JUDGMENT : SANGEETA K. VISHEN, J. 1. The captioned civil revision application was previously ordered to be taken up for final disposal and thus, with the consent of the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, it is taken up for final disposal. 2. Issue Rule, returnable forthwith. Mr. B.C. Dave, learned advocate waives service of notice of Rule for and on behalf of respondents. 3. By the captioned civil revision application under sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Gujarat Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (‘the Rent Act’ for short) the applicants - the heirs of the landlord, inter alia, have prayed for quashing and setting aside the judgment and order dated 31.08.2021 passed by the learned 6th Additional District Judge, Banaskantha, Palanpur in Regular Civil Appeal no. 43 of 2007. By the above referred judgment, the Appellate Court, allowed the appeal filed by the respondent- original defendant i.e. the tenant and set aside the judgment and decree dated 29.09.2007 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge, Palanpur in Regular Civil Suit no. 314 of 1998. 4. Tersely stated, are the facts: 4.1 The applicants-original plaintiffs, are the heirs of deceased Sagaalchand Devjibhai Acharya who was the owner of the property bearing Municipal House nos.2/822/20/3 and 2/822/20/3(A) situated at Palanpur (hereinafter referred to as ‘the suit property’) which was given to the original defendant on monthly rent of Rs.50/-. The plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit no. 314 of 1998 under the provisions of Section 12 of the Rent Act before the learned Additional Civil Judge, Palanpur seeking eviction of the original defendant and his family members from the suit property and payment of the outstanding rent. The plaintiff, also prayed for direction to the defendant to pay the rent of Rs.50/- per month till the possession, is handed over. It was the case of the plaintiff that the rent for the period from 01.06.1990 to 31.05.1998 to the tune of Rs.4,800/- has not been paid by the defendant and has also failed to pay the municipal tax of the suit property. Bona fide requirement was also one of the grounds, seeking eviction as the plaintiff’s son, has been married and the suit property was required for his use. 4.2 The defendant appeared and filed the written statement. The suit property, having given for monthly rent of Rs.50/-, is admitted. Bona fide requirement was also one of the grounds, seeking eviction as the plaintiff’s son, has been married and the suit property was required for his use. 4.2 The defendant appeared and filed the written statement. The suit property, having given for monthly rent of Rs.50/-, is admitted. It was the stand in the written statement that the plaintiff never informed the defendant that the defendant is required to pay the municipal tax. It was also contended that the defendant has regularly paid the rent; however, it was the plaintiff who had not issued the receipt in lieu of the payment. Payment was also done through the money orders to the plaintiff. In the written statement, it is contended that the plaintiff is in no need of the suit property for bona fide requirement. 4.3 The suit, came to be partly decreed in favour of the plaintiff whereby, the defendant was directed to give the possession of the suit property coupled with the direction to pay the monthly rent of Rs.50/- till the possession of the suit property is given. Further direction was also issued to pay the outstanding rent of last three years together with interest and other expenses. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 29.09.2007, passed in Regular Civil Suit no. 314 of 1998, the defendant preferred Regular Civil Appeal no. 43 of 2007 which came to be allowed vide judgment and order dated 31.08.2021. The Appellate Court quashed and set aside the judgment and decree dated 29.09.2007 on the ground that the defendant had already paid the rent in advance upto 31.03.2022 in view of the order passed in Execution Petition no. 15 of 2017 and therefore, the defendant cannot be evicted. During the pendency of the appeal before the Appellate Court, the heirs of the original plaintiff and the original defendant, were brought on the record. 4.4 Being aggrieved, the applicants have preferred the captioned civil revision application. 5. Ms. Archana R. Acharya, learned advocate appearing for the applicants, submitted that various issues, were formulated and answered accordingly. It is submitted that the issue no. 2, was as to whether the plaintiff proves that there is an arrears of rent to be recovered from the defendant for the period from 01.06.1990 to 31.05.1998 to the tune of Rs.4,800/-. Considering the evidence on record, issue no. It is submitted that the issue no. 2, was as to whether the plaintiff proves that there is an arrears of rent to be recovered from the defendant for the period from 01.06.1990 to 31.05.1998 to the tune of Rs.4,800/-. Considering the evidence on record, issue no. 2, was decided partly in affirmative and was declared that the plaintiff is entitled to receive the rent of Rs.1,800/-. Issue nos. 3 and 5, were (i) as to whether the plaintiff proves that he is entitled to get the possession of the suit property for his bona fide requirement and (ii) as to whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant was issued a notice for payment of arrears of rent of Rs.4,800/- and despite which, the defendant has not made payment of rent within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the notice. It is submitted that in paragraph 5, the learned judge has clearly recorded about the order passed below Exhibit 20 by which, the defendant was directed to deposit the amount towards the rent by 16.08.2007 which, has not been complied with and hence would not be entitle for the statutory protection. Upon purshish Exhibit 29 filed by the plaintiff, order has been passed and the right of the defendant was directed to be closed. Since the defendant was found tenant in arrears, that issue nos.3 and 5, were decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. 5.1 It is further submitted that the defendant-tenant was in arrears of rent prior to the filing of the suit and had not deposited the same on the date of first hearing of the suit i.e. on the date of framing of issues and before the date fixed by the learned judge which, is clear from the findings recorded by the trial court, clearly stating that the order was passed on 16.08.2007 on application Exhibit 20 and till the date of passing of the judgment, the defendant has not complied with the said order. It is further submitted that similarly, in paragraph 8, the learned judge has reiterated the aspect of the application Exhibit 20 by the defendant and the fact that as the defendant has not deposited the amount of the arrears of rent, he cannot be extended the benefit provided under clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 12. It is further submitted that similarly, in paragraph 8, the learned judge has reiterated the aspect of the application Exhibit 20 by the defendant and the fact that as the defendant has not deposited the amount of the arrears of rent, he cannot be extended the benefit provided under clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 12. The learned judge also took note of the fact that the notice by the plaintiff Exhibit 30 has been duly served upon the defendant which is strengthened by the document Exhibit 31 and defendant having not deposited the rent, the plaintiff i.e. the landlord would be entitled for the possession. With these facts that the trial court had declared the defendant as tenant in arrears and that he would not be entitled to protection under clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Rent Act. 5.2 It is further submitted that the defendant, being aggrieved, preferred an appeal and the Appellate Court, vide order dated 31.08.2021, allowed the same. What weighed with the Appellate Court, was that during the pendency of the appeal, and apropos the order passed in execution petition the defendant had deposited the amount of rent and therefore, it cannot be said that the defendant- appellant, is tenant in arrears, which is erroneous and against the well settled principles. 5.3 It is submitted that judgments were cited on behalf of the plaintiff-applicants; however, the judgments have not been appreciated by the Appellate Court. Disregarding the said judgments and relying upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Murlis Chandrakant Choksi vs. Maganbhai Hansjibhai Patel, 2002 (3) GLH 411 , that the appeal came to be allowed. It is submitted that the Apex Court, in the case of Yusufbhai Noormohammed Jodhpurwala vs. Mohmmed Sabir Ibrahim Byavarwala, (2015) 6 SCC 526 , referred to the judgment in the case of Vasant Ganesh Damle vs. Shrikant Trimbak Datar and Another, (2002) 4 SCC 183 , wherein, it has been held and observed that the right conferred upon a bona-fide tenant can be availed of only twice under the Act and not thereafter. It is submitted that the facts in the case of Yusufbhai Noormohammed Jodhpurwala v. Mohmmed Sabir Ibrahim Byavarwala (supra), were identical to the facts of the present case and therefore, the principle, would squarely apply to the facts of the present case. It is submitted that the facts in the case of Yusufbhai Noormohammed Jodhpurwala v. Mohmmed Sabir Ibrahim Byavarwala (supra), were identical to the facts of the present case and therefore, the principle, would squarely apply to the facts of the present case. It is submitted that the judgment in the case of Murlis Chandrakant Choksi vs. Maganbhai Hansjibhai Patel (supra) was prior in point of time whereas, in subsequent judgments of the Apex Court, the issue stands crystalized. 5.4 It is submitted that the defendant was in arrears of the rent prior to the filing of the suit and did not deposit the arrears on the date of the first hearing of the suit or on the date of framing of the issues and on or before the date fixed by the learned judge which factum, is clearly borne out from the judgment and decree dated 29.09.2007. Disregarding the said aspect and while allowing the appeal, the Appellate Court has recorded that the amount has been deposited by the defendant on 01.01.2014. It has also been observed that before the suit came to be disposed of, that the defendant has deposited the amount which is incorrect inasmuch as, the deposit by the defendant was on 01.01.2014 towards the rent i.e. at the appellate stage. Deposit on 01.01.2014 at the appellate stage weighed with the Appellate Court to come to the conclusion that the defendant, would be entitled for the benefit of clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Rent Act. 5.5 It is submitted that on the other hand, all the conditions contained in the provisions of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 12, were satisfied considering the fact that the notice, was issued and was received by the tenant; however, no reply was sent; no dispute was raised within one month from the date of the receipt of the notice; no application for fixation of standard rent under Section 11 was made and the rent demanded in the notice was outstanding for more than six months. It is submitted that when all the statutory requirements were established, there was no reason available to the Appellate Court, to have accepted deposit made by the defendant on 01.01.2014 for allowing the appeal. It is submitted that when all the statutory requirements were established, there was no reason available to the Appellate Court, to have accepted deposit made by the defendant on 01.01.2014 for allowing the appeal. 5.6 Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Vasant Ganesh Damle vs. Shrikant Trimbak Datar and Another (supra), wherein, it has been held and observed that the beneficial provision under the Rent Act unequivocally provides that it can be availed of in the suit and that too on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the court may fix. It has also been held and observed that the first date of hearing cannot be stretched to be any date beyond the date when the issues were framed in the suit. The Apex Court has further observed that the object is to protect the bona fide tenants from being evicted on the grounds of default by affording them further opportunity to make the payment of the arrears of rent at least two times during the subsistence of the tenancy and that the provision is not intended to confer a right without circumspection to be availed of by the tenant at any time according to his convenience. 5.7 It is lastly submitted that therefore, the Appellate Court, committed an error in allowing the appeal on the ground that the defendant has already paid the rent in advance till 31.03.2022 as per the order passed in Execution Petition No. 15 of 2017. The observations made by the Appellate Court are arbitrary inasmuch as, the same, would be beyond and against the provisions of the Rent Act so also the principle laid down by the judgments of the Apex Court and therefore, the judgment and decree deserves to be quashed and set aside. 6. On the other hand, Mr. B.C. Dave, learned advocate for the respondent, while inviting the attention of this Court to the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Rent Act, submitted that no error, much less apparent on the face of the record, has been committed in passing the judgment and order under challenge. 6. On the other hand, Mr. B.C. Dave, learned advocate for the respondent, while inviting the attention of this Court to the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Rent Act, submitted that no error, much less apparent on the face of the record, has been committed in passing the judgment and order under challenge. It is submitted that provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Rent Act, have been fully complied with by the respondent and therefore, the Appellate Court has rightly set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court inasmuch as, the said decree passed by the trial court, was illegal, unjust and contrary to the provisions of the Rent Act. It is submitted that during the proceedings in the appeal, it was the case of the applicant that if the defendant wants to retain the possession, the defendant is oblige to deposit the entire rent. As the defendant had deposited the entire rent up to the period of 31.03.2022, that the applicant - original plaintiff will not be entitled for the eviction as prayed for and therefore, the judgment of the trial court was full of error whereas, the judgment of the Appellate Court was in conformity with the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Rent Act. 6.1 It is further submitted that considering the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, the direction was issued to hand over the possession of the suit property to the applicant and to pay Rs.1,950/- as mesne profit till the possession of the suit property is handed over. It is submitted that so far as the deposit with the trial court is concerned, the same, was complied with and therefore, the Appellate Court, in its order recorded that the defendant, has deposited the amount on 01.01.2014. The Appellate Court also recorded the aspect that on 07.12.2018, at the time of restoring the appeal, the defendant was directed to deposit an amount of Rs.13,200/- + Rs.800/- towards the expenses and that Rs.14,000/- has been deposited. The Appellate Court also recorded the aspect that on 07.12.2018, at the time of restoring the appeal, the defendant was directed to deposit an amount of Rs.13,200/- + Rs.800/- towards the expenses and that Rs.14,000/- has been deposited. The Appellate Court taking note of the deposit by the defendant from time to time, was of the opinion that before the suit was decided, that the defendant-appellant has deposited the amount and once the amount has been deposited, it cannot be said that the defendant was tenant in arrears. 6.2 Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of Murlis Chandrakant Choksi vs. Maganbhai Hansjibhai Patel (supra). It is submitted that while dealing with the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Rent Act, this Court, has held and observed that no decree of eviction can be passed once the tenant deposits the entire rent before the judgment of appeal court is pronounced; though the tenant may have failed to make the payment of rent at regular intervals during the pendency of the appeal. 6.3 It is therefore submitted that the principle laid down by this Court, applies on all fours to the facts of the present case. It is submitted that in view of the deposit by the defendant - tenant, at the stage of appeal, it cannot be said that the order passed by the Appellate Court is erroneous or it deserves interference. In view thereof, the civil revision application deserves to be dismissed. 7. Heard the learned advocates and perused the documents made available by the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties. 8. The facts in brief are; the plaintiff was the owner of the suit property and it was given on monthly rent of Rs.50/- to the defendant. As there was default in payment of the rent that the plaintiff issued a notice dated 29.05.1998 (Exhibit 30), under the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Rent Act, terminating the right of tenant and requiring the defendant to pay the outstanding rent and to vacate the suit property and hand over the possession. Since, the notice remained unanswered that the plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit no. Since, the notice remained unanswered that the plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit no. 314 of 1998 under the provisions of Section 12 of the Rent Act before the learned Additional Civil Judge, Palanpur seeking eviction of the defendant and his family members from the suit property with other prayers. Case put forth by the plaintiff was that the rent for the period from 01.06.1990 to 31.05.1998, totaling to the tune of Rs.4,800/- has remained unpaid by the defendant so also lapse in making the payment of the municipal tax of the suit property. Apart from the arrears, ground raised was also of a bona fide requirement. The defendant appeared and filed a written statement (Exhibit 12), admitting the fact that the suit property was given on monthly rent of Rs.50/- by the plaintiff. The factum of payment of the municipal tax was denied and contention was raised that the defendant has regularly paid the rent; however, it was the plaintiff who had not issued any rent receipt. It was also the case of the defendant before the court below, that the rent was tried to be deposited through money orders but the same was not accepted. 9. The trial court, passed judgment and decree by which, the defendant was directed to be evicted from the suit premises with a further direction to deposit mesne profit of Rs.1,800/- + Rs.150/- towards expenses for the notice totaling to Rs.1,950/-. Being aggrieved, the defendant preferred Regular Civil Appeal No. 43 of 2007. As recorded hereinabove, during the pendency of the appeal the plaintiff and the defendant both passed away and the heirs of the plaintiff and the defendant were brought on the record. 10. While deciding the appeal, what weighed with the Appellate Court was the deposit of the outstanding amount of arrears of rent by the defendant during the pendency of the appeal. Accepting the aspect of deposit, the appeal was allowed and hence, the captioned civil revision application. 11. For deciding the issues raised, relevant would be the provision of Section 12 of the Rent Act which, provides that no ejectment ordinarily to be made if tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay standard rent and permitted increase. Relevant portion of Section 12 reads thus: “12. 11. For deciding the issues raised, relevant would be the provision of Section 12 of the Rent Act which, provides that no ejectment ordinarily to be made if tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay standard rent and permitted increase. Relevant portion of Section 12 reads thus: “12. No ejectment ordinarily to be made if tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay standard rent and permitted increases: (1) A landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay, the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy, in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of this Act. (1-A) Where by reason of riot or violence of a mob any material part of the premises in a disturbed area is wholly destroyed or rendered substantially and permanently unfit for the purpose for which it was let, the landlord shall not be entitled to: (a) the standard rent and permitted increases due for the premises. (b) recover possession of such premises merely on the ground of non-payment of standard rent and permitted increases due, during the period in which such premises remain so destroyed, or unfit. (1-B) Notwithstanding any thing contained in this Act, where by reason of earthquake or any other natural calamity any material part of premises is wholly destroyed or rendered substantially and permanently unfit for the purpose for which it was let, the landlord shall not be entitled to: (a) standard rent and permitted increases due for the premises. (b) recover possession of such premises merely on the ground of non-payment of standard rent and permitted increases due, during the period in which such premises remained so destroyed or unfit. (2) No suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord against a tenant on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent or permitted increases due, until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in the manner provided in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (IV of 1882). (3)(a) Where the rent is payable by the month and there is no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases, if such rent or increases are in arrears for a period of six months or more and the tenant neglects to make payment thereof until the expiration of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2), the Court may pass a decree for eviction in any suit for recovery of possession. (b) In any other case, no decree for eviction shall be passed in any such suit if, on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the Court may fix, the tenant pays or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due and [thereafter: (i) continues to pay or tender in Court such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided and (ii) pat s costs of the suit], as directed by the Court.....” 12. Clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Rent Act, provides that where the rent is payable by the month and there is no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases, if such rent or increases, are in arrears for a period of six months or more and the tenant neglects to make payment thereof until the expiration of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2), the Court may pass a decree for eviction in any such suit for recovery of possession. Sub-clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Rent Act provides that in any other cases, no decree for eviction shall be passed in any suit if, on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the Court may fix, the tenant pays or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due and thereafter, (i) continues to pay or tender in Court such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided; and (ii) pays costs of the suit as directed by the Court. 13. The above referred provision, has been considered by the Apex Court in the case of Vasant Ganesh Damle vs. Shrikant Trimbak Datar and Another (supra). 13. The above referred provision, has been considered by the Apex Court in the case of Vasant Ganesh Damle vs. Shrikant Trimbak Datar and Another (supra). In the said case, suit was filed by the plaintiff which was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the plaintiff failed to established that he was the landlord. The appeal came to be allowed by the Appellate Bench as it found that the tenant had defaulted in payment of rent and was liable to be evicted from the leased premises. In the proceedings before the High Court, the writ petition, came to be dismissed. In appeal by the tenant, the Apex Court considered the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Rent Act and it has been held and observed that but for the provisions of the Act, the tenant had no right to resist the claim of the landlord for his eviction after termination of the tenancy. It has been further held that the Rent Control Act is a social welfare legislation meant to protect and safeguard the interests of the tenant which does not confer unfettered powers on the tenant to remain in the possession of the leased premises without the compliance of directions of the court or the provisions of the statute. It has been pointed out that undisputedly, the landlord is entitled to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of defaults in the payment of rent and that the statute further provides that despite default, a tenant can approach the court in any suit for possession on the ground of arrears of rent and submit on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the court may fix to tender the standard rent and permitted increases together with interest and costs. Paragraphs 6 to 11 of the judgment, read thus: “6. Paragraphs 6 to 11 of the judgment, read thus: “6. Section 12(3) of the Act provides: “Sec. 12(3) No decree for eviction shall be passed by the Court in any suit for recovery of possession on the ground of arrears of standard rent and permitted increases if, on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the court may fix, the tenant pays or tenders in court the standard rent and permitted increases then due and together with simple interest on the amount of arrears of such standard rent and permitted increases at the rate of nine percent, per annum; and thereafter continues to pay or tenders in court regularly such standard rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided and also pays cost of the suit as directed by the Court: Provided that, the relief provided under this sub-section shall not be available to a tenant to whom relief against forfeiture was given in any two suits previously instituted by the landlord against such tenant.” It may be kept in mind that but for the provisions of the Act, the appellant-tenant had no right to resist the claim of the landlords for his eviction after termination of the tenancy. The Rent Control Act is a social welfare legislation meant to protect and safeguard the interests of the tenant which does not confer unfettered powers on the tenant to remain in the possession of the leased premises notwithstanding the compliance of directions of the court or the provisions of the statute. The Act is intended to protect the bona-fide tenants in possession. It has put restrictions on the right of the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant only on the grounds specified under the relevant statute. There is no dispute that under the Act the landlord is entitled to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of defaults in the payment of rent. The statute further provides that despite default, a tenant can approach the court in any suit for possession on the ground of arrears of rent and submit on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the court may fix to tender the standard rent and permitted increases together with interest and costs. If such a prayer is made, the court, dealing with the suit has been conferred the powers to pass appropriate orders in terms of Section 12(3) and in that event the suit of eviction against the tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent shall be dismissed. Non payment of rent, as per contract and statutory provisions, entitles the landlord to seek possession. The right conferred upon a bona-fide tenant can be availed of only twice and not thereafter. 7. A perusal of the trial order dated 3-9-1994 clearly and unambiguously shows that the said order had not been passed in terms of Sub-Section (3) of Section 12 of the Act. The aforesaid order was not passed at the request of the tenant but passed on the application of the respondents-plaintiffs who had prayed for the payment of the suit amount rent. The said order was passed not on the first day of hearing or on or before any other date as fixed by the court. The amount mentioned in the order was the suit amount which did not include permitted increases or interest and costs as contemplated by the aforesaid provision. It has been pointed out that despite the aforesaid order the appellant did not make the payment within time specified and defaulted the payment of future rent in terms thereof. The suit of the plaintiff could not, therefore, be dismissed on the basis of the trial court's order dated 3-9-1994. 8. The order of the appellate court dated 18-1-2001 was passed in Civil Appeal No. 87 of 1997 and the amount determined therein deposited in the court after 22-2-2001. 9. The appeal is considered to be an extension of the suit because under Section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellate court has the same powers as are conferred by the Code on courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. Such a power can be exercised by the appellate court “as nearly as may be” exercised by the trial court under the Code. If the powers conferred upon the trial court are under a specified statute and not under the Code, it has to be ascertained as to whether such a power was intended to be exercised by the appellate court as well. If the powers conferred upon the trial court are under a specified statute and not under the Code, it has to be ascertained as to whether such a power was intended to be exercised by the appellate court as well. Such a position can be ascertained by having a reference to the specified law by keeping in mind the legislative intention of conferment of power on the appellate court either expressly or by necessary implication. 10. In the instant case the appellant, by filing the application under Section 12(3) of the Act, had not made a prayer to the appellate court for passing any order which the trial court was intended to pass under the Code of Civil Procedure. His prayer was to invoke the benefit conferred upon a tenant under the Act. The beneficial provision under the Act unequivocally provides that it can be availed of in the suit and that too on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the court may fix. The first date of hearing cannot be stretched to be any date beyond the date before the issues are framed in the suit. The object is to protect the bona-fide tenants from being evicted on the grounds of default by affording them further opportunity to make the payment of the arrears of rent atleast at two times during the subsistence of tenancy. The provision is not intended to confer a right without circumspection to be availed of by the tenant at any time according to his convenience. 11. It is contended that the words “such other date as the court may fix” would also include the date fixed by the appellate court in terms of Section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We do not agree with such a submission. However, in the instant case vide its order dated 18-1-2001 the appellate court had not extended the time and expressly permitted the appellant to deposit the arrears of rent allegedly payable by him without prejudice to the rights of the other party, i.e. the landlords. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that the appellant cannot take advantage of Section 12(3) of the Act at the appellate stage which he had failed to avail of before the trial court. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that the appellant cannot take advantage of Section 12(3) of the Act at the appellate stage which he had failed to avail of before the trial court. The appellant was rightly held to be in arrears of rent for more than 6 months from the date of filing of the suit and had failed to apply before the trial court on the first day of suit for depositing the arrears of rent.” 13.1 The Apex Court, did not agree with the submission raised on behalf of the tenant, that the words “such other date as the court may fix” would also include the date fixed by the appellate court in terms of Section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Apex Court, while dismissing the appeal, held and observed that the High Court was justified in holding that the appellant cannot take advantage of sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act at the appellate stage which he had failed to avail of before the trial court. The Apex Court noted that the beneficial provision under the Act unequivocally provides that it can be availed of in the suit and that too on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the court may fix. The first date of hearing cannot be stretched to be any date beyond the date when the issues are framed in the suit. The object is to protect the bona fide tenants from being evicted on the grounds of default by affording them further opportunity to make the payment of the arrears of rent at least at two times during the subsistence of tenancy. The provision, is not intended to confer a right without circumspection to be availed of by the tenant at any time according to his convenience. 14. Yet in another decision of the Apex Court, a bench of three judge, in the case of Yusufbhai Noormohammed Jodhpurwala vs. Mohmmed Sabir Ibrahim Byavarwala (supra), while considering the series of judgments, held and observed that the right conferred upon a bona fide tenant can be availed of only twice under the Act and not thereafter. 14. Yet in another decision of the Apex Court, a bench of three judge, in the case of Yusufbhai Noormohammed Jodhpurwala vs. Mohmmed Sabir Ibrahim Byavarwala (supra), while considering the series of judgments, held and observed that the right conferred upon a bona fide tenant can be availed of only twice under the Act and not thereafter. The facts before the Apex Court, were to the effect that a legal notice was issued on 09.03.1987 on the ground of the tenant in arrears of rent for more than six months, which was replied by the tenant denying all the allegations, followed by an eviction suit in the year 1987 on various grounds including the arrears of rent. The trial court had dismissed the suit as it found that the rent was deposited. In the appeal, the ground of eviction was made out by the landlord. The Appellate Bench was of the opinion that the tenant cannot be protected under clause (b) sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Rent Act and allowed the appeal, observing that though the tenant deposited the amount of rent due from him on 03.08.1994 i.e. the date on which the issues were framed it fell short by Rs.270/-. The High Court allowed the revision application of the tenant. The Apex Court, while allowing the landlord’s appeal, pointed out that as on the date of first hearing of the suit i.e. date on which the issues were framed namely 03.08.1994, the rent that was paid fell short by Rs.270/- and observed thus: “9. In the judgment cited by the impugned judgment, namely Vasant Ganesh Damle (supra), this Court categorically held that the right conferred upon a bona-fide tenant can be availed of only twice under the Act and not thereafter. 10. On facts, it is clear that the tenant was in arrears of rent prior to the filing of the suit and continued to be so. On the date of the first hearing of the suit, that is the date on which issues were struck, namely 3-8-1994, the rent that was paid admittedly fell short by Rs.270/-. It is clear therefore that assuming that the respondent is a bona fide tenant the right that is conferred upon him by the legislature can be availed of only twice and on both occasions the tenant was found to be in arrears. It is clear therefore that assuming that the respondent is a bona fide tenant the right that is conferred upon him by the legislature can be availed of only twice and on both occasions the tenant was found to be in arrears. The High Court was wrong in interpreting Section 12(3)(b) purposively holding that so long as the High Court, in its discretion, feels that there is a readiness and willingness on the part of the tenant to pay rent, the High Court can in its discretion say that substantial compliance of Section 12(3)(b) is good enough for the tenant to escape eviction on the ground of non payment of arrears of rent. Having regard to the judgments of this Court and the fact that Section 12(3)(b) has been construed to be a mandatory provision which must be strictly complied with, the judgment under appeal has to be set aside, and the order of the appellate bench of Small Causes restored.” 15. It is by now well settled that clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Rent Act, is a mandatory provision and if the tenant fails to comply, he cannot be extended the protection of the said clause and eviction is to follow as a matter of course. In view of the above referred discussion, reliance placed by Mr. B. C. Dave, learned advocate on the judgment in the case of Murlis Chandrakant Choksi vs. Maganbhai Hansjibhai Patel (supra) is misplaced. 16. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the tenant had paid the amount towards the arrears on 01.01.2014 and some in the year 2018, at the time of restoration of the appeal which was dismissed for default, and some as per the order passed in execution petition. Therefore, the amount of rent was paid at the appellate stage. Such deposit at the stage of appeal cannot be said to be in strict compliance of the requirement contained in clause (b) of sub- section (3) of Section 12 of the Rent Act and since the tenant failed to deposit the amount of rent as required, the Appellate Court, was in error in concluding that the tenant is entitled for the protection and therefore, the order passed by the Appellate Court, is erroneous and perverse. Besides, the learned judge did not properly consider the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Yusufbhai Noormohammed Jodhpurwala vs. Mohmmed Sabir Ibrahim Byavarwala (supra) as well as Vasant Ganesh Damle vs. Shrikant Trimbak Datar and Another (supra), except recording that the judgments cannot be made applicable to the facts of the case. 17. The principles laid down in above referred judgments apply on all fours to the facts of the present case for, the amount of rent was deposited at the stage of the appeal and not as per the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Rent Act which provides that no decree of eviction shall be passed if on the first date of the hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the court may fix, the tenant pays or tenders in court the rent. In the present case, the first date of hearing of the suit was 27.09.2002 when the tenant failed to deposit the amount of rent. Moreover, application Exhibit 20 was filed and the order was passed directing the tenant to deposit the amount within a period of one week which, was 16.08.2007. The tenant failed to implement the said order as well. The opportunity was available to the tenant only twice and on both the occasions undisputedly, the tenant i.e. the original defendant failed to avail of the said opportunities hence, the tenant was in arrears. The defect cannot be cured at the appellate stage and therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the learned trial court did not commit any error in not extending the statutory protection and directing eviction vide the judgment and order dated 29.09.2007; however, the Appellate Court, was in error considering the payment by the tenant at the appellate stage and allowing the appeal. 18. In view of the above, the judgment and decree dated 31.08.2021, passed by the learned 6th Additional District Judge, Banaskantha, Palanpur in Regular Civil Appeal No. 43 of 2007, deserves to be quashed and set aside and is hereby quashed and set aside. The judgment and order dated 29.09.2007, passed by the learned trial court, is restored. The civil revision application, thus, stands allowed. Rule is made absolute. No order as to costs. 19. At this stage, Mr. The judgment and order dated 29.09.2007, passed by the learned trial court, is restored. The civil revision application, thus, stands allowed. Rule is made absolute. No order as to costs. 19. At this stage, Mr. B.C. Dave, learned advocate appearing for the respondents, urges for stay of the judgment for a period of eight weeks. 20. Ms. Archana R. Acharya, learned advocate appearing for the applicants has vehemently opposed the said request of stay on the ground that the suit is of the year 1998 and the issue stands squarely covered by the judgments of the Apex Court and the operation of the judgment be not stayed. 21. In view of the above referred discussion and the facts involved so also the issue being squarely covered by the judgments of the Apex Court, the request of the learned advocate appearing for the respondents, cannot be acceded to and is hereby rejected.