JUDGMENT : Om Prakash Shukla, J. 1. Heard Shri H.J.S. Parihar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mrs. Meenakshi Singh Parihar for the petitioner. Shri Ashish Kumar Pathak, Mrs. Alka Verma, Shri Anand Dubey, Shri Anupam Shukla, Shri I.P. Singh, Shri R.D. Shahi, Shri S.S. Rajawat, Shri Bhanu Bajpai, Shri Pradeep Kumar Singh, Shri Firoz Ahmad Khan, Shri Chandrashekhar Singh, , Shri Alok Srivastava, Shri Prashant Kumar Singh, Shri S. Chandra, Shri Vinod Kumar Gupta, Shri Ravikant Mishra, Shri Ajay Kumar Singh, Shri P.K. Singh, Shri Pawan Kumar Pandey, Shri G.C. Verma, Shri Y.K. Mishra, Shri Ansuman Singh, Shri Ashutosh Shahi, Shri Ganesh Nath Mishra, Shri Sanjay Mishra, Shri Ramchandra Gupta, Shri Rajendra Pratap Singh, Shri Alok Pandey, Shri Udai bhan Pandey, Shri Shashank Singh, Shri Kshemenda Shukla, Shri Jitendra Kumar Pandey, Shri Vinod Kumar Srivastava, Shri Anupam Mehrotra, Shri Krishna Kumar Dubey are present for the petitioners. Shri Badrish Kumar Tripathi, learned Counsel Shri V.P. Nag & Shri Gopal Kumar Srivastava, learned Standing Counsel are present for the opposite parties. 2. The Petitioners in this leading Writ Petition claim to be Teachers L.T Grade and as such have knocked the door of this Court, thereby seeking regular payment of salary, arrears of salary from their respective date of joining and non-interference by the respondents in regular functioning of these Writ Petitioners on the post of Assistant Teachers L.T. Grade in their respective institution. 3. Since common issue has been raised in this bunch of matter, they are being taken up together for disposal. In order to appreciate the controversy in these bunch of writ petition, it would be appropriate to curl the facts of any writ petition and for the limited purpose, the fact of leading Writ Petition bearing no. 1223 of 2006 (Sushil Kumar Dubey vs. State of U.P & Ors.), is being taken for consideration. The Petitioner in the said Writ Petition claims to be fully qualified for appointment to the post of Assistant Teacher L.T Grade and having been appointed on a vacant post. The Petitioner claims pursuant to the arising of the said vacancy, the post was advertisement and he applied in view of the said advertisement. It is the case of the petitioner that he had been post on the post of Assistant Teacher L.T Grade pursuant to a resolution dated 15.07.2003 issued by the managing committee of the intermediate college, Newadhiya District Jaunpur. It is the case of the petitioner that he had been post on the post of Assistant Teacher L.T Grade pursuant to a resolution dated 15.07.2003 issued by the managing committee of the intermediate college, Newadhiya District Jaunpur. The Petitioner claims to have been issued appointment letter on 16.07.2003 and joined on the said post on 18.07.2003 and his name being sent to the office of the District Inspector of schools on 21.07.2003. In view of his said appointment, the petitioner claimed that although several request were made by him to the Manager and Principal of Institution for payment of salary however the same was not released and on his inquiry to the District Inspector of Schools, Jaunpur he was told that the Secretary of Secondary Education, Government of Uttar Pradesh has issued circular dated 10.05.2002 mentioning therein that no approval to the adhoc appointments be made as there was no provision for making adhoc appointment by the management. 4. Although, this court finds on fact that the petitioner ought to be bound by the circular as it was issued much prior to his appointment and was commensurate to the existing law relating to appointment under the U.P Education Act, however the petitioner claims that the Government has no power to make adhoc appointment under the rules or regulations framed under U. P Secondary Education Service Selection Board (U.P Act no. 5 of 1982) as well as U.P Intermediate Education Board Act as it is the Managing committee of an institution, which has been vested with the said power. Thus, it is the case of the petitioner that the state government has no power and authority to stop the management of its essential functions of appointment of Teachers and Principal in the name of grant in aid as his appointment has been made by the Committee of Management in exercise of powers conferred under Section 16 E (11) of U. P Intermediate Education Board Act read with Regulation 9 of Chapter II of the U.P Intermediate Education Board Act. He also claims that since the post in question is under grant in aid it is the responsibility of the State Government to make payment of his salary and any violation thereof is in the teeth of the provisions contained under the U. P High School and Intermediate Colleges (payment of salaries to teachers and other employees) Act, 1971. He also claims that since the post in question is under grant in aid it is the responsibility of the State Government to make payment of his salary and any violation thereof is in the teeth of the provisions contained under the U. P High School and Intermediate Colleges (payment of salaries to teachers and other employees) Act, 1971. Thus, it has been prayed by the petitioner that since he has been continuously and regularly 5. This court finds profitable to quote, section 16 E of the U. P Intermediate Education Board Act, 1921, which provides procedure for filling of temporary vacancy of teachers and head of institutions. Sub – section 11 of Section 16 E inter alia provides as under: - “Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub sections, appointments in the case of a temporary vacancy caused by the grant of leave to an incumbent for a period not exceeding six months or 1 [by death, termination or otherwise] of an incumbent occurring during an educational session, may be made by direct recruitment or promotion without reference to the Selection Committee in such manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. [Provided that no appointment made under this subsection shall, in any case, continue beyond the end of the educational session during which such appointment was made.” 6. The aforesaid clause is an exception to the general rule that recruitment or promotion can be made by reference to the selection committee only for all grant-in aid institutions. The said non-obstante clause makes it loud and clear that no doubt a temporary vacancy can be filled by the management of the institution in case of an exigency like death or termination etc., during an educational session, however it is also equally clear that the same can be done for a period not exceeding 6 months and in any case no appointment can continue beyond the end of the educational session during which such appointment was made. Thus, on facts of the case, it seems apparently the petitioner could not allowed to be continue on the said post for perpetuity without his appointment having been referred to selection committee. 7. However, this court finds that the controversy relating to the issue being raised in this bunch of matters has been decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide Judgment dated 20.08.2020 passed in Civil Appeal no. 7. However, this court finds that the controversy relating to the issue being raised in this bunch of matters has been decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide Judgment dated 20.08.2020 passed in Civil Appeal no. 8300 of 2016 (Sanjay Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P & Ors.), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said judgment gave a slew of directions to the commission in paras 7 to 11 of the judgment relating to conducting of one single examination, interview, weightage to the persons who have worked as TGT or Lecturers etc. etc. Seeing the number of petitions engaging the attention of this court on an issue, which stands already decided by the Apex Court, it would be pertinent to mention Para 7(e) of the said direction which clearly says that the decision taken by the commission shall be final and no further litigation will be entertained in respect thereof. 8. It is also reported that an M.A no. 818/2021 was also filed in the said Civil Appeal no. 8300 of 2016 which was decided on 07.12.2021 wherein the court clarified that weightage will be given to only those who have been found appointed on adhoc basis following procedure as prescribed under section 16 E (11) of the Act. The Ld. Standing Counsel has submitted that in compliance to the directions passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid Sanjay Singh’s case an advertisement was issued for selection to the post of Assistant Teacher for which test/interview was held on 07/08 of August, 2022 and similar advertisement was issued for selection to the post of Lecturer for which test/interview was held on 17/18 of August, 2021. It is the further submission of the Ld. Standing Counsel that after holding the selection process which was participated by total 1455 (1446 TGT and 9 Lecturer) candidates, who claimed to be working on adhoc basis, only 126 adhoc teachers on being verified were found to be working and appointed as per Section 16 E (11) of the Act. The Ld. Counsel submits that due weightage were given to these successful candidates and accordingly panel has been sent to DIOS concerned. The Ld. Counsel submits that due weightage were given to these successful candidates and accordingly panel has been sent to DIOS concerned. Thus, he submits that in view of the direction of the Hon’ble Apex court the selection process were initiated, completed and names of successful adhoc teachers whose services could be verified has been already sent to the DIOS and as such nothing remains in the present bunch of Writ Petitions as the writ petitioners have no legally enforceable right to continue in the respective institutions nor they may be granted salary from the public ex chequer. 9. This court finds that a similar writ petition as the present bunch of the writ petition has been decided by a coordinate bench of this court based on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Court in the aforesaid Sanjay Singh’s Case. The Ld. Coordinate Bench in Writ -A No. 95 of 2011 (Vinod Kumar Yadav vs. State of U.P), after extensively quoting the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Singh’s case has held as follows: “The petitioner has been working as LT Grade Teacher in the opposite party no. 4-Institutoin in terms of the interim order dated 11.01.2011, however, his rights, if any, are now restricted in terms of the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Sanjay Singh (supra). On being asked as to whether the petitioner appeared in the selection held by the Board in pursuance to the said judgment vide advertisements No. 1 and 2 of 2021, learned counsel fairly submitted that the petitioner did not appear. In these circumstances, it is difficult to pass any order in favour of the petitioner. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the State Government proposes to frame some policy for adjustments of ad hoc teachers such as the petitioner on honorarium basis. He says that policy will be applicable only to those Teachers who are still working on the date of issuance of the policy. On being asked, learned counsel for the State and the petitioner's submitted that the matter is still under consideration and no policy has been issued by the State Government as yet. In this view of the matter, there is nothing that this Court can do anything in favour of the petitioner. On being asked, learned counsel for the State and the petitioner's submitted that the matter is still under consideration and no policy has been issued by the State Government as yet. In this view of the matter, there is nothing that this Court can do anything in favour of the petitioner. The matter stands concluded by the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Sanjay Singh's case quoted hereinabove, therefore, this writ petition is disposed of in terms thereof.” 10. Thus, this court is of the considered opinion that all the issues raised by the petitioner stands decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as by this court in one matter or the other and the issues raised are no longer res integra. Moreover, this court cannot be oblivious of the law of precedents, which forms the foundation of administration of Justice and it has been held time and again that a single Judge of a High Court is ordinarily bound to accept as correct judgments of Courts of coordinate jurisdiction and of Division Benches and of the Full Benches of his Court. The rule of precedent is binding for the reason that there me view as has been taken earlier. The earlier decision of the coordinate bench is binding upon any latter coordinate bench deciding the same or similar issues. If the latter bench wants to take a different view than that taken by the earlier bench, the proper course is for it to refer the matter to a larger bench. The Apex Court in the judgment reported in the State of Punjab and another versus Devans Modern Breweries ltd. and another, (2004) 11 SCC 26 , held at paragraph 339 as follows:- “339. Judicial discipline envisages that a coordinate Bench follow the decision of an earlier coordinate Bench. If a coordinate Bench does not agree with the principles of law enunciated by another Bench, the matter may be referred only to a Larger Bench. (See Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik, (2002) 1 SCC 1 followed in Union of India Vs. Hansoli Devi, (2002) 7 SCC 273 . But no decision can be arrived at contrary to or inconsistent with the law laid down by the coordinate Bench. Kalyani Stores (supra) and K.K. Narula (supra) both have been rendered by the Constitution Benches. (See Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik, (2002) 1 SCC 1 followed in Union of India Vs. Hansoli Devi, (2002) 7 SCC 273 . But no decision can be arrived at contrary to or inconsistent with the law laid down by the coordinate Bench. Kalyani Stores (supra) and K.K. Narula (supra) both have been rendered by the Constitution Benches. The said decisions, therefore, cannot be thrown out for any purpose whatsoever; more so when both of them if applied collectively lead to a contrary decision proposed by the majority.” 11. In view of the above and keeping in mind the Judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sanjay Singh’s case and the compliances made by the respondent-State leading to the conducting of examination/interview and preparation of panel sent to the DIOS, nothing survives to be decided in these bunch of matters and as such the present bunch of writ petitions are DISPOSED OF in the said terms. It is made clear that this court has not expressed its view on any individual matters, which nonetheless shall be guided on their own merits and may also be entitled for the benefits, if any, in case accrued to them as per the judgment in Sanjay Singh’s case and the subsequent compliances made by the State as aforesaid. There shall be no order as to costs. is a desire to secure uniformity and certainty in law. It is expected that a coordinate bench must follow the decision of another coordinate bench and take the same view as has been taken earlier. The earlier decision of the coordinate bench is binding upon any latter coordinate bench deciding the same or similar issues. If the latter bench wants to take a different view than that taken by the earlier bench, the proper course is for it to refer the matter to a larger bench. The Apex Court in the judgment reported in the State of Punjab and another versus Devans Modern Breweries ltd. and another, (2004) 11 SCC 26 , held at paragraph 339 as follows:- “339. Judicial discipline envisages that a coordinate Bench follow the decision of an earlier coordinate Bench. If a coordinate Bench does not agree with the principles of law enunciated by another Bench, the matter may be referred only to a Larger Bench. and another, (2004) 11 SCC 26 , held at paragraph 339 as follows:- “339. Judicial discipline envisages that a coordinate Bench follow the decision of an earlier coordinate Bench. If a coordinate Bench does not agree with the principles of law enunciated by another Bench, the matter may be referred only to a Larger Bench. (See Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik, (2002) 1 SCC 1 followed in Union of India Vs. Hansoli Devi, (2002) 7 SCC 273 . But no decision can be arrived at contrary to or inconsistent with the law laid down by the coordinate Bench. Kalyani Stores (supra) and K.K. Narula (supra) both have been rendered by the Constitution Benches. The said decisions, therefore, cannot be thrown out for any purpose whatsoever; more so when both of them if applied collectively lead to a contrary decision proposed by the majority.” 12. In view of the above and keeping in mind the Judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sanjay Singh’s case and the compliances made by the respondent-State leading to the conducting of examination/interview and preparation of panel sent to the DIOS, nothing survives to be decided in these bunch of matters and as such the present bunch of writ petitions are DISPOSED OF in the said terms. It is made clear that this court has not expressed its view on any individual matters, which nonetheless shall be guided on their own merits and may also be entitled for the benefits, if any, in case accrued to them as per the judgment in Sanjay Singh’s case and the subsequent compliances made by the State as aforesaid. There shall be no order as to costs.