Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2023 DIGILAW 870 (GUJ)

Patel Rajnikant Ishwarbhai v. State Of Gujarat

2023-07-17

SANDEEP N.BHATT

body2023
JUDGMENT : 1. The present application is filed for seeking following reliefs: (A) YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to admit and allow the present petition; (B) YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to quash and set-aside the impugned complaint dated 03/02/2017, bearing Criminal Case No. 41 of 2017 pending in the Court of J.M.F.C. Malpur, District: Aravalli (Annexure– A); (C) YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased stay further complaint proceedings dated of the 03/02/2017, impugned bearing Criminal Case No. 41 of 2017 pending in the Court of J.M.F.C. Malpur, District: Aravalli, pending admission, hearing and final disposal of the present petition; (D) An ex-parte ad interim relief in terms of prayer [C] above may kindly be granted; (E) Pass such orders as thought fit in the interest of justice.” 2.1 Brief facts as per the case of the applicant in this application are as such that the applicant is involved in agriculture and acts as an agriculture agent. In May 2012, the applicant supplied cotton seeds, pesticides, and money worth Rs. 5,03,000/- to respondent No. 2, with an agreement that the respondent would supply the cotton produce to the applicant in return. However, respondent No. 2 sold the cotton produce to someone else, breached the trust, and cheated the applicant by not repaying the due amount. When the applicant demanded the money, respondent No. 2 refused and issued threats. 2.2 The applicant issued a legal notice to respondent No. 2 on 22/09/2015, but there was no response. Subsequently, on 21/01/2016, the applicant filed a complaint with the Vijapur Police station, which led to the registration of an F.I.R. on 06/02/2016 under Sections 406 & 420 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C). Respondent No. 2, in turn, issued a legal notice to the applicant on 02/05/2016, making false claims and demanding an amount of Rs. 9,28,372/-. The applicant alleges that the money was given to respondent No. 2 for growing cotton, and the latter's friend collected the money on some occasions, with the applicant obtaining his signature on the vouchers. 2.3 The applicant further claims that respondent No. 2 presented concocted documents before the Hon'ble Court, which lacked the applicant's signature, and obtained a stay of investigation and proceedings of the F.I.R. through an order dated 23/01/2017, passed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 34460 of 2016. 2.3 The applicant further claims that respondent No. 2 presented concocted documents before the Hon'ble Court, which lacked the applicant's signature, and obtained a stay of investigation and proceedings of the F.I.R. through an order dated 23/01/2017, passed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 34460 of 2016. The applicant also alleges that he was not served any notice or summons in the impugned complaint filed by respondent No. 2. Instead, the police informed his family member that there was a warrant against the applicant, asking him to remain present before the J.M.F.C. Court Malpur in the said complaint case on 27/04/2018. 2.4 Based on these contentions, the applicant has preferred the present application to address the issues and seek appropriate resolution. 3. Heard learned advocate Mr. Dipak H. Sindhi for the applicant, learned advocate Ms. Amrita Ajmera for Mr. Daifraz Havewalla, learned advocate for the respondent No.2 – complainant and learned Assistant Public Prosecutor (APP) Mr. Soaham Joshi appearing for the respondent No.1 – State. 4.1 Learned advocate Mr. Dipak H. Sindhi for the applicant has submitted that upon a bare reading of the private complaint filed by the complainant, no offence is made out against the applicant herein. He argues that the trial court has committed a gross error of law by not considering the fact that the complainant does not have any averment which constitutes an offence against the applicant. Mr. Sindhi further contends that, on the contrary, the complainant has suppressed many things in the complaint. Therefore, on this ground also, the impugned complaint is required to be quashed. 4.2 Furthermore, Mr. Sindhi points out that the complaint is filed as a counterblast, as the complainant has already lodged an F.I.R. bearing C.R. No. I-13 of 2016 on 6.2.2016 under Sections 420 & 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, "the IPC"). He draws attention to the notice correspondence, whereby the applicant issued a notice to the complainant about the alleged transaction, and thereafter, the F.I.R. is lodged against the present complainant. The present complaint is filed about one year later in the year 2017. Therefore, Mr. Sindhi submits that the complaint is filed with a mala fide intention, and continuing such proceedings will amount to an abuse of the process of law. The present complaint is filed about one year later in the year 2017. Therefore, Mr. Sindhi submits that the complaint is filed with a mala fide intention, and continuing such proceedings will amount to an abuse of the process of law. 4.3 Furthermore, he submits that the provisions of Sections 406 & 420 of the IPC cannot go together, as per the view taken by this Court. Additionally, he argues that the nature of the dispute involved in the present case is of a civil nature, and the applicant is trying to give it the color of criminality. Thus, the private complaint filed by the present complainant is required to be quashed in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana V/s Bhajan Lal reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 . Therefore, he prays to allow this application by exercising the powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, "the CrPC"). 5. Per contra, learned advocate Ms. Amrita Ajmera for Mr. Daifraz Havewalla, learned advocate for the respondent No.2 – complainant strongly opposes the prayers made in the present application. She submits that a prima facie case is made out pursuant to filing the complaint under Sections 406, 420 of the IPC before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class. She draws attention to the facts narrated in the complaint and contends that a total of 71 farmers who handed over the crop to the present applicant were duped by not paying the loan as required, and there are specific details mentioned in the complaint that prima facie satisfy the ingredients under Sections 405, 415 of the I.P.C. Therefore, the complaint is filed under Section 406 and 420 of the IPC. Furthermore, she submits that the learned Magistrate, after considering the averments made in the complaint, has recorded satisfaction prior to passing the order of issuance of process for the registration of the case. Hence, from the reading of that, the statement of complaint recorded, and thereafter, the process is issued by considering prima facie the ingredients under Sections 406, 420 of the IPC is satisfied. Hence, from the reading of that, the statement of complaint recorded, and thereafter, the process is issued by considering prima facie the ingredients under Sections 406, 420 of the IPC is satisfied. Therefore, she submits that this Court should not exercise the powers under Sections 482 of the CrPC when a prima facie offence is made out, especially under the guise that the present complaint is filed subsequent to the F.I.R. lodged by the applicant against the complaint. She explains that aspect by urging that since the complainant is representing the interests of 71 farmers, they tried to lodge their F.I.R., but since the police did not take this complaint, they had to file this private complaint before the Magistrate. Furthermore, she contends that this cannot be considered a counterblast; on the contrary, the complainant and the interests of 71 other persons were jeopardized by the applicant. Therefore, she prays that in view of the settled position of law, this Court should not examine the powers under Section 482 of the CrPC when the complaint is prima facie disclosing any offence against the applicant/(s) or not, and thus, this is not a fit case where the Court should exercise its discretion. 6. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor Mr. Soaham Joshi, appearing for respondent No.1 – State, has also objected to the prayers made in the present application. He draws attention to the averments made in the complaint and submits that a prima facie case is made out against the applicant. Therefore, the Court should not exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, which should be exercised very sparingly, considering the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. versus State of Maharashtra and Others reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315. More particularly, para 80 is relevant, and this is not a fit case where the Court should exercise its discretion or powers under the provisions of Section 482 of the CrPC. 7.1 I have heard learned advocates for the respective parties. I have considered rival submissions made at the bar. 7.2 It is required to refer Sections 405, 406, 415 and 420 of the IPC, as under: “Section 405 in The Indian Penal Code:- 405. 7.1 I have heard learned advocates for the respective parties. I have considered rival submissions made at the bar. 7.2 It is required to refer Sections 405, 406, 415 and 420 of the IPC, as under: “Section 405 in The Indian Penal Code:- 405. Criminal breach of trust.—Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits “criminal breach of trust”. 1[Explanation 2[1].—A person, being an employer 3[of an establishment whether exempted under section 17 of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), or not] who deducts the employee’s contribution from the wages payable to the employee for credit to a Provident Fund or Family Pension Fund established by any law for the time being in force, shall be deemed to have been entrusted with the amount of the contribution so deducted by him and if he makes default in the payment of such contribution to the said Fund in violation of the said law, shall be deemed to have dishonestly used the amount of the said contribution in violation of a direction of law as aforesaid.] 4[Explanation 2.—A person, being an employer, who deducts the employees’ contribution from the wages payable to the employee for credit to the Employees’ State Insurance Fund held and administered by the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation established under the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), shall be deemed to have been entrusted with the amount of the contribution so deducted by him and if he makes default in the payment of such contribution to the said Fund in violation of the said Act, shall be deemed to have dishonestly used the amount of the said contribution in violation of a direction of law as aforesaid.] Illustrations (a) A, being executor to the will of a deceased person, dishonestly disobeys the law which directs him to divide the effects according to the will, and appropriate them to his own use. A has committed criminal breach of trust. A has committed criminal breach of trust. (b) A is a warehouse-keeper. Z going on a journey, entrusts his furniture to A, under a contract that it shall be returned on payment of a stipulated sum for warehouse room. A dishonestly sells the goods. A has committed criminal breach of trust. (c) A, residing in Calcutta, is agent for Z, residing at Delhi. There is an express or implied contract between A and Z, that all sums remitted by Z to A shall be invested by A, according to Z’s direction. Z remits a lakh of rupees to A, with directions to A to invest the same in Company’s paper. A dishonestly disobeys the direction and employs the money in his own business. A has committed criminal breach of trust. (d) But if A, in the last illustration, not dishonestly but in good faith, believing that it will be more for Z’s advantage to hold shares in the Bank of Bengal, disobeys Z’s directions, and buys shares in the Bank of Bengal, for Z, instead of buying Company’s paper, here, though Z should suffer loss, and should be entitled to bring a civil action against A, on account of that loss, yet A, not having acted dishonestly, has not committed criminal breach of trust. (e) A, a revenue-officer, is entrusted with public money and is either directed by law, or bound by a contract, express or implied, with the Government, to pay into a certain treasury all the public money which he holds. A dishonestly appropriates the money. A has committed criminal breach of trust. (f) A, a carrier, is entrusted by Z with property to be carried by land or by water. A dishonestly misappropriates the property. A has committed criminal breach of trust. Comments Criminal Conspiracy Sanction for prosecution is not necessary if a public servant is charged for offence of entering into a criminal conspiracy for committed breach of trust; State of Kerala v. Padmanabham Nair, 1999 Cr LJ 3696 (SC). Criminal breach of trust: Meaning and extent It must be proved that the beneficial interest in the property in respect of which the offence is alleged to have been committed was vested in some person other than the accused, and that the accused held that property on behalf of that person. Criminal breach of trust: Meaning and extent It must be proved that the beneficial interest in the property in respect of which the offence is alleged to have been committed was vested in some person other than the accused, and that the accused held that property on behalf of that person. A relationship is created between the transferor and transferee, whereunder the transferor remains the owner of the property and the transferee has legal custody of the property for the benefit of the transferor himself or transferee has only the custody of the property for the benefit of the transferor himself or someone else. At best, the transferee obtains in the property entrusted to him only special interest limited to claim for his charges in respect of its safe retention, and under no circumstances does he acquire a right to dispose of that property in contravention of the condition of the entrustment; Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 575 . Entrustment The word entrusted in the section is very important unless there is entrustment, there can be no offence under the section; Ramaswami Nadar v. State of Madras, AIR 1958 SC 56 . Section 406 in The Indian Penal Code:- 406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust.—Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. Section 415 in The Indian Penal Code:- 415. Cheating.—Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”. Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section. Illustrations (a) A, by falsely pretending to be in the Civil Service, intentionally deceives Z, and thus dishonestly induces Z to let him have on credit goods for which he does not mean to pay. A cheats. Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section. Illustrations (a) A, by falsely pretending to be in the Civil Service, intentionally deceives Z, and thus dishonestly induces Z to let him have on credit goods for which he does not mean to pay. A cheats. (b) A, by putting a counterfeit mark on an article, intentionally deceives Z into a belief that this article was made by a certain celebrated manufacturer, and thus dishonestly induces Z to buy and pay for the article. A cheats. (c) A, by exhibiting to Z a false sample of an article, intentionally deceives Z into believing that the article corresponds with the sample, and thereby, dishonestly induces Z to buy and pay for the article. A cheats. (d) A, by tendering in payment for an article a bill on a house with which A keeps no money, and by which A expects that the bill will be dishonored, intentionally deceives Z, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to deliver the article, intending not to pay for it. A cheats. (e) A, by pledging as diamonds article which he knows are not diamonds, intentionally deceives Z, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to lend money. A cheats. (f) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to repay any money that Z may lend to him and thereby dishonestly induces Z to lend him money. A not intending to repay it. A cheats. (g) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to deliver to Z a certain quantity of indigo plant which he does not intend to deliver, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to advance money upon the faith of such delivery. A cheats; but if A, at the time of obtaining the money, intends to deliver the indigo plant, and afterwards breaks his contract and does not deliver it, he does not cheat, but is liable only to a civil action for breach of contract. (h) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A has performed A’s part of a contract made with Z, which he has not performed, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to pay money. A cheats. (h) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A has performed A’s part of a contract made with Z, which he has not performed, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to pay money. A cheats. (i) A sells and conveys an estate to B. A, knowing that in consequence of such sale he has no right to the property, sells or mortgages the same to Z, without disclosing the fact of the previous sale and conveyance to B, and receives the purchase or mortgage money from Z. A cheats. Section 420 in The Indian Penal Code:- 420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.—Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 7.3 It is relevant to consider that one complaint has already been filed on 6.2.2016 by the applicant herein against the complainant under Sections 406 & 420 of the IPC. Therefore, it is not appropriate at this stage to contend on behalf of the applicant that the provisions of Sections 406 & 420 cannot go together. The court has to examine each matter on its own facts and the allegations made in the complaint or F.I.R. It is an undisputed fact emerging from the record that there is some transaction regarding seeds, insecticides, and crops standing on the premises, which involves about 71 farmers. It appears that the present applicant and complainant have a business relationship and are transacting regarding agricultural produce. Therefore, considering the allegations made in the F.I.R., prima facie, it is borne out from the complaint itself that there are allegations regarding cheat and criminal breach of trust. The trial court has recorded prima facie satisfaction before registering the case and issuing process pursuant to the complaint. Therefore, when the process is issued under the provisions of Section 204 of the CrPC, as under: “Section 204 in The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973:- 204. Issue of process. The trial court has recorded prima facie satisfaction before registering the case and issuing process pursuant to the complaint. Therefore, when the process is issued under the provisions of Section 204 of the CrPC, as under: “Section 204 in The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973:- 204. Issue of process. (1) If in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding, and the case appears to be- (a) a summons- case, he shall issue his summons for the attendance of the accused, or (b) a warrant- case, he may issue a warrant, or, if he thinks fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be brought or to appear at a certain time before such Magistrate or (if he has no jurisdiction himself) some other Magistrate having jurisdiction. (2) No summons or warrant shall be issued against the accused under sub- section (1) until a list of the prosecution witnesses has been filed. (3) In a proceeding instituted upon a complaint made in writing every summons or warrant issued under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied by a copy of such complaint. (4) When by any law for the time being in force any process- fees or other fees are payable, no process shall be issued until the fees are paid and, if such fees are not paid within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may dismiss the complaint. (5) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of section 87.” 7.4 I am of the opinion that it is not appropriate, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, to exercise my inherent powers by interfering in the process of adjudication pursuant to the criminal complaint filed before the concerned court. On the contrary, if such interference is made at this stage, in my opinion, it will amount to an abuse of process of law by the applicant herein. On the contrary, if such interference is made at this stage, in my opinion, it will amount to an abuse of process of law by the applicant herein. 7.5 Further, it will also be fruitful to mention the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana V/s Bhajan Lal reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed thus - “In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Ch.XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Art.226 or the inherent powers under sec.482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under sec.156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of sec.155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under sec.156(2) of the Code. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under sec.156(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 7.6 Further, in the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. versus State of Maharashtra and Others reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, and more particularly para 80 is relevant, which is as under: “80. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under: i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence; ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty). v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule; viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere; ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping; x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences; xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure; xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court; xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR; xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order. xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.” 7.7 I am of the opinion that in this application, a full- fledged trial is required, and at this stage, the Court should not exercise its inherent powers, as a prima facie case is made out against the present applicant 8. Accordingly, the present application is dismissed as not entertained. Notice stands discharged. Interim relief granted earlier stands vacated.