ORDER : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. I.A. No. 8138 of 2019 This application has been filed for condonation of delay of 54 days in filing the present appeal. 2. Having considered the statements made in the application, the delay of 54 days in filing the present appeal is condoned. 3. I.A. No. 8138 of 2019 is, accordingly, allowed. L.P.A. No. 549 of 2019 4. The order passed by the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 has been affirmed by the writ Court in WP(L) No.4265 of 2018. 5. While dismissing WP(L) No.4265 of 2018, the writ Court has made the following observations: “7. …..................................................................................... The controlling authority by putting reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of D.S. Nakara and Vrs. Union of India, since the plea was taken by the petitioner that the other similarly situated employee has been extended the benefit of gratuity, has passed the order directing for making payment of gratuity. It is the admitted case of the petitioner that he had performed his duty for a period of 153 days and as such it cannot be said that he has discharged, continuous service of 240 days as per the stipulation made under the provision of Section 2A of the Act, 1972. So far as the finding recorded by the controlling authority with respect to granting benefit in favour of the other similarly situated employees which has been negated by the Appellate Authority on the ground of Article 14 of the Constitution of India which does not envisage negative equality. This Court is of the view that the gratuity is a right of the employee, if covered under the Act, 1972 and is to be paid subject to fulfillment of the terms and conditions stipulated therein. Admittedly, the petitioner has not fulfilled the continuous discharge of duty for a period of 240 days rather he has discharged duty only for 153 days, and therefore, he is held not entitled to get the gratuity for the aforesaid period. Admittedly, the petitioner has not fulfilled the continuous discharge of duty for a period of 240 days rather he has discharged duty only for 153 days, and therefore, he is held not entitled to get the gratuity for the aforesaid period. So far as the finding of the controlling authority that since the others have been paid, so the petitioner is also entitled to get the same in view of the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution of the India but the same has been negated by the Appellate Authority, this Court is of the view that the controlling authority is not right in passing the order merely on account of the fact that the others have been paid, even though they were not entitled to get as per the provision of the Payment of Gratuity Act,1972 as discussed hereinabove, but the said finding has been reversed by the appellate authority which cannot be said to be illegal, it is for the reason that as per the settled legal position, Article 14 of the Constitution of India is not meant to perpetuate illegally since Article 14 envisages positive equality and not the negative one, otherwise if on the basis of wrong committed, relief would be granted to them that would lead to allowing the illegality to be perpetuated, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chaman Lal Vrs. State of Punjab and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC 3640 , wherein at Paragraph 15 as quoted hereinbelow:- “15. Moreso, it is also settled legal proposition that Article 14 does not envisage for negative equality. In case a wrong benefit has been conferred upon someone inadvertently or otherwise it may not be a ground to grant similar relief to others. This Court in Basawaraj and Anr. V. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2014 SC 746 considered this issue and held as under: “It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases. The said provision does not envisage negative equality but has only a positive aspect. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2014 SC 746 considered this issue and held as under: “It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases. The said provision does not envisage negative equality but has only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some relief/benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as well. If a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforce by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a similarly wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise, Article 14 cannot be stretched too far for otherwise it would make functioning of administration impossible. (Vide: Chandigarh Administration and Anr. v. Jagjit Singh and Anr., AIR 1995 SC 705 ; M/s. Anand Button Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Ors., AIR 2005 SC 565 ; K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. and Ors., AIR 2006 SC 898 ; and Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab, AIR 2010 SC 1937 ).” Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Basawaraj and Anr. Vrs. Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81 wherein at Paragraph-8 mentioned as hereinbelow :- “8. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases. The said provision does not envisage negative equality but has only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some relief/benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as well. The said provision does not envisage negative equality but has only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some relief/benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as well. If a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a similarly wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise, Article 14 cannot be stretched too far for otherwise it would make functioning of administration impossible. (Vide Chandigarh Admn. V. Jagjit Singh, Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana, K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. and Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab.)” In view thereof, and as per the aforesaid legal proposition and on the basis of reason referred hereinabove, according to the considered view of this Court the appellate authority while reversing the order passed by the controlling authority, has committed no illegality, therefore, this Court refrains itself to interfere with the order passed by the appellate authority in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. This writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly, dismissed.” 6. Aggrieved thereof, Anil Kumar Sinha who was initially engaged as Seasonal Message Assistant under the Damodar Valley Corporation (in short, DVC) has challenged the order dated 29th March 2019 by which WP(L) No.4265 of 2018 has been dismissed. 7. In “Garment Cleaning Works v. Workmen” (1962) 1 SCR 711 , it was observed that the gratuity is not paid to the employee gratuitously or merely as a matter of boon rather, it is paid to him for long and meritorious service rendered by him to the employer. Ordinarily, pension includes gratuity except, when the term “pension” is used in contradistinction to gratuity. Ordinarily, pension includes gratuity except, when the term “pension” is used in contradistinction to gratuity. It is well settled that pension is property within the meaning of Article 300 A of the Constitution of India and a workman can be deprived of benefit of pension only in accordance with law. In “Balbir Kaur and anr. v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors.” (2000) 6 SCC 493 , it has been held that “the payment of gratuity is no longer in the realm of charity but it is the statutory right provided in favour of the employee”. 8. In “Ahmedabad (P) Primary Teachers' Assn. v. Administrative Officer” (2004) 1 SCC 755 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “6. The Act is a piece of social welfare legislation and deals with the payment of gratuity which is a kind of retiral benefit like pension, provident fund etc. As has been explained in the concurring opinion of one of the learned Judges of the High Court “gratuity in its etymological sense is a gift, especially for services rendered, or return for favours received”. It has now been universally recognized that all persons in society need protection against loss of income due to unemployment arising out of incapacity to work due to invalidity, old age etc. For the wage-earning population, security of income, when the worker becomes old or infirm, is of consequential importance. The provisions contained in the Act are in the nature of social-security measures like employment insurance, provident fund and pension. The Act accepts, in principle, compulsory payment of gratuity as a social-security measure to wage-earning population in industries, factories and establishments. 7. Thus, the main purpose and concept of gratuity is to help the workman after retirement, whether retirement is a result of rules of superannuation or physical disablement or impairment of vital part of the body. The expression “gratuity” itself suggests that it is a gratuitous payment given to an employee on discharge, superannuation or death. Gratuity is an amount paid unconnected with any consideration and not resting upon it, and has to be considered as something given freely, voluntarily or without recompense. It is a sort of financial assistance to tide over post-retiral hardships and inconveniences.” 9. With the aforesaid object behind payment of gratuity in mind, we would now examine the claim raised before the Controlling Authority. It is a sort of financial assistance to tide over post-retiral hardships and inconveniences.” 9. With the aforesaid object behind payment of gratuity in mind, we would now examine the claim raised before the Controlling Authority. The appellant who superannuated from service on 31st January 2014 approached the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act seeking payment of gratuity for whole of the period from 1st June 1978 to 31st January 2014. This is not in dispute that the appellant was engaged as Seasonal Message Assistant at MRO's office on 1st June 1978 and continued to render service for about 5 months every year till 31st October 2004 and thereafter between 1st June 1979 to 31st October 1979. This is also not in dispute that he worked as casual labour for the period between 1st June 1979 to 31st October 2004 and thereafter he was regularized in service by appointment on the post of Assistant-cum-Typist at GOMD-II at Maithan under the DVC w.e.f. 20th May 2005. The claim raised by the appellant is that from 1978 to 2004 during which period he worked for about 11.25 years gratuity shall be payable to him. The Controlling Authority has recorded his evidence and having examined the documents laid in evidence by the parties recorded a finding that the employee has worked for 153 days every year during the period of his temporary employment. 10. However, on the ground that the other employees or their dependents have been paid gratuity for their temporary period of employment the Controlling Authority has held that gratuity payable to the appellant shall be calculated for the total length of service which comes about 19 years, 11 months and 11 days. In this context, the Controlling Authority has referred to the judgment in “D.S. Nakara v. Union of India” (1983) 1 SCC 305 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “31. In this context, the Controlling Authority has referred to the judgment in “D.S. Nakara v. Union of India” (1983) 1 SCC 305 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “31. From the discussion three things emerge: (i) that pension is neither a bounty nor a matter of grace depending upon the sweet will of the employer and that it creates a vested right subject to 1972 Rules which are statutory in character because they are enacted in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 and clause (5) of Article 148 of the Constitution; (ii) that the pension is not an ex gratia payment but it is a payment for the past service rendered; and (iii) it is a social welfare measure rendering socio-economic justice to those who in the hey-day of their life ceaselessly toiled for the employer on an assurance that in their old age they would not be left in lurch. ….....................” 11. The Appellate Authority has however interfered with the aforesaid order dated 30th November 2017 for the following reasons: “During the hearing the counsel for the Appellant has submitted that some persons have got gratuity for the casual period of service wrongly from 1978 to 2004 and the concerned officers have been directed to recover the same from the Pension (DA portion). The Respondent does not dispute the claim of the employer that during the period from 1978 to 2004 he worked for 150 days. If some ex-employees have been paid gratuity for the above period due to the mistakes or negligence of the office staff of DVC, this Authority cannot perpetuate this wrong. The Controlling Authority or the Appellate Authority cannot go beyond the proviso of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. In order to be eligible to get gratuity an employee should work at least for 240 days in a year which is not so in the present case. An employee/applicant cannot take advantage of a wrong committed by the office staff.” 12. The Appellate Authority has come to the aforesaid conclusion for the reason that the appellant did not work for 240 days in any year between 1978 to 2004 and therefore shall not be entitled for payment of gratuity for the said period. 13. Mr. An employee/applicant cannot take advantage of a wrong committed by the office staff.” 12. The Appellate Authority has come to the aforesaid conclusion for the reason that the appellant did not work for 240 days in any year between 1978 to 2004 and therefore shall not be entitled for payment of gratuity for the said period. 13. Mr. Ajit Kumar, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant was engaged by the DVC and he was always ready and willing to discharge his duty as temporary Message Assistant but the employer did not permit him to work for even 240 days and therefore an inference must be drawn in favour of the employee. 14. Plainly speaking, the submission raised at bar is that it is not the period of days over which an employee has worked in a year which is important rather what is important is to see whether the employee has been in service of the employer and ready and willing to work. 15. To lay support of this submission, Mr. Ajit Kumar, the learned counsel for the appellant has referred to a decision of the Kerala High Court in “Vallabadas Kanji (Private), Ltd. v. Esmail Koya” 1977 SCC OnLine Ker 44 wherein a learned Single Judge has observed as under: “8. It appears to me that when once it is shown that a person is employed on wages as contradistinct to being engaged on wages the Payment of Gratuity Act applies to such person because the period of service including the period during which he was given no work due to no fault of his would be a period of continuous service. This is the view taken by the controlling authority and appellate authority and I cannot see any obvious error of law in that view.” 16. In the first place, we must indicate that a judgment is an authority for what it decides and it is the ratio decidendi of the judgment which alone is used as a precedent. In “Amrendra Pratap Singh Vs. Tej Bahadur Prajapati & Ors.” (2004) 10 SCC 65 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus, 28. In the first place, we must indicate that a judgment is an authority for what it decides and it is the ratio decidendi of the judgment which alone is used as a precedent. In “Amrendra Pratap Singh Vs. Tej Bahadur Prajapati & Ors.” (2004) 10 SCC 65 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus, 28. “............A judicial decision is an authority for what it actually decides and not for what can be read into it by implication or by assigning an assumed intention to the judges, and inferring from it a proposition of law which the judges have not specifically laid down in the pronouncement..........” 17. In “Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd. v. DMRC” (2022) 9 SCC 286 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that a judgment cannot be applied in every case de hors the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, it is well remembered that even minor difference in the facts of a case can be the reason for not applying the ratio of a judgment. 18. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under section 2A of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. A mere glance at the provisions under section 2A would disclose that the definition of continuous service is exhaustive and it takes note of different situations which are enumerated under sub-section (2) as under: “2A. Continuous Service. —For the purpose of this Act …...................................................................................................... A mere glance at the provisions under section 2A would disclose that the definition of continuous service is exhaustive and it takes note of different situations which are enumerated under sub-section (2) as under: “2A. Continuous Service. —For the purpose of this Act …...................................................................................................... (2) where an employee (not being an employee employed in a seasonal establishment) is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1), for any period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under the employer— (a) for the said period of one year, if the employee during the period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than— (i) one hundred and ninety days, in the case of any employee employed below the ground in a mine or in an establishment which works for less than six days in a week; and (ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case; (b) for the said period of six months, if the employee during the period of six calendar months preceding the date with reference to which the calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than— (i) ninety-five days, in the case of an employee employed below the ground in a mine or in an establishment which works for less than six days in a week; and (ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case.” 19. Having regard to the fact that there is a statutory requirement of working for 240 days in a year except the cases enumerated under subclause (a)(i) and (b)(i) & (ii) to sub-section (2) to section 2A of the Payment of Gratuity Act, we do not find any reason to interfere in this matter and would affirm the writ Court's order dated 29th March 2019. 20. L.P.A. No.549 of 2019 is dismissed.