ORDER 1. This second appeal has been filed by the appellants/defendants under section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, against the judgment and decree dated 11.10.2021 passed by Third Additional District Judge, Khargone (MP) in Regular Civil Appeal No.15/2017, whereby dismissing the appeal against the judgment and decree passed by Second Civil Judge, Class-2, Khargone passed in Regular Civil Suit No.53- A/2015. 2. The brief facts of the case are that respondent/plaintiff Munnibai filed a suit for declaration of title, partition, mesne profit, permanent injunction and delivery of possession on the ground that plaintiff and defendants are real brothers/sisters/mother and suit property were of their father/husband Narayan's owernship. Hence, the plaintiff is entitled to 1/3 share of the suit property. 3. Learned trial Court vide judgment dated 9.3.2017decreed the suit of plaintiff and appeal filed against this judgment by appellants/defendants was also dismissed by appellate Court vide judgment dated 11.10.2021 passed in RCA No.15/2017. Against this, present second appeal has been filed. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants has submitted that plaintiff in his statement Ex.D/6, which was recorded before Tehsildar, has admitted that she has received her share in the property but learned trial Court as well as appellate Court has completely ignored Ex.D/6. It is also urged that Tehsildar's order Ex.D/5 regarding partition of suit property has never been challenged by the plaintiff anywhere. In para-14, the learned trial Court and in para-15, appellate Court have drawn conclusions which are against the evidence on record. On above grounds, it is urged that substantial questions of law, as mentioned in the appeal memo, arises in the instant case. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants/defendants and have perused the records of Courts below. 6. It is apparent from the records of Courts below that it is a case of concurrent findings of facts i.e. trial Court decreed the suit of plaintiff and appeal filed by appellants/defendants was dismissed by appellate Court. 7. Therefore, question arises as to when this Court can interfere with the findings of facts arrived at by the Courts below. In this connection, I would like to refer to the law laid down by the Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Chandrabhan (Deceased) through Lrs. 7. Therefore, question arises as to when this Court can interfere with the findings of facts arrived at by the Courts below. In this connection, I would like to refer to the law laid down by the Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Chandrabhan (Deceased) through Lrs. And Others v. Saraswati and Others reported in AIR 2022 SC 4601 , wherein Hon'ble apex Court in para 33(iii) has held as under:- “33 (iii) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well - recognized exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision” based on no evidence”, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding”. 8. Similarly in the case of Gurnam Singh (Dead) by legal representatives and Others v. Lehna Singh (Dead) by legal representatives, Hon'ble apex Court has held as under:- “13.1.......However, in Second Appeal under section 100 of the CPC, the High Court, by impugned judgment and order has interfered with the Judgment and Decree passed by the First Appellate Court. While interfering with the judgment and order passed by the first Appellate Court, it appears that while upsetting the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court, the High Court has again appreciated the entire evidence on record, which in exercise of powers under section 100 CPC is not permissible. While passing the impugned judgment and order, it appears that High Court has not at all appreciated the fact that the High Court was deciding the second Appeal under section 100 of the CPC and not first appeal under section 96 of the CPC. While passing the impugned judgment and order, it appears that High Court has not at all appreciated the fact that the High Court was deciding the second Appeal under section 100 of the CPC and not first appeal under section 96 of the CPC. As per the law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions, the jurisdiction of High Court to entertain second appeal under section 100 CPC after the 1976 Amendment, is confined only when the second appeal involves a substantial question of law.The existence of ‘a substantial question of law’ is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under section 100 of the CPC. As observed and held by this Court in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (Supra), in a second appeal under section 100 of the CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the First Appellate Court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the lower Court were erroneous being: (i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law; OR (ii) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the apex Court; OR (iii) Based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence. It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision that if First Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. It is further observed that the trial Court could have decided differently is not a question of law justifying interference in second appeal”. 9. In this connection, Ishwar Dass Jain (Dead) through LRs v. Sohan Lal (Dead) by LRs reported in (2000) 1 Supreme Court Cases 434 may also be referred to. Paras 11 and 12 of the said judgment is relevant and is under:- “11. There are two situations in which interference with findings of fact is permissible. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered would have led to an opposite conclusion. This principle has been laid down in a series of judgments of this Court in relation to section 100 CPC after the 1976 amendment. In Dilbagrai Punjabi vs. Sharad Chandra [1988 Supple. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered would have led to an opposite conclusion. This principle has been laid down in a series of judgments of this Court in relation to section 100 CPC after the 1976 amendment. In Dilbagrai Punjabi vs. Sharad Chandra [1988 Supple. SCC 710],while dealing with a Second Appeal of 1978 decided by the Madhya Pradesh High Court on 20.8.81, L.M.Sharma, J. (as he then was) observed that "The Court (the first appellate Court) is under a duty to examine the entire relevant evidence on record and if it refuses to consider important evidence having direct bearing on the disputed issue and the error which arises as of a magnitude that it gives birth to a substantial question of law, the High Court is fully authorized to set aside the finding. This is the situation in the present case." In that case, an admission by the defendant-tenant in the reply notice in regard to the plaintiff's title and the description of the plaintiff as `owner' of the property signed by the defendant were not considered by the first appellate Court while holding that the plaintiff had not proved his title. The High Court interfered with the finding on the ground of non-consideration of vital evidence and this Court affirmed the said decision. That was upheld. In Jagdish Singh v. Nathu Singh [ 1992 (1) SCC 647 ], with reference to a Second Appeal of 1978 disposed of on 5.4.1991. Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) held: "where the findings by the Court of facts is vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by an essentially erroneous approach to the matter, the High Court is not precluded from recording proper findings." Again in Sundra Naicka Vadiyar v. Ramaswami Ayyar [1995 Suppl. (4) SCC 534], it was held that where certain vital documents for deciding the question of possession were ignored - such as a compromise, an order of the revenue Court - reliance on oral evidence was unjustified. (4) SCC 534], it was held that where certain vital documents for deciding the question of possession were ignored - such as a compromise, an order of the revenue Court - reliance on oral evidence was unjustified. In yet another case in Mehrunissa v. Visham Kumari [ 1998 (2) SCC 295 ] arising out of Second appeal of 1988 decided on 15.1.1996, it was held by Venkataswami, J. that a finding arrived at by ignoring the second notice issued by the landlady and without noticing that the suit was not based on earlier notices, was vitiated and the High Court could interfere with such a finding. This was in Second Appeal of 1988 decided on 15.1.1996. 12. The second situation in which interference with findings of fact is permissible is where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate Court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. In Sri Chand Gupta v. Gulzar Singh [ 1992 (1) SCC 143 ], it was held that the High Court was right in interfering in Second Appeal where the lower appellate Court relied upon an admission of a third party treating it as binding on the defendant. The admission was inadmissible as against the defendant. This was also a Second Appeal of 1981 disposed of on 24.9.1985”. 10. A perusal of the case file reveals that appellants/defendants did not file any fard batwara list. Again in application Ex.D/1, there is no mention that the appellants father had partitioned the property between sons and daughter. Further, in Ex.D/1, it is also not mentioned that respondent/plaintiff Munnibai has already otherwise received her share, therefore her no share is left in the suit property. Therefore, in view of over all facts on record, especially, Ex.D/1 and Ex.D/6 and in absence of any fard batwara list, it cannot be said that respondent/plaintiff did not have any share in the suit property. 11. Evidently, fard batwara list has not been filed by the appellants/defendants in this case. Further, in Ex.D/1, which is an application for partition submitted before Tehsildar, it is nowhere mentioned that plaintiff had already received her share etc, therefore, she is not entitled to any share in the suit property. Further, there is no registered documents to show that the plaintiff has relinquished/waived her share in the suit property. Further, in Ex.D/1, which is an application for partition submitted before Tehsildar, it is nowhere mentioned that plaintiff had already received her share etc, therefore, she is not entitled to any share in the suit property. Further, there is no registered documents to show that the plaintiff has relinquished/waived her share in the suit property. A perusal of Ex.D/1's deposition, allegedly recorded in the court of Tehsildar, reveals that therein Parvati is mentioned as “witness's name” and later on “Parvati alias Munni” has been interpolated therein. Above thumb impression “Parvati” is mentioned. There is no documents on record to show that Munnibai was also known by the name of Parvati. In Ex.D/1's application, name of Munnibai is mentioned and not Parvatibai. Thus, there is no documentary evidence to establish that plaintiff has relinquished her share in the suit property. 12. If pleadings of the parties and evidence adduced by the parties and the impugned judgments passed by the Courts below are considered in light of the above legal principles/legal provisions reiterated in aforesaid judgments, then, in this Court's considered opinion, the findings of facts concurrently recorded by the Courts below are not liable to be interfered with in the instant case and it cannot be said that Courts below have ignored any material evidence or has acted on no evidence or Courts have drawn wrong inferences from the proved facts etc. Further, it cannot be said that evidence taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the findings. It can also be not said that the findings of Courts below are based on inadmissible evidence. 13. A perusal of the impugned judgments and decree passed by the Courts below reveal that they are well reasoned and have been passed after due consideration of oral as well as documentary evidence on record. Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants has failed to show that how the findings of facts recorded by the Courts below are illegal, perverse and based on no evidence etc. The learned Courts below have legally and rightly dealt with the issues involved in the matter and have recorded correct findings of facts. 14. For the reasons aforesaid, I find no merit in the instant second appeal. Concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below in favour of defendants are fully justified by the evidence on record. The learned Courts below have legally and rightly dealt with the issues involved in the matter and have recorded correct findings of facts. 14. For the reasons aforesaid, I find no merit in the instant second appeal. Concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below in favour of defendants are fully justified by the evidence on record. Concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below are not based on misreading or misappreciation of evidence nor it is shown to be illegal or perverse in any manner so as to call for interference in second appeal. No question of law, much less substantial question of law, arises for adjudication in the instant second appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed in limine. 15. A copy of this order along with record be sent back to the Courts below for information and its compliance.