ORDER : 1. The petitioner is before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: (a) Issue a writ of Certiorari or any other order in the like nature quashing the impugned order dated: 21.04.2023 in Election Case No. 02/2021 passed by Addl. Sr. Civil Judge and JMFC-I at Raichur, vide Annexure-K, in the interest of justice. (b) To Pass any other order as this Hon’ble Court deems fit under the facts and circumstances of the case in the interest of justice and equity. 2. The general election for Gram Panchayath was notified on 30.11.2020 and held on 22.12.2020. The petitioner had contested from the General Seat and respondent No. 1 contested for Gram Panchayati Member of Chandrabanda-5 Gram Panchayati under Schedule Tribe Reservation Seat/post. Respondents No. 2 and 3 had also contested in the said election. 3. The results being declared on 30.12.2020, the petitioner was declared as elected candidate from the general seat. The respondent No. 1 filed an Election Petition in Election case No. 2/2021 on 21.01.2021 before the Additional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC-I., Raichur (trial Court) on the ground that the petitioner was holding an office of profit and alleging that the petitioner being a Class-I Electrical Contractor with GESCOM/KPTCL, the petitioner could not have contested the election. 4. The Election Petition having been allowed by the impugned order dated 21.04.2023 declaring the election of the petitioner as void, the petitioner is before this Court. 5. Sri.S.S.Halalli, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that: 5.1. The petitioner is not holding an office of profit in terms of Section 12(g) of the Karnataka Gram Swaraj and Panchayath Raj Act, 1993 (for short ‘the Act of 1993’) inasmuch as under Section 12(h) of the Act of 1993, the disqualification is only as regards a candidate who directly or indirectly has any contract or employment with the Gram Panchayath. In the present case, the petitioner having a contract with GESCOM/KPTCL and not with Gram Panchayath, the same would not lead to disqualification of the petitioner. 5.2. The petitioner only holds a licence and there is no work which has been carried out by the petitioner under the said licence or contract as on the date of filing of the nomination or thereafter. The petitioner had infact surrendered his contractor licence to the Executive Engineer on 20.11.2020, which was prior to the filing of the nomination. 5.2. The petitioner only holds a licence and there is no work which has been carried out by the petitioner under the said licence or contract as on the date of filing of the nomination or thereafter. The petitioner had infact surrendered his contractor licence to the Executive Engineer on 20.11.2020, which was prior to the filing of the nomination. The surrender of the licence would categorically establish that the petitioner was not carrying out any work with GESCOM/KPTCL. 5.3. The holding of Contractor Licence would not amount to an office of profit under Section 12(g) of the Act of 1993. Section 12(g) of the Act of 1993 only relates to actual holding of office and in this regard, he relies on the guidelines published by the Election Commission where there is no mention made of the contractor to be holding an office of profit. 5.4. By drawing attention to Clause 16 of the guidelines, he submits that the said Clause only relates to contractual workman who are disqualified and the same does not relate to persons who have entered into a contract as a tenderer/licencee. 5.5. Be that as it may, he submits that the said Clause deals with contractual workers engaged with KPCTL and cannot refer to or include a contractor having Contractor Licence under KPTCL. The petitioner is a private Class-I Electrical Contractor working with KPTCL and such a contract cannot be said to amount to an office of profit requiring the disqualification under Section 12(g) of the Act of 1993. 5.6. The trial Court has grossly erred in coming to a conclusion that holding an electrical licence under KPTCL would amount to holding an office of profit. On these grounds, he submits that the impugned order is required to be set aside and the election results insofar as the petitioner is concerned be held appropriate. 6. Sri.Arunkumar Amargundappa, learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 to 3 would submit that: 6.1. It is both Section 12(g) and Section 12(h) of the Act of 1993 which are attracted to the present case. In support of Section 12(h), he submits that the petitioner being a contractor with KPTCL is not in dispute. 6. Sri.Arunkumar Amargundappa, learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 to 3 would submit that: 6.1. It is both Section 12(g) and Section 12(h) of the Act of 1993 which are attracted to the present case. In support of Section 12(h), he submits that the petitioner being a contractor with KPTCL is not in dispute. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has rendered works under various contracts and as on the date of filing of the nomination, Contractor Licence as also contracts being in subsistence, the petitioner having violated Section 12(g) and Section 12(h) of the Act of 1993, the trial Court has rightly held him to be disqualified and set aside the election. 6.2. In this regard, he relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Govt. of NCT of Delhi vs. M/s. Shyam Sunder Goel, W.P. (C) No. 6406/2008 and C.M. No. 12246/2008 more particularly, Paras 17, 21 and 22, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: “17. It appears to this Court that the decision in Shrikant cannot come to the aid of the Respondent herein for the simple reason that the statute here in question i.e. the DMC Act, in Section 9 (1)(g), talks of disqualification even where an “office of profit” is held under the GNCTD or the Central Government and not only with the MCD. As explained by the Supreme Court in Shibu Soren, for determining whether a person can be said to be holding an “office of profit” under the Government, each case has to be judged in light of the relevant provisions of the statute and on its own peculiar facts. It was explained that whenever such question arises, a realistic approach would have to be adopted having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case and the relevant statutory provisions. It was explained that a ban on the candidature must have a substantial and reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved, namely elimination or in any event reduction of possibility of misuse of the position which the legislator concerned holds or has held at the relevant time. In the said case, it was further explained in Para 26 as under: “The expression “office of profit” has not been defined either in the Constitution or in the Representation of People Act. In the said case, it was further explained in Para 26 as under: “The expression “office of profit” has not been defined either in the Constitution or in the Representation of People Act. In common parlance, the expression 'profit' connotes an idea of some pecuniary gain. If there is really some gain, its label - 'honorarium' - 'remuneration' - 'salary' is not material - it is the substance and not he form which matters and even the quantum or amount of “pecuniary gain” is not relevant - what needs to be found out is whether the amount of money receivable by the concerned person in connection with the office he holds, gives to him some “pecuniary gain”, other than an 'compensation' to defray his out of pocket expenses, which may have the possibility to bring that person under the influence of the executive, which is conferring that benefit on him.” 21. Keeping in view the background of the law explained by the Supreme Court in the above decisions, the decision of the MCD not to permit an elected Councillor to continue to be a KOD licencee under the GNCTD cannot be faulted. The said decision of the MCD has not been challenged by the Respondent who, having served as a Municipal Councillor for the full term, could in any event not now turn around and challenge the decision. That the Respondent was not aware of the above decision is no excuse. It does not help him to seek revival of his KOD licence notwithstanding that he has completed his complete term as a Municipal Councillor. 22. There is also merit in the contention that the Respondent was also aware that his continuing to hold the KOD licence, while being a Municipal Councilor, was legally untenable and that is why he responded to the show cause notice by seeking transfer of the KOD licence in favour of his wife. Although the Respondent appears to have given up the said ground in these proceedings, it was certainly one of the points urged when the order was passed by the Commissioner, FSD on 7th April 2006. As rightly pointed out in the said order, there is no provision in the Control Order or even the instructions or guidelines issued thereunder to effect a change in the constitution of a licence holder even when the original licencee is alive. As rightly pointed out in the said order, there is no provision in the Control Order or even the instructions or guidelines issued thereunder to effect a change in the constitution of a licence holder even when the original licencee is alive. The departmental guidelines issued on 17th June 2002 made it clear that change in constitution will be allowed only in case of death of licencee, and consequent transfer of the licence to his successor, legal heir or natural heir. Therefore, the Petitioner was justified in rejecting the prayer of the Respondent for transfer of the KOD licence in the name of his wife upon his being elected as a Municipal Councillor.” 6.3. Relying on the above, he submits that a term “office of profit” not being defined, what would have to be seen by this Court is as to whether the petitioner would derive any pecuniary benefit and if there is such a benefit, he would be disqualified by applying principles of office of profit. He submits that expression ‘profit’ would denote an idea of some pecuniary gain be it under whatever label as long as the contestants receive any money or pecuniary advantage on account of his appointment that would amount to an office of profit. 6.4. He relies upon the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of H.R. Annamalai Mudaliar vs. Devaraja Urs and Others, AIR 1968 Mysore 140 (V 55 C 38) more particularly unnumbered Para 3, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: “Payment of price is a different matter and claim for damages is quite another. We do not consider it necessary to examine cases of frustration novation, etc. because those cases must be pronounced upon whey they arise. Sri B.T. Parthasarathy pointed out with reference to Anson's Law of Contract that a contract is discharged (a) by agreement (b) by performance. (c) by breach, (d) by frustration or (e) by operation of law. He submits that the case of the petitioner, comes under discharge by agreement and not by performance or any other head. On the basis of my finding on the question of fact, the case comes under discharge by breach. Even then, it is contended that owing to discharge of the contract by breach, the contract ceases to subsist. He submits that the case of the petitioner, comes under discharge by agreement and not by performance or any other head. On the basis of my finding on the question of fact, the case comes under discharge by breach. Even then, it is contended that owing to discharge of the contract by breach, the contract ceases to subsist. In this context a reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in and an examination of its implication becomes relevant. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that the Supreme Court has unequivocally repelled the contention that supplies of goods having been made by the contractor, there was no longer any contract for supply of goods in existence but only an obligation arising under the guarantee clause. While repelling the contention, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observe. 6.5. Relying on the above, he submits that the contract would continue to be in subsistence until it is discharged by way of agreement, performance or a breach, frustration or operation of law. In the present case, the contractor’s licence continuing to be in subsistence and in favour of the petitioner. The mere surrender of a contractor licence to an Executive Engineer who infact is not the appropriate authority to receive a surrender of a licence would not enure to the benefit of the petitioner inasmuch as there is no acceptance of such surrender which has been made and when surrender is not accepted, the licence would continue to be in operation. 6.6. A further submission is that the average time taken to complete a contract is about 6 months. Even a little prior to the filing of the nominations, the petitioner had several contracts and taking this into account, the trial Court has come to a conclusion that the petitioner would be disqualified by applying principles of office of profit. By placing reliance on all the above arguments, he submits that the petition is required to be dismissed and the order passed by the trial Court be confirmed. 7. Sri.Venkatesh C.Mallabadi, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 supports the case of the petitioner herein and submits that: 7.1. By placing reliance on all the above arguments, he submits that the petition is required to be dismissed and the order passed by the trial Court be confirmed. 7. Sri.Venkatesh C.Mallabadi, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 supports the case of the petitioner herein and submits that: 7.1. for a person to hold an office of profit, there must be a continuous remuneration in existence and without continuous remuneration being paid by KPTCL to the petitioner on account of the contractor licence cannot be said to be an office of profit. 7.2. Secondly, he submits that the burden of proof in an election petition is that of the petitioner in the election petition. In this case, the petitioner has not produced any documents to establish that the petitioner was carrying out any contractual work or derived any financial benefit. There being no evidence on record, the finding of the trial Court is bad. On these grounds, he submits that the petition is required to be allowed. 8. Heard Sri.S.S.Halalli, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri.Arunkumar Amargundappa, learned counsel for respondents No. 1 to 3, Sri.Venkatesh C.Mallabadi, learned counsel for respondent No. 4 and Smt.Maya T.R., learned HCGP for respondent No. 5 and perused papers. 9. The points that would arise for determination are: (1) Whether holding of a Contractor’s Licence under the GESCOM/KPTCL would disqualify such holder from standing for election in terms of Section 12(g) of the Karnataka Gram Swaraj and Panchayath Raj Act, 1993 and whether holding of a Contractor Licence amounts to an office of profit? (2) Whether, in the present case, the orders passed by the trial Court require any interference at the hands of this Court? (3) What order? 10. I answer the above points as under. 11. Answer to Point No. (1): Whether holding of a Contractor’s Licence under the GESCOM/ KPTCL would disqualify such holder from standing for election in terms of Section 12(g) of the Karnataka Gram Swaraj and Panchayath Raj Act, 1993 and whether holding of a Contractor Licence amounts to an ‘office of profit’? 11.1. In the present case, the petitioner is stated to be a contractor with GESCOM/KPTCL. 11.1. In the present case, the petitioner is stated to be a contractor with GESCOM/KPTCL. It is on that basis that election petition had been filed in Election Petition No. 2/2021 challenging the legality and validity of his election amongst several grounds on the ground that the petitioner being proprietor of M/s. Ranjit Electricals, holding Class-I Electrical Contractor Licence valid upto 31.03.2025 and that he had carried works for GESCOM/KPTCL. Holding of such licence and carrying out contract works was contended to be office of profit. The petitioner having contested the same, the trial Court vide its judgment dated 21.04.2023 had declared the election of the petitioner as void and it is challenging the same that the petitioner is before this Court. 11.2. The trial Court has come to a conclusion that the electrical board i.e., GESCOM/KPTCL would fall within the definition of State and therefore, under Section 12(g) of the Act of 1993, he would be disqualified since he is holding an office of profit under other authorities subject to the control of the Central Government, the State Government or the Government of any other State. On the ground that the said licence had not been surrendered on the date when the nomination was filed, it was held that the petitioner was continuing to hold the office of profit as on the date on which the nomination was filed. The relevant provisions which are required to be considered by this Court to answer the above question is Sections 12(g) and 12(h) of the Act of 1993 which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: “12. Disqualification for members - A person shall be disqualified for being chosen and for being a member of a Grama Panchayat: (a) to (f) xxx (g) if he holds any office of profit under any local or other authority subject to the control of the Central Government, the State Government or the Government of any other State, other than such offices as are declared by rules made under this Act not to disqualify the holder. Explanation - For the purpose of this clause, a person shall not be deemed to hold an office of profit under the Grama Panchayat by reason only that he is an Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha of the Grama Panchayat. Explanation - For the purpose of this clause, a person shall not be deemed to hold an office of profit under the Grama Panchayat by reason only that he is an Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha of the Grama Panchayat. (h) if, save as hereinafter provided he has directly or indirectly any share or interest in any work done by order of the Grama Panchayat, or in any contract or employment with, or under, or by, or on behalf of, the Grama Panchayat or if he is either directly or indirectly by himself or by his agent, partner or employee involved in obtaining or execution of any such work or contract on behalf of the Grama Panchayat or of any contract for the supply of goods and services to the Grama Panchayat.” 11.3. A perusal of Section 12(g) of the Act of 1993 would indicate that a person shall be disqualified for being chosen and for being member of the Gram Panchayat if he holds any office of profit under any local or other authority subject to the control of the Central Government, the State Government or the Government of any other State. 11.4. In the present case, GESCOM/KPTCL being an authority which comes within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution of India is not in dispute. What is required to be ascertained is if holding a contractors licence would amount to office of profit. 11.5. Section 12(h) of the Act of 1993 deals with a candidate who has directly or indirectly any share or interest in any work done by order of the Gram Panchayat or is in any contract or employment with or under, or by, or on behalf of, the Gram Panchayat. It further provides that if a candidate either by himself or through agent, partner or employee involved in obtaining or execution of any work or contract on behalf of the Gram Panchayat or of any contract for supply of goods and services to the Gram Panchayat. Thus, first portion of Section 12(h) of the Act of 1993 deals with employment. The second portion deals with contracts either for execution of work or supply of goods and services. Both these are relatable to a Gram Panchayat inasmuch as, the employment is to be with the Gram Panchayat and contract also to be with the Gram Panchayat or for and on behalf of the Gram Panchayat. 11.6. The second portion deals with contracts either for execution of work or supply of goods and services. Both these are relatable to a Gram Panchayat inasmuch as, the employment is to be with the Gram Panchayat and contract also to be with the Gram Panchayat or for and on behalf of the Gram Panchayat. 11.6. Section 9A of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (for short, hereinafter referred to as ‘R.P. Act’) reads as under: “9A. Disqualification for Government contracts, etc. - A person shall be disqualified if, and for so long as, there subsists a contract entered into by him in the course of his trade or business with the appropriate Government for the supply of goods to, or for the execution of any works, undertaken by that Government. Explanation - For the purposes of this section, where a contract has been fully performed by the person by whom it has been entered into with the appropriate Government, the contract shall be deemed not to subsist by reason only of the fact that the Government has not performed its part of the contract either wholly or in part.” 11.7. Thus, in terms of Section 9(a) of the R.P. Act, a person would be disqualified for being a Member of Parliament or State Legislature if there is subsisting contract with the appropriate Government. Thus, under the R.P. Act, contract is treated to be as office of profit for such disqualification. 11.8. In the present case, there being no dispute as regards the petitioner being a partner in a firm which is having a contract with the GESCOM/KPTCL, a meaningful reading of Section 12(g) of the Act of 1993 by taking reference of Section 9(a) of the R.P. Act would indicate that the petitioner is holding office of profit. The term office of profit has not been defined. 11.9. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in M/s.Shyam Sunder Goel’s case (supra) while dealing with election of a candidate to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, has held that what is to be taken into consideration is the pecuniary gain that may ensue to the candidate to determine whether the same would amount to office of profit. In that background, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court held that holding a kerosene oil dealership licence issued by the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi would amount to office of profit. In that background, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court held that holding a kerosene oil dealership licence issued by the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi would amount to office of profit. When a kerosene dealership would amount to office of profit, the Electrical Contractor Licence would also in my considered opinion, amount to an office of profit. 11.10. This Court in Devaraja Urs’s case (supra) has held that when there is a contract in existence, discharge thereof can only by valid means and only if the contract had come to an end by such valid means would office of profit cease to exist. 11.11. In the present case, there is no dispute about the continuation of the contractor licence and the term of the contract with the GESCOM/KPTCL. The only defence taken by the petitioner is that the licence was surrendered. But the licence was surrendered before the authority who had no right to accept the surrender. Be that as it may, the evidence on record indicates that the said surrender has not been accepted and thereby establishing that the contractors licence continues to be valid and in force. 11.12. The Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with disqualification of Member of Legislative Assembly in Sewaram vs. Sobaran Singh, AIR 1993 SC 212 held that when there is a contract between the candidate and the Madhya Pradesh Government which was subsisting as on the date of the nomination, the said candidate was disqualified. 11.13. From analysis of all the above decisions, it is clearly seen that a kerosene dealership granted by the State Government would amount to office of profit in terms of decision in M/s.Shyam Sunder Goel’s case (supra), in terms of the decision of this Court in Devaraja Urs’s case (supra), mere surrender of contractors licence would not bring an end to the licence, until accepted by the competent authority and in terms of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sewaram’s case (supra), if a contract was subsisting on the date of filing of the nomination, the candidate would be disqualified. 11.14. 11.14. Applying all the above decisions as also the law thereof namely Section 12(g) of the Act of 1993 and 9(a) of the R.P. Act, the petitioner who was holding Electrical Contractors Licence which was subsisting as on the date of filing of the nomination amounts to holding an office of profit which would disqualify him under Section 12(g) of the Act of 1993. 11.15. I answer point No. (1) by holding that holding Contractors Licence and discharging contracts with GESCOM/KPTCL would amount to office of profit and would disqualify such licence holder under Section 12(g) of the Act of 1993. 12. Answer to point No. (2): Whether, in the present case, the orders passed by the trial Court require any interference at the hands of this Court? 12.1. In view of my finding to point No. (1), for the reasons stated hereinabove as also for the reasons stated by the trial Court, the petitioner being disqualified, I do not see any need to interfere with the well reasoned order passed by the trial Court. 13. Answer to point No. (3): What order? 13.1. The Writ Petition is dismissed.