JUDGMENT : 1. The appellant – State of Gujarat has preferred the present Appeal under Section 378 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 01.03.2006 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Special Judge, Fast Track Court No.10, Rajkot at Morbi (hereinafter referred to as the "Trial Court") in Special Case No.02 of 2000, whereby the respondent-original accused was acquitted from the charge levelled against him under Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 2. The facts in brief giving rise to the filing of present Appeal are as under: 2.1 The respondent - accused, who was discharging his duties as Police Inspector of Morbi City Police Station, during the period from 25.06.1998 to 16.08.1999, though being Government Servant was collecting bribe amount from the owners of the private luxury buses and the administrators of the said luxury buses for driving the same on the road from Morbi city to other cities. Thus, for his personal gain, he was collecting cash money from the drivers of the said buses. The accused, though there was notification of District Collector bearing Sr. No. G.H.G./641/1999 dtd. 26.04.1998 by which there was a ban to ply or to park private buses within 100 mtr. of Morbi Bus Station, after taking bribe amount permitted them to ply the same and to park the same within the said area. Thus, the accused committed breach of said notification and also committed offence punishable under Section 13 of Prevention of Corruption Act. Therefore, FIR came to be registered against the accused person - present respondent. 2.2 On the basis of the said FIR, investigation was carried out by the Investigating Officer and after having sufficient material and evidence on record, the Investigating Officer has filed charge-sheet against the accused and submitted the same before the concerned Court and the same is registered as Special Case No. 2 of 2000. 2.3 Thereafter, after verifying whether the accused was given all the necessary police papers or not, the learned Special Judge framed charges against the accused to which the plea of the accused was recorded, wherein he denied his involvement in the offence. 3. To prove its case, the prosecution has examined fifteen witnesses and produced various documentary evidence before the concerned Trial Court. 3. To prove its case, the prosecution has examined fifteen witnesses and produced various documentary evidence before the concerned Trial Court. However, learned Additional Sessions Judge, Special Judge, Fast Track Court No.10, Rajkot at Morbi, after hearing both the parties vide his judgment and order dated 01.03.2006 passed in Special Case No. 2 of 2000 has acquitted the accused of the offences with which he was charged. 4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order dated 01.03.2006 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Special Judge, Fast Track Court No.10, Rajkot at Morbi in Special Case No.2 of 2000, the State of Gujarat has filed present Appeal. 5. Heard Ms. Maithili Mehta, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant – State of Gujarat and Mr. Arpit Kapadia, learned Counsel for the respondent herein - accused. 6. While referring to the evidence on record, Ms. Maithili Mehta learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant – State of Gujarat has vehemently submitted that there is serious charge of demanding illegal gratification against the respondent - accused. She further submitted that the said charge is proved from the depositions of the witnesses. She further submitted that from the deposition of the witnesses the facts reveal to the effect that the witnesses gathered at the Morbi Circuit House to meet the M.L.A. of the Morbi City for the purpose of making representation against present respondent with regard to the demand of illegal gratification from the owners of the public transport vehicles, which were plying between Rajkot and Morbi and Vankaner and Morbi. She further submitted that in that view of the matter, the learned Trial Judge ought to have appreciated this evidence and convicted the accused person. It is further contended by Ms. Mehta, learned APP that though there is ample evidence against the accused with regard to illegal gratification, as all the witnesses have confirmed the said fact that they went to the circuit house to make representation to the concerned M.L.A. against present respondent for demand of illegal gratification. However, the said aspect is not considered by the learned Trial Judge while appreciating the evidence of those witnesses in its true and proper spirit and thereby committed an error while passing the impugned judgment and order and therefore, the same deserves to be quashed. It is further contended by Ms. However, the said aspect is not considered by the learned Trial Judge while appreciating the evidence of those witnesses in its true and proper spirit and thereby committed an error while passing the impugned judgment and order and therefore, the same deserves to be quashed. It is further contended by Ms. Maithili Mehta, learned APP for the appellant – State of Gujarat that the learned Trial Judge measurably failed to appreciate the evidence led by the prosecution in its true and proper spirit hence, the impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial Court acquitting the accused is bad in law and is required to be set aside and present Appeal may be allowed. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Arpit Kapadia, learned Counsel for the respondent has opposed the present appeal and has supported the finding recorded by the learned Trial Judge and submitted that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal recorded by the learned Trial Judge is in consonance with the provisions of settled legal principle and there is no infirmity or perversity in the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and therefore, this Court may not entertain present Appeal. Mr. Kapadia, learned Counsel for the respondent accused has further submitted that it is settled legal principle that while interfering in the acquittal order recorded by the Trial Court the Appellate Court has very limited jurisdiction that if and when the Appellate Court finds any illegality or any perversity or any erroneous findings, then only in that circumstance, the Appellate Court can interfere in the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court. 8. I have perused the relevant materials available on record and evidence led by the prosecution. I have also gone through the original records and proceedings of the Appeal as well as impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial Court. 9. As the case is registered under the provision of Prevention and Corruption Act, the basic ingredients of demand and acceptance are to be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. 10. The case of the prosecution is that they have received certain information with regard to demand of illegal gratification made by the respondent accused to all the transporters, who were plying their vehicles on root from Morbi to Rajkot and Morbi to Vankaner. 10. The case of the prosecution is that they have received certain information with regard to demand of illegal gratification made by the respondent accused to all the transporters, who were plying their vehicles on root from Morbi to Rajkot and Morbi to Vankaner. With regard to the demand of illegal gratification made by the present respondent-original accused a representation was made to M.L.A.. It is relevant to note herein that from the evidence recorded by the Trial Court of the witnesses, I have not found any material which supports to the case of the prosecution. From the bare reading of the evidence of the witnesses, the fact reveals that there was no case of demand nor any material available with regard to the acceptance. Even, there is no case is found against the accused with regard to the demand and recovery or any acceptance with regard to illegal gratification, which is the preliminary requirement to register, the case against the accused person under Sections 13(1)(d), 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In present case, even from the bare reading of the evidence of the complainant, who is police officer and who has recorded the FIR against present respondent, it comes out that from the statement of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code, the said fact of illegal demand or acceptance or any recovery is not borne out against present respondent accused and there is no illicit material come out from the deposition of any of the witnesses, which lead to connect or draw any presumption with regard to the demand of illegal gratification and acceptance on part of the respondent accused. 11. It is also relevant to note herein that though it is a case of demand of illegal gratification, the FIR is not registered by the competent A.C.B. Police Station but the said F.I.R. is registered by the officer of P.I. of L.C.B., Rajkot Rural Police Station. It is also required to be noted herein that the very officer who has registered the FIR has carried out the investigation, which is also against the settled principles of law that the person who has registered the FIR cannot investigate the case further against accused person. It is also required to be noted herein that the very officer who has registered the FIR has carried out the investigation, which is also against the settled principles of law that the person who has registered the FIR cannot investigate the case further against accused person. Hence, learned Trial Judge has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, after appreciating the evidence of the witnesses and after considering the submissions on behalf of the accused. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that the Trial Court has not committed any illegality or error while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 12. At this stage, it is relevant to take into account Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, which read thus:- “7. Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act. — Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in clause (c) of section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than six months but which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation — (a) “Expecting to be a public servant”. If a person not expecting to be in office obtains a gratification by deceiving others into a belief that he is about to be in office, and that he will then serve them, he may be guilty of cheating, but he is not guilty of the offence defined in this section. (b) “Gratification”. The word “gratification” is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in money. (c) “Legal remuneration”. (b) “Gratification”. The word “gratification” is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in money. (c) “Legal remuneration”. The words “legal remuneration” are not restricted to remuneration which a public servant can lawfully demand, but include all remuneration which he is permitted by the Government or the organisation, which he serves, to accept. (d) “A motive or reward for doing”. A person who receives a gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend or is not in a position to do, or has not done, comes within this expression. (e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneously to believe that his influence with the Government has obtained a title for that person and thus induces that person to give the public servant, money or any other. 13. (e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneously to believe that his influence with the Government has obtained a title for that person and thus induces that person to give the public servant, money or any other. 13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.— (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct, — (a) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any other person any gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7; or (b) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain for himself or for any other person, any valuable thing without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate from any person whom he knows to have been, or to be, or to be likely to be concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or about to be transacted by him, or having any connection with the official functions of himself or of any public servant to whom he is subordinate, or from any person whom he knows to be interested in or related to the person so concerned; or (c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or allows any other person so to do; or (d) if he - (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest; or (iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest; or (e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “known sources of income” means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. (2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.” 13. It is well settled by catena of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the Trial Court. 14. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged. 15. It is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 . The relevant paragraph of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandrappa (supra) reads as under:- “The following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 16. Even otherwise, considering the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court in the case of A. Subair Vs. State of Kerala, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 587 , State of Kerala and another Vs. C. P. Rao, reported in (2011) 6 SCC 450 , Neeraj Datta Vs. State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi) reported in AIR 2023 SC 330 and State of Gujarat Vs. Ratilal Hirji Jobanputra reported in 2023 LawSuit (Guj.) 783, this Court is of the opinion that the present appeal being meritless deserves to be dismissed. 17. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court, it clearly transpires that the Trial Court has taken into consideration all the facts while acquitting the accused. The impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court is not perverse one and it is based on the evidence on record. The same does not warrant any interference at the hands of this Court and the same is sustainable in the eyes of law. This Court is in complete agreement with the impugned judgment and order of the learned Special Judge. 18. For the foregoing reasons, the present appeal is devoid of merits and it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, it is dismissed. The impugned judgment and order dated 01.03.2006 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Special Judge, Fast Track Court No.10, Rajkot at Morbi in Special Case No.02 of 2000 is hereby confirmed. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.