ORDER : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. The workman who was employed under M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited (in short, 'BCCL') is aggrieved of the order dated 26th August 2019 passed in WPL No. 2172 of 2006 by which the writ Court has set-aside the Award made in his favour. 2. Briefly stated, the appellant who was employed since 1st January 1973 has claimed that his actual date of birth was 14th November 1949 which has been wrongly recorded in the management's records as 17th September 1941. He has put forth this claim on the basis of admit card of matriculation certificate and the school transfer certificate wherein his date of birth is recorded as 14th November 1949. According to him, the service records when his details were filled in he had raised objection and submitted a representation dated 22th July 1987. He has further pleaded that vide letter dated 12th February 1992 Mines Superintendent of Kuiya colliery has also taken some action on his representation but finally his date of birth was not corrected in the service records and, compelled thereof, he submitted representations dated 12th May 1995 and 27th November 1995. The Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union which espoused his cause also submitted representations on 2nd December 1996 and 2nd December 1997. On the other hand, the BCCL produced Form-B register which has been signed by the workman and has pleaded that the admit card and school transfer certificate are not genuine documents and were fabricated to raise the date of birth dispute so as to get extension of service. 3. The Central Government in exercise of powers under section 10(1)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 referred the following dispute to the Tribunal for adjudication: THE SCHEDULE “Whether the demand of the Union for the alteration of the date of birth of Sri Rahish Tiwary, U.G. Munshi of Kuiya Colliery as per the matriculation documents of Bihar School Examination Board is justified? If so, to what relief is the workman entitled?” 4. Before the Tribunal, the workman examined himself and tendered oral evidence in support of his claim whereas the management has examined D.D.Goswami MW1 as its witness to prove Form-B register vol. I of Kuiya colliery vide Ext. M-1, Identity Card register of Kuiya colliery vide Ext. M-2, original service excerpts vide Ext. M-3, superannuation letter vide Ext.-M-4, CMPF Form vide Ext. M-5 and Finger Print Report vide Ext. I of Kuiya colliery vide Ext. M-1, Identity Card register of Kuiya colliery vide Ext. M-2, original service excerpts vide Ext. M-3, superannuation letter vide Ext.-M-4, CMPF Form vide Ext. M-5 and Finger Print Report vide Ext. M-6 to demonstrate that the workman's real date of birth is 17th September 1941 and not 14th November 1949 as claimed by him. On the other hand, the workman has claimed that he could know about wrong recording of his date of birth when the management issued Identity Card to him and, accordingly, he lodged his objection. Later on, he submitted representations in the year 1987 when his service record was prepared. He laid in evidence the admit card of matriculation examination and school transfer certificate which were duly marked Exhibits. He has also produced his representations made to the management of BCCL. 5. The Tribunal has recorded that date of birth of the workman in Form-B register was recorded as 17th September 1941. However, the Tribunal raised the adverse burden against the management to establish the basis on which such date of birth of the workman was recorded. The Tribunal has further held that it was obligatory on the part of the management to accept school leaving certificate and the matriculation certificate as proof of date of birth of the concerned workman and, moreover, there was no impediment in sending the concerned workman to Apex Medical Board for assessment of his age. 6. The writ Court referred to Implementation Instruction No. 76 which lays down the procedure for determination/verification of age of the employees to hold that Award dated 28th September 2005 was made ignoring the procedure prescribed for determination/verification of the age of the employees. The writ Court has held so on the ground that there was no discrepancy in the official records of the BCCL as regards the date of birth of the workman and Implementation Instruction No. 76 can be invoked only in cases where different dates of birth of the employee are recorded in service records and other documents pertaining to age of the employee. 7. The writ Court has also referred to the judgment in “G.M., Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., West Bengal v. Shib Kumar Dushad & Ors.” (2000) 8 SCC 696 wherein the Hon'ble Suprme Court has held as under: “17. 7. The writ Court has also referred to the judgment in “G.M., Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., West Bengal v. Shib Kumar Dushad & Ors.” (2000) 8 SCC 696 wherein the Hon'ble Suprme Court has held as under: “17. The date of birth of an employee is not only important for the employee but for the employer also. On the length of service put in by the employee depends the quantum of retiral benefits he would be entitled to. Therefore, while determining the dispute in such matters courts should bear in mind that a change of the date of birth long after joining service, particularly when the employee is due to retire shortly, will upset the date recorded in the service records maintained in due course of administration should not generally be accepted. In such a case the burden is heavy on the employee who comes to the court with the case that the date of birth in the service record maintained by the employer is untrue and incorrect. The burden can be discharged only by producing acceptable evidence of a clinching nature. We are constrained to make this observation as we find that in a large number of cases employees who are on the verge of retirement raise a dispute regarding correctness of the date of birth entered in the service record and the courts are inclined to pass an interim order for continuance of such employee beyond the date of superannuation on the basis of the entry of date of birth in the service record. Such a situation cannot be commended for the reason that the court in passing such an interim order grants a relief to the employee even before determining the issue regarding correctness of the date of birth entered in the service record. Such interim orders create various complications. Anticipated vacancy for which the employee next in the line has been waiting does not materialise, on account of which the junior is denied promotion which he has all along been led to believe will be his due on the retirement of the senior.” 8. Now this is the law settled through a catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that a mandamus cannot be issued for correction of date of birth at the fag end of the service. Now this is the law settled through a catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that a mandamus cannot be issued for correction of date of birth at the fag end of the service. In “Secretary and Commissioner, Home Department v. R. Kirubakaran” 1994 Supp (1) SCC 155 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the application seeking correction in the date of birth should be made within the time fixed by the rule/circular/notification of the employer and in absence of any rule or order it should be made within a reasonable time. 9. The workman who admitted before the Tribunal that he could notice wrong recording of his date of birth in the Identity Card in 1973 itself has, however, failed to offer any explanation why he immediately did not lodge his objection. No doubt he has produced his representations made in the year 1987 and 1995, but then, the burden lies on him to demonstrate that the recording of his date of birth in the service records is wrong. He had not produced original matriculation certificate which is issued even to the candidates who have failed in the examination and there is no explanation offered by him on this issue. The workman has also failed to offer any explanation or clarification as regards discrepancy in the name of the student and his name. On the other hand, the management has disputed genuineness of admit card and school leaving certificate in which different name of the student is recorded. 10. With the aforesaid issues in the background, the real question which arises is whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to make aforesaid award in terms of the reference dated 29th January 1999. Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 provides that the Court or the Tribunal or National Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other authority concerned may think and shall have same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for (a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath (b) compelling the production of documents and material objects (c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses and (d) in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed. Section 11 further provides that the proceeding before the Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code and it shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for the purposes of sections 345, 346 and 348 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this regard, this is also necessary to bear in mind that the Industrial Tribunal is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction and its jurisdiction is confined to the trial of industrial dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is well-settled that the terms of reference determine the scope of powers and jurisdictions of the Tribunal and, therefore, it is not open to the Tribunal to travel materially beyond the scope of reference. In “Indian Banks Association v. Workmen of Syndicate Bane and Ors” (2001) 3 SCC 36 the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not approve the award which directed absorption of Deposit Collectors as regular workmen as no such demand was made by them. 11. In “State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Om Prakash Sharma” (2006) 5 SCC 123 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “14. In the instant case, the award of the Labour Court suffers from an illegality, which appears on the face of the record. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court emanated from the order of the reference. It could not have passed an order going beyond the terms of the reference. While passing the award, if the Labour Court exceeds its jurisdiction, the award must be held to be suffering from a jurisdictional error. It was capable of being corrected by the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review. The High Court, therefore, clearly fell in error in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction. The award and the judgment of the High Court, therefore, cannot be sustained. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The award is set aside to the extent of the order of reinstatement with back wages. The writ petition filed by the appellant in the High Court is, thus, allowed.” 12. The award and the judgment of the High Court, therefore, cannot be sustained. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The award is set aside to the extent of the order of reinstatement with back wages. The writ petition filed by the appellant in the High Court is, thus, allowed.” 12. This is thus a well-accepted proposition that the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal shall adjudicate the matter referred by the Central Government in exercise of powers under section 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and it has no powers to go beyond the reference so made. The reference made vide order dated 29th January 1999 was that the Industrial Tribunal-II at Dhanbad shall adjudicate “whether the demand of the Union for the alteration of the date of birth of Sri Raish Tiwari is justified? And if so, to what relief is the workman entitled?”. However, the Tribunal has gone beyond the reference and made the award dated 28th September 2005 to the following effect: "The demand of the Union for alteration of the date of birth of Sri Rahish Tiwary, U.G. Munshi of Kuiya Colliery as per the Matriculation documents of Bihar School Examination Board is not justified in view of the observation made in the body of the Award. Management is directed to send the concerned workman to Apex Medical Board for assessment of his age complying with the strict guideline of medical jurisprudence within three months from the date of publication of the Award and decision of the Apex Medical Board in the matter of assessment of the age of the concerned workman should be binding upon both sides strictly. If it is established as per report of the Apex Medical Board that the concerned workman named above was prematurely superannuated by the management in that case he will be entitled to get full employment benefit for the period in question." 13. The materials on record in the present case do not reveal that reference made by the order dated 29th January 1999 can be stretched to confer jurisdiction upon the Tribunal to pass an order for medical examination of the workman by the Apex Medical Board. The materials on record in the present case do not reveal that reference made by the order dated 29th January 1999 can be stretched to confer jurisdiction upon the Tribunal to pass an order for medical examination of the workman by the Apex Medical Board. Therefore, the award so made is beyond the reference made vide order dated 29th January 1999 in exercise of the powers under section 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act and while so, we do not find any ground to interfere in the matter and, accordingly, L.P.A. No.763 of 2019 is dismissed.