ORDER : 1. This petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (`Code’ for short) praying to quash and set aside the FIR being C.R.No.II-29 of 2019 registered at Lathi Police Station, Dist.Amreli for the offences punishable under Sections 504 and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code (`IPC’ for short) and Sections 3(1)(r)(s), 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (`Atrocities Act’ for short). 2. Rule. Learned APP Mr.Joshi waives service of notice of rule for respondent no.1 and learned advocate Mr.Vaidya waives service of notice of rule for respondent no.2. 3. The brief facts as stated in this application are such that an FIR is lodged by respondent no.2 herein alleging that on the said date of incident i.e. 22.5.2019 initially at around 7.00 a.m. in the morning, present applicant visited the house of respondent no.2, called him outside of his house and that the applicants being member of Bhingrad Gram Panchayat scolded respondent no.2 that they being the sweepers of the Gram Panchayat, they don’t fully accomplish their work of sweeping, and therefore they should not turn back for the work of sweeping and it is alleged that respondent no.2 was responded by a caste abuse. On the word against word going on, the present applicant got provoked, started speaking abusive language towards him and also scolding him, that now onwards, he along with his wife, are seen indulging into sweeping work and turn up to Gram Panchayat for their monthly salary, their bones will be broken and that was followed by a quarrel and the applicant abused respondent no.2 by his caste and therefore the impugned FIR is filed, which is sought to be quashed by way of filing of this application. 4. Heard learned advocates for the parties. 4.1 Learned advocate Mr.Trivedi for the applicant has drawn my attention towards the allegation made in the FIR and has submitted that the offence is registered under the provisions of the IPC and Atrocities Act. He has submitted that on bare reading of FIR, provisions of the Atrocities Act cannot be made applicable, more particularly, in view of the provisions of Sections 3(1)(r) as the incident should occur in public view and admittedly, as per the allegation made in the FIR, the incident has occurred at the house of the complainant which cannot be considered as public place. 4.2 He relied on the case of Hitesh Verma V/s State of Uttarakhand and Another reported in 2020 SCC online (SC) 907, more particularly, paragraphs 12, 14 and 15 of that judgment. 4.3 He has further submitted that even from the tenor of the FIR, no offences under Sections 504 and 506(2) of IPC are made out. He, therefore, prayed to allow this application and quash the impugned FIR. 5. Per contra, learned advocate Mr.Vaidya for the respondent no.2-complainant has strongly opposed this application and submitted that the powers under Section 482 of the Code should be exercised sparingly and in the facts and circumstances of the present case, no case is made out to exercise such powers, as prima facie, case is made out against the present applicant and therefore, this application be rejected. 6. I have considered the rival submissions and I have also perused the material on record. 7. At the outset, if we peruse the provisions of Sections 3(1)(r)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act, they read as under: “3. Punishment for offences of atrocities 1. Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe: (r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view; (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view; 3(2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe- [(va) commits any offence specified in the Schedule, against a person or property, knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with such punishment as specified under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) for such offences and shall also be liable to fine;] 8. From the tenor of the FIR, it transpires that the incident has occurred within the residential premises of the complainant which cannot be said to have occurred in public place and in public view, which is a primary requirement for invoking the above sections. From the tenor of the FIR, it transpires that the incident has occurred within the residential premises of the complainant which cannot be said to have occurred in public place and in public view, which is a primary requirement for invoking the above sections. Further, the incident put forward in the impugned FIR cannot be believed by any prudent mind that any person, in such small town for no reason, would go to anybody’s house in the early morning as alleged in FIR and create such scene and abuse them. Based on facts and circumstances of present case, I have little hesitation in holding that even by assuming that the applicant might have abused the complainant but in clear absence of ingredients of intentional insult of such a degree that it could provoke a person to commit any offence, then also it does not warrant subjecting present applicant to face trial. 9. In the case of Hitesh Verma (supra), it is held in paragraphs 12, 14 and 15 as under: “12. The basic ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1) (r) of the Act can be classified as "1) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and 2) in any place within public view". 14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in "any place within public view". What is to be regarded as "place in public view" had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh and Ors. v. State through Standing Counsel and Ors. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression "public place" and "in any place within public view". It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view. The Court held as under: "28. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view. The Court held as under: "28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a "chamar") when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression "place within public view" with the expression "public place". A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies." 15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered "in any place within public view" is not made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered "in any place within public view" is not made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh, it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet.” 10. It is also relevant to refer to the judgment in the case of Dhiren Prafulbhai Shah V/s State of Gujarat, reported in 2016(4) GLR 2785 , more particularly, paragraph nos.39 to 47, which read as under : “39. Although it has been contended vociferously that the Court should not embark upon any inquiry as regards the truthfulness of the allegations. Yet, in the facts of the present case, more particularly, considering the inordinate delay of more than three years in lodging the F.I.R., such inquiry in my view is necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of law. I have narrated the facts in details as regards the long standing dispute between the first informant and the management of the college, which includes the applicant herein being a Principal of the College. The words were uttered as alleged in December, 2012, whereas, the F.I.R. was registered in May, 2015. So far as the allegation of continuous harassment is concerned, no specific instances have been given and more importantly, no specific words alleged to have been uttered, could be found in the F.I.R. 40. Prompt and early reporting of the occurrence by the informant with all its vivid details gives an assurance regarding truth of its version. In case, there is some delay in filing the FIR, the complainant must give explanation for the same. Undoubtedly, delay in lodging the FIR does not make the complainant's case improbable when such delay is properly explained. However, deliberate delay in lodging the complaint is always fatal. [vide: Kishan Singh (D) through L.Rs. v. Gurpal Singh and others, 2010 Cri.L.J. 4710]. 41. Undoubtedly, delay in lodging the FIR does not make the complainant's case improbable when such delay is properly explained. However, deliberate delay in lodging the complaint is always fatal. [vide: Kishan Singh (D) through L.Rs. v. Gurpal Singh and others, 2010 Cri.L.J. 4710]. 41. In cases where there is a delay in lodging an FIR, the court has to look for a plausible explanation for such delay. In absence of such an explanation, the delay may be fatal. The reason for quashing such proceedings may not be merely that the allegations were an afterthought or had given a coloured version of events. In such cases, the court should carefully examine the facts before it for the reason that a frustrated litigant who failed to succeed before a civil court may initiate criminal proceedings just to harass the other side with a malafide intention or the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the other party. Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustrations by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal court. The court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and persecution. In such a case, where an FIR is lodged clearly with a view to spite the other party because of a private and personal grudge and to enmesh the other party in long and arduous criminal proceedings, the court may take a view that it amounts to an abuse of the process of law in the facts and circumstances of the case. (vide : Kishan Singh (D) through L.Rs. v. Gurpal Singh and others, 2010 Cri.L.J. 4710]. 42. I shall now consider whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the offence so far as the Section 3(1)(ix) of the Act is concerned. Section 3(1)(ix) reads thus: 3(1)(ix) – gives, any false or frivolous information to any public servant and thereby causes such public servant to use his lawful power to the injury or annoyance of a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. 43. It appears that the Investigating Agency thought fit to file chargesheet for the offence punishable under Sections3(1)(ix) of the Act on the allegations that the applicant herein furnished false information to the management and pursuant to the same, the respondent no.2 was served with a chargesheet and was proceeded departmentally. 43. It appears that the Investigating Agency thought fit to file chargesheet for the offence punishable under Sections3(1)(ix) of the Act on the allegations that the applicant herein furnished false information to the management and pursuant to the same, the respondent no.2 was served with a chargesheet and was proceeded departmentally. In my view, Section 3(1)(ix) has no application worth the name in the case in hand. I have already discussed above that serious allegations were levelled against the respondent no.2 and in that regard, a three member Inquiry Committee was constituted by the management and at the end of a fullfledged departmental inquiry, it was held that the charges levelled against the respondent no.2 were established. Accordingly, the respondent no.2 was dismissed from service. 44. The Supreme Court, in a number of cases, has laid down the scope and ambit of the High Court's power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Inherent power under section 482, Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute. 45. In Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1964 AC 1254, Lord Ried at page 1296 expressed his view "there must always be a residual discretion to prevent anything which savours of abuse of process" with which view all the members of the House of Lords agreed but differed as to whether this entitled a Court to stay a lawful prosecution. 46. A three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of 'Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal' reported in (2007) 12 SCC 1 : ( AIR 2008 SC 251 ) has examined scope and ambit of Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court in the said case observed that inherent powers under Section 482 should be exercised for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be fully justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers of the court. The Court in the said case observed that inherent powers under Section 482 should be exercised for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be fully justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers of the court. 47. In the case of 'Devendra and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another' reported in (2009) 7 SCC 495 , the Supreme Court observed as under: "There is no dispute with regard to the aforementioned propositions of law. However, it is now well settled that the High Court ordinarily would exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the allegations made in the first information report, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, do not make out any offence. When the allegations made in the first information report or the evidence collected during investigation do not satisfy the ingredients of an offence, the superior courts would not encourage harassment of a person in a criminal court for nothing.” 11. In view of the above, it is prima facie found that the provisions of the Atrocities Act are applied in mechanical manner. 12. As far as the provisions of the IPC which are invoked, if we peruse Sections 504 and 506(2) of IPC, they read as under: "S. 504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace.—Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. S. 506. S. 506. Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both. 13. It is also profitable to refer to paragraphs 17, 18, 22 and 23 of the very recent judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Chandra Vaishya V/s State of Uttar Pradesh and another, reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 668, which reads as under: “17. The first question that calls for an answer is whether it was at a place within public view that the appellant hurled caste related abuses at the complainant with an intent to insult or intimidate with an intent to humiliate him. From the charge-sheet dated 21 st January, 2016 filed by the I.O., it appears that the prosecution would seek to rely on the evidence of three witnesses to drive home the charge against the appellant of committing offences under sections 323 and 504, IPC and 3(1)(x), SC/ST Act. These three witnesses are none other than the complainant, his wife and their son. Neither the first F.I.R. nor the charge- sheet refers to the presence of a fifth individual (a member of the public) at the place of occurrence (apart from the appellant, the complainant, his wife and their son). Since the utterances, if any, made by the appellant were not “in any place within public view”, the basic ingredient for attracting section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was missing/absent. We, therefore, hold that at the relevant point of time of the incident (of hurling of caste related abuse at the complainant by the appellant), no member of the public was present. 18. We, therefore, hold that at the relevant point of time of the incident (of hurling of caste related abuse at the complainant by the appellant), no member of the public was present. 18. That apart, assuming arguendo that the appellant had hurled caste related abuses at the complainant with a view to insult or humiliate him, the same does not advance the case of the complainant any further to bring it within the ambit of section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. We have noted from the first F.I.R. as well as the charge- sheet that the same makes no reference to the utterances of the appellant during the course of verbal altercation or to the caste to which the complainant belonged, except for the allegation/observation that caste-related abuses were hurled. The legislative intent seems to be clear that every insult or intimidation for humiliation to a person would not amount to an offence under section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of course, such insult or intimidation is targeted at the victim because of he being a member of a particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If one calls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place within public view, this would obviously constitute an act intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive or offensive language. Even if the same be directed generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless such words are laced with casteist remarks. Even if the same be directed generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless such words are laced with casteist remarks. Since section 18 of the SC/ST Act bars invocation of the court’s jurisdiction under section 438, Cr.PC and having regard to the overriding effect of the SC/ST Act over other laws, it is desirable that before an accused is subjected to a trial for alleged commission of offence under section 3(1)(x), the utterances made by him in any place within public view are outlined, if not in the F.I.R. (which is not required to be an encyclopaedia of all facts and events), but at least in the charge-sheet (which is prepared based either on statements of witnesses recorded in course of investigation or otherwise) so as to enable the court to ascertain whether the charge sheet makes out a case of an offence under the SC/ST Act having been committed for forming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the situation before it, prior to taking cognisance of the offence. Even for the limited test that has to be applied in a case of e present nature, the charge-sheet dated 21st January, 2016 does not make out any case of an offence having been committed by the appellant under section 3(1)(x) warranting him to stand a trial. 22. What remains is section 504, IPC. In Fiona Shrikhande and Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 , this Court had the occasion to hold that: “13. Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz. (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. The person who intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504 IPC.” 23. Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, we have little hesitation in holding that even though the appellant might have abused the complainant but such abuse by itself and without anything more does not warrant subjecting the appellant to face a trial, particularly in the clear absence of the ingredient of intentional insult of such a degree that it could provoke a person to break public peace or commit any other offence.” 14. In view of the above, if we peruse the allegations in the present case, there is no specific allegation that attracts the provisions of IPC in the present FIR. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that this is a fit case to exercise inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. 15. In the case of Bhajanlal & Ors. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has settled the guidelines when the Court can exercise powers under Section 482 of the Code, the relevant paragraph reads as under: In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Ch.XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Art.226 or the inherent powers under sec.482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under sec.156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of sec.155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under sec.156(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/ or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 16. It is also relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Inder Mohan Goswami and Another versus State of Uttaranchal reported in (2007) 12 SCC 1 , more particularly para : 23 & 24 thereof, which read as under : “23. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts' powers under Sec. 482 CrPC. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts' powers under Sec. 482 CrPC. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under Sec. 482 CrPC can be exercised: [(i) to give effect to an order under the Code;] [(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and] [(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.] 24. Inherent powers under Sec. 482 CrPC though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself'. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute. Discussion of decided cases.” 17. In view of above settled position of law and after considering the facts as alleged in the FIR and circumstances of the present case, it transpires that continuation of further proceedings pursuant to the said FIR will cause greater hardships to the applicant and no fruitful purpose would be served if such further proceedings are allowed to be continued. The Court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with ulterior motive to pressurise accused or to settle the score. 18. Resultantly, this application is allowed. The F.I.R. registered as FIR being C.R.No.II-29 of 2019 registered at Lathi Police Station, Dist.Amreli and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, if any, are hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute. Direct service is permitted. The amount of compensation, if any, paid to the complainant be refunded to the state.