JUDGMENT : C. PRATHEEP KUMAR, J. 1. This is an appeal filed under Section 30 of the Employees Compensation Act, 1923 by the second opposite party in E.C.C. No. 20/2020 (Old No. 132/2015) on the file of the Industrial Tribunal and Employees Compensation Commissioner, Kozhikode. 2. E.C.C. No. 20/2020 (old No. 132/2015) is an application filed under Section 22 of the Employees Compensation Act, 1923 (in short, Act 8 of 1923), claiming compensation for the injury sustained to him on 2.11.2012 at Vellaramkunnu near Kalpetta out of and in the course of his employment as helper to the first opposite party in his tailoring business. According to the applicant, he was engaged by the first opposite party to deliver the stitched dress materials and to collect the amounts due to him from various places. For that purpose, the first opposite party had provided a motor cycle bearing Registration No. KL-12 G/7763 to the applicant. On 2.11.2012 at about 3 pm, the applicant was proceeding in the said vehicle to Lakkidi, as per the instructions of the first opposite party, to collect some amount due to the opposite party and when he reached Vallaramkunnu, the motor cycle hit against a jeep bearing No. KL-12E/0079 and in the incident, he sustained serious injuries. Immediately after the incident, he was taken to Leo hospital, Kalpetta, where he was admitted and treated till he was discharged on 16.11.2012. 3. Originally, the application was filed as E.C.C. No. 132/2015 and as per order dated 28.12.2018, the Industrial Tribunal and Employees Compensation Commissioner, Kozhikode directed the second opposite party to deposit an amount of Rs. 21,621/- along with interest at the rate of 12% w.e.f. 2.11.2012 till deposit and also Rs. 30.668/- towards treatment expenses. Aggrieved by the above order, the second opposite party preferred MFA No. 61/2019 before this Court. As per judgment dated 27.2.2020, another Single Judge of this Court remanded the matter with a direction to reconsider the issue as to whether the Insurance Company would be liable under the provisions of Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 4. After the remand, the Industrial Tribunal and Employees Compensation Commissioner re-numbered the case as ECC No. 20/2020 and again disposed of the matter as per the impugned order, directing the second opposite party to remit the very same amount as compensation, within 30 days. 4. After the remand, the Industrial Tribunal and Employees Compensation Commissioner re-numbered the case as ECC No. 20/2020 and again disposed of the matter as per the impugned order, directing the second opposite party to remit the very same amount as compensation, within 30 days. Aggrieved by the above revised order, the second opposite party, namely, The Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Ltd, Main road, Kalpetta, preferred this appeal under Section 30 of Act 8 of 2023. According to the appellant, the impugned award was passed without considering the specific directions issued by this Court in Annexure-A1 judgment, that the Industrial Tribunal failed to consider the law laid down by the Apex Court in Ramashray Singh vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Others, 2003 AIR SCW 3601 and that the award was passed without properly understanding the scope and applicability of Section 147 of the MV Act correctly. It was also contended that the applicant was not employed as driver of the vehicle and that the applicant was riding the vehicle not as an employee of the first opposite party. It was also argued that the decision in United India Insurance Company Ltd. Kochi vs. P.R. Surendran and Others, AIR 2015 Kerala 36 relied upon by the Tribunal is per incurium in the light of Ramashray Singh's case (supra). 5. Now the points that arise for consideration are the following: (i) Whether the benefit of clause (a) of the first proviso to Section 147 (1) of the MV Act is available to an employee who was permitted by the employer himself for attending to the work connected with his employment. (ii) Whether the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in P.R. Surendran's case (supra) is per incuriam, as urged by the appellant. 6. Heard both sides. 7. This is the second round of litigation between the parties before this Court. The dispute involved in this case centers around the liability of the appellant/National Insurance Co. Ltd. to compensate the injury sustained by the first respondent/applicant as a result of the accident that occurred on 2.11.2012 at about 3.00 pm. The 1st respondent relies upon clause (a) of the first proviso to Section 147 (1) of the MV Act as it stood prior to 2019 amendment. Ltd. to compensate the injury sustained by the first respondent/applicant as a result of the accident that occurred on 2.11.2012 at about 3.00 pm. The 1st respondent relies upon clause (a) of the first proviso to Section 147 (1) of the MV Act as it stood prior to 2019 amendment. On the other hand, according to the appellant, since the 1st respondent was working only as a helper to the second respondent herein, the above proviso does not come to his rescue. 8. Section 147 (1) of the MV Act is extracted hereunder for easy reference: “Requirement of policies and limits of liability: (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which: (a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer. (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2): (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the motor vehicle or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the motor vehicle in a public place. (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a transport vehicle, except gratuitous passengers of a goods vehicle, caused by or arising out of the use of the motor vehicle in a public place. Provided that a policy shall not be required: (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee: (a) engaged in driving the vehicle. (b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle. (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle. (ii) to cover any contractual liability.” 9. The second respondent was running a tailoring unit. (b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle. (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle. (ii) to cover any contractual liability.” 9. The second respondent was running a tailoring unit. The first respondent was engaged by the second respondent as his helper. According to the first respondent, the nature of his work was to distribute the clothes stitched by the second respondent and to collect money due to the second respondent from various persons and in order to enable him to do the above work, the second respondent provided him the motor cycle bearing No. KL-12G/7763. Accordingly, as per the instructions of the second respondent, the first respondent went to Lakkidi on the ill-fated day on 2.11.2012 in the motor cycle bearing Registration No. KL-12G/7763, to collect some amount due to the second respondent. On the way, when he reached Vellaramkunnu, the motor cycle hit against a jeep bearing Registration No. KL-12E/0079 and in that accident, the first respondent sustained serious injuries. 10. In this case, the fact that the first respondent was the employee of the second respondent was not seriously disputed. The nature of work entrusted by the second respondent to the first respondent is also not seriously disputed. The main argument was that the second respondent had not engaged the first respondent in driving the motor cycle as his job was only as a helper and therefore, the proviso to Section 147 does not apply in this case. 11. In support of his argument, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme court in Ramashray Singh vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Others, 2003 AIR SCW 3601. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the above judgment vehemently relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant are as follows: “(10)......However, the proviso to the sub-section carves out an exception in respect of one class of persons and passengers, namely, employees of the insured. In other words, if the “person” or “passenger” is an employee, then the insurer is required under the statute to cover only certain employees. In other words, if the “person” or “passenger” is an employee, then the insurer is required under the statute to cover only certain employees. As stated earlier, this would still allow the insured to enter into an agreement to cover other employees, but under the proviso to Section 147(1)(b), it is clear that for the purposes of section 146(1), a policy shall not be required to cover liability in respect of the death arising out of and in the course of any employment of the person insured unless: first the liability of the insured arises under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and second : if the employee is engaged in driving the vehicle and if it is a public service vehicle, is engaged as conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle. If the concerned employee is neither a driver nor conductor nor examiner of tickets, the insured cannot claim that the employee would come under the description of “any person” or “passenger.” If this were permissible, then there would be no need to make special provisions for employees of the insured. The mere mention of the word “cleaner” while describing the seating capacity of the vehicle does not mean that the cleaner was therefore a passenger. Besides the claim of the deceased employee was adjudicated upon by the Workmen's Compensation Court which could have assumed jurisdiction and passed an order directing compensation only on the basis that the deceased was an employee. This order cannot now be enforced on the basis that the deceased was a passenger. (11) The decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court relied on by the appellant National Insurance Co. Ltd vs. Philomena Mathew, 1993 ACJ 1116 was based on a construction of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 the corresponding section to which under the present Act is section 147. The relevant provisions of the two sections which are otherwise in pari materia are materially different in one respect. Section 95 covered a fourth category of employee after the three now mentioned in clauses (a)(b) and (c) to the proviso to Section 147 (1)(b) viz. The relevant provisions of the two sections which are otherwise in pari materia are materially different in one respect. Section 95 covered a fourth category of employee after the three now mentioned in clauses (a)(b) and (c) to the proviso to Section 147 (1)(b) viz. “where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event, out of which a claim arises.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. In this context it is to be noted that the vehicle involved in Ramashray Singh's case (supra) is a trekker in which passengers were carried for hire. The owner of the vehicle employed Shashi Bhyshan Singh as a ‘Khalasi’ of the vehicle. On 21.10.1998, the vehicle met with an accident and as a result of which, Shashi Bhushan Singh died. In that case, the legal heirs of Shashi Bhushan Singh raised rival contentions that Shashi Bhushan Singh was a passenger and also that he was the conductor. He was not the driver of the vehicle. Therefore, it cannot be said that Shashi Bhushan Singh was engaged in driving the vehicle. Clause (a) of the first proviso to Section 147 (1) of the MV Act applies only to a person engaged in driving the vehicle. It was in the above context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Insurance company has no liability to compensate the legal heirs of Shashi Bhushan Singh. 13. In the instant case, the vehicle involved is a motor cycle owned by the second respondent. In the application filed by the first respondent before the Industrial Tribunal and Employees Compensation Commissioner, he categorically pleaded that the employer provided the motor cycle bearing No. KL-12G/7763 to him as he has to go to various places in connection with his work. In the counter filed by the employer before the Industrial Tribunal, he admitted that the first respondent was working as his helper and also that for the purpose of the employment, he had provided the workman, his motor cycle bearing No. KL-12G/7763. In the counter, he also admitted the employer-employee relationship as well as the accident. In the counter filed by the employer before the Industrial Tribunal, he admitted that the first respondent was working as his helper and also that for the purpose of the employment, he had provided the workman, his motor cycle bearing No. KL-12G/7763. In the counter, he also admitted the employer-employee relationship as well as the accident. In the counter, the contention taken by him is that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the applicant and hence he is not liable to pay any compensation to the applicant. 14. In the counter filed by this appellant before the Industrial Tribunal, they have admitted that the motor Cycle bearing No. KL-12G/7763 was insured with them. With regard to the nature of the work of the first respondent, they denied the averment that the applicant is a helper of the second respondent to deliver the stitched dress materials and to collect the amount from various places etc. In paragraph 8 of the counter, they have raised a contention that at the time of the accident, the applicant was not in the course of employment. However, the averment in the claim petition that the second respondent provided the motor cycle for the purpose of his duty and that on 2.11.2012 he went to Lakkidi in the motor cycle as per the instructions of the second respondent to collect money due to him, were not specifically denied. 15. When the first respondent was examined before the Industrial Tribunal, he categorically stated in the proof affidavit that the above motor cycle was provided to him by his employer for the purpose of his work and that he met with the accident and sustained injuries during the course of his employment. However, the above averment in the proof affidavit was not specifically challenged during the cross-examination. In the above circumstances, the averment of the first respondent that the motor cycle bearing No. KL-12G/7763 was provided to him by his employer for the purpose of carrying out the work and that on 2.11.2012 when the accident occurred, he was in the course of his employment, stands proved. 16. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Nimmy, 2002 KHC 714, a workman employed by his employer while riding the scooter owned by the employer died in an accident during the course of employment. 16. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Nimmy, 2002 KHC 714, a workman employed by his employer while riding the scooter owned by the employer died in an accident during the course of employment. The Insurance Company contended that, in order to claim benefit under the proviso to Section 147(1) of the MV Act, the employee should be employed as a permanent driver by the owner of the vehicle. A Division Bench of this Court, after evaluating the facts, held that at the time of the accident, the employee was driving the vehicle as part of his duty and as such, the same will come within the first proviso to Section 147(1) of the MV Act. 17. In United India Insurance Company Ltd. Kochi vs. P.R. Surendran and Others, AIR 2015 Kerala 36, a similar matter came up before the Full Bench of this Court. The claimants therein were sales representatives employed by their respective employers. As part of their conditions of service, their employers had provided them two-wheeler. While riding the vehicles in their course of employment, they met with an accident, resulting in bodily injuries. As in the present case, they have claimed the benefit of coverage of the Insurance policy under the Workmen's Compensation Act, in the light of the proviso to Section 147 of the MV Act. The Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation overruled the objections raised by the Insurance Companies and awarded compensation to the claimants. The appeals filed by the Insurance Companies were referred to a Full Bench, as the Division Bench before which the matter came up, has doubted the correctness of the view taken by the Division Bench in Nimmy's case (supra). After evaluating the various decisions, the Full Bench confirmed the dictum laid down by the Division Bench in Nimmy's case. Therefore, it can be seen that if the employer himself has permitted the employee to travel in the motor cycle for attending the work connected with the employment, the mere fact that he was self driving the vehicle, will not take his case out of the expression “engaged in driving the vehicle” used in clause (a) of proviso (1) to Section 147 of the MV Act. 18. In Ramashray Singh's case, relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, the vehicle involved was a trekker used for transporting passengers and the claimant therein was a Khalasi. 18. In Ramashray Singh's case, relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, the vehicle involved was a trekker used for transporting passengers and the claimant therein was a Khalasi. In the above trekker, he was travelling along with other passengers as well as the driver, when the accident occurred. On the other hand, in Nimmy's case and in P.R. Surendran's case, the employers provided a two-wheeler to the employees to travel for attending the work connected with their employment and as such, those decisions are distinguishable from Ramashray Singh's case. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the decision of the Full Bench in P.R. Surendran's case is per incuriam. 19. In other words, the decision of the Full Bench in P.R. Surendran's case, still hold good and as such, it is binding on me. Therefore, it is to be held that the benefit of clause (a) of the first proviso to Section 147(1) of the MV Act will be available to an employee who was permitted by the employer himself for attending to the work connected with his employment. Points (i) and (ii) are answered accordingly. 20. In the instant case, the first respondent was working under the second respondent. The second respondent provided him a motor cycle bearing No. KL-12G/7763 to travel in it for attending to the work connected with his employment and during the course of employment, he met with an accident and sustained injuries and as such, clause (a) of the first proviso to Section 147(1) of the MV Act squarely applies in this case. In the judgment dated 27.2.2020, P.R. Surendran's case (supra) and Ramashray Singh's case (supra) were referred and the Industrial Tribunal and Employees Compensation Commissioner was directed to dispose of the matter afresh in the light of those decisions. In the impugned order, though Ramashray Singh's case was not discussed, the finding arrived at is perfectly justified and as such it is liable to be sustained. I do not find any valid grounds to interfere with the above order of the Industrial Tribunal and Employees Compensation Commissioner and therefore, this appeal is liable to be dismissed. 21. In the result, the Appeal stands dismissed.