ORDER : 1. Defendant in the suit filed the above revision against the order dated 08.11.2022 in O.S.No.27 of 2014 on the file of Principal District Judge, Nellore. 2. Plaintiff filed suit O.S.No.27 of 2014 seeking the following relief: “Directing the defendant to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff or his nominees within the time stipulated by the Hon’ble Court regarding the ‘B’ schedule property and deliver possession of the same to the plaintiff and if the defendant fails to do so, the same may be done through process of law and grant costs”. 3. (a) In the plaint, it was contended interalia that plaint ‘A’ schedule property is a joint family property of defendant and her elder son Venkata Ranga Reddy and Srikar Reddy. They divided their property under a registered partition deed dated 09.07.2010. ‘A’ schedule mentioned property in the partition deed fell to the share of defendant and her elder son Venkata Ranga Reddy. ‘B’ schedule property referred in partition deed fell to the share of Srikar Reddy. The elder son executed a registered settlement deed dated 10.11.2010 in relation to his half share in favour of defendant. Thus, the defendant became absolute owner of property. The schedule property mentioned in the agreement is an extent of 2730 Ankanams, though it is mentioned as Ac.6.00 cents of land, which is fit for house sites with specific boundaries. Regarding delivery of property, it was mentioned in the plaint that defendant handed over land to the plaintiff for laying house plots, roads, tree guards, electricity and drainage. Plaintiff invested huge amount for that purpose. (b) It was further alleged in the plaint that defendant sold some of the plots through the plaintiff and retained some plots to herself and failed to execute sale deeds for the plots mentioned in B schedule property in favour of plaintiff’s nominees. Eventually the suit was filed for specific performance and delivery of possession of property. 4. Defendant filed written statement and contended interalia that defendant granted temporary permission to the plaintiff to form layout roads, electricity, drainage connection to the respective plots. Defendant admitted about execution of agreement of sale dated 22.01.2011. 5. The suit is coming up for evidence. Plaintiff intended to mark the agreement of sale dated 22.01.2011. 4. Defendant filed written statement and contended interalia that defendant granted temporary permission to the plaintiff to form layout roads, electricity, drainage connection to the respective plots. Defendant admitted about execution of agreement of sale dated 22.01.2011. 5. The suit is coming up for evidence. Plaintiff intended to mark the agreement of sale dated 22.01.2011. Objection was raised by defendant that agreement of sale dated 22.01.2011 requires stamp duty and penalty, since possession was delivered to the plaintiff under the document. Trial Court by order dated 08.11.2022 concluded that transfer of possession under agreement of sale dated 22.01.2011 is for limited purpose of laying roads and thereby it cannot be held as inadmissible document. Trial Court posted the suit to 19.01.2023 for examination of P.W.1. Aggrieved by the same, the present revision is filed. 6. Heard Sri P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri M.V.S.Suresh Kumar, learned senior counsel representing Sri S.Harinath Reddy, learned counsel for respondent. 7. Learned counsel for petitioner would submit that recitals in the document would disclose delivery of possession of property and once recitals manifest delivery of possession, the document is liable to be stamped under Article 47A of Schedule-IA of the Indian Stamp Act,1899 (for short “the Act”). He would also submit that pleadings of the parties have no relevancy, and the Court has to look into the recitals of the document. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the following judgments: i) Tirumala Housing (P) Limited Vs. GPR Housing (P) Limited, 2006 (5) ALD 532. ii) Vanapalli Jayalaxmi @ Venkata Jayalaxmi Vs. A.Kondalarao, S/o Satyam and others, 2014 (1) ALD 491 . iii) B.Ratnamala Vs. G.Rudramma, 1999 (6) ALD 160 . iv) Avinash Kumar Chauhan Vs. Vijay Krishna Mishra, (2009) 2 SCC 532 . v) Omprakash Vs.Laxminarayan and others, (2014) 1 SCC 618 . 8. Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that actual possession was not delivered under the agreement. Delivery of property is for a limited purpose i.e. dividing land into plots, laying of road, trees guards, electric poles and construction of drainage. He would also submit that even in the plaint, plaintiff contended that delivery of possession of property was temporary. Even defendant by filing written statement contended that temporary permission was granted to plaintiff for laying roads, tree guards and drainage to respective plots. He would also submit that even in the plaint, plaintiff contended that delivery of possession of property was temporary. Even defendant by filing written statement contended that temporary permission was granted to plaintiff for laying roads, tree guards and drainage to respective plots. Thus, the learned senior counsel would submit that even as per the understanding between the parties, property was not delivered, and defendant is in actual possession of the property. In support of said contention, learned senior counsel relied upon the following judgments: i) Cheryala Srinivas Vs. Moola Sujatha and others, 2010 (1) ALD 246 . ii) E.Padma Rao @ Vadla Padma Rao and others Vs. Vijay Kumar and another, 2013 (1) ALD 581 . iii) R.Venkataram Reddy and another Vs. V.Jetamoni Gouramma, 2011 (3) ALT 524 . 9. Now the point for consideration is: Whether the property was delivered under the document dated 22.01.2011? If so, whether the document dated 22-01-2011 require stamp duty and penalty as contemplated under Article 47A, Schedule-IA of the Act? 10. The relevant portion of document dated 22.01.2011 is extracted hereunder: The relevant portion of document at Page No.3 reads thus: The endorsement dated 18.05.2011 on the back side of Page No.2 of the agreement reads thus: The endorsement dated 17.06.2011 on the back side of Page No.2 of the agreement reads thus: 11. Before proceeding further, certain decisions dealing with construction of deeds and documents, decided earlier, need to be noted here. 12. In C.Cheriathan Vs. P.Narayana Embranthiri, (2009) 2 SCC 673 , the Hon’ble Apex Court to determine as to whether a document was mortgage by conditional sale or sale with condition of repurchase observed as follows: “A document, as is well known, must be read in its entirety. When the character of a document is in question, although the heading thereof would not be conclusive, it plays a significant role. The intention of parties must be gathered from the document itself but therefore circumstances attending thereto would also be relevant; particularly when the relationship between the parties is in question. For the said purpose, it is essential that all parts of the deed should be read in their entirety.” 13. Deed in English Common Law is an instrument written in parchment or paper, whereunto ten things are necessarily incident, viz., First, writing. Secondly, in parchment or paper. Thirdly, a person able to contract. Fourthly, by a sufficient name. For the said purpose, it is essential that all parts of the deed should be read in their entirety.” 13. Deed in English Common Law is an instrument written in parchment or paper, whereunto ten things are necessarily incident, viz., First, writing. Secondly, in parchment or paper. Thirdly, a person able to contract. Fourthly, by a sufficient name. Fifthly, a person able to be contracted with. Sixthly, by a sufficient name. Seventhly, a thing to be contracted for. Eighthly, apt words (if any) required by law. Ninthly, sealing, and Tenthly, delivery. A deed cannot be written upon wood, leather, cloth, or the like, but only upon parchment or paper, for the writing upon them can be least vitiated, altered or corrupted. 14. Document as per Section 3 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 29 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, means any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter. 15. Instrument as per Section 2(14) of Indian Stamp Act, 1899, includes every document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. 16. ODGERS Construction of Deeds and Statutes (1967 5th edition by Gerald Dworkin 1st Indian Reprint 1996) crystallized body of rules of interpretation of deeds as follows: “The intention of the parties must be discovered, if possible, from the expressions they have used. Clear and unambiguous words prevail over any intention, but if the words used are not clear and unambiguous, the intention will prevail. The plain, ordinary meaning of the words used is to be adopted in construing a document. Whatever the instrument, it must receive a construction according to the plain meaning of the words and sentences therein contained. Extrinsic evidence does not mean evidence of the writers intention but evidence to enable the court to interpret the language used. Technical legal terms, or words of well-known legal import used by lawyers, especially conveyancers, will have their technical legal import, “though the testator uses inconsistent terms or gives repugnant or impossible directions. Collecting the general intention from the instrument as a whole and inferring that intention from the general frame of the deed.” 17. Technical legal terms, or words of well-known legal import used by lawyers, especially conveyancers, will have their technical legal import, “though the testator uses inconsistent terms or gives repugnant or impossible directions. Collecting the general intention from the instrument as a whole and inferring that intention from the general frame of the deed.” 17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in T.N. Electricity Board Vs Status Spg.Mills Ltd., (2008) 7 SCC 353 , relied on the maxim ‘contemporanea Expositio’ and held that “a word cannot be assigned a meaning in vaccum ….. it has to be read in the context in which it has been used and while doing so considering the executive order is not barred”. 18. In Provash Chandra Dalvi Vs. Bishwanath Banarjee, AIR 1989 SC 1834 , referring to N.E. Railway Vs. Hastings [(1900) A.C. 260], the Supreme Court held that, every contract is to be construed with reference to its object and the whole of its terms. The whole context must be considered to ascertain the intention of the parties. It is an accepted principle of construction that the sense and meaning of the parties in any particular part of instrument may be collected. ‘ex antecedentibus et consequentibus’. Every part of it may be brought into action in order to collect from the whole one uniform and consistent sense, if that is possible. It was further held that, “In construing a contract the court must look at the words used in the contract unless they are such that one may suspect that they do not convey the intention correctly. If the words are clear, there is very little the court can do about it. In the construction of a written instrument it is legitimate in order to ascertain the true meaning of the words used and if that be doubtful it is legitimate to have regard to the circumstances surrounding their creation and the subject-matter to which it was designed and intended they should apply” 19. In Puram Singh Sahni Vs Sundari Bhagwandas Kripalani, (1991) 2 SCC 180 , the question was whether the agreement between the parties is lease or licence. In Puram Singh Sahni Vs Sundari Bhagwandas Kripalani, (1991) 2 SCC 180 , the question was whether the agreement between the parties is lease or licence. The Supreme Court relied on the maxim ‘ex praecedentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretatio’ and held that, the sense and meaning of the parties has to be collected from the context and every part of the agreement has to be brought into action to collect from the whole one uniform and consistent sense. 20. The words used in a document are to be given literal meaning ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat’. The Hon’ble Apex Court applied this maxim in many a cases and held that, a Statute must be read always in such a manner that it would not lead to absurdity and make the instrument workable. 21. Literal meaning depends on the circumstances of the parties and technical legal terms will always be given their legal meaning. When the language is very clear, the interpreter is precluded from supplying the words or reading something depending on the oral evidence. It is well settled that when the language is clear, oral evidence is not permissible. However, as suggested by the maxim ‘ambiguitas verborum latens verificatione suppletur nam quod ex facto oritur ambiguum verificatione facti tollitur’, latent ambiguity may be explained by evidence because the ambiguity often arises by proof of an intrinsic fact, which may be removed in like manner. 22. It is one of the important legal maxims that the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it ‘nscitur a sociis’. Relative words refer to the next antecedent, unless by such construction the meaning of the sentence would be impaired. ‘Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio, nisi impediatur sententia’. 23. Thus, keeping in view the legal maxims and expressions of the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court should consider the document in question. 24. The recitals in the document that possession was delivered cannot be read in isolation. The entire document and endorsements must be read to ascertain whether the possession was delivered to vendor. 25. In the case of Tirumala Housing (P) Limited (supra-1) a suit for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 25.07.1998 was filed by plaintiff against the defendant. 24. The recitals in the document that possession was delivered cannot be read in isolation. The entire document and endorsements must be read to ascertain whether the possession was delivered to vendor. 25. In the case of Tirumala Housing (P) Limited (supra-1) a suit for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 25.07.1998 was filed by plaintiff against the defendant. Plaintiff pleaded the defendant entered into agreement of sale initially for an extent of Ac.150.00 cents of land and later executed sale deeds in respect of Ac.116.06 guntas in favour of nominees of plaintiffs, but failed to execute sale deeds in respect of balance area of Ac.33.33 guntas. The defendant opposed the suit and raised objection that agreement of sale is engrafted on a stamp paper of Rs.100/- and it cannot be looked into as per the provisions of A.P. Act 21 of 1995. As per clauses 1 and 2 of the agreement, the purchaser was enabled to get layout approved by Town Planning authorities, to advertise the sale of plots and book the sales to prospective purchasers, receive consideration by passing necessary receipts and to deal with the property with necessary control over the land. Considering the recitals of agreement therein and by placing reliance upon B.Ratnamala’s case (supra) and Veena Hasmukh Jain and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors, (1999) 5 SCC 725 , learned single Judge came to the conclusion that document is liable for stamp duty as conveyance under Article 47-A of Schedule I-A of the Act. 26. Another learned single Judge of the composite High Court in Cheryala Srinivas’s case (supra-6) considered whether the document requires to be stamped under Schedule-IA of Article 47-A of the Act. The learned single Judge considered what amounts to delivery of possession. After considering the concept of possession, learned single Judge observed thus: “Therefore, the practical way of looking at the matter is, as to whether a person, in whom the possession is said to have vested, has the effective control of the subject-matter, and is in a position to enjoy the benefit of it. Unless person is in a position to enjoy it, he cannot be said to be in possession thereof.” Eventually, learned single Judge concluded that– “Therefore, the documents cannot be treated as those, covered by Explanation-I, to Entry 47-A, of Schedule I-A.” 27. Unless person is in a position to enjoy it, he cannot be said to be in possession thereof.” Eventually, learned single Judge concluded that– “Therefore, the documents cannot be treated as those, covered by Explanation-I, to Entry 47-A, of Schedule I-A.” 27. In E.Padma Rao’s case the facts as seen from the judgment are that petitioner executed an agreement of sale dated 28.01.2001 in favour of respondents for sale of an extent of Ac.4.00 guntas of land in S.Nos.79 and 80 of Quthbullapur village and Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. The parties agreed to divide the land into plots and the petitioners have undertaken to execute sale deeds in respect of plots in the layout in favour of persons nominated by the respondents. Respondents filed suit O.S.No.545 of 2006 seeking specific performance of agreement of sale. Petitioner filed written statement and opposed the suit. When the agreement of sale dated 28.01.2001 was sought to be marked, an objection was raised as to its admissibility on the ground that it was not properly stamped. It was pleaded that there is a recital in the agreement that possession of property was delivered. The recitals in the agreement dated 28.01.2001 reads that “possession of land is delivered to the vendees in order to divide the land into residential plots in a layout”. Placing reliance upon Cheryala Srinivas’s case, learned single Judge concluded that it does not require stamp duty. Learned single judge dissented with the view in the case of Tirumala Housing (P) Limited and observed thus: “With great respect to the Honourable Judge, who rendered the judgment, the possession which is delivered for the limited purpose of dividing the land into plots, cannot be treated as the one that enables the party to enjoy the property without any fetters. As observed earlier, when the factum of delivery of possession has the effect of elevating agreement of sale covered by Article - 6 of the Schedule IA of the Act, to the level or status of a sale deed, covered by Article 47-A of the Act, it cannot be a mere permission to enter the land to divide it into plots. To treat the possession over an item of immovable property as absolute, irrespective of the nature of recitals, would amount to oversimplification of one of the most complicated concepts of civil law.” It was further observed thus: “It is not in dispute that 3/4th of the extent of the property, covered by the agreement, was already sold through various sale deeds. Stamp duty and registration charges were paid on the extent covered by the documents. If today, the agreement is to be levied stamp duty, as though it is a sale deed, a situation would emerge, wherein, double the stamp duty and registration cheques would be paid, to the extent of the land, that already sold. Collection of deficit stamp duty, on an agreement for sale land, does not arise, once sale deed was executed in pursuance of the agreement. The fail that the sale deed is not in respect of the entire land, covered by the agreement, does not make any difference. Proviso to Explanation - I deals with a reverse situation, viz., credit being given to the stamp duty paid on an agreement of sale when sale deed is executed. It does not contemplate the situation where the stamp duty paid on a sale deed must be taken into account when the agreement of sale in respect of the very property is found to be not adequately stamped.” 28. In R.Venkataram Reddy’s case learned single Judge of composite High Court concluded that delivery of possession of land under an agreement of sale only for the limited purpose of survey and demarcation does not attract the Explanation-I of Article 47-A of the Stamp Act for the purpose of payment of stamp duty treating the transaction as sale. 29. In S.Vijayalakshmi Vs. Boyapalli Shanthamma, 2002 (5) ALT 406 , learned single Judge of composite High Court in the facts of the said case observed that the plaintiff therein was permitted to make the plots and lay the road on the land in question. But the power to execute the sale deed in favour of the present purchasers is still vested with the defendants. Considering those recitals, learned single Judge held that the document does not require stamp duty. 30. In an unreported judgment of composite High Court in K.Pedda Raghava Reddy and another Vs. But the power to execute the sale deed in favour of the present purchasers is still vested with the defendants. Considering those recitals, learned single Judge held that the document does not require stamp duty. 30. In an unreported judgment of composite High Court in K.Pedda Raghava Reddy and another Vs. Smt.Paladugu Aruna and another, C.R.P.No.2340 of 2011 dated 10.08.2011, considering the fact that property was delivered for the purpose of making layout, learned single Judge came to the conclusion that the document in question need not be charged as sale. 31. In an unreported judgment in B.Chandra Reddy Vs. T.Pratap Reddy and others, C.R.P.No.4410 of 2009 dated 14.07.2009, learned single Judge of composite High Court considered that whether the document in question requires stamp duty in terms of Explanation-I of Article 47-A of Schedule I-A of the Act. The recitals in the documents therein were considered as follows: “It was further stipulated that the purchaser shall be entitled to enter upon the schedule land for the purpose of survey, demarcation, plotting, fixing of stones, laying of roads and displaying the boards, etc. and purchasers shall have right to use the said property as he desires. It was further agreed that the vendors shall execute and register a proper sale deed in favour of the purchasers or their nominees in full or part wise or as desired by the purchaser. It is, therefore, clear from the above recitals in the suit agreement that the purchasers were permitted to enter upon the land for certain specific purposes. The recitals in the suit document would not disclose that any absolute rights of possession or enjoyment were conferred on the purchasers under the document.” Learned single Judge concluded that the question as to whether or not a particular document is to be treated as mere agreement of sale or as a conveyance depends upon the recitals contained therein and the same varies from case to case, going by the recitals of the suit agreement of sale. Since the document in that case does not recite, that possession is delivered to the plaintiff but merely enables the purchaser to enter upon the land for certain specified purposes only, it does not require stamp duty. 32. Since the document in that case does not recite, that possession is delivered to the plaintiff but merely enables the purchaser to enter upon the land for certain specified purposes only, it does not require stamp duty. 32. In all cases, except in Cheryala Srinivas case, the judgment of Tirumala Housing case was cited, however, learned single judges, took different view basing on the recital in the document that delivery is only for the purpose of making layout and the vendee has no absolute right to deal with the property. 33. Case on hand, as seen from the agreement of sale, delivery was given to the vendee to divide the land into plots to do real estate business. The vendee has to divide the plots at his own expense, lay road, tree guards, electricity poles and construction of drainage. There are different endorsements on the reverse of the document. Two endorsements are extracted supra. The endorsement dated 29.06.2011 would reflect that vendor got the document registered in respect of plot Nos.6,7, 38, 44 and 45 as per the desire of the vendee and received consideration being paid by respective purchasers. 34. Thus, the recitals in the document coupled with endorsement dated 29.06.2011, would make is clear that property was delivered to the plaintiff only to divide the property into plots, to lay roads, tree guards, electricity poles and construction of drainage. The vendor remained in control over the property. Reading of the entire document, recitals in the document and the intention of the parties is clear that possession was delivered for the purpose of doing some works. 35. As per Explanation-I of Article 47-A of Schedule I-A of the Act, an agreement of sell followed by or evidencing delivery of possession of the property agreed to be sold shall be chargeable as a "sale" under this article. However, the question whether the document is mere agreement of sale or it is coupled with possession, is to be decided with regard to recital regarding delivery of property. Hence, the recital in the document and the intention of the parties play vital role to decide whether the document requires stamp duty as conveyance as defined under Explanation-I of Article 47-A of Schedule I-A of the Act. 36. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Omprakash’s case (supra-5) considered the recitals in the agreement to sell, which was extracted as follows: 1. 36. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Omprakash’s case (supra-5) considered the recitals in the agreement to sell, which was extracted as follows: 1. That while selling the aforesaid land I the seller, have received Rs. 1,15,000/- (Rupees one lac fifteen thousand) cash as a token amount before the witnesses and, by remaining present at the spot, actual physical possession has been handed over to the purchaser, and after receiving remaining sale consideration amount Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand) from the purchaser within a year I, the purchaser, will get the sale deed of the said land registered in the name of the purchaser. Suit therein was filed for specific performance of contract, possession and permanent injunction. Defendants filed written statement and denied the assertion of plaintiffs and denied even the execution of agreement to sell and delivery of possession. When the document was sought to be marked, defendants raised an objection and the same was upheld by the trial Court. By filing, writ petition, before the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it was contended by the plaintiffs that defendants in the suit themselves asserted that possession of property was not delivered and the recital in the agreement is of no consequence. The High Court, basing on the contention in the written statement concluded that property was not delivered and hence, the document does not require stamp duty. Defendants therein filed Special Leave Petition and the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that if in document certain recitals are made then the Court would decide the admissibility of the document on the strength of such recitals and not otherwise. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that “in a given case, if there is an absolute unregistered sale deed and the parties say that the same is not required to be registered then we don't think that the Court would be entitled to admit the document because simply the parties say so. The jurisdiction of the Court flows from Sections 33, 35 and 38 of the Indian Stamp Act and the Court has to decide the question of admissibility.” 37. The jurisdiction of the Court flows from Sections 33, 35 and 38 of the Indian Stamp Act and the Court has to decide the question of admissibility.” 37. Learned counsel for revision petitioner by placing reliance upon the observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court would submit that in the case on hand, in the document in question, there is a recital regarding delivery of possession of property, it requires stamp duty in terms of Explanation-I of Article 47-A of Schedule I-A of the Act. Thus, this Court has to see whether possession of property was delivered for the purpose of dividing land into plots, laying roads, tree guards and construction of drainage or to retain possession with vendee. This Court also has to see whether the vendee under the document any right has to exercise over the schedule property pursuant to the agreement of sale. 38. Learned single Judge in Cheryala Srinivasa’s case considered when a person can be said to be actual and effective possession. P.J. Fitzgerald, in ‘Salmond on Jurisprudence’, says; “The test then for determining whether a man is in possession of anything is whether he is in general control of it. Unless he is actually holding or using it-in which event he clearly has possession-we have to ask whether the facts are such that we can expect him to be able to enjoy the use of it without interference on the part of others. There will always, of course, be border-line cases. Suppose I become paralysed: am I still in possession of the coat by my side? Such questions need not detain us, for the ordinary concept of possession is not designed to cope with such marginal cases, while the existence of legal rules relating to legal possession will answer such questions and obviate the need for any decision in terms of possession in fact.” 'Salmond on Jurisprudence' explained the difference between legal and actual possession as under: “Of all the divergencies between legal and actual possession this is the most notable, viz., that outside the law possession is used in an absolute sense whereas within the law it is employed in a relative sense. Outside the law we do not speak of a person having possession as against someone else; we say that he either has or has not got possession. Outside the law we do not speak of a person having possession as against someone else; we say that he either has or has not got possession. In law we talk rather of possession as something which one person has against another.” Dias, in his treatise on 'Jurisprudence', has discussed the concept of possession, with reference to the theories, propounded by eminent jurists, viz., Salmond, Holmes, Pollock, and ultimately summed up, that there cannot be any straightaway and simple answer to the question, as to whether possession is a matter of law, or of fact. Ultimately he suggested that; “...Possession has three aspects; firstly, the relation between a person and a thing is a fact. Secondly, the advantages attached by law to that relation is a matter of law. Thirdly, these advantages are also attributed to a person when certain other facts exist. What they are in any given type of case is a matter of law.” Learned single Judge came to conclusion that – “13. Therefore, the practical way of looking at the matter is, as to whether a person, in whom the possession is said to have vested, has the effective control of the subject-matter, and is in a position to enjoy the benefit of it. Unless person is in a position to enjoy it, he cannot be said to be in possession thereof.” 39. Of course, pleadings of the parties, are not relevant and the recitals in the documents alone are to be considered. However, one should not forget the other principles qua construction of document. While considering the recitals in the document, the entire document should be read. One should keep in mind whether delivery of possession is to do certain acts or actual delivery. If the delivery is to do particular act and still the vendor retained rights over the property, it cannot be termed as actual delivery of property, which attracts the meaning of conveyance. In such a case the document is not liable for stamp duty as per Explanation-I of Article 47-A of Schedule I-A of the Act. 40. If a document is presented before any authority the authority should consider the aspect of delivery of possession as to whether it is actual delivery or delivery for the purpose of development activity? 41. The case on hand, as discussed supra, property was divided into plots and some sale deeds were already executed. 40. If a document is presented before any authority the authority should consider the aspect of delivery of possession as to whether it is actual delivery or delivery for the purpose of development activity? 41. The case on hand, as discussed supra, property was divided into plots and some sale deeds were already executed. In respect of those plots proper stamp duty was paid to the Government they were registered. Thus, out of the total extent mentioned in the document, part of property (divided into plots) stamp duty was paid to the government. If the agreement of sale is to be levied with stamp duty treating the same as sale deed for the purpose of stamp duty, double the stamp duty and registration charges need to be paid. Parties need to pay stamp duty and penalty even to the plots already sold. Collection of stamp duty on agreement of sale does not arise, once sale deed was executed pursuant to the agreement for part of the land. 42. Explanation-I of Article 47-A of Schedule I-A of the Act reads thus: “Explanation I:-- An agreement to sell followed by or evidencing delivery of possession of the property agreed to be sold shall be chargeable as a "sale" under this article. Provided that, where subsequently a sale deed is executed, in pursuance of an agreement of sale as aforesaid or in pursuance of an agreement referred to in clause (B) of Article 6, the stamp duty, if any, already paid or recovered on the agreement of sale shall be adjusted towards the total duty leviable on the sale deed. 43. Proviso to Explanation-I would make it clear that subsequent sale deed executed pursuant to agreement of sale or in pursuance of an agreement referred to in clause (B) of Article 6, the stamp duty, if any, already paid or recovered on the agreement of sale shall be adjusted towards the total duty leviable on the sale deed. However, proviso to the Explanation-I does not apply to the facts of the case. 44. Since this court is of the considered opinion that actual delivery of possession under the agreement of sale dated 22.01.2011 is not delivered, and the delivery is only for the purpose of division of property into plots and actual possession was retained by the vendors, the order under revision does not call for any interference. 44. Since this court is of the considered opinion that actual delivery of possession under the agreement of sale dated 22.01.2011 is not delivered, and the delivery is only for the purpose of division of property into plots and actual possession was retained by the vendors, the order under revision does not call for any interference. There is no illegality in the impugned order passed by the Court below warranting interference of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. There are no merits in this revision and the same is liable to be dismissed. 45. Accordingly, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed at admission stage. No costs. Since the suit is of the year 2014, the trial court shall dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible, strictly in accordance with law, adhering to the instructions given by this Court in circular R.O.C.No.560/OP/CELL/2022, dated 23.11.2022. As a sequel, all the pending miscellaneous applications shall stand closed.