ORDER : Both the above cases are arising from a single crime registered by the Kottayam West Police Station and since the issues involved are connected, the same are being disposed of by a common order. Crl.M.C.No.5052/2020 is filed by the accused Nos.1, 2 and 5 in Crime No.1785/2015 of Kottayam West Police Station, for quashing all further proceedings against the petitioners in the said crime, which was registered pursuant to Annexure-A1 complaint. W.P.(C)No.2676/2020 is filed by the defacto complainant in the said crime, for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the official respondents to complete the investigation in the said crime and to submit a final report expeditiously. 2. The facts which led to the filing of these cases are as follows: The aforesaid crime was registered based on a private complaint submitted by the defacto complainant before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-III, Kottayam. The said private complaint is produced as Annexure-A1 in Crl.M.C No.5052/2020. Annexure A4 is the F.I.R. registered in the said case by Kottayam West Police Station, based on the said complaint. The offences alleged against the accused are under Sections 120B, 406, 465, 467, 468 r/w Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). 3. The crux of the allegations contained in Annexure-A1 complaint is as follows; the husband of the defacto complainant, along with his friends, started a private limited Company under the name and style M/s Roshini Sea Foods, showing its registered office at Kottayam. The business of the Company was mainly related to the sea foods and fish farming. The husband of the defacto complainant had 2,25,000 shares in the said Company, whereas the defacto complainant had 10000 shares. As part of the business of the said Company, the husband of the defacto complainant purchased 90 acres of land at Kannur for the purpose of fish farming and necessary machineries for processing the same were also installed. The husband of the defacto complainant procured the funds required for the same after mortgaging his personal properties. The 1st petitioner herein initially joined as one of the Directors of the said Company without any investments. Later, on account of certain differences of opinion owing to certain malpractices committed by the 1st accused, he resigned from the Directorship of the said company. The 1st petitioner herein initially joined as one of the Directors of the said Company without any investments. Later, on account of certain differences of opinion owing to certain malpractices committed by the 1st accused, he resigned from the Directorship of the said company. However, the husband of the defacto complainant could not manage the business of the Company profitably and therefore, the Company sustained a huge loss in the business and thereby exposed to the recovery proceedings. 4. While so, the husband of the defacto complainant passed away on 16.02.1998. Thereupon, the 1st accused, who was a Chartered Accountant by profession, approached the defacto complainant and offered all his help to manage the affairs of the Company. As the defacto complainant was not well-versed in the management of the said Company, 1st accused was permitted to manage the affairs of the Company. While managing the affairs of the Company, the 1st accused created several false documents, forged the signatures of the defacto complainant and other shareholders, and transferred the shares of her husband in favour of other accused persons. It is also alleged in the private complaint that the 1st accused also created false documents by forging the signatures of the defacto complainant and other shareholders to convey the properties of the Company, including immovable properties in favour of the other accused who are the close relatives viz. wife and children of the 1st accused. The complaint was submitted in such circumstances with the said allegations. The learned Magistrate forwarded the said complaint to the Kottayam West Police for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC), and Annexure A4 FIR, i.e. Crime No 1785/2015 was registered for the offences referred to above. The Crl.M.C. is filed by the petitioner in such circumstances seeking to quash the investigation which is now being conducted in the said crime. 5. Earlier, the defacto complainant approached this Court by filing W.P(C) No.17170/2018 for transferring the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation on the ground that the investigation conducted by the police was not proper. The aforesaid Writ Petition was disposed of by this Court as per judgment dated 18.11.2019, directing the transfer of the investigation from Kottayam West Police to the Crime Branch. Consequently, the investigation of the said case was entrusted to the District Crime Branch, Kottayam. The aforesaid Writ Petition was disposed of by this Court as per judgment dated 18.11.2019, directing the transfer of the investigation from Kottayam West Police to the Crime Branch. Consequently, the investigation of the said case was entrusted to the District Crime Branch, Kottayam. However, according to the defacto complainant, even now, the investigation has not been completed. The W.P (C) No.2676/2020 is filed by the defacto complainant seeking to expedite the investigation that the Crime Branch is conducting. 6. Heard Sri.Shinu J. Pillai, the learned counsel for the petitioners/accused Nos.1,2 and 5, Sri. C.Unnikrishnan, the learned counsel appearing for the defacto complainant and Sri.Vipin Narayan, the learned Public Prosecutor for the State. 7. The main contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners in Crl.M.C. (Accused Nos.1,2 and 5) is that by virtue of the provisions of the Companies Act 2013, the Police cannot investigate the offences alleged against them as the investigation is relating to the matters touching upon the affairs of the Company. The learned counsel mainly places reliance upon the statutory stipulations contained in Section 212(6) r/w. 447 of the Companies Act. For convenience, both the said provisions are extracted below: “212. Investigation into affairs of Company by Serious Fraud Investigation Office.- ……….. …….. (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), offence covered under section 447 of this Act shall be cognizable and no person accused of any offence under those sections shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless- (i) the Public prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Provided that a person, who, is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm, may be released on bail, if the Special Court so directs: Provided further that the Special Court shall not take cognizance of any offence referred to this sub-section except upon a complaint in writing made by- (i) the Director, Serious Fraud Investigation Office; or (ii) any officer of the Central Government authorised, by a general or special order in writing in this behalf by the Government.” “S. 447. Punishment for fraud. - Without prejudice to any liability including repayment of any debt under this Act or any other law for the time being in force, any person who is found to be guilty of fraud [involving an amount of at least ten lakh rupees or one per cent, of the turnover of the company, whichever is lower], shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than the amount involved in the fraud, but which may extend to three times the amount involved in the fraud: Provided that where the fraud in question involves public interest, the term of imprisonment shall not be less than three years: [Provided further that where the fraud involves an amount less than ten lakh rupees or one per cent. of the turnover of the company, whichever is lower, and does not involve public interest, any person guilty of such fraud shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years or with fine which may extend to [ fifty lakh rupees] or with both.] Explanation. of the turnover of the company, whichever is lower, and does not involve public interest, any person guilty of such fraud shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years or with fine which may extend to [ fifty lakh rupees] or with both.] Explanation. - For the purposes of this section- (i)”fraud” in relation to affairs of a company or any body corporate, includes any act, omission, concealment of any fact or abuse of position committed by any person or any other person with the connivance in any manner, with intent to deceive, to gain undue advantage from, or to injure the interests of, the company or its shareholders or its creditors or any other person, whether or not there is any wrongful gain or wrongful loss; (ii) “wrongful gain” means the gain by unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is not legally entitled; (iii) “wrongful loss” means the loss by unlawful means of property to which the person losing is legally entitled.” 8. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners/accused Nos.1,2 and 5 is that as per the second proviso to Section 212(6), the cognizance can be taken only by the Special Court constituted, on the basis of a complaint made in writing made by the Director, Serious Fraud Investigation Office or any officer of the Central Government authorised by a general or special order in writing in this behalf by the Government. Thus, it is contemplated that an investigation into the offences referred to in Section 212(6) of the Act cannot be made by the Police. The learned counsel pointed out that Sub section (6) of Section 212 makes specific reference to the offences covered under Section 447 of the Companies Act, and therefore all the offences coming within the purview of Section 447 of the Act can only be investigated as per the special procedure contemplated under the Companies Act, 2013 and through no other means. It was pointed out that Section 447 of the Companies Act deals with the offences relating to ‘fraud’. It was pointed out that Section 447 of the Companies Act deals with the offences relating to ‘fraud’. The expression ‘fraud’ is defined as any act, omission, concealment of any fact or abuse of position committed by any person or any other person with the connivance in any manner, with intent to deceive, to gain undue advantage from, or to injure the interests of the company or its shareholders or its creditors or any other person. Therefore, according to him, any offence relating to the omission, concealment of any fact or abuse of position committed by any person with an intention to deceive or injure the interest of the Company or its shareholders in relation to the affairs of the said Company would come under the purview of Section 447 of the Companies Act. As far as the offences alleged against the accused in Annexure-A4 FIR are concerned, even though the said offences are under the provisions of IPC, the allegations which formed the basis of the said offences are in relation to the affairs of the said Company and are coming within the definition of ‘fraud’ as contained in Section 447 of the Companies Act, contends the learned counsel for the accused. 9. The learned Public Prosecutor, as well as the learned counsel appearing for the defacto complainant, stoutly opposes the prayer sought in this Crl. M.C by pointing out that the offences alleged in the complaint and incorporated in the FIR are distinct offences which need not be a subject matter of the special procedure for investigation, as contemplated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013. It was also pointed out that the Companies Act, 2013 does not absolutely prohibit an investigation being conducted for the offences under the IPC, even if the allegations pertain to the affairs of the said Company and the special procedure contemplated in the said Act are in relation to the commission of the offences under the Companies Act and the same cannot be extended to the offences of IPC. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the defacto complainant that the provisions under the Companies Act, 2013 cannot be made applicable to the offences for which crime was registered as the cause of action for the offences arose much prior to the enactment of the Companies Act, 2013. 10. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the defacto complainant that the provisions under the Companies Act, 2013 cannot be made applicable to the offences for which crime was registered as the cause of action for the offences arose much prior to the enactment of the Companies Act, 2013. 10. I have carefully gone through the materials placed on record, contentions raised from either side and various decisions relied on by both sides to substantiate their respective contentions. 11. The first and foremost aspect to be noticed is that, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the defacto complainant, the basic allegations against the accused in the crime are related to the creation of false documents and using the said documents to transfer the shares of the husband of the defacto complainant and also the properties of the Company in the name of the close relatives of the 1st accused. It was also specifically alleged that those transactions were effected by creating false documents by forging signatures of the defacto complainant and other shareholders. Another crucial aspect to be noticed is that those transactions have occurred prior to the enactment of the Companies Act, 2013. It is seen from Annexure R4(b) in the above Crl.M.C, which is a written statement filed by one of the Directors of the Company in O.S.No.104/2016 filed by the defacto complainant before the Sub Court, Kottayam, that the transactions which were allegedly made by the 1st accused clandestinely by creating false documents have occurred during the year, 2008. The petitioners in the Crl.M.C are also not disputing that all the transactions referred to in the complaint are prior to the enactment of the Companies Act, 2013. 12. Therefore, the primary question that arises is whether the interpretation of the term ‘fraud’ as defined under Section 447 of the Companies Act, 2013, which is an offence under the said provision, can be extended to include the acts admittedly committed prior to the enactment of the Companies Act. There cannot be any doubt on the proposition that the offences that can be charged against a person for the commission of a particular act, is based on the date on which such particular act was committed by the said person and laws applicable at the time of commission of the said act. There cannot be any doubt on the proposition that the offences that can be charged against a person for the commission of a particular act, is based on the date on which such particular act was committed by the said person and laws applicable at the time of commission of the said act. An offence which was introduced in a statute brought into force after the date of commission of such act, cannot be made applicable. This is because a particular act of a person, if it is an offence, can attract the penal provisions, which are prevailing at the time of commission of such offences and under no circumstances the same can be brought within the purview of any enactment which was subsequently brought into force, unless otherwise specifically provided. 13. In this case, the Companies Act, 2013 contemplates a special procedure for investigation of the offences by virtue of Section 212 of the Act. Sub-section (1) thereof contemplates an investigation into the affairs of the Company by a serious fraud investigation office. Such an investigation can be commenced on a receipt of the report of the Registrar or Inspector under section 208, or on intimation of a special resolution passed by a company that its affairs are required to be investigated or in the interest of the public interest or upon the request from any Department of the Central Government or a State Government. Therefore, as per section 212 of the Act, the investigation can be instituted as per the special procedure only based on the reports and the circumstances referred to above. The crucial aspect to be noticed is that, the complaint at the instance of the private individual is not contemplated therein. The remedy of a private individual or shareholder appears to be that he can approach the Registrar for initiating an inquiry under section 206 of the Companies Act. As per Sub-sections (6) of Section 212 of the Companies Act, certain special conditions are imposed for the purpose of the release of a person accused of the offences referred to therein on bail, and it also refers to the cognizance to be taken by the special court upon a complaint submitted by certain authorities alone. However, Sub-sections (6) of Section 212 of the Act, for its application, specifically refers to the offences covered under section 447 of the Act. However, Sub-sections (6) of Section 212 of the Act, for its application, specifically refers to the offences covered under section 447 of the Act. As mentioned above, Section 447 of the Act deals with the offences of ‘fraud’ in relation to the affairs of the Company and the term 'fraud' is also defined therein. However, the acts which may constitute 'fraud' for the purpose of Section 447 of the Act and to be a subject matter of prosecution for the said offence can only be in respect of the acts which were committed after the Companies Act, 2013 was brought into force. Since section 447 of the Companies Act, 2013, being a penal provision which deals with the punishment for the offence of “fraud”, is a substantive provision, unless specifically mentioned so, it cannot have any retrospective operation. Thus, it depends upon the date on which the offence was committed. In this case, evidently and undisputedly, the acts which are the subject matter of the complaint were allegedly committed by the accused persons prior to the enactment of the Companies Act, 2013, and therefore, under no circumstances, the operation of the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 can be brought in for regulating an investigation to be conducted by the police into the offences in Annexure-1 private complaint and Annexure-A4 FIR. 14. Even otherwise, it may not be possible to hold that the provisions in the Companies Act can act as a bar for conducting the investigation by the police in respect of the offences committed under the provisions of the IPC. In State of Maharashtra and Another v. Sayyed Subhan and Others [ (2019)18 SCC 145 ], a similar question in relation to the offences under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 and the offences under the Indian Penal Code was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. After referring to various provisions in the special statute and the IPC, it was observed in paragraphs 7 and 8 in the said case as follows: 7. There is no bar to a trial or conviction of an offender under two different enactments, but the bar is only to the punishment of the offender twice for the offence. After referring to various provisions in the special statute and the IPC, it was observed in paragraphs 7 and 8 in the said case as follows: 7. There is no bar to a trial or conviction of an offender under two different enactments, but the bar is only to the punishment of the offender twice for the offence. Where an act or an omission constitutes an offence under two enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. [T.S. Baliah v. T.S. Rangachari, (1969) 3 SCR 65 : AIR 1969 SC 701 ] The same set of facts, in conceivable cases, can constitute offences under two different laws. An act or an omission can amount to and constitute an offence under IPC and at the same time, an offence under any other law. [State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, (1988) 4 SCC 655 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 27] The High Court ought to have taken note of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which reads as follows: “26. Provision as to offences punishable under two or more enactments.—Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.” 8. In Hat Singh case [State of Rajasthan v. Hat Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 152 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 451] this Court discussed the doctrine of double jeopardy and Section 26 of the General Clauses Act to observe that prosecution under two different Acts is permissible if the ingredients of the provisions are satisfied on the same facts. While considering a dispute about the prosecution of the respondent therein for offences under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and the Penal Code, this Court in [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 437] held that there is no bar in prosecuting persons under the Penal Code where the offences committed by persons are penal and cognizable offences. A perusal of the provisions of the FSS Act would make it clear that there is no bar for prosecution under IPC merely because the provisions in the FSS Act prescribe penalties. We, therefore, set aside the finding of the High Court on the first point. Similarly, in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay [ (2014)9 SCC 772 ]=2014(3)KLT 1033, the question relating to the prosecution of the persons for the offences under the IPC in light of the offences under section 21 and 22 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation)Act, 1957 was considered. After referring to a large number of decisions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in paragraph 71 in the manner as follows: “71. From a close reading of the provisions of the MMDR Act and the offence defined under Section 378 IPC, it is manifest that the ingredients constituting the offence are different. The contravention of terms and conditions of mining lease or doing mining activity in violation of Section 4 of the Act is an offence punishable under Section 21 of the MMDR Act, whereas dishonestly removing sand, gravel and other minerals from the river, which is the property of the State, out of the State's possession without the consent, constitute an offence of theft. Hence, merely because initiation of proceeding for commission of an offence under the MMDR Act on the basis of complaint cannot and shall not debar the police from taking action against persons for committing theft of sand and minerals in the manner mentioned above by exercising power under the Code of Criminal Procedure and submit a report before the Magistrate for taking cognizance against such persons. In other words, in a case where there is a theft of sand and gravel from the government land, the police can register a case, investigate the same and submit a final report under Section 173 CrPC before a Magistrate having jurisdiction for the purpose of taking cognizance as provided in Section 190(1)(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure” 15. In State of Bombay v. S.L.Apte [ AIR 1961 SC 578 ], it was observed by a constitution bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows: “To operate as a bar the second prosecution and the consequential punishment thereunder must be for ‘the same offence’. In State of Bombay v. S.L.Apte [ AIR 1961 SC 578 ], it was observed by a constitution bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows: “To operate as a bar the second prosecution and the consequential punishment thereunder must be for ‘the same offence’. The crucial requirement, therefore, for attracting the article is that the offences are the same i.e. they should be identical. If, however, the two offences are distinct, then notwithstanding that the allegations of facts in the two complaints might be substantially similar, the benefit of the ban cannot be invoked. It is, therefore, necessary to analyse and compare not the allegations in the two complaints but the ingredients of the two offences and see whether their identity is made out. It would be seen from a comparison of Section 105 of the Insurance Act and Section 405 of the Penal Code (Section 409 of the Penal Code being only an aggravated form of the same offence) that though some of the necessary ingredients are common they differ in the following: (1) Whereas under Section 405 of the Penal Code the accused must be entrusted’ with property or with ‘dominion over that property’, under Section 105 of the Insurance Act the entrustment or dominion over property is unnecessary; it is sufficient if the manager, director, etc. ‘obtains possession’ of the property. (2) The offence of criminal breach of trust (Section 405 of the Penal Code) is not committed unless the act of misappropriation or conversion or ‘the disposition in violation of the law or contract’, is done with a dishonest intention, but Section 105 of the Insurance Act postulates no intention and punishes as an offence the mere withholding of the property—whatever be the intent with which the same is done, and the act of application of the property of an insurer to purposes other than those authorised by the Act is similarly without reference to any intent with which such application or misapplication is made. In these circumstances it does not seem possible to say that the offence of criminal breach of trust under the Penal Code is the ‘same offence’ for which the respondents were prosecuted on the complaint of the company charging them with an offence under Section 105 of the Insurance Act.” 16. In these circumstances it does not seem possible to say that the offence of criminal breach of trust under the Penal Code is the ‘same offence’ for which the respondents were prosecuted on the complaint of the company charging them with an offence under Section 105 of the Insurance Act.” 16. Thus, when the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions are made applicable to the facts of this case, it can be seen that, there is no absolute prohibition in investigating into the matter even if the offences alleged against the accused persons are having some trappings of the offences under the Companies Act. As held in Sayyed Subhan's case (supra), where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender can be prosecuted and convicted under both enactments. However, the only restriction is that the offender shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. Therefore, there is no absolute prohibition for conducting an investigation, even if it is assumed for argument sake that the offence would come under the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013. 17. There is yet another aspect which fortifies the contention of the defacto complainant. On going through the statutory stipulations contained in sub-section(6) of Section 212, the prohibition is with respect to taking cognizance of the offences triable by the special court. The expression used in the second proviso is to the effect that “provided further that the special court shall not take cognizance of any offence referred to this sub-section...............” There are two aspects in this case, first of all, the restrictions imposed in this provision are regarding taking cognizance by a special court and secondly, the cognizance contemplated therein is in relation to the offence referred to in the sub-section which means the offence under section 447 of the Companies Act as it is specifically referred to in subsection (6) of Section 212 of the Act. In this case, the offences which are now being investigated into by the police in Annexure-A4 crime are in relation to the offences under the provisions of the IPC and, therefore would not come under the offences referred to in sub-section (6) of section 212 of the Act. In this case, the offences which are now being investigated into by the police in Annexure-A4 crime are in relation to the offences under the provisions of the IPC and, therefore would not come under the offences referred to in sub-section (6) of section 212 of the Act. Moreover, the offences which are now being investigated are to be taken cognizance of by regular criminal courts and not by a special court constituted under the provisions of the Companies Act. Therefore, even though, the offences alleged against the accused have some relation to the affairs of the said company, that would not take away the right of a private individual to resort to criminal prosecution for the offences contemplated under the IPC in the absence of a specific prohibition in this regard. Moreover, the offences were allegedly committed prior to the enactment of the Companies Act, 2013 and therefore, no prosecution can be launched under the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013. Therefore, I am unable to find any prohibition in the matter of investigation being conducted into the offences alleged in the private complaint and the FIR registered in connection with the case. Moreover, it is to be noted that specific allegations raised in the said complaint are in relation to the manipulation of records, forging of signatures and creation of false documents, which are clearly coming under the definition of the offences under sections 406,465, 467 and 468 of IPC. 18. The learned counsel for the accused also contended that, since a special procedure for investigation by experts in Company affairs is contemplated for the offences related to the affairs of the said company, the police are not competent to conduct an investigation into the same. He also placed reliance upon the decisions rendered by the Telangana High. Court in M/s Heera Gold Exim Pvt Ltd v. State of Telangana (CDJ 2020 TSFC 325 and Sumana Paruchuri v,. Jakka Vinod Kumar Reddy ( CDJ 2022 TSHC 232). However, I am not inclined to accept the said contention for various reasons. Firstly, I have already found that, the offences were allegedly committed prior to the enactment of the Companies Act, 2013 and therefore, the provisions therein are not applicable. Jakka Vinod Kumar Reddy ( CDJ 2022 TSHC 232). However, I am not inclined to accept the said contention for various reasons. Firstly, I have already found that, the offences were allegedly committed prior to the enactment of the Companies Act, 2013 and therefore, the provisions therein are not applicable. Moreover, the allegations in the complaint related to the creation of false documents by committing forgery, which would prima facie attract the offences under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. Even though the said offences were allegedly committed in relation to the properties of the company and its shares, since the basic allegations are the creation of false records, I am of the view that, the police can effectively investigate the same matter. Further, the offences referred to in section 212 (6) and 447 of the Companies Act, pertains to the offences under the Companies Act, and the said procedure cannot prevent the police from conducting an investigation for the offences that would attract the offences under the Indian Penal Code. The decisions relied on by the accused are also decided in different factual circumstances and therefore the observations made therein cannot be made applicable to this case as well. 19. The learned counsel for the accused also raised various contentions with regard to the falsity of the allegations raised in the complaint. However, I am of the view that, those contentions cannot be considered at this juncture as the matter is being investigated. Now, the relief sought in the Crl.MC is to quash FIR and all further proceedings pursuant to the said crime. The scope of this Court in interfering with the investigation is very much limited. When considering the challenge against an FIR, the jurisdiction of this Court is very limited, and interference can be made only if it is shown that, even if the allegations made in the complaint are accepted for its face value, it would not make out any of the offences alleged therein. For considering the said aspect, what is to be taken into consideration is the allegations raised and not the materials produced in respect of the same as the said materials are to be evaluated by the investigation agency and to decide whether a final charge is to be laid or not. For considering the said aspect, what is to be taken into consideration is the allegations raised and not the materials produced in respect of the same as the said materials are to be evaluated by the investigation agency and to decide whether a final charge is to be laid or not. Therefore, this Court has to proceed with the assumption while considering the challenge against the FIR that the allegations raised therein are true, and even then, the said allegations would not make out the ingredients for attracting the offences. However, on going through the contents of the private complaint and the FIR registered based on the same, it can be seen that specific allegations are raised against the accused persons so as to constitute the offences alleged against them at least prima facie. The matter is under investigation. It is also to be noted in this regard that, crime has been registered in the year 2015, and the accused persons have approached this Court only in the year, 2022. Therefore, I do not find any justification in interfering in the investigation, allowing the prayers sought in this Crl.M.C. 20. As far as the prayers sought in the Writ Petition filed by the defacto complainant are concerned, the crucial aspect to be noticed is that even though the crime was registered in the year, 2015, the final report has not been submitted so far. The defacto complainant has earlier approached this Court seeking to transfer the investigation agency by entrusting the same to the CBI, and this Court, as per judgment in WP(C) No.17170/2018, entrusted the investigation to the Crime Branch. The said judgment was passed on 18.11.2019, and even now, the investigation has not been completed. The status of the investigation is discernible from the statement submitted by the investigation officer in Crl.MC No.5052/2020. The said statement would reveal that several transactions, which appears to be prima facie illegal, were allegedly committed by the accused persons. Therefore, after considering the statement of the investigation agency, I am of the view that investigation in this case needs to be expedited. The said statement would reveal that several transactions, which appears to be prima facie illegal, were allegedly committed by the accused persons. Therefore, after considering the statement of the investigation agency, I am of the view that investigation in this case needs to be expedited. Thus, while dismissing Crl.M.C.No.5052/2020 filed by the accused Nos.1,2 and 5 in Crime No.1785/2015 of Kottayam West Police, it is directed that investigation in the said crime, which is now being conducted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, District Crime Branch, Kottayam be expedited and concluded without any delay and submit a final report within a period of six months from the date of production of a copy of this judgment.