JUDGMENT : 1. The instant bail application has been filed by the petitioner Prahlad S/o Shri Radheshyam Parikh under Section 439 Cr.P.C against the order impugned dated passed by learned court below in connection with FIR No.153/2022 registered at Police Station Dhamotar, District Pratapgarh for the offences under Sections 8/22 and 29 of NDPS Act. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a false case has been foisted against the petitioner. He has nothing to do with the alleged offences and no useful purpose would be served by keeping him behind the bars. The charge against the petitioner for his alleged act of his being the alleged future recipient of the contraband. He have been made accused on the strength of confessional statement made by the co-accused during police custody which is otherwise not admissible in evidence by virtue of Sections 25 and 26 of Indian Evidence Act. The said disclosure statement does not come within the ambit of Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act. He submits that for booking an accused for the accusation of the offence committed under Section 29 of the NDPS Act, there must be some corroborative evidence. Since nothing is there on record from which involvement of the accused can be presumed, therefore, the embargo under Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not come in way of releasing the petitioner on bail. 3. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor opposes the bail application on the ground that the recovered contraband weighed 17 Grams in total and that is way above the commercial quantity demarcated for MDMA and therefore, in view of the bar contained under Section 37 of NDPS Act, no case of bail is made out. 4. Heard. Perused the material available on record. 5. It is alleged that the said accused Govind disclosed this fact to the I.O. that the present petitioner is the future recipient of the contraband MDMA. Upon receiving the information from co-accused Govind, the present petitioner was booked and arrested in the matter. Except disclosure statement made to the police in custody by the principal accused, there is no other evidence, direct or indirect to substantiate the charge against the petitioner. 6. The Privy Council in the case of Pulukuri Kotayya Vs. Emperor reported in AIR (1947) PC 67 discussed the provision stipulated under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. Except disclosure statement made to the police in custody by the principal accused, there is no other evidence, direct or indirect to substantiate the charge against the petitioner. 6. The Privy Council in the case of Pulukuri Kotayya Vs. Emperor reported in AIR (1947) PC 67 discussed the provision stipulated under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced herein as under: "It is fallacious to treat the 'fact discovered' within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that 'I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house' does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added 'with which I stabbed A'., these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant." 7. The observations of the Privy Counsel in the case of Pulukuri Kotayya (supra) stand accepted by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Prabhoo Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in AIR (1963) SC 113 and then, it has been reiterated/referred in a catena of legal pronouncements. 8. In this regard, we may refer to Sangappa Basalingappa Rabasetty Versus State of Karnataka reported in Criminal Appeal No.37/1982 where in it was held as under:- “The confessions made to the police are irrelevant and inadmissible in evidence under Sections 24, 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. Section 27 makes a departure from the principle laid down in Sections 24 and 26 of the Evidence Act. Section 27 makes a departure from the principle laid down in Sections 24 and 26 of the Evidence Act. When the information contained in the statements (whether amounting to a confession or not)made by an accused person in police custody is confirmed by the finding of some object or fact, the danger disappears; for the discovery of the stolen goods, the instrument of crime, the dead body, the clothes which the deceased was wearing or any other material thing, which are capable of being perceived by the senses demonstrates conclusively that these portions at least of the confession cannot have been false. In such a case so much of the information given by the accused as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered becomes relevant under Section 27. The Section is based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true, and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence. It can be seen that simply discovery of fact as a result of information from accused does not make it admissible unless its relevancy is established by other evidence showing the connection between the fact discovered and the offence charged and the accused. Section 27 involves the principle of confirmation by subsequent facts. There appears to be a distinction between a statement that “it is lying hid or buried at a certain place” and “I hid or buried it at a certain place”. For instance, in the case of a dead body, a statement of the latter kind involves a confession of concealing evidence or conniving at such being done; or the statement” I stole and buried or concealed” or “the stolen property was hid at a certain place” includes a confession of theft and it might also be hit by Sections 25 or 26. In the application of the rule it should never be lost sight of that part of a statement wherein the accused admits his guilt in regard to an offence is inadmissible as it does not in any sense relate distinctly to the discovery of any fact.” 9. In the application of the rule it should never be lost sight of that part of a statement wherein the accused admits his guilt in regard to an offence is inadmissible as it does not in any sense relate distinctly to the discovery of any fact.” 9. A simple reading of Section 27 of the Evidence Act and landmark judgments show that the part of information in the form of confession received from disclosure made by an accused in isolation cannot be taken as reliable piece of evidence until there is a discovery or recovery of another fact to corroborate and prove the veracity of the said information. To be more specific, Section 27 of the Evidence Act is an exception to Sections 24, 25, and 26 of the Evidence Act; however, the exception limits its admissibility only to what is specified in the act and not beyond that. 10. In a recent ruling titled Mohd Muslim @ Hussain V. State (NCT OF DELHI) in Special Leave Petition (CRL.) NO(S). 915 of 2023 order dated 28.03.2023, Hon’ble the Supreme Court has discussed Section 37 of the NDPS Act in detail and has allowed the accused in that matter to be released on bail while holding that the impediment contained under Section 37 is not a bar to grant of bail in cases where there is undue delay in conclusion of trial. The paragraph of the afore-said judgment relevant to the present matter is reproduced below: “18. The conditions which courts have to be cognizant of are that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty of such offence” and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. What is meant by “not guilty” when all the evidence is not before the court? It can only be a prima facie determination. That places the court’s discretion within a very narrow margin. Given the mandate of the general law on bails (Sections 436, 437 and 439, CrPC) which classify offences based on their gravity, and instruct that certain serious crimes have to be dealt with differently while considering bail applications, the additional condition that the court should be satisfied that the accused (who is in law presumed to be innocent) is not guilty, has to be interpreted reasonably. Further the classification of offences under Special Acts (NDPS Act, etc.), which apply over and above the ordinary bail conditions required to be assessed by courts, require that the court records its satisfaction that the accused might not be guilty of the offence and that upon release, they are not likely to commit any offence. These two conditions have the effect of overshadowing other conditions. In cases where bail is sought, the court assesses the material on record such as the nature of the offence, likelihood of the accused co-operating with the investigation, not fleeing from justice: even in serious offences like murder, kidnapping, rape, etc. On the other hand, the court in these cases under such special Acts, have to address itself principally on two facts: likely guilt of the accused and the likelihood of them not committing any offence upon release. This court has generally upheld such conditions on the ground that liberty of such citizens have to - in cases when accused of offences enacted under special laws – be balanced against the public interest. 19. A plain and literal interpretation of the conditions under Section 37 (i.e., that Court should be satisfied that the accused is not guilty and would not commit any offence) would effectively exclude grant of bail altogether, resulting in punitive detention and unsanctioned preventive detention as well. Therefore, the only manner in which such special conditions as enacted under Section 37 can be considered within constitutional parameters is where the court is reasonably satisfied on a prima facie look at the material on record (whenever the bail application is made) that the accused is not guilty. Any other interpretation, would result in complete denial of the bail to a person accused of offences such as those enacted under Section 37 of the NDPS Act.” 11. Having regard to the totality of facts and circumstances as available on record and upon a consideration of the arguments advanced, at this stage of infancy of trial, this Court refrains from passing any comments over the admissibility of evidence and the quality of evidence yet it is of the firm opinion that the appellant deserves to be enlarged on bail in this case. It is needless to say that any observations, particularly the observation with regard to the admissibility of the confessional statement before the trial shall not influence the trial judge so as to adversely affect the rights of either of the parties. 12. Accordingly, the second bail application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. is allowed and it is ordered that the accused-petitioner Prahlad S/o Shri Radheshyam Parikh shall be enlarged on bail provided he furnishes a personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with two sureties of Rs.25,000/- each to the satisfaction of the learned trial Judge for his appearance before the court concerned on all the dates of hearing as and when called upon to do so.