in exercise of power of judicial review if the order is found to be disproportionate to the charges levelled against the delinquent employee as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India Vs. P. Gunasekaran (supra); Management of State Bank of India vs. Smita Sharad Deshmukh and Anr. (supra); Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali (supra). 16. It also requires to refer herein that while interfering with the order of punishment on the ground of quantum, the same can only be passed if the conscience of the court shocks and in that circumstances, the requirement of law is that the court is to assign the reason that what led the court to come to the conclusion that how the conscience of the court is shocked holding the order to be disproportionate. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Dev Singh vs. Punjab Tourism Development Corporation and Anr., (2003) 8 SCC 9 , paragraph-6 of the said judgment reads as under: “6. A perusal of the above judgments clearly shows that a court sitting in appeal against a punishment imposed in the disciplinary proceedings will not normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty, however, if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the court, then the court would appropriately mould the relief either by directing the disciplinary/appropriate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed or to shorten the litigation it may make an exception in rare cases and impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. It is also clear from the abovenoted judgments of this Court, if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is totally disproportionate to the misconduct proved against the delinquent officer, then the court would interfere in such a case.” 17. It is also clear from the abovenoted judgments of this Court, if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is totally disproportionate to the misconduct proved against the delinquent officer, then the court would interfere in such a case.” 17. This Court has proceeded to examine the legality and propriety of the order passed by the learned Single Judge on the basis of the position of law as has been referred hereinabove as settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court. The fact which is not in dispute, as per the material available on record, is that the writ petitioner while working as Scale-III Manager under the appellant-Bank was having with the power to sanction the loans and he in order to achieve the target, as per the instructions of the higher authority of the Bank, has committed some irregularity as has been admitted by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner in this proceeding. 18. The Bank has conducted internal audit based upon the irregularities committed by the writ petitioner and the disciplinary authority on consideration of the finding of the audit has sought for explanation from the writ petitioner but the explanation furnished by the writ petitioner was found to be not satisfactory, therefore, the respondent-Bank has decided to initiate a departmental proceeding by appointing an enquiry officer. The writ petitioner has defended himself at length against the charges but some of the charges have been found to be proved and some of the charges have not been found to be proved as would be evident from the extract of the charges quoted and referred above in the form of tabular chart. 19. This Court has considered the nature of charges which has been found to be proved by the enquiry officer and has found therefrom that the charges pertains to commission of not observing the procedure laid down prior to sanctioning the loan by not protecting the account by the proper documentation and the adequate collateral security and in some cases even the collateral security has been found to be fake. It is also evident from the charges have been proved wherein it has come that the writ petitioner has exceeded his jurisdiction in sanctioning the loans. 20. It is also evident from the charges have been proved wherein it has come that the writ petitioner has exceeded his jurisdiction in sanctioning the loans. 20. This Court on the basis of the proved charge and considering its nature, is required to consider as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, there is any procedural lapses in course of conducting the departmental proceeding as also the interference shown by the High Court in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is justified by remitting it before the authority concerned to take a fresh decision on the point of quantum of punishment. 21. So far as the interference shown with the impugned order is concerned, it is not a case of the writ petitioner that he has not been provided with adequate opportunity of hearing in course of enquiry, as such, there is no allegation of non-observance of cardinal principle of natural justice rather he has been provided with full opportunity to defend himself. 22. It is required to refer herein as per the material available on record that the writ petitioner while working in the capacity of Scale-III Manager, is required to follow such regulation while sanctioning the loan, i.e., proper documentation and the loan is to be protected by adequate collateral security. The sanctioning authority of the Bank is required to verify the documents pertaining to collateral security even by visiting the site so as to verify the genuineness of the property sought to be kept for the collateral security. 23. It is evident from the charge that such accountability has not been verified by the writ petitioner, therefore, the reply has not been found to be satisfactory submitted by the writ petitioner to that effect which led the enquiry officer to prove the charge. 24. It also requires to be refer herein that the writ petitioner, who is working in the Bank, are dealing with public money and are required to discharge their duty with more accountability and the accountability which he holds is having more in comparison to the employees who are working in the civil side, therefore, while dealing with the conduct of the irregularity in a disciplinary proceeding utmost care is to be given as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank & Ors. Vs. Vs. P.C. Kakkar, (2003) 4 SCC 364 , paragraph-14 of the said judgment reads hereunder as: “14. A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with the money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik [ (1996) 9 SCC 69 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1194] it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court.” It is evident from the aforesaid judgment as referred hereinabove that while dealing with the conduct of the employees/officers working in the bank it is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the bank. 25. This Court, therefore, is of the view on the basis of material available on record and as per the discussion made hereinabove that the case of the writ petitioner is coming under the fold of guidelines as has been formulated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India Vs. P. Gunasekaran (supra); Management of State Bank of India vs. Smita Sharad Deshmukh and Anr. (supra); Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali (supra), therefore, the interference shown by the learned Single Judge with the impugned orders, according to the considered view of this Court, cannot be said to suffer from propriety. P. Gunasekaran (supra); Management of State Bank of India vs. Smita Sharad Deshmukh and Anr. (supra); Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali (supra), therefore, the interference shown by the learned Single Judge with the impugned orders, according to the considered view of this Court, cannot be said to suffer from propriety. Further, the learned Single Judge after quashing the impugned orders has remitted the matter before the authority for taking a decision afresh on the point of quantum of punishment. The principle of law is well settled as has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Dev Singh vs. Punjab Tourism Development Corporation and Anr. (supra) that the Court is required to assign the reason of shocking the conscience. 26. The learned Single Judge while relegating the matter before the disciplinary authority has given a finding that the order of compulsory retirement is excessive as also the order of reversion. The relevant part of the impugned order/judgment reads as under: “… There is no charge of misappropriation framed against the petitioner and, therefore, findings recorded by the disciplinary authority that punishment of compulsory retirement is unwarranted in the case, is erroneous and, therefore, interference is required. Even in the present case, admittedly though some charges were proved, many of the charges were not proved and as such, even in the proved charge of misconduct, the penalty of compulsory retirement is excessive and disproportionate and even the consequent modification is excessive and disproportionate.” The question arises that when the order of compulsory retirement has already been reversed by the appellate authority then where is the requirement by the learned Single Judge to give its finding regarding the proportion of the order of punishment of compulsory retirement. The learned Single Judge has also given finding holding the punishment reversion to be excessive but without assigning any reason as to what lead the learned Single Judge shocking the conscience holding the order of punishment of reversion to be excessive. 27. This Court considering the observation as has been made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments and after taking into consideration the nature of allegation found to be proved by the enquiry officer, is of the view that the writ petitioner being working as a Branch Head of the concerned Branch is required to discharge his duty with good conduct and discipline. Good conduct and discipline always means that the decision is to be taken strictly in accordance with the rules/regulations and the guidelines, more particularly, for the purpose of sanctioning of the loans. If the loan will not be sanctioned strictly in accordance with the guidelines applicable, there will be adverse consequence of non-recovery of the sanctioned amount by way of loan. The purpose of framing guidelines is to secure the public money in case of account having been found to be Non-Performing Asset (NPA) by liquidating the collateral security, therefore, guidelines speaks that there must be proper documentation in support of the loan which is to be sanctioned so that in case of account having been found to be under the category of NPA, the public money may be secured by liquidating the property which has been kept by way of collateral security but here, in the instant case, as has been found by the enquiry officer that the writ petitioner has failed to discharge his duty while sanctioning the loan and in complete deviation to the guidelines formulated by the Bank, therefore, the same cannot be considered to be good conduct of the writ petitioner and discharge of duty with utmost discipline. 28. The position of law is well settled that a thing is to be done strictly in accordance with law and there cannot be any deviation otherwise there will be no meaning of any rules and regulation as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Singhara Singh and Ors., reported in AIR (1964) SC 358, wherein it has been held at paragraph 8 as under: “....its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted....” Reference has also made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Babu Verghese and Ors. vs. Bar Council of Kerala and Ors., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 422 , wherein it has been held at paragraphs 31 & 32 as under: “31. vs. Bar Council of Kerala and Ors., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 422 , wherein it has been held at paragraphs 31 & 32 as under: “31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor who stated as under: “[W]here a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.” 32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of V.P. and again in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan. These cases were considered by a three-judge bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case was again upheld. This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognized as a statutory principle of administrative law.” Reference to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court also needs to be made in Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai vs. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala & Ors., reported in (2002) 1 SCC 633 , wherein it has been held at paragraph 27 as under: “..... it is a normal rule of consideration that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself....” Reference is also made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ambay Cements & Anr., reported in (2005) 1 SCC 368 , wherein it has been held at paragraph 26 as under: “....it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way. vs. Ambay Cements & Anr., reported in (2005) 1 SCC 368 , wherein it has been held at paragraph 26 as under: “....it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way. It is also settled rule of interpretation that where a statute is penal in character, it must be strictly construed and followed.....” Reference is also made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Zuari Cement Ltd. vs. Regional Director ESIC Hyderabad & Ors. (in Civil Appeal No.5138-40/2007), reported in (2015) 7 SCC 690 , wherein it has been held at paragraph 14 as under: “14. As per the scheme of the Act, the appropriate Government alone could grant or refuse exemption. When the statute prescribed the procedure for grant or refusal of exemption from the operation of the Act, it is to be done in that manner and not in any other manner. In State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, it was held that: (SCC p. 378, para 26) 26.... it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way.” Thus, it is, evident that the Hon'ble Apex Court has propounded the law that if a thing is to be done as required to be done under the statutory mandate, the same is to be done strictly in accordance with the same, meaning thereby, there cannot be any deviation from the statutory mandate. 29. It is equally settled that acting contrary to the guidelines formulated by the Bank will be said to be acting beyond the authority which itself is a breach of discipline and is a misconduct as the case herein is, where, the writ petitioner as per the charge proved has acted beyond its authority since the guidelines formulated for the purpose of sanctioning the loan has not been followed by the writ petitioner. 30. 30. This Court, after taking into consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter and considering the fact that the appellate authority has already taken a lenient view by reversing the order of punishment of compulsory retirement to that of reversion, as such, the same requires no interference by this Court by taking into consideration the guidelines laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India Vs. P. Gunasekaran (supra); Management of State Bank of India vs. Smita Sharad Deshmukh and Anr. (supra); Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali (supra). Since the case of the writ petitioner is not falling under the categories as carved out by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment referred above, hence, it is not a case where the interference is to be shown by the High Court in exercise of power of judicial review sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 31. The learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate these aspects of the matter while passing the order as has been referred hereinabove. 32. This Court, in the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case, is of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be said to be sustainable in the eyes of law, as such, the instant appeal deserves to be allowed. 33. Accordingly, the instant appeal is allowed. 34. In consequence thereof, the writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 999 of 2011 stands dismissed. 35. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.