ORDER : (Karunesh Singh Pawar, J.) 1. Heard Shri Sanjeev Kumar Pandey, learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as Ms. Alina Masoodi, Advocate holding brief of Shri Raj Kumar Singh, learned Counsel for the respondents. 2. Through this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order of termination dated 30.12.2011 passed by the Commandant, 91st Battalion, Group Kendra, Central Reserve Police Force, District Lucknow (opposite party no.4) contained as Annexure-1 to the writ petition and the appellate order dated 14.11.2012 passed by the Inspector General of Police, Central Sector, Central Reserve Police Force, Lucknow (opposite party no.2) contained as Annexure-2 to the writ petition. The petitioner is also seeking a writ of Mandamus directing the opposite parties to reinstate him in service on the post of Constable with effect from the date of termination from service i.e. on 3.11.2012 with all consequential benefits. 3. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Constable by means of order dated 20.8.2011. This appointment order clearly stated that petitioner’s service is purely temporary in nature and can be terminated at any time without assigning any reason by giving him one month notice. The petitioner was enlisted on a temporary basis as Constable w.e.f. 16.8.2011. On 4.11.2011, at about 20:45 hours, the petitioner left the police line/camp without any prior intimation, notice and permission of his superiors/competent authority. The petitioner remained absent from 4.11.2011 till 25.11.2011 for 22 days and reported at his own convenience on 26.11.2011 at 09:00 hours. The petitioner, while reporting back on 26.11.2011 at 09:00 hours, has not provided any supporting documents along with his report dated ‘Nil’ wherein he stated that he went to take care of his ailing father. Therefore, the petitioner's services were terminated in exercise of the provisions contained in Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 by means of impugned order dated 30.12.2011 and prior to it, one month’s notice was issued to him vide letter no.P.VIII.21/2011-EC-II dated 30.11.2011 through Deputy Commandant (Administration), GC,CRPF, Bijnore, Lucknow (U.P.). Aggrieved by the afroresaid termination order dated 30.12.2011, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority, which was considered and was rejected being time barred by the Appellate Authority vide letter No. R.XIII.33/2012-CS-Adm-3 dated 14.11.2012. Aggrieved by the afroresaid termination order dated 30.12.2011, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority, which was considered and was rejected being time barred by the Appellate Authority vide letter No. R.XIII.33/2012-CS-Adm-3 dated 14.11.2012. Against the aforesaid termination order dated 30.12.2011 and appellate order dated 14.11.2012, the petitioner has filed the present petition. 4. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that prior to terminating the services of the petitioner, no reason has been assigned. According to him, termination is a major penalty and it cannot be passed without giving opportunity of hearing and without holding an enquiry. Therefore, the impugned termination order dated 30.12.2011 is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and also violative of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. His submission is that in case the termination order is not quashed, it will take away the right of livelihood of an employee. The impugned order has been passed de horse the principles of natural justice and it has also not been passed in accordance with relevant Rules. He also submitted that the Appellate Authority, while passing the impugned appellate order dated 14.11.2012, has also not considered the matter to the aforesaid effect. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, in support of his contention, has relied upon the decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1958 SC36, Purushotam Lal Dhingra vs. Union of India; 2000 (5) SCC 152 , Chandra Prakash Shahi vs. State of U.P. and others; 2000 SCC (3) 239, V.P. Ahuja Vs. State of Punjab and others and 2010 SCC (8) 220, Union of India and others vs. Mahaveer C. Singhvi. 6. Per contra, Ms. Alina Masoodi, learned counsel for the respondent/ Union of India submits that as per the admitted position, the petitioner was a temporary employee and had barely completed 3 months of service as a Constable. Since the right exists under contract or service rules to terminate services of a probationer or a temporary employee, the employer in exercise of the said right, terminated the services of an employee. Since the petitioner was appointed on a temporary basis, which is evident by his appointment letter dated 20.08.2011, the employer or the competent authority had a right to terminate the services of the petitioner by giving him one month’s notice. Since the petitioner was appointed on a temporary basis, which is evident by his appointment letter dated 20.08.2011, the employer or the competent authority had a right to terminate the services of the petitioner by giving him one month’s notice. She has submitted that the petitioner's services were terminated from service in exercise of the provisions contained in Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 w.e.f. 31.12.2011 after completion of the one month’s notice period. In such circumstances, the motive operating on the mind of the employer is wholly irrelevant. 7. Learned Counsel for the respondents has further submitted that admittedly, no charges were framed against the petitioner; no stigmatic or punitive order was passed against the petitioner; no preliminary or departmental enquiry was conducted against the petitioner; and no punitive or penal consequences flowed from the order of termination. The order of termination was termination simplicitor to ensure that the petitioner could find other means of employment and not to bar him from any future prospects of employment. Thus, the impugned termination order is not stigmatic or punitive in nature. 8. Learned Counsel for the respondents has also submitted that the protection under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India is available to probationers and temporary employee in the event that a termination order was by way of punishment and punitive and stigmatic in nature, which is not the present case. As per Rules, the competent authority, in the present case, had a right to terminate the services of the petitioner as long as he was a temporary employee and had not completed 3 years of service by giving him one month’s notice period and this procedure was admittedly followed in the present case and his termination simplicitor has been passed pursuant to Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 as well as his appointment order dated 20.08.2011. 9. It is next submitted that the distinction between temporary employees/probationers and permanent employees would be completely obliterated if protection afforded by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India is afforded to all. It is submitted that the whole purpose of probation and being a temporary employee is that it gives the superior authority the chance to judge the suitability of a temporary employee as to whether he meets all requirements of the job and he should be made permanent or not. It is submitted that the whole purpose of probation and being a temporary employee is that it gives the superior authority the chance to judge the suitability of a temporary employee as to whether he meets all requirements of the job and he should be made permanent or not. 10. In support of his submission, learned Counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2005) 5 SCC 569 , State of Punjab and others vs. Sukhwinder Singh; (2002) 1 SCC 520 , Pavanendra Narayan Verma vs. Sanjay Gandhi P.G.I of Medical Sciences and Another; 1990 (Supp) SCC 283, Union of India and another vs. K.Balakrishnan Kani; and (1964) 5 SCR 190 : AIR 1964 SC 1854 , Champaklal Chimanlal Shah vs. Union of India. 11. I have considered the arguments advanced by learned Counsel for the parties. 12. A perusal of the appointment order of the petitioner shows that the petitioner was appointed on temporary basis and his services were terminable at any time by giving him one month’s notice. It is not in dispute that the petitioner, after his appointment, remained absent without any intimation or permission unauthorizedly from 4.11.2011 to 25.11.2011 for a period of 22 days within the initial three months of his service. He left the police line/camp without any prior intimation to his superior authorities and even when he reported back on 26.11.2011, no supportive documents along with his representation have been given by the petitioner. Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 is extracted below:- "5. Termination of temporary service. (1) (a) The services of a temporary Government servant shall be liable to termination at any time by a notice in writing given either by the Government servant to the appointing authority or by the appointing authority to the Government servant;" 13. After the petitioner reported for duty on 26.11.2011 from his unauthorized absence, one month’s notice for termination of service of the petitioner was issued vide letter dated 30.11.2011 to him and the petitioner was terminated from service w.e.f. 31.12.2011 on completion of period of one month’s notice. After the petitioner reported for duty on 26.11.2011 from his unauthorized absence, one month’s notice for termination of service of the petitioner was issued vide letter dated 30.11.2011 to him and the petitioner was terminated from service w.e.f. 31.12.2011 on completion of period of one month’s notice. The termination order dated 31.12.2011 is extracted below:- ¼lsok lekfIr uksfVl½ dsUn~jh; flfoy lsok ¼vkbZ fu;ekj yh 1965½ ds fu;e ds mi fu;e ¼1½ ds lkFk ifBr dsUn~jh; fjtoZ iqfyl cy fu;ekoyh 1938 ds fu;e 16 ,oa ifjf'k"B ,d ¼10½ ds uhps uksV&2 ds vuqlj.k esa] eSa KkusUn~j dqekj dukUMs.V] x~#i dsUn~j dsŒfjŒiqŒcy] y[kuÅ ¼mRr½] bl x~#i dsUn~j ds cy la[;k & 115182734 fjdwV ¼thŒMhŒ½ eqds'k dqekj ;kno dks mrn~}kjk bl vk'k; dk uksfVl nsrk gS fd mldh lsok,a ;g uksfVl tkjh gks ds rkjh[k ls ,d ekg lekIr gksus dh rkjh[k ls lekIr dj nh tk,xhA 14. A perusal of the impugned termination order shows that it is a termination simplicitor. No charges were framed against the petitioner. The termination order is not stigmatic or punitive. No preliminary or departmental enquiry has been conducted and no punitive or penal consequences flowed from the order of termination. 15. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab and others vs. Sukhwinder Singh (supra), in paragraphs 19 and 20, has held that superior authorities of the departments have to take work from an employee and they are the best people to judge whether an employee should be continued in service and made a permanent employee or not having regard to his performance, conduct and overall suitability for the job. The probationer is on test and a temporary employee has no right to the post. Relevant paragraphs 19 and 20 of the judgment are extracted below:- “19. It must be borne in mind that no employee whether a probationer or temporary will be discharged or reverted, arbitrarily, without any rhyme or reason. Where a superior officer, in order to satisfy himself whether the employee concerned should be continued in service or not makes inquiries for this purpose, it would be wrong to hold that the inquiry which was held, was really intended for the purpose of imposing punishment. Where a superior officer, in order to satisfy himself whether the employee concerned should be continued in service or not makes inquiries for this purpose, it would be wrong to hold that the inquiry which was held, was really intended for the purpose of imposing punishment. If in every case where some kind of fact finding inquiry is made, wherein the employee is either given an opportunity to explain or the inquiry is held behind his back, it is held that the order of discharge or termination from service is punitive in nature, even a bona fide attempt by the superior officer to decide whether the employee concerned should be retained in service or not would run the risk of being dubbed as an order of punishment. The decision to discharge a probationer during the period of probation or the order to terminate the service of a temporary employee is taken by the appointing authority or administrative heads of various departments, who are not judicially trained people. The superior authorities of the departments have to take work from an employee and they are the best people to judge whether an employee should be continued in service and made a permanent employee or not having regard to his performance, conduct and overall suitability for the job. As mentioned earlier a probationer is on test and a temporary employee has no right to the post. If mere holding of an inquiry to ascertain the relevant facts for arriving at a decision on objective considerations whether to continue the employee in service or to make him permanent is treated as an inquiry "for the purpose of imposing punishment" and an order of discharge or termination of service as a result thereof "punitive in character", the fundamental difference between a probationer or a temporary employee and a permanent employee would be completely obliterated, which would be wholly wrong. "20. In the present case neither any formal departmental inquiry nor any preliminary fact finding inquiry had been held and a simple order of discharge had been passed. The High Court has built an edifice on the basis of a statement made in the written statement that the respondent was habitual absentee during his short period of service and has concluded therefrom that it was his absence from duty that weighed in the mind of Senior Superintendent of Police as absence from duty is a misconduct. The High Court has built an edifice on the basis of a statement made in the written statement that the respondent was habitual absentee during his short period of service and has concluded therefrom that it was his absence from duty that weighed in the mind of Senior Superintendent of Police as absence from duty is a misconduct. The High Court has further gone on to hold that there is direct nexus between the order of discharge of the respondent from service and his absence from duty and, therefore, the order discharging him from service will be viewed as punitive in nature calling for a regular inquiry under Rule 16.24 of the Rules. We are of the opinion that the High Court has gone completely wrong in drawing the inference that the order of discharge dated 16.3.1990 was, in fact, based upon the misconduct and was, therefore, punitive in nature, which should have been preceded by a regular departmental inquiry. There cannot be any doubt that the respondent was on probation having been appointed about eight months back. As observed in Ajit Singh and others etc. vs. State of Punjab and another (supra) the period of probation gives time and opportunity to the employer to watch the work ability, efficiency, sincerity and competence of the servant and if he is found not suitable for the post, the master reserves a right to dispense with his service without anything more during or at the end of the prescribed period, which is styled as period of probation. The mere holding of preliminary inquiry where explanation is called from an employee would not make an otherwise innocuous order of discharge or termination of service punitive in nature. Therefore, the High Court was clearly in error in holding that the respondent's absence from duty was the foundation of the order, which necessitated an inquiry as envisaged under Rule 16.24(ix) of the Rules". 16. Therefore, the High Court was clearly in error in holding that the respondent's absence from duty was the foundation of the order, which necessitated an inquiry as envisaged under Rule 16.24(ix) of the Rules". 16. In the case of Union of India and another vs. K. Balakrishnan Kani (supra), where the services of Peon in the Custom department on a temporary post were terminated after a couple of months of service under Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, it was held that since there is no indication of any stigma in the order of termination, quotation of rule in the impugned termination order should have been taken as a sufficient reason and nothing more should have been looked for. 17. Likewise in the case of Pavanendra Narayan Verma (supra), Hon'ble Supreme court in paragraphs 21 and 22 held as under:- "21. One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination there was (a) a full scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct (c) which culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely if any one of the three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld. 22.The three factors are distinguishable in the following passage in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) where it was said:(SCC p. 851, para 64) "64. Before a probationer is confirmed the authority concerned is under an obligation to consider whether the work of the probationer is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post. In the absence of any rules governing a probationer in this respect the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperamental or other object not involving moral turpitude the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. No punishment is involved in this. The authority may in some cases be of the view that the conduct of the probationer may result in dismissal or removal on an inquiry. No punishment is involved in this. The authority may in some cases be of the view that the conduct of the probationer may result in dismissal or removal on an inquiry. But in those cases the authority may not hold an inquiry and may simply discharge the probationer with a view to giving him a chance to make good in other walks of life without a stigma at the time of termination of probation. If, on the other hand, the probationer is faced with an enquiry on charges of misconduct or inefficiency or corruption, and if his services are terminated without following the provisions of Article 311(2) he can claim protection." (Emphasis supplied) 18. So far as judgement of Purushotam Lal Dhingra (supra) is concerned, in that case, adverse remarks against the appellant in the confidential report were made and communicated to the appellant and thereafter he was punished by reducing in rank without any opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken in that regard to him, then, it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that the order was invalid or non-compliance of provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The facts of this case is entirely different from the peculiar facts of the case in hand as herein, no remarks or stigma has been made in the impugned order of termination. 19. Likewise in the case of Chandra Prakash Shahi (supra), the termination preceeded by a preliminary enquiry in which appellant was found involved in incident of quarrel, hence it was held that termination was founded upon misconduct and, therefore, punitive. The facts of this case is also distinguishable from the present case. 20. In the case of V.P. Ahuja (supra), the impugned order was ex facie found to be stigmatic and also punitive. The order was passed on the ground that the appellant failed in discharging his duties administrively and technically. Then it was held that termination order could not have been passed without holding regular enquiry and the termination was held to be punitive, which is not the case in the present case. 21. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sukhwinder Singh (supra) has held that the superior authorities of the department has to take work from employee and they are the best people to judge whether an employee should be continued in service and made a permanent employee or not. 21. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sukhwinder Singh (supra) has held that the superior authorities of the department has to take work from employee and they are the best people to judge whether an employee should be continued in service and made a permanent employee or not. The probationer is on test and a temporary employee has no right to the post. 22. In the present case, the petitioner was on probation; he was appointed just three months’ back; he was unauthorizedly absent from duty for a period of 22 days, therefore, the competent authority has rightly terminated the services of the petitioner under Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 after giving one month’s notice by a simplicitor order, which is neither punitive in nature nor stigmatic. Terminating the services of the petitioner in exercise of employer's right to dispense with the services of such employee within a period of probation, would not make an otherwise innocuous order of discharge or termination of service punitive in nature. 23. In view of the aforesaid, no interference is required in the impugned order of termination and impugned appellate order. 24. The petition being devoid of merit is dismissed.