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Allahabad High Court · body

2023 DIGILAW 861 (ALL)

Vijendra Kapoor v. State Of U. P.

2023-03-31

ANISH KUMAR GUPTA, SURYA PRAKASH KESARWANI

body2023
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Devesh Kumar Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Rajiv Gupta, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State – respondents and Sri Sanjai Singh, learned counsel for the respondent No.4/Bank. 2. Petitioner No.1 is the husband of the petitioner no.2. They have filed the present writ petition praying for the following reliefs : “i. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari, quashing the order dated 18-06-2021, passed by the respondent no-3, whereby the bank account of the petitioners has been freezed. ii. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent authorities to pass an appropriate orders of defreezing the account of the petitioners forthwith. iii. Issue a writ, order of direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent authorities as well as Bank, not to interfere in the peaceful use of his bank account in any manner.” 3. By the impugned order dated 18.06.2021 the Senior Superintendent of Police, Aligarh, has freezed the joint saving bank account of the petitioners on the ground of some involvement of the petitioners in the matter of hooch tragedy on account of sale of ethyl alcohol and rectified sprit, has been recorded and investigation is under process. As per records of the writ petition, the joint saving bank account of the petitioners is the saving bank account from which the petitioners pay their monthly instalment towards housing loan. The balance standing in the saving bank account as on 04.07.2021 was Rs.1354.58(CR). A charge sheet against the petitioner no.1 has been filed in case crime no.224/2021 P.S. Harduaganj, under Sections 60 A, 62 U.P. Excise Act and Sections 120-B, 272, 273, 304, 420, 467, 468 and 471 I.P.C. 4. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has produced before us instructions of the concerned police station as forwarded by the Joint Director of Prosecution, Aligarh, which is kept on record. 5. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has produced before us instructions of the concerned police station as forwarded by the Joint Director of Prosecution, Aligarh, which is kept on record. 5. In paragraphs 4, 5, 15 and 16 of the instructions the respondents have stated as under : ^^4- izLrj la[;k&4 esa ;kph dk dFku gS fd ;kphx.k dk la;qDr [kkrk la[;k&6563000100013382 iatkc us'kuy cSad jke?kkV jksM 'kk[kk esa gS] ftlesa ;kphx.k dk vk/kkj dkMZ laŒ&5842 5760 7982 o eksŒ laŒ 8477036000 iathd`r gSA ijUrq ;g dFku vlR; gS fd ;kph la[;k&1 dks voS/k 'kjkc fodz; ds vkijkf/kd eqdneksa esa >wBk Q¡lk;k x;k gSA cfYd lR;rk ;g gS fd ;kph fxjksgcan] ljd'k] fgLVªh'khVj] viuh QSDVªh eSŒ ojnku bad ,.M lkyosa.V izkŒ fyŒ irk Mh 132&133 lSŒ&1 ;wŒihŒ,lŒvkbZŒMhŒlhŒ rkyk uxjh tuin vyhxढ+ esa gS.M lsusVkbtj o vU; mRiknuksa ds fuekZ.k dh vkM+ esa feFkkby ,Ydksgy@jsDVhQkbM fLizV] o vU; dbZ izdkj ds gkfudkjd jklk;fud dSehdyksa tSls ekuo thou ds fy;s ?kkrd inkFkksZ ls Hkjs gq;s 203 ¼uki 200 yhŒ izR;sd Mªe½ Mªeksa ds Hkkjh Hkjde LVkd dks voS/k ns'kh 'kjkc vifeJ.k djus okys ekfQ;kvksa dks pksjh fNis fcuk fdlh vf/kdkfjrk ds voS/k :i ls jktLo dks gkfu igq¡pk dj lIykbZ djus okyk vijk/kh izo`fRr dk O;fDr gSA o"kZ 2021 esa Fkkuk gjnqvkxat iqfyl }kjk iz'kklfud mPpkf/kdkfj;ksa ds vkns'kkuqlkj eqŒvŒlaŒ&224@2021 esa nfo'k nsdj ;kph dh mijksDr QSDVjh ls ,Fkkby ,Ydksgy@jsDVhqkbM fLizV] tSls ekuo thou ds fy;s mPp Lrjh; ?kkrd jlk;u ls Hkjs gq, 203 Mªe o dqN Mªeksa esa dbZ izdkj ds gkfudkjd jklk;fud dSehdy Hkjs gq;s cjken fd;s x;s gSa] rFkk fo'ys"k.k ls Kkr gqvk gS fd ;kph ekuo thou fy;s vfr ?kkrd mijksDr j;k;uksa dks tuin ds 'kjkc ekfQ;kvksa dks voS/k o vuqfpr YkkHk izkfIr gqrq egaxs nkeksa esa fodz; djuk ik;k x;k gSA ;kph ds mDrd`R; ls tuin esa voS/k vifefJr ns'kh efnjk ds pksjh fNis dkjksckj esa tcjnLr mNky vk;k gS] tlds dkj.k tuin esa dkQh funksZ"k xjhc yksxksa dh eqR;q gks x;h gS rFkk dkQh la[;k esa xaHkhj :i ls chekj gq;s gSaA rFkk vk¡[kksa dh jks'kuh pyh x;h gSa] ;kph }kjk lIykbZ fd;s x;s mDr jlk;u ls fufeZr voS/k vifefJr tgjhyh udyh ns'kh 'kjkc ds lsou ls fujhg o funksZ"k yksxksa ds LkkFk flljksbZ bZaV HkV~Vk 'kjkc etnwj dk.M tSlh ?kVuk,a vey esa vk;ha gSA blds fo:) fofHkUu Fkkuksa esa yEck vkijkf/kd bfrgkl esa vkijkf/kd eqdnesa iathd`r gSaA 5- izLrj la[;k&5 esa ;kph dk dFku gS fd mijksDr [kkrk ;kph dh nqdku ls lacaf/kr ugha gS 'kjkc O;olk; dh [kjhn fodzh ls lacaf/kr vyx ,ekm.V lapkfyr gSA mDr orZeku cSad [kkrs dk laca/k ;kph ds 'kjkc dkjksckj laca/kh O;olkf;d ysu nsu ls ugha gSA bl laca/k esa dFku djuk gS fd mDr dFku dk lacaf/kr ;kphx.k ds orZeku cSad [kkrs la laca/kh cSad ysu nsu ls gS] ftlds laca/k esa ;kphx.k ds vfrfjDr ;g okLrfodrk dksbZ ugha tku ldrk fd ;kphx.k }kjk [kkrs esa ls fd;k ysus nsu fdl en esa O;; fd;k tk jgk gSA 15- izLrj la[;k&15 esa vafdr ;kphx.k dk dFku gS fd Qzht [kkrk dsl izkiVhZ u gksus ds dkj.k /kkjk&102 CrPc ds izkfo/kkuqlkj voS/k gS rFkk ekuŒ U;k;ky; }kjk gLr{ksi fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSA bl laca/k esa dFku djuk gS mDr dFku dkuwu ls lacaf/kr gS dksbZ fVIi.kh ugh djuh gSA 16- izLrj la[;k&16 esa vafdr ;kphx.k dk dFku gS fd ;kphx.k mPpLrjh; jsthMsafl;y fiyj gSa rFkk iz'uxr [kkrs dks fMQzht djus gsrq nj&nj HkVd jgs gSaA ijUrq ;g dFku vlR; gS fd ;kphx.k dks mRihfM+r j[kus dh xjt ls vdkj.k gh mudh izkFkZuk dks gok esa mM+k fn;k x;k gSA cfYd lR;rk ;g gS fd 'kklu@iz'kklu }kjk vkns'k ;kph la[;k&1 }kjk ftys ds lEiw.kZ ‘kklu@iz'kklu o turk tuknZu dks fgyk nsus okys vkijkf/kd d`R; ds dkj.k tkjh fd;k x;k gS tks ftyk Lrj ds mPpre vf/kdkjhx.k }kjk {ks=h; lkekftd 'kkfUr o dkuwu O;oLFkk dks cuk;s j[kus gsrq tkjh fd;k x;k gSA vr% mijksDr cSad 'kk[kk dks mDr vkns'k ds fo#) tkdj ;kphx.k ds izkFkZuk i= dks Lchdkj djus dk dkuwuu dksbZ vf/kdkj ugha gSA^^ 6. Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides as under : “102. Power of police officer to seize certain property. (1) Any police officer may seize any property which may be alleged or suspected to have been stolen, or which may be found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence. (2) Such police officer, if subordinate to the officer in charge of a police station, shall forthwith report the seizure to that officer. (3) Every police officer acting under sub-section (1) shall forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate having jurisdiction and where the property seized is such that it cannot be conveniently transported to the Court, [or where there is difficulty in securing proper accommodation for the custody of such property, or where the continued retention of the property in police custody may not be considered necessary for the purpose of investigation], he may give custody thereof to any person on his executing a bond undertaking to produce the property before the Court as and when required and to give effect to the further orders of the Court as to the disposal of the same:] [Provided that where the property seized under sub-section (1) is subject to speedy and natural decay and if the person entitled to the possession of such property is unknown or absent and the value of such property is less than five hundred rupees, it may forthwith be sold by auction under the orders of the Superintendent of Police and the provisions of sections 457 and 458 shall, as nearly as may be practicable, apply to the net proceeds of such sale.]” 7. Sub Section (1) of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers any police officer to seize any property which may be alleged or suspected to have been stolen, or which may be found under circumstances which create suspicion of the Commission of any offence. Sub Section (2) requires such police officer, if subordinate to the officer in charge of a police station, to report forthwith the seizure to that officer. Xxxx 9. Sub Section (2) requires such police officer, if subordinate to the officer in charge of a police station, to report forthwith the seizure to that officer. Xxxx 9. Sub Section (3) provides that Officer acting under Sub-Section (1) shall forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate having jurisdiction and where the property seized is such that it cannot be, conveniently transported to the Court or where there is difficulty in securing proper accommodation for the custody of such property, or where the continued retention of the property in police custody may not be considered necessary for the purpose of investigation, he may give custody thereof to any person on his executing a bond undertaking to produce the property before the Court as and when required and to give effect to the further orders of the Court as to the disposal of the same. 10. The proviso to sub Rule (3) that deals with situation the property ceased under sub Section (1) is subject to speedy and natural decay. 11. Thus, property including a bank account creating suspicion about commission of an offence may be seized by the investigating officer or he may prohibit operation of such bank account of any person who may be found under circumstances creating suspicion of commission of any offence. The scope and object of Section 102 is to help and assist investigation and to enable a police officer to collect evidence to be produced to prove charge complained of and set up in the charge sheet. Plain reading of sub Section 1 of Section 102 makes it clear that the property seized must be suspected to have been stolen or which may be found under circumstances which creates suspicion of the commission of any offence. 12. In the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Tapas D. Neogy (1999) 7 SCC 685 (paragraphs 6 & 12) Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under : “6. A plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 102 indicates that the police officer has the power to seize any property which may be found under circumstances creating suspicion of the commission of any offence. The legislature having used the expression "any property" and "any offence" have made the applicability of the provisions wide enough to cover offences created under any Act. The legislature having used the expression "any property" and "any offence" have made the applicability of the provisions wide enough to cover offences created under any Act. But the two preconditions for applicability of Section 102(1) are that it must be "property" and secondly, in respect of the said property there must have been suspicion of commission of any offence. In this view of the matter the two further questions that arise for consideration are whether the bank account of an accused or of his relation can be said to be "property" within the meaning of sub-section (1) of Section 102 CrPC and secondly, whether circumstances exist, creating suspicion of commission of any offence in relation to the same. ……. 12. Having considered the divergent views taken by different High Courts with regard to the power of seizure under Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and whether the bank account can be held to be "property" within the meaning of the said Section 102(1), we see no justification to give any narrow interpretation to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is well known that corruption in public offices has become so rampant that it has become difficult to cope up with the same. Then again the time consumed by the courts in concluding the trials is another factor which should be borne in mind in interpreting the provisions of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the underlying object engrafted therein, inasmuch as if there can be no order of seizure of the bank account of the accused then the entire money deposited in a bank which is ultimately held in the trial to be the outcome of the illegal gratification, could be withdrawn by the accused and the courts would be powerless to get the said money which has any direct link with the commission of the offence committed by the accused as a public officer. We are, therefore, persuaded to take the view that the bank account of the accused or any of his relations is "property" within the meaning of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code and a police officer in course of investigation can seize or prohibit the operation of the said account if such assets have direct links with the commission of the offence for which the police officer is investigating into. The contrary view expressed by the Karnataka, Gauhati and Allahabad High Courts, does not represent the correct law. It may also be seen that under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, in the matter of imposition of fine under subsection (2) of Section 13, the legislatures have provided that the courts in fixing the amount of fine shall take into consideration the amount or the value of the property which the accused person has obtained by committing the offence or where the conviction is for an offence referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 13, the pecuniary resources or property for which the accused person is unable to account satisfactorily. The interpretation given by us in respect of the power of seizure under Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code is in accordance with the intention of the legislature engrafted in Section 16 of the Prevention of Corruption Act referred to above. In the aforesaid premises, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court of Bombay committed error in holding that the police officer could not have seized the bank account or could not have issued any direction to the bank officer, prohibiting the account of the accused from being operated upon. Though we have laid down the law, but so far as the present case is concerned, the order impugned has already been given effect to and the accused has been operating his account, and so, we do not interfere with the same.” 13. In the case of M.T. Enrica Lexie Vs. Doramma, (2012) 6 SCC 760 (para 14) Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the object, purpose and scope of Section 102 Cr.P.C., and held as under : 14. The police officer in course of investigation can seize any property under Section 102 if such property is alleged to be stolen or is suspected to be stolen or is the object of the crime under investigation or has direct link with the commission of offence for which the police officer is investigating into. A property not suspected of commission of the offence which is being investigated into by the police officer cannot be seized. Under Section 102 of the Code, the police officer can seize such property which is covered by Section 102(1) and no other. 14. In the case of Teesta Atul Setalvad Vs. A property not suspected of commission of the offence which is being investigated into by the police officer cannot be seized. Under Section 102 of the Code, the police officer can seize such property which is covered by Section 102(1) and no other. 14. In the case of Teesta Atul Setalvad Vs. State of Gujarat (2018) 2 SCC 372 (paragraphs 20 & 26) Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the scope and effect of Section 102 Cr.P.C., and following the law laid down in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Tapas D. Neogy (supra) held as under : “20. As regards the procedure for issuing instructions to freeze the bank accounts, it is noticed that the same has been followed by giving intimation to the Magistrate concerned on 21-11-2014 as required in terms of Section 102 of the Code. There is nothing in Section 102 which mandates giving of prior notice to the account-holder before the seizure of his bank account. The Magistrate after noticing that the principle stated by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Shashikant D. Karnik v. State of Maharashtra has been overruled in terms of the Full Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Vinodkumar Ramachandran Valluvar, rightly negatived that contention. The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court has expounded that Section 102 does not require issuance of notice to a person before or simultaneously with the action attaching his bank account. In Adarsh Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Union of India, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court once again considered the issue and rejected the argument that prior notice to the account-holder was required to be given before seizure of his bank account. It also noted that the bank account need not be only of the accused but it can be any account creating suspicion about the commission of an offence. The view so taken commends us. 26. Although both sides have adverted to statement of accounts and vouchers to buttress their respective submissions, we do not deem it necessary nor think it appropriate to analyse the same while considering the matter on hand which emanates from an application preferred by the appellants to defreeze the stated bank accounts pending investigation of the case. Indisputably, the investigation is still in progress. Indisputably, the investigation is still in progress. The appellants will have to explain their position to the investigating agency and after investigation is complete, the matter can proceed further depending on the material gathered during the investigation. The suspicion entertained by the investigating agency as to how the appellants appropriated huge funds, which in fact were meant to be disbursed to the unfortunate victims of 2002 riots will have to be explained by the appellants. Further, once the investigation is complete and police report is submitted to the court concerned, it would be open to the appellants to apply for defreezing of the bank accounts and persuade the court concerned that the said bank accounts are no more necessary for the purpose of investigation, as provided in sub-section (3) of Section 102 of the Code. It will be open to the court concerned to consider that request in accordance with law after hearing the investigating agency, including to impose conditions as may be warranted in the fact situation of the case.” (emphasis supplied by us) 15. In the case of Nevada Properties Private Limited through its Directors Vs. State of Maharashtra and another (2019) 20 SCC 119 (paragraphs 28 to 34 & 42), Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under : “28. The first part of sub-section (1) of Section 102 of the Code relates to the property which may be alleged or suspected to have been stolen. Immovable property certainly cannot be stolen and cannot fall in this part. The second part relates to the property which may be found by a police officer under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence. We have already referred to the judgments of the Delhi High Court in P.K. Parmar [P.K. Parmar v. Union of India, 1992 SCC OnLine Del 136 : 1992 Cri LJ 2499], Swaran Sabharwal [Swaran Sabharwal v. Commr. of Police, 1987 SCC OnLine Del 221 : 1988 Cri LJ 241] and Jagdish Chander [Jagdish Chander v. State, 1989 SCC OnLine Del 403 : (1990) 40 DLT 233 ], which have elucidated and in a restricted and narrow manner defined the requirement for invoking the second part. of Police, 1987 SCC OnLine Del 221 : 1988 Cri LJ 241] and Jagdish Chander [Jagdish Chander v. State, 1989 SCC OnLine Del 403 : (1990) 40 DLT 233 ], which have elucidated and in a restricted and narrow manner defined the requirement for invoking the second part. However, we have come across a decision of this Court in Teesta Atul Setalvad v. State of Gujarat [Teesta Atul Setalvad v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 2 SCC 372 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 718] , on an appeal from the judgment [Teesta Atul Setalvad v. State of Gujarat, 2015 SCC OnLine Guj 6283] of the Gujarat High Court and had dealt with a situation when an act of freezing the accounts was a sequel to the crime as the crime was detected earlier. The Gujarat High Court took a somewhat contrary view, by not interfering and directing defreezing, observing that even if the action of the investigating agency at the inception to seize may not be regular, the court cannot be oblivious to the collection of substantial material by the investigating agency which justifies its action under Section 102 of the Code. Further when the investigation had progressed to a material point, defreezing the bank accounts on the basis of such arguments would paralyse the investigation which would not be in the interest of justice. After referring to the factual matrix in Teesta Atul Setalvad [Teesta Atul Setalvad v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 2 SCC 372 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 718] , this Court observed that the investigating officer was in possession of material pointing out to the circumstances that had created suspicion of the commission of an offence, in particular the one under investigation, and therefore exercise of power under Section 102 of the Code would be in law legitimate as it was exercised after following the procedure prescribed in sub-sections (2) and (3) of the same provision. 29. Section 102 postulates seizure of the property. Immovable property cannot, in its strict sense, be seized, though documents of title, etc. relating to immovable property can be seized, taken into custody and produced. Immovable property can be attached and also locked/sealed. It could be argued that the word "seize" would include such action of attachment and sealing. 29. Section 102 postulates seizure of the property. Immovable property cannot, in its strict sense, be seized, though documents of title, etc. relating to immovable property can be seized, taken into custody and produced. Immovable property can be attached and also locked/sealed. It could be argued that the word "seize" would include such action of attachment and sealing. Seizure of immovable property in this sense and manner would in law require dispossession of the person in occupation/possession of the immovable property, unless there are no claimants, which would be rare. Language of Section 102 of the Code does not support the interpretation that the police officer has the power to dispossess a person in occupation and take possession of an immovable property in order to seize it. In the absence of the legislature conferring this express or implied power under Section 102 of the Code to the police officer, we would hesitate and not hold that this power should be inferred and is implicit in the power to effect seizure. 30. Equally important, for the purpose of interpretation is the scope and object of Section 102 of the Code, which is to help and assist investigation and to enable the police officer to collect and collate evidence to be produced to prove the charge complained of and set up in the charge-sheet. The section is a part of the provisions concerning investigation undertaken by the police officer. After the charge-sheet is filed, the prosecution leads and produces evidence to secure conviction. Section 102 is not, per se, an enabling provision by which the police officer acts to seize the property to do justice and to hand over the property to a person whom the police officer feels is the rightful and true owner. This is clear from the objective behind Section 102, use of the words in the section and the scope and ambit of the power conferred on the criminal court vide Sections 451 to 459 of the Code. 31. The expression "circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence" in Section 102 does not refer to a firm opinion or an adjudication/finding by a police officer to ascertain whether or not "any property" is required to be seized. The word "suspicion" is a weaker and a broader expression than "reasonable belief" or "satisfaction". 31. The expression "circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence" in Section 102 does not refer to a firm opinion or an adjudication/finding by a police officer to ascertain whether or not "any property" is required to be seized. The word "suspicion" is a weaker and a broader expression than "reasonable belief" or "satisfaction". The police officer is an investigator and not an adjudicator or a decision maker. This is the reason why the Ordinance was enacted to deal with attachment of money and immovable properties in cases of scheduled offences. 32. In case and if we allow the police officer to "seize" immovable property on a mere "suspicion of the commission of any offence", it would mean and imply giving a drastic and extreme power to dispossess, etc. to the police officer on a mere conjecture and surmise, that is, on suspicion, which has hitherto not been exercised. We have hardly come across any case where immovable property was seized vide an attachment order that was treated as a seizure order by police officer under Section 102 of the Code. The reason is obvious. Disputes relating to title, possession, etc., of immovable property are civil disputes which have to be decided and adjudicated in civil courts. We must discourage and stall any attempt to convert civil disputes into criminal cases to put pressure on the other side (see Binod Kumar v. State of Bihar [Binod Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 10 SCC 663 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 203] ). Thus, it will not be proper to hold that Section 102 of the Code empowers a police officer to seize immovable property, land, plots, residential houses, streets or similar properties. Given the nature of criminal litigation, such seizure of an immovable property by the police officer in the form of an attachment and dispossession would not facilitate investigation to collect evidence/material to be produced during inquiry and trial. 33. As far as possession of the immovable property is concerned, specific provisions in the form of Sections 145 and 146 of the Code can be invoked as per and in accordance with law. Section 102 of the Code is not a general provision which enables and authorises the police officer to seize immovable property for being able to be produced in the criminal court during trial. Section 102 of the Code is not a general provision which enables and authorises the police officer to seize immovable property for being able to be produced in the criminal court during trial. This, however, would not bar or prohibit the police officer from seizing documents/papers of title relating to immovable property, as it is distinct and different from seizure of immovable property. Disputes and matters relating to the physical and legal possession and title of the property must be adjudicated upon by a civil court. 34. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the reference is answered by holding that the power of a police officer under Section 102 of the Code to seize any property, which may be found under circumstances that create suspicion of the commission of any offence, would not include the power to attach, seize and seal an immovable property. 42. Section 102 has been in the statute book for more than a century. Section 102 corresponds to Section 550 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. For more than a century the courts have read the words "any property" to mean movable property [Textile Traders Syndicate Ltd. v. State of U.P., 1959 SCC OnLine All 207 : AIR 1960 All 405 ] , [Kuriachan Chacko v. State of Kerala, 2012 SCC OnLine Ker 31708 : (2012) 3 KLJ 620 ], [Brajesh Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar, 2016 SCC OnLine Pat 2900 : (2016) 3 Pat LJR 464] and no decision to the contrary was brought to our notice. Reliance is only placed on the judgment of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Tapas D. Neogy [State of Maharashtra v. Tapas D. Neogy, (1999) 7 SCC 685 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1352] . In that case, the question was totally different and this Court only decided that a bank account of an accused was property within the meaning of Section 102. The Court did not go into the question of movable or immovable property and, therefore, this judgment would not be applicable. 16. In that case, the question was totally different and this Court only decided that a bank account of an accused was property within the meaning of Section 102. The Court did not go into the question of movable or immovable property and, therefore, this judgment would not be applicable. 16. The legal position as emerges from the plain reading of Section 102 Cr.P.C. and also on perusal of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments aforenoted, is briefly summarized as under: (i) The Police officer has the power to freeze "any" property either stolen or which may be found under the circumstances creating suspicion of commission of any offence. By using the words ''any property" and "any offence", the legislature has made the applicability of Section 102 wide enough to cover any offences under any Act. (ii) The preconditions for applicability of Section 102 of Cr.P.C. are: (a) that there must be a property and (b) that property is alleged or suspected to have been stolen or which may be found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence. (iii) Undoubtedly, a bank account is covered within the meaning of "property" under Section 102 (1) of Cr.P.C. (iv) The Police Officer in course of investigation can seize any property under Section 102 Cr.P.C. if: (a) such property is alleged to be stolen or (b) is suspected to be stolen or (c) is the object of the crime under investigation or (d) has direct link with commission of offence for which the Police Officer is investigating (v) So far as the procedure of issuing instructions to freeze the bank accounts, the Police Officer is required to give an intimation of such freezing of account to the concerned Magistrate. (vi) Before issuing instructions to bank for freezing the bank account there is no requirement of issuing any prior notice to the account holder before freezing of the bank account. (vii) Under Section 102 of Cr.P.C. immovable property in its strict sense cannot be seized though the documents of title relating to immovable property can be seized. Power under Section 102 would not include the power to attach, seize and seal an immovable property. (vii) Under Section 102 of Cr.P.C. immovable property in its strict sense cannot be seized though the documents of title relating to immovable property can be seized. Power under Section 102 would not include the power to attach, seize and seal an immovable property. (viii) Once the investigation is complete and Police report is submitted to the Court concerned it is open for the person whose account has been freezed during investigation, to apply for defreezing of the bank account before the concerned Magistrate in terms of Section 102 (3) of Cr.P.C. and persuade the Court concerned that the said bank account is no more necessary for the purpose of investigation. If such application is filed, the Court concerned shall consider the request in accordance with law, and after hearing the investigation agency, may allow the application and direct defreezing of such bank account. While doing so, the Court concerned may impose conditions as may be warranted in the facts and situations of the case. 17. Since it is admitted case of the parties that a charge sheet has already been filed, therefore, we permit the petitioners to move an application before the concerned court for release of their bank account in the light of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Teesta Atul Setalvad (supra). 18. In the event such an application is filed by the petitioners before the concerned Court/Magistrate, it shall be decided by the concerned Court/Magistrate in accordance with law, expeditiously, preferably within two months from the date of submission of the application. 19. The writ petition is disposed of with the observations made above.