JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. The present application is filed for seeking following reliefs: “(A) YOUR LORDSHIPS be pleased to call for the record and proceedings of FIR no. 11208045210650 registered with Malaviyanagar Police Station, Rajkotand after perusing the same, be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned FIR and all proceedings arising therefrom, in the interest of justice and equity; (B) YOUR LORDSHIPS be pleased to stay further proceedings arising out of FIR no. 11208045210650 registered with Malaviyanagar Police Station, Rajkot and all proceedings arising therefrom, pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition; (C) YOUR LORDSHIPS be pleased to grant such other and further relief(s) as may be deemed fit in the interest of justice.” 2.1 Brief facts as per the case of the applicant in this application are as such that the respondent no.2 is a tenant of the applicant. The respondent no.2 has executed a rent agreement with the applicant on 19.06.2020, wherein the respondent no.2 has agreed to pay an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- per month towards rent. As per the said rent agreement, in the event, there is any default in making payment of rent for consecutive two months, the applicant will be at liberty to initiate appropriate steps of eviction. It is further the case of the applicant in this application that the respondent no.2 paid no amount to the applicant towards rent for consecutive 3 months and therefore, the applicant was constrained to issue a legal demand notice to the respondent no.2 demanding arrears of rent and the applicant also invoked relevant clause i.e. Clause no.12 of the rent agreement for taking over possession. The said notice was sent by way of RPAD. It is further the case of the applicant in this application that it appears that the said notice was not received by the respondent no.2 and therefore, the applicant once again was constrained to issue a fresh notice dated 18.09.2020 by way of RPAD. 2.2 It is further the case of the applicant in this application that the respondent no.2 who was to pay the arrears of rent gave various kinds of threats to the applicant for the purpose of forgoing the amount. 2.2 It is further the case of the applicant in this application that the respondent no.2 who was to pay the arrears of rent gave various kinds of threats to the applicant for the purpose of forgoing the amount. The respondent no.2 also threatened the applicant that in the event the applicant demands the amount from her, she would file/plant a case against the applicant by invoking the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The applicant, therefore, was constrained to file a detailed complaint against the respondent no.2 with the Commissioner of Police, Rajkot, wherein the applicant requested the Commissioner to take appropriate action against the respondent no.2 who has not only cheated the applicant, but is also threatening the applicant for implicating the applicant in a false case under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. It is further the case of the applicant in this application that the respondent no.2 thereafter has filed the FIR in question against the applicant by projecting an incorrect picture and by concocting story with a view to arm-twist applicant who has filed a complaint against her much prior in point of time. Hence, this application is preferred. 3. Heard learned advocate Mr. Pratik Jasani for the applicant, Mr. Pathik Acharya, learned advocate for the respondent No.2 - complainant and Mr. Soaham Joshi, learned APP for the respondent No.1 – State. 4.1 At the outset, Mr. Pratik Jasani for the applicant has drawn my attention towards the order dated 15.3.2021. He has submitted that the present appellant has withdrawn the application concerning Sections 427 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code in the aforementioned F.I.R. Now, he is pressing this application for the offences punishable under Sections 3(2)(v-a) and 3(1)(r) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (herein referred to as the "the Atrocities Act" for short). 4.2 He contends that upon a bare reading of the F.I.R., it reveals that the incident and the dispute occurred over the payment of rent of Rs. 6 lakhs. Thus, the present complaint is filed, alleging that the applicant abused the complainant using words pertaining to her caste. 4.2 He contends that upon a bare reading of the F.I.R., it reveals that the incident and the dispute occurred over the payment of rent of Rs. 6 lakhs. Thus, the present complaint is filed, alleging that the applicant abused the complainant using words pertaining to her caste. Additionally, he argues that considering the place of the incident, which happened at a shop/showroom, it is alleged that some incident took place when the complainant reached the shop, and at that point of time, the applicant used offensive language. Notably, the incident took place in a private place and not in public. 4.3 According to Mr. Pratik Jasani, Section 3(2)(v-a) of the Atrocities Act requires the incident to happen in a public place. Therefore, he claims that the allegations made under the provisions of the Atrocities Act are made with a mala fide intention, as a calculated step to pressurize the applicant. 4.4 Furthermore, he contends that the impugned F.I.R. does not bear any averment regarding the accused persons' caste, particularly scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, as required by law. He also argues that since the applicant has already filed a prior complaint against the applicant under Sections 384, 387, and 447 of the I.P.C., the subsequent complaint filed by the complainant is nothing but a counterblast. In light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana V/s Bhajan Lal reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 and other subsequent judgments, Mr. Pratik Jasani urges this Court to exercise the powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 5.1 Per contra, Mr. Pathik Acharya, learned advocate for the respondent No.2 – complainant opposes the averments made by the learned advocate for the applicant. He submits that since the applicant has not pressed the application qua Sections 427 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, it can be presumed that the incident occurred before the filing of the F.I.R., which should be quashed in totality. Therefore, he insists that the complainant's statements should not be disbelieved at this stage. 5.2 Moreover, he argues that prima facie, considering the averments made in the F.I.R., a case is made out under Sections 3(2)(v-a) and 3(1)(r) of the Atrocities Act. Therefore, he insists that the complainant's statements should not be disbelieved at this stage. 5.2 Moreover, he argues that prima facie, considering the averments made in the F.I.R., a case is made out under Sections 3(2)(v-a) and 3(1)(r) of the Atrocities Act. To support his argument, he relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Renu Kumari versus Sanjay Kumar and Others reported in (2018) 12 SCC 346. He has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hitesh Verma V/s State of Uttarakhand and Another reported in 2020 SCC online (SC) 907, more particularly, paragraphs 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21 and 22 of that judgment. Therefore, he submits that this Court should not exercise its powers at this stage, particularly inherent powers, which should be exercised very sparingly. 6. Mr. Soaham Joshi, learned APP for the respondent No.1 – State has tendered the report dated 22.2.2023 received from concerned Police Station. He asserts that the investigation has been conducted on specific aspects, and based on the available evidence, a prima facie offense is established against the applicant. Therefore, he argues that the Court should not terminate the proceedings at this stage. He further submits that all the defenses raised by the applicant can be addressed during the trial and not at this preliminary stage. As a result, he requests the Court to dismiss this application. 7.1 I have considered the rival submissions made at the bar by the respective parties. It is important to note that the present application is not pressed with regard to the offenses under the Indian Penal Code. After examining the averments, it is evident that the alleged offense took place at a shop, which constitutes a private place. There is no mention of the presence of other individuals, and thus, prima facie, it appears that the incident did not occur in a public place as required by the provisions of the law, particularly Section 3(2)(v-a) of the Atrocities Act. 7.2 At the outset, if we peruse the provisions of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act, they read as under: “3. Punishment for offences of atrocities 1. 7.2 At the outset, if we peruse the provisions of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act, they read as under: “3. Punishment for offences of atrocities 1. Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe: (r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view; 3(2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe- [(va) commits any offence specified in the Schedule, against a person or property, knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to suchmember, shall be punishable with such punishment as specified under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) for such offences and shall also be liable to fine; 7.3 It has come to light that the applicant had previously filed a complaint under Sections 384, 387, and 447 of the I.P.C. against the complainant, and it appears that the present complaint has been filed as a counterblast in response to that. Upon examining the complaint, it is evident that no other credible allegations have been made, and considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court believes that the essential elements of any of the Sections are not satisfied prima facie. 7.4 It is relevant to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hitesh Verma (supra), specifically, paragraphs 12, 14 to 16, 18, 21 and 22 are relevant to the facts of the present case, which are as under: “12. The basic ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act can be classified as “1) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and 2) in any place within public view”. 14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State through Standing Counsel & Ors., (2008) 8 SCC 435 . The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State through Standing Counsel & Ors., (2008) 8 SCC 435 . The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view. The Court held as under: “28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.” 15. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.” 15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered “in any place within public view” is not made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh, it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet. 16. There is a dispute about the possession of the land which is the subject matter of civil dispute between the parties as per respondent No.2 herself. Due to dispute, appellant and others were not permitting respondent No.2 to cultivate the land for the last six months. Since the matter is regarding possession of property pending before the Civil Court, any dispute arising on account of possession of the said property would not disclose an offence under the Act unless the victim is abused, intimated or harassed only for the reason that she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. 18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste. In the present case, the parties are litigating over possession of the land. The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property. In the present case, the parties are litigating over possession of the land. The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property. If such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out. 21. In Gerige Pentaiah, one of the arguments raised was non- disclosure of the caste of the accused but the facts were almost similar as there was civil dispute between parties pending and the allegation was that the accused has called abuses in the name of the caste of the victim. The High Court herein has misread the judgment of this Court in Ashabai Machindra Adhagale as it was not a case about the caste of the victim but the fact that the accused was belonging to upper caste was not mentioned in the FIR. The High Court of Bombay had quashed the proceedings for the reason that the caste of the accused was not mentioned in the FIR, therefore, the offence under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Act is not made out. In an appeal against the decision of the Bombay High Court, this Court held that this will be the matter of investigation as to whether the accused either belongs to or does not belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Therefore, the High Court erred in law to dismiss the quashing petition relying upon later larger Bench judgment. 22. The appellant had sought quashing of the charge- sheet on the ground that the allegation does not make out an offence under the Act against the appellant merely because respondent No. 2 was a Scheduled Caste since the property dispute was not on account of the fact that respondent No. 2 was a Scheduled Caste. The property disputes between a vulnerable section of the society and a person of upper caste will not disclose any offence under the Act unless, the allegations are on account of the victim being a Scheduled Caste. The property disputes between a vulnerable section of the society and a person of upper caste will not disclose any offence under the Act unless, the allegations are on account of the victim being a Scheduled Caste. Still further, the finding that the appellant was aware of the caste of the informant is wholly inconsequential as the knowledge does not bar, any person to protect his rights by way of a procedure established by law.” 7.5 It is also relevant to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Aex Court in the case of Ramesh Chandra Vaishya versus State of Uttar Pradesh and Another reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 668, specifically paragraphs 16 to 23 are relevant, as under: “16. The first F.I.R., registered at the instance of the complainant, is silent about the place of occurrence and who, being a member of the public, was present when the appellant is alleged to have hurled caste related abuses at the complainant. However, on a reading of the second F.I.R. registered at the behest of the appellant, it appears that the incident took place at the house of the appellant. 17. The first question that calls for an answer is whether it was at a place within public view that the appellant hurled caste related abuses at the complainant with an intent to insult or intimidate with an intent to humiliate him. From the charge-sheet dated 21 st January, 2016 filed by the I.O., it appears that the prosecution would seek to rely on the evidence of three witnesses to drive home the charge against the appellant of committing offences under sections 323 and 504, IPC and 3(1)(x), SC/ST Act. These three witnesses are none other than the complainant, his wife and their son. Neither the first F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet refers to the presence of a fifth individual (a member of the public) at the place of occurrence (apart from the appellant, the complainant, his wife and their son). Since the utterances, if any, made by the appellant were not “in any place within public view”, the basic ingredient for attracting section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was missing/absent. We, therefore, hold that at the relevant point of time of the incident (of hurling of caste related abuse at the complainant by the appellant), no member of the public was present. 18. We, therefore, hold that at the relevant point of time of the incident (of hurling of caste related abuse at the complainant by the appellant), no member of the public was present. 18. That apart, assuming arguendo that the appellant had hurled caste related abuses at the complainant with a view to insult or humiliate him, the same does not advance the case of the complainant any further to bring it within the ambit of section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. We have noted from the first F.I.R. as well as the charge- sheet that the same makes no reference to the utterances of the appellant during the course of verbal altercation or to the caste to which the complainant belonged, except for the allegation/observation that caste-related abuses were hurled. The legislative intent seems to be clear that every insult or intimidation for humiliation to a person would not amount to an offence under section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of course, such insult or intimidation is targeted at the victim because of he being a member of a particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If one calls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place within public view, this would obviously constitute an act intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive or offensive language. Even if the same be directed generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract section 3(1) (x) unless such words are laced with casteist remarks. Even if the same be directed generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract section 3(1) (x) unless such words are laced with casteist remarks. Since section 18 of the SC/ST Act bars invocation of the court’s jurisdiction under section 438, Cr.PC and having regard to the overriding effect of the SC/ST Act over other laws, it is desirable that before an accused is subjected to a trial for alleged commission of offence under section 3(1)(x), the utterances made by him in any place within public view are outlined, if not in the F.I.R. (which is not required to be an encyclopaedia of all facts and events), but at least in the charge-sheet (which is prepared based either on statements of witnesses recorded in course of investigation or otherwise) so as to enable the court to ascertain whether the charge sheet makes out a case of an offence under the SC/ST Act having been committed for forming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the situation before it, prior to taking cognisance of the offence. Even for the limited test that has to be applied in a case of the present nature, the charge- sheet dated 21 st January, 2016 does not make out any case of an offence having been committed by the appellant under section 3(1)(x) warranting him to stand a trial. 19. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the decision in Hitesh Verma (supra) cited by Ms. Shukla can be pressed in aid to support the view that we have taken above. 20. The second question that would engage our attention is, whether the criminal proceedings against the appellant should be allowed to be taken further in view of the appellant facing accusation of offences punishable under sections 323 and 504, IPC. 21. Section 323, IPC prescribes punishment for voluntarily causing hurt. Hurt is defined in section 319, IPC as causing bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person. The allegation in the first F.I.R. is that the appellant had beaten up the complainant for which he sustained multiple injuries. Although the complainant alleged that such incident was witnessed by many persons and that he sustained injuries on his hand, the charge-sheet does neither refer to any eye- witness other than the complainant’s wife and son nor to any medical report. Although the complainant alleged that such incident was witnessed by many persons and that he sustained injuries on his hand, the charge-sheet does neither refer to any eye- witness other than the complainant’s wife and son nor to any medical report. The nature of hurt suffered by the complainant in the process is neither reflected from the first F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet. On the contrary, the appellant had the injuries suffered by him treated immediately after the incident. In the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent (State) in the present proceeding, there is no material worthy of consideration in this behalf except a bald statement that the complainant sustained multiple injuries “in his hand and other body parts”. If indeed the complainant’s version were to be believed, the I.O. ought to have asked for a medical report to support the same. Completion of investigation within a day in a given case could be appreciated but in the present case it has resulted in more disservice than service to the cause of justice. The situation becomes all the more glaring when in course of this proceeding the parties including the first respondent are unable to apprise us the outcome of the second F.I.R. In any event, we do not find any ring of truth in the prosecution case to allow the proceedings to continue vis-à-vis section 323, IPC. 22. What remains is section 504, IPC. In Fiona Shrikhande and Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 , this Court had the occasion to hold that: “13. Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz. (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. The person who intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504 IPC.” 23. Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, we have little hesitation in holding that even though the appellant might have abused the complainant but such abuse by itself and without anything more does not warrant subjecting the appellant to face a trial, particularly in the clear absence of the ingredient of intentional insult of such a degree that it could provoke a person to break public peace or commit any other offence.” 7.6 In light of the above, the continuation of the present matter would amount to an abuse of the process of law, as it appears that the complainant lodged this complaint with the intent to exert pressure. Moreover, considering the dispute of civil nature regarding the outstanding rent amount of approximately Rs. Moreover, considering the dispute of civil nature regarding the outstanding rent amount of approximately Rs. 6 lakhs, this is fit case where the Court should prevent the abuse of the legal process by invoking its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 in view of the decision to do so is in line with the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana V/s Bhajan Lal reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows - “In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Ch.XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Art.226 or the inherent powers under sec.482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or therwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under sec.156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of sec.155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under sec.156(2) of the Code. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under sec.156(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” The judgments cited at the bar by learned advocate for the respondent is not helpful to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 8. Accordingly, the present application is allowed. 9. Impugned FIR C.R. No.11208045210650 registered with Malaviyanagar Police Station, Rajkot and is quashed and set aside as well as consequential proceedings pursuant to the impugned F.I.R. is also quashed and set aside qua the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 10. Compensation if any is received pursuant to the impugned F.I.R. under the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 shall be refunded back to the State by the complainant and in case of default, State Government is at liberty to take appropriate action, in accordance with law. 11. It is clarified that proceedings qua offence punishable under the provisions of Indian Penal Code shall continue. Rule is made absolute.