JUDGMENT : The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner no.1 has left for his heavenly abode. He submits that now the petition survives only for petitioner no.2. 2. In view of such submission, let name of petitioner no.1 be deleted from the array of the petitioners. 3. This petition has been filed for quashing of entire criminal proceeding in connection C/2 Case No.366 of 1998 including the order dated 08.06.2015 whereby the learned court has been pleased to take cognizance under section 92 of the Factories Act, 1948 for violation of Section 32(C) of the Factories Act read with Rule 55 of the Bihar Factories Rule, 1950, pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur. 4. The case was lodged on application of O.P.No.2 alleging therein that on 13.4.1998 the O.P.No.2 filed a complaint case in court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur, against the petitioners and one another accused alleging commission of offence under section 92 of Factories Act 1948. That on 13.10.1998 the deceased was engaged by contractor of M/s Tata Iron and Steel Works Company and while working at Ammonia Distillation Unit of bye product plant at coke oven fell from a height of 32.5 mtrs and died at the site as a result of serious injuries. Inquiry was conducted and in the said inquiry statement of four persons were recorded. These persons were also employed by M/s Steward and Llyod Ltd. The complainant in his report opined that in said accident death of deceased took place as a result of violation of section 32(c) of the Act and Rule 55 (c) (1) of Bihar Factories Rules, 1950. 5. Mr. Sinha the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has earlier moved before this Court in Miscellaneous Case No.8903 of 1999 and by order dated 08.07.2014 the order taking cognizance was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the learned court to pass a fresh order and in pursuant to that the present cognizance order is passed. He submits that the Factory Inspector has instituted as many as 11 cases against the officials of Tata Steel Company Limited. He submits that lodging 11 cases itself suggest that filing of the case against the company and the officers is malafide. He submits that the allegation is made in the complaint that securing the safety by fencing was not provided. He submits that lodging 11 cases itself suggest that filing of the case against the company and the officers is malafide. He submits that the allegation is made in the complaint that securing the safety by fencing was not provided. He submits that in the enquiry also it has come that the workman himself has removed it and that is why occurrence has taken place and to buttress his argument he draws the attention of the Court to the statement of co-worker during enquiry contained at page 42 onwards and relevant at page 46. On this ground, he submits that the entire proceeding may kindly be quashed. 6. In view of the above submissions of the learned counsel for the parties the Court has gone through the contents of the complaint case as well as the order taking cognizance. Admittedly occurrence took place in factory premises and co-workman has also admitted in statement that safety equipment has been supplied to him. Prima facie it appears that this is not a case that the management has not provided safety equipment to the workman. To fasten liability upon the management one is also required to look into sections 97 and 111 of Factory Act, 1948 and there are certain obligation cast upon the worker also and the safety equipment has been supplied by the management and not taking advantage of the same, the workman is also liable under section 97 and 111 of the said Act. For ready reference sections 97 and 111 of the said Act are quoted below: “97. Offences by workers.— (1) Subject to the provisions of section 111, if any worker employed in a factory contravenes any provision of this Act or any rules or orders made thereunder, imposing any duty or liability on workers, he shall be punishable with fine which may extend to 1[five hundred rupees]. (2) Where a worker is convicted of an offence punishable under sub-section (1) the occupier or manager of the factory shall not be deemed to be guilty of an offence in respect of that contravention, unless it is proved that he failed to take all reasonable measures for its prevention. 111. (2) Where a worker is convicted of an offence punishable under sub-section (1) the occupier or manager of the factory shall not be deemed to be guilty of an offence in respect of that contravention, unless it is proved that he failed to take all reasonable measures for its prevention. 111. Obligations of workers.—(1) No worker in a factory— (a) shall wilfully interfere with or misuse any appliance, convenience or other thing provided in a factory for the purposes of securing the health, safety or welfare of the workers therein; (b) shall wilfully and without reasonable cause do anything likely to endanger himself or others; and (c) shall wilfully neglect to make use of any appliance or other thing provided in the factory for the purposes of securing the health or safety of the workers therein. (2) If any worker employed in a factory contravenes any of the provisions of this section or of any rule or order made thereunder, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to one hundred rupees, or with both.” 7. On perusal of these two provisions of the Factories Act, it is crystal clear that the scheme of the Factories Act is there, at the first instance the occupier and Manager must be prosecuted in terms of Section 92 of the Act, however, they may seek exemption under Section 101 of the said Act. Such interpretation would render the provisions of Sections 97 and 111 of the Act invalid. It is well settled principle of interpretation of the statute that it is incumbent upon the Court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which will render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application, which has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “Visitor AMU v. K.S. Misra”, reported in (2007) 8 SCC 593 , wherein in para-13, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:— “13. The problem can be looked from another angle. If the view taken by the High Court that the provision is directory is accepted as correct, it would in effect amount to making the provisions of sub-clause (c) of Statute 61(6)(iv) otiose. The problem can be looked from another angle. If the view taken by the High Court that the provision is directory is accepted as correct, it would in effect amount to making the provisions of sub-clause (c) of Statute 61(6)(iv) otiose. In such a case the consequences provided therein that if no option is exercised within the prescribed time limit, the employee shall be deemed to have opted for the retention of the benefits already received by him would never come into play. It is well settled principle of interpretation of statute that it is incumbent upon the Court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which will render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application. The Courts always presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intent is that every part of the statute should have effect. The legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the Legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. It is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the staute. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh Ninth Edition page 68)” 8. On perusal of the complaint, it transpires that there is no material on record to prima facie suggest that the Occupier or Manager are in any manner responsible for the unfortunate accident. The Court finds that although the long order is passed by the learned court while calling upon the petitioner to face trial under aforesaid sections however it appears that page no.46 of the statement of co-worker is not taken care of. Sections 97 and 111 was not looked into by the Inspector, as admitted in the statement of co-worker itself that the workman concerned has removed the belt. No case is made out against the petitioners in terms of the Factories Act. Sections 97 and 111 have been ignored by the Inspector of the Factories while submitting the report and at the time of filing the complaint. 9. Accordingly, entire criminal proceeding in C/2 Case No.366 of 1998, including the cognizance order dated 08.06.2015 pending before learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur is quashed. 10. Sections 97 and 111 have been ignored by the Inspector of the Factories while submitting the report and at the time of filing the complaint. 9. Accordingly, entire criminal proceeding in C/2 Case No.366 of 1998, including the cognizance order dated 08.06.2015 pending before learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur is quashed. 10. Cr.M.P. No. 240 of 2016 stands allowed and disposed of. 11. Pending petition if any also stands disposed of.