ORDER 1. This Petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been filed seeking following reliefs: 1. That, this Honble Court may kindly be please to direct the respondent no.3 to issue the appointment order of the petitioners as soon as possible. 2. That, this Honble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondents to compassionate the petitioners which has been occurred due to negligency of the respondents. 3. Any other relief which this Honble Court may deem fit and may also be granted. 4. "Amended by court order dated 29.08.2020." That, this Honble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the letter date 11.11.2019 in relation to cancellation of merit list of petitioners which has been issued by respondent no.3. 2. It is the case of petitioners that they appeared in examination of Group-IV Combined Recruitment Examination, 2018 conducted by Professional Examination Board and on 12.12.2018 some candidates were selected to the post of Assistant Grade-III and some were selected for Steno Typist in the department of Chief Electoral Officer. It is submitted that respondent No.3 is under obligation to issue appointment orders of petitioners within three months of their selection as per procedure of recruitment but they have not issued the same till today, whereas validity of merit list is up to 12.12.2019. Thus, it is the case of petitioners that although they have been selected but their orders of appointment have not been issued. Thereafter, during pendency of writ petition, the petition was amended and an additional relief was claimed thereby seeking quashment of order dated 11.11.2019 by which merit list was cancelled. 3. The moot question for consideration is as to whether a selected candidate has a right to claim appointment or not? 4. The question is no more res integra. 5. The Supreme Court in the case of Union Territory of Chandigarh Vs. Dilbagh Singh and Others reported in (1993) 1 SCC 154 has held as under: "12. 3. The moot question for consideration is as to whether a selected candidate has a right to claim appointment or not? 4. The question is no more res integra. 5. The Supreme Court in the case of Union Territory of Chandigarh Vs. Dilbagh Singh and Others reported in (1993) 1 SCC 154 has held as under: "12. If we have regard to the above enunciation that a candidate who finds a place in the select list as a candidate selected for appointment to a civil post, does not acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed in such post in the absence of any specific rule entitling him for such appointment and he could be aggrieved by his nonappointment only when the Administration does so either arbitrarily or for no bona fide reasons, it follows as a necessary concomitant that such candidate even if has a legitimate expectation of being appointed in such posts due to his name finding a place in the select list of candidates, cannot claim to have a right to be heard before such select list is cancelled for bona fide and valid reasons and not arbitrarily. In the instant case, when the Chandigarh Administration which received the complaints about the unfair and injudicious manner in which select list of candidates for appointment as conductors in CTU was prepared by the Selection Board constituted for the purpose, found those complaints to be well founded on an enquiry got made in that regard, we are unable to find that the Chandigarh Administration had acted either arbitrarily or without bona fide and valid reasons in cancelling such dubious select list. Hence, the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents as to the sustainability of the judgment of CAT under appeal on the ground of non-affording of an opportunity of hearing to the respondents (candidates in the select list) is a misconceived one and is consequently rejected." 6. The Supreme Court in the case of Shankarsan Dash Vs. Union of India reported in (1991) 3 SCC 47 has held as under: "7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Union of India reported in (1991) 3 SCC 47 has held as under: "7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted. This correct position has been consistently followed by this Court, and we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha [ (1974) 3 SCC 220 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 488 : (1974) 1 SCR 165 ], Neelima Shangla v. State of Haryana [ (1986) 4 SCC 268 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 759], or Jatinder Kumar v. State of Punjab [ (1985) 1 SCC 122 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 174 : (1985) 1 SCR 899 ]. " 7. The Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. And Others Vs. Rajkumar Sharma And Others reported in (2006) 3 SCC 330 has held as under: "14. Selectees cannot claim the appointment as a matter of right. Mere inclusion of candidate's name in the list does not confer any right to be selected, even if some of the vacancies remained unfilled and the candidates concerned cannot claim that they have been given a hostile discrimination. Selectees cannot claim the appointment as a matter of right. Mere inclusion of candidate's name in the list does not confer any right to be selected, even if some of the vacancies remained unfilled and the candidates concerned cannot claim that they have been given a hostile discrimination. (See Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India [ (1991) 3 SCC 47 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 800 : (1991) 17 ATC 95 : AIR 1991 SC 1612 ] ; Asha Kaul v. State of J&K [ (1993) 2 SCC 573 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 637 : (1993) 24 ATC 576]; Union of India v. S.S. Uppal [ (1996) 2 SCC 168 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 438 : (1996) 32 ATC 668 : AIR 1996 SC 2340 ]; Hanuman Prasad v. Union of India [ (1996) 10 SCC 742 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 364] ; Bihar Public Service Commission v. State of Bihar [ (1997) 3 SCC 198 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 775 : AIR 1997 SC 2280 ]; Syndicate Bank v. Shankar Paul [ (1997) 6 SCC 584 : AIR 1997 SC 3091 ] ; Vice-Chancellor, University of Allahabad v. Dr. Anand Prakash Mishra [ (1997) 10 SCC 264 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1265] ; Punjab SEB v. Seema [1999 SCC (L&S) 629] ; All India SC & ST Employees' Assn. v. A. Arthur Jeen [ (2001) 6 SCC 380 : AIR 2001 SC 1851 ]; Vinodan T. v. University of Calicut [ (2002) 4 SCC 726 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 606]; S. Renuka v. State of A.P. [ (2002) 5 SCC 195 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 689 : AIR 2002 SC 1523 ] and Batiarani Gramiya Bank v. Pallab Kumar [ (2004) 9 SCC 100 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 715 : AIR 2003 SC 4248 ].) 15. Even if in some cases appointments have been made by mistake or wrongly that does not confer any right on another person. Article 14 of the Constitution does not envisage negative equality, and if the State committed the mistake it cannot be forced to perpetuate the same mistake. Even if in some cases appointments have been made by mistake or wrongly that does not confer any right on another person. Article 14 of the Constitution does not envisage negative equality, and if the State committed the mistake it cannot be forced to perpetuate the same mistake. (See Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P [ (1996) 7 SCC 426 : AIR 1996 SC 540 ] ; Secy., Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain [ (1997) 1 SCC 35 ] ; State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann [ (1997) 3 SCC 321 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 801] ; Faridabad C.T. Scan Centre v. D.G., Health Services [ (1997) 7 SCC 752 ] ; Jalandhar Improvement Trust v. Sampuran Singh [ (1999) 3 SCC 494 : AIR 1999 SC 1347 ] ; State of Punjab v. Dr. Rajeev Sarwal [ (1999) 9 SCC 240 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1171] ; Yogesh Kumar v. Govt. of NCT Delhi [ (2003) 3 SCC 548 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 346] ; Union of India v. International Trading Co. [ (2003) 5 SCC 437 ] and Kastha Niwarak Grihnirman Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit v. President, Indore Development Authority [ (2006) 2 SCC 604 : JT (2006) 2 SC 259] .)" 8. The Supreme Court in the case of S.S. Balu And Another Vs. State of Kerala And Others reported in (2009) 2 SCC 479 has held as under: "12. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot also be lost sight of. A person does not acquire a legal right to be appointed only because his name appears in the select list. (See Pitta Naveen Kumar v. Raja Narasaiah Zangiti [ (2006) 10 SCC 261 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 92] .) The State as an employer has a right to fill up all the posts or not to fill them up. Unless a discrimination is made in regard to the filling up of the vacancies or an arbitrariness is committed, the candidate concerned will have no legal right for obtaining a writ of or in the nature of mandamus. (See Batiarani Gramiya Bank v. Pallab Kumar [ (2004) 9 SCC 100 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 715] .) In Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India [ (1991) 3 SCC 47 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 800 : (1991) 17 ATC 95] a Constitution Bench of this Court held: (SCC pp. (See Batiarani Gramiya Bank v. Pallab Kumar [ (2004) 9 SCC 100 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 715] .) In Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India [ (1991) 3 SCC 47 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 800 : (1991) 17 ATC 95] a Constitution Bench of this Court held: (SCC pp. 50-51, para 7) " 7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted." 13. In State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha [ (1974) 3 SCC 220 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 488] this Court held: (SCC p. 226, paras 10-11) " 10. ... The mere fact that a candidate's name appears in the list will not entitle him to a mandamus that he be appointed. Indeed, if the State Government while making the selection for appointment had departed from the ranking given in the list, there would have been a legitimate grievance on the ground that the State Government had departed from the rules in this respect. ... 11. It must be remembered that the petition is for a mandamus. This Court has pointed out in Rai Shivendra Bahadur (Dr.) v. Nalanda College [ AIR 1962 SC 1210 ] that in order that mandamus may issue to compel an authority to do something, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on that authority and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. Since there is no legal duty on the State Government to appoint all the 15 persons who are in the list and the petitioners have no legal right under the rules to enforce its performance the petition is clearly misconceived." 14. In Pitta Naveen Kumar v. Raja Narasaiah Zangiti [ (2006) 10 SCC 261 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 92] this Court held: (SCC p. 273, para 32) "32. ... A candidate does not have any legal right to be appointed. He in terms of Article 16 of the Constitution of India has only a right to be considered therefor. Consideration of the case of an individual candidate although ordinarily is required to be made in terms of the extant rules but strict adherence thereto would be necessary in a case where the rules operate only to the disadvantage of the candidates concerned and not otherwise." 15. In State of Rajasthan v. Jagdish Chopra [ (2007) 8 SCC 161 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 837] this Court held: (SCC pp. 16465, paras 9 and 11) " 9. Recruitment for teachers in the State of Rajasthan is admittedly governed by the statutory rules. All recruitments, therefore, are required to be made in terms thereof. Although Rule 9(3) of the Rules does not specifically provide for the period for which the merit list shall remain valid but the intent of the legislature is absolutely clear as vacancies have to be determined only once in a year. Vacancies which arose in the subsequent years could be filled up from the select list prepared in the previous year and not in other manner. Even otherwise, in absence of any rule, ordinary period of validity of select list should be one year. In State of Bihar v. Amrendra Kumar Mishra [ (2006) 12 SCC 561 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 132] this Court opined: (SCC p. 564, para 9) 9. In the aforementioned situation, in our opinion, he did not have any legal right to be appointed. Life of a panel, it is well known, remains valid for a year. Once it lapses, unless an appropriate order is issued by the State, no appointment can be made out of the said panel. It was further held: (Amrendra Kumar case [ (2006) 12 SCC 561 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 132] , SCC p. 565, para 13) 13. Life of a panel, it is well known, remains valid for a year. Once it lapses, unless an appropriate order is issued by the State, no appointment can be made out of the said panel. It was further held: (Amrendra Kumar case [ (2006) 12 SCC 561 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 132] , SCC p. 565, para 13) 13. The decisions noticed hereinbefore are authorities for the proposition that even the wait list must be acted upon having regard to the terms of the advertisement and in any event cannot remain operative beyond the prescribed period. *** 11. It is well-settled principle of law that even selected candidates do not have legal right in this behalf. (See Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India [ (1991) 3 SCC 47 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 800 : (1991) 17 ATC 95] and Asha Kaul v. State of J&K [ (1993) 2 SCC 573 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 637 : (1993) 24 ATC 576] .)" 16. Furthermore, the rank list was valid for a period of three years. Its validity expired on 5-6-2000. Another select list was published for the period from 16-9-2002 to 15-9-2005. Vacancies in terms of the said select list have also been filled up. 17. It is also well-settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". The Government Order was issued on 15-1-2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal thereagainst, they impleaded themselves as party-respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this stage. In NDMC v. Pan Singh [ (2007) 9 SCC 278 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 398] this Court held: (SCC p. 283, para 16) " 16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. In NDMC v. Pan Singh [ (2007) 9 SCC 278 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 398] this Court held: (SCC p. 283, para 16) " 16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction." (See also Virender Chaudhary v. Bharat Petroleum Corpn. [ (2009) 1 SCC 297 : (2008) 15 Scale 67 ] at SCC p. 302, para 17.)"" 9. Respondents have filed their return and have clarified that at the time of finalization of list, it was found that reservation rules for grant of reservation to women candidates and reservation pertaining to disable category have not been adhered and not taken care of, accordingly, a decision was taken to cancel the process of recruitment as the entire recruitment process got vitiated for the reasons of non-adherence of M.P. Civil Services (Special Provisions for Appointment of Women) Rules, 1997 and reservation policy issued by M.P. GAD regarding disabled persons. Thus, it is submitted that for valid reason the appointment orders have not been issued. 10. Considering the fact that selected candidate has no vested right to claim appointment and respondents have assigned reasons for not issuing appointment orders as well as for cancelling the entire selection process coupled with the fact that validity of merit list was only for one year, it is held that in absence of any vested right to seek appointment, no case is made out warranting interference. 11. Petition fails and is hereby dismissed.