JUDGMENT : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. IA No. 2615 of 2021 This Interlocutory Application has been filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 71 days in filing the present Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Having been satisfied with the grounds taken in this Interlocutory Application, delay of 71 days in filing the present Letters Patent Appeal is condoned. 3. IA No. 2615 of 2021 is allowed. LPA No. 720 of 2019 4. The writ petitioner has challenged the order dated 24th June 2019 by which WP(S) No. 6176 of 2008 has been dismissed. 5. Briefly stated, on 31st March 1989 the Deputy Commissioner of Lohardaga called the names from Employment Exchange for appointment of Class-IV employees and the writ petitioner was duly appointed as Class-IV employee. More than 12 years thereafter, by an order dated 13th June 2002 the Executive Engineer, REO Works Division at Lohardaga issued a direction to stop salary of the writ petitioner till verification of the complaint made against him and asked him to deposit the original school certificate etc. However, a copy of the complaint was not provided to him and, on the contrary, the Executive Engineer issued a further direction not to take work from him by an order dated 6th March 2003. Both these orders were challenged in WP(S) No. 5103 of 2003 which were quashed by the writ Court but it was only after Contempt Case (Civil) No. 430 of 2004 was filed salary to the writ petitioner for the period he actually worked was paid and was permitted to rejoin his duties. However, he was not allowed to work and again payment of salary was stopped. Therefore, the writ petitioner again approached this Court in WP(S) No. 6176 of 2008. Initially the writ petitioner had approached the Court with a grievance that he was not paid salary from March 2003. During pendency of the writ petition office order dated 6th February 2010 was issued by invoking Board Miscellaneous Rules 165 and 166 to dismiss him from service and this order was put to challenge by the writ petitioner by filing IA No. 2075 of 2012. 6. In the counter-affidavit filed before the writ Court, the respondents have taken a stand that the writ petitioner was paid salary till April 2002 and thereafter he had stopped working. 6. In the counter-affidavit filed before the writ Court, the respondents have taken a stand that the writ petitioner was paid salary till April 2002 and thereafter he had stopped working. The respondents took a stand that a departmental proceeding was initiated against the writ petitioner as there was a complaint against him that he had produced fake certificates. Therefore he was directed to produce original documents before the Superintending Engineer, RWD, Work Circle at Ranchi on 12th January 2009 to whom the matter was referred for enquiry. The respondents have further pleaded that the departmental proceeding against the writ petitioner was conducted on 22nd July 2009 in the office of the Superintending Engineer at Ranchi and it was found that he has obtained fake certificates. So the matter was discussed in the Establishment Committee meeting and a decision was taken to terminate the writ petitioner from service. 7. Mr. Rahul Saboo, the learned State counsel submits that the certificate produced by the writ petitioner was not found in the school records and in the service book of the writ petitioner a different name of his father has been written through overwriting. 8. In the order dated 24th June 2019, the writ Court has held that there is a serious dispute as to genuineness of the certificate produced by the writ petitioner and such dispute does not fall within the domain of jurisdiction of Article 226 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, no relief can be granted to him. 9. There is no dispute that the writ petitioner was appointed through the procedure prescribed for appointment of Class-IV employees by calling name of candidates from Employment Exchange. In the list prepared by the District Establishment Committee on 14th March 1989 of eleven candidates the writ petitioner's name appeared at serial no. 3, he was asked to undergo through the process of interview on 28th April 1989, his original certificates were verified and appointment letter was issued to him vide memo No. 509 dated 29th April 1989. However, all of a sudden his salary was stopped from May 2002 and constrained thereby he approached the writ Court in WP(S) No. 5103 of 2003 which was disposed of in the following terms: “4. Admittedly, neither any departmental proceeding has been initiated against the petitioner nor a charge sheet has been served upon him. However, all of a sudden his salary was stopped from May 2002 and constrained thereby he approached the writ Court in WP(S) No. 5103 of 2003 which was disposed of in the following terms: “4. Admittedly, neither any departmental proceeding has been initiated against the petitioner nor a charge sheet has been served upon him. In such circumstances, respondents cannot stop payment of salary or cannot stop taking work from the petitioner. The proper course is to suspend the petitioner and proceed with a departmental proceeding, if prima facie charge appears to be true. Without initiating a departmental proceeding and without giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner no order in the manner could have been passed by the respondents. 5. For the aforesaid reasons, this writ application is allowed in part and the impugned orders are quashed. The respondents if so advised may put the petitioner under suspension and proceed with the departmental proceeding in accordance with law. In the meantime, petitioner shall be paid his salary for the period he actually rendered his services.” 10. Now, as claimed by the respondents, a departmental proceeding was initiated against the writ petitioner but the records of the said proceeding have not been produced by the respondents. The writ petitioner has made a specific statement that even a copy of the complaint was not made available to him and this has not been controverted by the respondents. There is nothing on record to suggest that in the departmental proceeding the writ petitioner was afforded an opportunity to defend himself. And, this is an admitted position that the order of dismissal from service dated 6th February 2010 has been issued without affording any opportunity to him. This is now well-settled law that service of a regular employee cannot be put to an end without any domestic inquiry subject to an exception where such inquiry has been validly dispensed with. 11. In “Kamal Nayan Mishra v. State of M.P.” (2010) 2 SCC 169 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “24. The termination of the appellant without an inquiry or hearing was illegal and invalid. In the normal course, we would have set aside the termination and directed reinstatement with consequential benefits, reserving liberty to the employer to initiate disciplinary proceedings. The termination of the appellant without an inquiry or hearing was illegal and invalid. In the normal course, we would have set aside the termination and directed reinstatement with consequential benefits, reserving liberty to the employer to initiate disciplinary proceedings. But the peculiar facts of this case require us to adopt a slightly different approach to do complete justice between the parties. 25. We have already pointed out that there are clear indications that the appellant was bona fide under the impression that he was required to give the particulars sought in Column 12 of the form with reference to the date of his appointment. Further, the entire matter relates to an attestation form given in 1994 and the appellant has already been out of service for more than seven years on account of the illegal termination from service without an inquiry on 7-3-2002. We are therefore of the view that the interests of justice would be served if the appellant is reinstated with continuity of service and other consequential benefits, dispensing with any further disciplinary action. The appellant will not be entitled to any salary for the period 7-3-2002 till today.” 12. Having found so, we are unable to accord our concurrence to the writ Court's order and, accordingly, the order dated 24th June 2019 passed in WP(S) No. 6176 of 2008 is set-aside. 13. LPA No. 720 of 2019 is allowed and, as a consequence thereof, WP(S) No. 6176 of 2008 stands allowed. 14. The appellant who is the writ petitioner shall be reinstated in service if has not attained the age of superannuation as directed by this Court in WP(S) No. 5103 of 2003 and shall be paid full salary and allowances for the actual period of work.