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2023 DIGILAW 886 (AP)

Mootha Midhun v. State of Andhra Pradesh

2023-06-16

RAVI CHEEMALAPATI

body2023
ORDER : 1. This Writ Petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the following relief: “...to issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or direction, to declare that the land acquisition proceedings concerning the land admeasuring Ac.5-00 in Sy.No.212/1B of Ramanaiahpet, Kakinada Municipal Corporation as per the preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is liable to be invalidated for violation and noncompliance of the settlement compromise recorded by the parties in SLP No.19302 of 1991 dated 29.09.1992, in particular clause E and F of the said settlement/compromise, for non-payment of the land acquisition compensation determined by the sub Judge, Kakinada within 8 weeks from the date of decision of the Sub Judge and also for the default on the part of the acquisitioning authority in making payment of the determined compensation amount in terms of the judgment of the Sub Judge, Kakinada and consequently direct the respondents to redeliver possession of the said land to the petitioner by declaring that the said land acquisition proceedings under the land Acquisition Act, 1894 have lapsed/since they were set aside in W.A.No.670 of 1985 dated 07.02.1991 and grant such other relief including the respondent to take back the amount allegedly deposited in O.P.No.53 of 1993, on the file of the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada and direct the respondents not to interfere with the possession and enjoyment(ownership) of the petitioner over the said land…..” 2. The case of the petitioner, in brief, is that the land admeasuring Ac.5-00 in Survey No.212/1B of Ramanaiahpeta, Kakinada Municipal Corporation, Kakinada, East Godavari District (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the subject land’) was the absolute property of the petitioner’s father and on his death the petitioner succeeded the same. The subject land was acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 vide notification under Section 4(1) of the said Act dated 08.06.1978, for the public purpose of construction of a Mini Dairy at Kakinada. The possession of the subject land was taken on 08.06.1978 itself and an award has been passed determining compensation amount at the rate of Rs.28,750/- per acre and an award was passed by the 3rd respondent vide Award No.10 of 1986 dated 05.09.1986. The possession of the subject land was taken on 08.06.1978 itself and an award has been passed determining compensation amount at the rate of Rs.28,750/- per acre and an award was passed by the 3rd respondent vide Award No.10 of 1986 dated 05.09.1986. The petitioner’s father has challenged the very acquisition proceedings by way of Writ Petition vide W.P.No.4082 of 1979, which was dismissed and aggrieved by the same, a writ appeal vide W.A.No.670 of 1985 was filed and the said writ appeal was allowed on 07.02.1991. Aggrieved by the same, the 4th respondent carried the matter to Supreme Court in SLP No.19302 of 1991 and the said SLP was disposed of by order dated 01.09.1992 by recording compromise between the parties to the effect “it is agreed by both the parties that the date 07.02.1991 be treated as the date for the purpose of determination of compensation payable to the land acquired U/s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The respondent is entitled for compensation at the market rate prevailing as on 07.02.1991 to be fixed by the Sub Court, Kakinada.” As per the said compromise, it is agreed that the respondent in SLP will file his claim within four weeks from 24.08.1991 before the Sub Court, Kakinada claiming compensation on the basis that S.4(1) notification is issued under the Land Acquisition Act on 07.02.1991. The petitioner in SLP (4th respondent herein) is also entitled to file documents and lead evidence opposition to the claim made by the respondent before the Sub-Court, Kakinada. The learned Subordinate Judge, Kakinada will determine the compensation payable to respondent for the land acquired in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The respondent is also entitled to the interest and solatium in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as if the notification under S.4(1) of the Act was issued on 07.02.1991. The compensation determined by the learned Subordinate Judge Kakinada will have to be paid to the respondent within a period of eight weeks thereafter. In default, the Acquisition will stand set aside and the rights and liability of the parties will be determined in accordance with law. The petitioner and the respondent are entitled to file appeal in the High Court in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, if they are aggrieved by the determination of compensation by the learned Subordinate Judge, Kakinada. The petitioner and the respondent are entitled to file appeal in the High Court in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, if they are aggrieved by the determination of compensation by the learned Subordinate Judge, Kakinada. The excess compensation if any determined by the High Court will be paid to the respondent. If the compensation is reduced by the Hon’ble Court, it will be refunded to the petitioner by the respondent. It is further stated that in view of the settlement recorded before the Supreme Court, the respondents are under an obligation to make payment of the entire compensation amount determined by the learned Subordinate Judge, Kakinada, within a period of eight weeks thereafter. Accordingly, the petitioner filed O.P.No.53 of 1993 and the learned Subordinate Judge has determined the compensation amount by judgment dated 23.01.2003. Though the compensation amount so determined should have been paid within eight weeks thereafter, without making payment of any part of the compensation amount determined by the Subordinate Court, the 4th respondent has filed A.S.No.836 of 2003 before the Division Bench of this Court. By judgment dated 09.06.2006, the said appeal was dismissed with an observation the petitioner is entitled to all statutory benefits including solatium and the additional market value as per the amended provisions of the Act. Again, the 4th respondent has carried the matter to Supreme Court of India in SLP No.21411 of 2006 and the same was dismissed on 08.01.2007. Thus, the compensation amount as determined by the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada in O.P.No.53 of 1993 dated 23.01.2003 has attained finality in which the market rate was fixed at Rs.800/- per sq.yard. It is further stated that, since the compensation amount was not paid as per the settlement recorded before the Supreme Court, the petitioner filed E.P.No.77 of 2016 in O.S.No.53 of 1993 in the court of the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada computing the compensation amount, the aggregate of which is Rs.143,88,07,136/- and the 4th respondent has filed a calculation memo to the effect that the entire compensation amount has been deposited on 27.10.2007 and hence a full satisfaction has to be recorded. In the said calculation memo, the 4th respondent has not included the components of interest on solatium and additional market value and hence the said calculation memo is patently incorrect and contrary to the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in A.S.No.836 of 2003, dated 09.06.2006 and thus there is no complete deposit of the legitimate compensation amount as determined by the Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada and modified by Division Bench of High Court. Hence, the 4th respondent has committed a clear default of the requirement of law i.e. payment of the compensation amount within five years from the date of the Award. Even otherwise, under the provision contained in Section 24(1)(a), where no award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act has been made then all the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply. In the present case, the award was originally made in the year 1986 but the same was quashed by the judgment of the Division Bench dated 07.02.1991. Thereafter, no award has been made by the Land Acquisition Officer till today. In such a case the compensation amount payable to the petitioner is the one under 2013 Act. Hence, the petitioner is entitled to the restoration of possession of the acquired land or in the alternative to payment of compensation amount as computed under the provisions of 2013 Act. It is further stated that no part of the compensation amount deposited by the 4th respondent has been withdrawn by the petitioner and the entire amount so far deposited is lying in the court only. Hence, the present writ petition has been filed to invalidate the land acquisition proceedings for non compliance of the settlement /compromise recorded in SLP NO.19302 of 1991 dated 29.09.1992. 3. The third respondent filed counter affidavit reiterating the averments in the affidavit writ petition regarding acquisition of land and the proceedings initiated by the land owner as well as the respondents, further contended that, aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge in O.P.No.53 of 1992, the respondent Nos. 3. The third respondent filed counter affidavit reiterating the averments in the affidavit writ petition regarding acquisition of land and the proceedings initiated by the land owner as well as the respondents, further contended that, aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge in O.P.No.53 of 1992, the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 have preferred appeal in A.S.No.836 of 2003 and this Court granted interim stay in CMP No.10094 of 2023 in the above appeal on 24.04.2003, subject to the condition of the appellant depositing 1/4th of the enhanced compensation in two equal instalments viz., the first instalment within two months and another instalment within two months thereafter and as the 4th respondent could not deposit the amount, they have filed an application seeking extension of time before this Court vide CMP No.13844 of 2003. Whereas the land owners filed writ petition vide W.P.No.6832 of 2003 for restitution of repossession of the acquired land and the same was dismissed by this Court vide orders dated 30.04.2003 in view of the orders of stay granted in CMP No.10094 in A.S.No.836 of 2003. The land owners also filed vacate stay petition in CMP No.13775 of 2003 before this Court and this Court extended the time for payment of compensation in CMP No.13775 of 2003 in A.S.No.836 of 2003. In the meantime the landowners filed E.P.No.112 of 2004 in O.P.No.53 of 1993. Thereafter, this Court by order dated 09.06.2006 dismissed the Appeal in A.S.No.836 of 2003 holding that the land owners are entitled to all the statutory benefits including the interest on solatium and additional market value as per the amended provisions of the Act. On receipt of the above orders, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Kakinada addressed the requisitioning department to comply with the orders of this Court and requested to pay compensation amount of Rs.13,16,28,640/- as on 10.04.2007. Accordingly, the 4th respondent send demand drafts for an amount of Rs.2,13,87,500/- and Rs.11,14,34,033/- towards decree amount in O.P.No.53 of 1993, but the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada declined to accord permission to deposit the said demand drafts into court and returned them, in view of the Special Leave Petition No.21411 of 2006 filed by requisitioning Department before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India against the orders passed in A.S.No.836 of 2003 dated 09.06.2006. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India dismissed SLP No.21411 of 2006 on 08.01.2007. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India dismissed SLP No.21411 of 2006 on 08.01.2007. The 4th respondent filed CRP No.4410 of 2007 before this Court against the orders passed by the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada in E.A.No.330 of 2007 in O.P.No.53 of 1993 and this Court in its interim order dated 11.10.2007 permitted to deposit the decretal amount to the credit of O.P.No.53 of 1993 and accordingly an amount of Rs.13,28,21,533/- was deposited to the credit of O.P.No.53 of 1993 on 22.10.2007 and the 4th respondent is requested to deposit further amount of Rs.9,43,800/- towards interest accrued thereon from August to October, 2007 and accordingly the 4th respondent sent demand draft vide his letter dated 27.10.2007 and the same was also deposited to the credit of the above O.P. on 07.11.2007. Thus, the decree passed in O.P. has been fully satisfied and the entire compensation amount of Rs.13,37,65,333/- was deposited to the credit of the O.P. The SLP No.5938 of 2007 filed by the landowners for reconveyance of their lands was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India on 03.11.2008 and the CRP filed by the 4th respondent against the orders passed in E.P.No.330 of 2007 in O.P.No.53 of 1993 was also dismissed by this Court on 13.03.2009. The Dairy at Kakinada is being run by the 5th respondent from 11.04.2000 on lease basis and the land is in possession of the Government. It is further stated in the counter affidavit that this Court has permitted the 4th respondent to deposit the compensation amount to the credit of the O.P. thereby giving extension of time to the respondents, which is not at all contrary to the terms of the compromise order dated 01.09.1992 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Thus, it is not correct to state that compensation amount was not deposited. Further, pursuant to the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP No.19302 of 1991, the petitioner himself has filed O.P.No.53 of 1993, wherein compensation was fixed by the learned Subordinate Judge from the renewed date viz., 07.02.1991 and hence the questioning of passing of award again is not correct. Further, pursuant to the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP No.19302 of 1991, the petitioner himself has filed O.P.No.53 of 1993, wherein compensation was fixed by the learned Subordinate Judge from the renewed date viz., 07.02.1991 and hence the questioning of passing of award again is not correct. According to Section 24(2) of the Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, in case the award has been made five (05) years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have been lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act. In view of the pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (C) Nos.9036-9038 of 2016, Section 24(2) would only operate where possession of the land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In the instant case, the Land Acquisition Officer & Revenue Divisional Officer, Kakinada has passed the award vide Award No.10/86 dated 05.09.1986 and possession has been taken and compensation was also deposited in the Court. Thus, Section 24(1)(a) of the Land Acquisition Act 30 of 2013 is not applicable in this case and so also the claim of the petitioner for damages/rents is not applicable. The claim of the petitioner for reconveyance of the land on the ground that the compensation was not deposited within the stipulated time is not correct, since compensation was deposited pursuant to direction of this Court and further the SLP No.5938 of 2007 for reconveyance of the lands was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 03.11.2008. Hence, prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 4. The respondent No.4 filed counter affidavit and while reiterating the contents of the writ affidavit and also the contents of the counter affidavit filed by the respondent No.3, inter alia contended that, aggrieved by the orders dated 23.01.2003 in O.P.No.53 of 1993, the respondent Nos.4 and 5 filed appeal in A.S.No.836 of 2003 on the file of this Court and during pendency of the said appeal this Court has passed several interlocutory orders interpreting and clarifying the orders of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada regarding time fixed for deposit of the compensation amount. However, the said appeal A.S.No.836 of 2003 was dismissed on 09.06.2006. Thereafter, as the learned Senior Civil Judge declined to accord permission to deposit the amount as per the decree in O.P.No.53 of 1993, the respondent No.4 preferred CRP No.4410 of 2007 on the file of this Court and this court granted permission to deposit the amount. Accordingly, the amount has been deposited to the credit of the O.P.No.53 of 1993 by calculating the interest upto 31.07.2007 on 22.10.2007 and thus the land acquisition process has come to an end and had attained finality. The writ petition vide W.P.No.6823 of 2003 filed by owner of the land for re-conveyance on the ground of nonpayment of compensation was dismissed by this Court making it clear that owner of the land is not entitled to redelivery of the acquired land. Possession of the land was taken in the year 1978 and payment of compensation amount of Rs.1,43,750/- was made even much before the matter was carried to Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP No.19302 of 1991. The issue that has to be decided between the land owner and this respondent by that time is only regarding the quantum of compensation payable and nothing else. With the deposit of decretal amount of O.P.53 of 1993,nothing remains to be decided in favour of owner of the land and till today, the owner of the land have not withdrawn the deposited amount nor did he disputed the correctness of the amount with ulterior motive and with a mala fide intention. Further, aggrieved by the orders passed in A.S.No.836 of 2003, the petitioner’s father filed SLP No.5983 of 2007 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court seeking a direction to set aside the land acquisition proceedings in terms of the compromise entered earlier. The said SLP was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 03.12.2008 indicating that the land acquisition proceeding does not stand set aside. With the above, it is clear that the petitioner is bound to receive the compensation amount already deposited during the year 2007 in O.P.No.53 of 1993. The petitioner has suppressed the judgment in SLP No.5983 of 2007 dated 03.12.2008 from being mentioned in the writ petition. With the above, it is clear that the petitioner is bound to receive the compensation amount already deposited during the year 2007 in O.P.No.53 of 1993. The petitioner has suppressed the judgment in SLP No.5983 of 2007 dated 03.12.2008 from being mentioned in the writ petition. In view of the orders passed in W.P.No.6832 of 2003 and SLP No.5983 of 2007, the present writ petition filed for a declaration that the land acquisition proceedings are liable to be invalidated is barred by the principles of res judicata. The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 2013 are not applicable since the land acquired was utilized for the purpose for which it was acquired soon after taking possession during 1978 itself and the entire compensation as fixed by the Hon’ble Court was deposited before the High Court during October, 2007 itself. The contention that no part of compensation amount was withdrawn and the same is lying in the Court only, is nothing but violation of the orders passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP No.5983 of 2007 wherein, on 03.12.2008 itself the Hon’ble Supreme Court has declared that the petitioner to entitled to withdraw the amount. But, the petitioner did not bring the said orders to the notice of this Court. The petitioner is not eligible for any other amounts except the amounts mentioned in the compromise memorandum before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP No.19302 of 1991. The land owner is multiplying the litigation without any valid reasons. The conditions for bringing into operation of Section 24(2) of the Act,. 2013 do not exist in the present case. The petitioner has no locus standi to agitate nearly four decades after the land acquisition proceedings have been settled. The petitioner has suppressed the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 03.12.2008 only with an intention to prolong the litigation to get undue advantage. Hence, prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 5. The respondent No.5 filed counter affidavit and while reiterating the contents of the writ affidavit to some extent and also the counter affidavits of respondent Nos.3 and 4, inter alia contended that, the relief sought by the petitioner is mala fide, misplaced, preposterous, a gross abuse of the process of the court and law, untenable under both fact and law, barred due to inordinate delay and the doctrine of laches and hence the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. The amendment sought for vis-a-vis the prayer in the main writ petition is not maintainable, as the petition filed for amendment is silent about the reason for such an amendment except for vaguely submitting that, in the light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India the prayer requires a modification and the amendment sought is barred by delay and the doctrine of laches. Further the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court does not confer any right upon the writ petitioner to seek for amendment and therefore the amendment sought for in light of such judgment is absolutely absurd and untenable under law. In fact, such amendment, if allowed, shall tantamount to permitting the writ petitioner to set up a new cause and shall cause irreparable loss and injury to the respondents. It is further stated that, ownership and title in the subject property vests in respondent No.4 along with absolute possession of the same and appropriate compensation for acquiring the subject property was duly deposited before the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada on 31.07.2007 itself, in strict compliance with the terms of settlement between the petitioner’s father and the respondent No.4, recorded before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in SLP No.19302 of 1991. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide its orders dated 03.12.2008 in SLP No.5983 of 2007 has put a quietus to the entire issue of invalidation of the land acquisition proceedings conducted by the respondent and has approved the validity of the same. However, the petitioner wants to once again agitate the self same grounds before this Court, which is impermissible in law since the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP No.5983 of 2007 operate as res judicata. Further, the petitioner also wilfully suppressed order dated 30.04.2003 passed in W.P.No.6832 of 2003 filed by the petitioner’s father claiming redelivery of the subject land and the same was dismissed by orders dated 30.04.2003. The petitioner has thus come before this Court with unclean hands and is therefore not entitled for any reliefs whatsoever. Further, the petitioner also wilfully suppressed order dated 30.04.2003 passed in W.P.No.6832 of 2003 filed by the petitioner’s father claiming redelivery of the subject land and the same was dismissed by orders dated 30.04.2003. The petitioner has thus come before this Court with unclean hands and is therefore not entitled for any reliefs whatsoever. It is further stated that challenging the acquisition proceedings, the petitioner’s father filed WP No.4082 of 1979 and this Court dismissed the said writ petition vide order dated 09.07.1984, observing that there was an inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner’s father in filing the writ petition and further observing that there is no illegality or irregularity in the acquisition proceedings. The writ appeal vide W.A.No.670/1985 filed by petitioner’s father was allowed quashing the acquisition proceedings, erroneously relying on Section 11-A of the Acquisition Act. In the Civil Appeal No.3476 of 1992 filed against the orders in W.A.No.670 of 1985, though the 4th respondent has fair chance of winning the case, due to intervening circumstances, the respondent No.4 agreed to settle the issue regarding the acquisition proceedings with the petitioner’s father. Accordingly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide its compromise order in Civil Appeal, set aside the orders passed in writ appeal and substituted the same vide the terms of settlement dated 01.09.1992. The entire relationship between the petitioner’s father and the respondent No.4 vis-avis the acquisition proceedings stood telescoped into such compromise order and the same attained finality between the parties and cannot be departed from in any manner whatsoever under law. It has been ordered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that, the petitioner’s father is only entitled to receive compensation under land acquisition proceedings. It is further stated that respondent No.4 had completed construction of mini dairy upon the schedule property by 10.04.1981 itself and the said mini dairy was commissioned on 22.10.1981. Though possession was taken, award was passed and the compensation amount was deposited, the petitioner’s father did not collect the compensation and preferred W.P.No.4082 of 1979 after undue delay of more than one year and started the entire litigation. Time was never intended to be the essence of the compromise order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and such issue was finally decided by our Hon’ble Supreme Court in its order dated 03.12.2008 passed in SLP (Civil) No.5983 of 2007. Time was never intended to be the essence of the compromise order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and such issue was finally decided by our Hon’ble Supreme Court in its order dated 03.12.2008 passed in SLP (Civil) No.5983 of 2007. The entire compensation amount has been deposited as per the compromise order by 22.10.2007 itself and since the amount has been deposited pursuant to permissions granted by this Court, the petitioner is only entitled to withdraw the amount so deposited. Section 24(2) of Act, 2013 has no application whatsoever, in as much as such legislation has not come into existence at all and since the land acquisition proceedings of the subject land have been approved by several courts as mentioned supra. Further, since the acquisition of the subject property is done in lieu of the compromise order and the orders passed in SLP (Civil) No.5983 of 2007, which attained finality, the provisions of Act, 2013, more particularly Section 24(2) has no application. The petitioner and other heirs of the deceased land owner started making hectic efforts to somehow defeat the orders of the Supreme Court passed in SLP (Civil) No.5983 of 2007 and claim more compensation by repeatedly filing frivolous and unsustainable proceedings and applications. The present petition is part of the frivolous attempt on the part of the petitioner to initiate vexatious litigation against the respondents. It is further stated that the issue of redelivery of subject property to the petitioner or his predecessors and alleged delay in depositing the total compensation amount within the stipulated time, have been time and again decided by this Court and also the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the same attained finality. Hence, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 6. The respondent No.5 filed additional counter affidavit reiterating the contents of the counter affidavit and further contended that the amended prayer as sought for by the petitioner vis-a-vis the main prayer cannot be entertained by this Court, in as much as the substance of such prayer has been the subject matter of adjudication in proceedings being SLP No.5983 of 2007 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, which attained finality vide its final order dated 03.12.2008. The petitioner since inception has never referred to or filed the said order. The petitioner since inception has never referred to or filed the said order. In view of the orders passed in SLP No.5983 of 2007, the petitioner is estopped under law to seek the relief as prayed for in the amended petition. Reconsideration of the issues mentioned in the amendment petition shall tantamount to revisiting the issues settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the same is not permissible under law. Thus, the orders passed in SLP No.5983 of 2007 operates as res judicata under law and therefore, the amendment of prayer is not maintainable. The original prayer in the writ petition is sought for on the premise that, the land acquisition proceedings involved in this writ petition have lapsed due to application of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, however, the petitioner having realized that such a prayer is not maintainable in the light of the Supreme Court Judgment in Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlala & Others (2020) 8 SCC 129 , sought for amendment of the prayer. The compromise orders passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP No.19302 of 1991 cannot be read in isolation, in as much as, the same came to be telescoped into the orders passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP No.5983 of 2007. The amended prayer also stands vitiated under the doctrine of delay and laches as the same is filed after inordinate delay of more than a decade. The conduct of the petitioner in attempting to seek the amended relief, inspite of having accepted the orders in SLP NO.5983 of 2007 earlier itself is mala fide and a gross abuse of the process of the court and the law. Hence, prayed to dismiss the writ petition with exemplary costs. 7. Heard Sri Vedula Venkata Ramana, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, Sri Ponnavolu Sudhakar Reddy, Additional Advocate General for respondents 1 to 3, Sri Kasa Jagan Mohan Reddy, learned counsel for Sri K.Apparao, learned Standing counsel for the 4th respondent and Sri M.S.R.Sashi Bhushan, learned counsel for the 5th respondent. 8. 7. Heard Sri Vedula Venkata Ramana, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, Sri Ponnavolu Sudhakar Reddy, Additional Advocate General for respondents 1 to 3, Sri Kasa Jagan Mohan Reddy, learned counsel for Sri K.Apparao, learned Standing counsel for the 4th respondent and Sri M.S.R.Sashi Bhushan, learned counsel for the 5th respondent. 8. Sri Vedula Venkata Ramana, learned senior counsel, in elaboration would submit that, the petitioner’s father challenged the acquisition proceedings by filing writ petition vide W.P.No.4082 of 1979, which was dismissed and aggrieved by the same, a writ appeal vide W.A.No.670 of 1985 was filed and the same was allowed on 7.2.1991 and has drawn the attention of this Court to the relevant observations made in the said Writ Appeal. The learned senior counsel would further submit that assailing the orders passed in W.A.No.670 of 1985, the 4th respondent filed SLP No.19302 of 1992, which was ended in compromise and as per condition No.4 of the Memorandum of Settlement, the compensation determined by the reference Court would have to be paid to the petitioner within a period of eight (08) weeks thereafter and in default, the acquisition would stand set aside and the rights and liabilities of the parties would be determined in accordance with law and has drawn the attention of this Court to the terms of compromise. The learned senior counsel would further submit that, the reference court determined the compensation payable to the petitioner on 23.1.2003 and so the respondents have to pay the amount on or before 23.3.2003. Admittedly, according to the counter affidavit contents of the respondent Nos.4 and 5, the amount was said to have been deposited on 22.10.2007 i.e. to say nearly with 4 ½ years delay. The learned senior counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to condition No.4 of the settlement and strenuously contended that the said condition in clear and categorical terms envisages that failure to pay the compensation amount would lead to severe consequence of setting aside the entire acquisition proceedings. However, the respondent authorities did not adhere to the terms of the compromise and thus, condition No.4 of the Memorandum of settlement would operate and the SLP deemed to have been dismissed and consequently the orders passed in Writ Appeal No.670 of 1985 are deemed to have been confirmed and as a consequence the entire land acquisition proceedings would stand set aside. The learned senior counsel would further submit that, the terms of the memorandum of settlement would amply bind the parties and the default clause incorporated by the parties in the said Memorandum of settlement and the consequences of such default, which are clear and unambiguous, and hence the Division Bench went wrong in diluting the intention of the parties to that of an endeavour of the parties to ensure payment of the amount, simple because the main appeal was being taken up. The learned senior counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to the relevant observations made by the Division Bench in A.S.No.836 of 2003. The learned senior counsel would further submit that what was settled between the parties is ‘payment of compensation’ but not ‘deposit of compensation amount’ and even till today the entire compensation amount has not been deposited leave about payment and the amount stated to have been deposited is not in accordance with the award passed by the reference court. The learned senior counsel would further submit that, unilateral extension of time granted by the High Court for depositing compensation amount during the course of A.S.No.836 of 2003 being beyond its jurisdiction and authority would not save lapsation of acquisition proceedings as settled by the parties in Memorandum of settlement. Thus, dispossession of the petitioner from the property cannot be termed ‘by following due process of law’ and the same is violative of Article 300-A of the Constitution. The learned senior counsel would further submit that the permission accorded to the respondents to deposit the decretal amount to the credit of the O.P.No.53 of 1993 vide orders of this Court in CRP No.4410 of 2007 is without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties. Thus, the said order cannot be construed to mean that the respondents were permitted to deposit the amount by condoning the delay. The learned senior counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to the relevant observations of the said CRP No.4410 of 2007. The learned senior counsel has further brought to the notice of this Court that the said CRP was ultimately dismissed and further argued that extension of time granted by the Courts in First Appeal and CRP would not have sufficient strength to change or alter the memorandum of settlement entered into between the parties before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The learned senior counsel has further brought to the notice of this Court that the said CRP was ultimately dismissed and further argued that extension of time granted by the Courts in First Appeal and CRP would not have sufficient strength to change or alter the memorandum of settlement entered into between the parties before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The learned senior counsel would further submit that even till today not even a single pie was paid to the petitioner towards compensation amount and the entire compensation amount payable was not deposited, which is in clear violation of the terms of the memorandum of settlement and hence the entire acquisition proceedings stood set aside as agreed upon between the parties. Hence, prayed to allow the writ petition. In support of his contentions, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Jagmittar Sain Bhagat and others vs. Director, Health Services, Haryana and others, (2013) 10 Supreme Court Cases 136 and D.B.Basnett (dead) through Legal Representatives vs. Collector, East District, Gangtok, Sikkim and another, (2020) 4 Supreme Court Cases 572. 9. On the other hand, Sri Ponnavolu Sudhakar Reddy, learned Additional Advocate General would submit that, even though the compensation amount was not deposited strictly in accordance with the terms of compromise entered into between the parties before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, since the respondents were released of the obligation of making deposit within the time specified in the memorandum of settlement by the Division Bench of this Court in A.S.No.836 of 2003, condition No.4 of the memorandum of settlement loses its significance and efficacy and thus the acquisition proceedings wont lapse and hence this writ petition is devoid of merits and deserves dismissal. 10. Sri Kasa Jagan Mohan Reddy, learned counsel for the 4th respondent, in elaboration would submit that the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and that of the learned Additional Advocate General that compensation amount is not deposited is not correct. In fact, the entire amount was deposited. If there is any short fall in payment of compensation, the authorities are ready to make good the same. In fact, the entire amount was deposited. If there is any short fall in payment of compensation, the authorities are ready to make good the same. The learned counsel would further submit that no doubt there is some delay in depositing the compensation amount, however the orders of the Division Bench of this Court in A.S.No.836 of 2003 and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP(C) No.5983 of 2007 make it clear that the respondents were relieved of their obligation and that the time limit prescribed in condition No.4 of the memorandum of settlement has been extended. Further, the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP(C) No.5983 of 2007 would unambiguously go to show that the ground of delay in depositing the compensation amount is not available to the petitioner and thus this writ petition since filed rejuvenating the said ground alone is hit by the principles of res judicata and the same is liable to be dismissed. 11. Sri M.S.R.Sashi Bhushan, the learned counsel for the 5th respondent has submitted that, the Division Bench of this Court has released the respondents from the obligation of making deposit within eight weeks from the date on which compensation was determined. SLP (C) No.5983 of 2007 filed by the petitioner’s father mainly on the question as to whether the High Court had erred in not setting aside the acquisition proceedings in terms of compromise and whether the High Court acted correctly in directing the respondents to pay the compensation, which amounted to extending the time for making such deposit which was contrary to the terms of the Memorandum of Settlement, was dismissed holding that once the respondents stood released of the obligation of making the deposit, it will no longer be available to the petitioner to claim that because of the default in making the deposit, the acquisition should stand set aside. The above judgment operates as res judicata , since the questions negated in the above SLP were again raised in this writ petition. Hence, prayed to dismiss the writ petition. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the 5th respondent has relied on Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, Peermade and another, (1999) 5 Supreme Court Cases 590. 12. Hence, prayed to dismiss the writ petition. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the 5th respondent has relied on Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, Peermade and another, (1999) 5 Supreme Court Cases 590. 12. Perusal of the material would indicate that petitioner’s father was the absolute owner of an extent of Ac.5-00 of land in Survey No.212/1B of Ramanaiahpeta, Kakinada Municipal Corporation, Kakinada, East Godavari District. Pursuant to the notification dated 08.06.1978 under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the said land was acquired for the purpose of construction of a mini-dairy. The Land Acquisition Officer passed an award fixing the market value of the land at Rs.28,750/- per acre. Possession of the land was taken on 31.08.1978. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner’s father filed a writ petition challenging the acquisition proceedings vide Writ Petition No.4082 of 1979 and the same was dismissed by this Court by orders dated 09.07.1984. Assailing the said orders, the petitioner’s father preferred writ appeal vide W.A.No.670 of 1985, and the same was allowed on 07.02.1991. The respondents carried the matter to Supreme Court in SLP (C) No.19302 of 1991 and the same was ended in a compromise on 01.09.1992 pursuant to the memorandum of settlement by the parties therein. For better appreciation of the matter, it is needful to extract the terms of the said memorandum of settlement hereunder: “MEMORANDUM OF SETTLEMENT The Petitioner and the Respondent have arrived at the settlement in the above petition on the following terms and conditions: 1. It is agreed by both the parties that the date 7.2.1991 be treated as the date for the purpose of determination of compensation payable to the Land acquired U/S 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The respondent is entitled for compensation at the market rate prevailing as on 7.2.1991 to be fixed by the Sub Court, Kakinada. 2. It is agreed that the Respondent will file his claim within four weeks from today (24.8.1992) before the Sub-Court Kakinada claiming compensation on the basis that 4(1) Notification is issued under the Land Acquisition Act on 07.02.1991. The petitioner is entitled to file document and lead evidence opposition to the claim made by the Respondent before the Sub-Court, Kakinada. The learned Subordinate Judge Kakinada will determine the compensation payable to Respondent for the land acquired in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. 3. The petitioner is entitled to file document and lead evidence opposition to the claim made by the Respondent before the Sub-Court, Kakinada. The learned Subordinate Judge Kakinada will determine the compensation payable to Respondent for the land acquired in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. 3. The respondent is also entitled to the benefit of interest and solatium in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as if the Notification under S.4(1) of the Act was issued on 7.2.1991. 4. The compensation determined by the learned Subordinate Judge, Kakinada will have to be paid to the respondent within a period of eight weeks thereafter. In default, the Acquisition will stand set aside and rights and liabilities of the parties will be determined in accordance with law. 5. The petitioner and the Respondent are entitled to file Appeal in the High Court in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. If they are aggrieved by the determination of compensation by the learned Subordinate Judge, Kakinada. The Excess compensation if any determined by the High Court will be paid to the respondent. If the compensation is reduced by the Hon’ble Court it will be refunded to the petitioner by the respondent.” 13. Condition No.4 is epicenter of the issue involved in the present writ petition and the contentions of the parties revolve round that condition. 14. Pursuant to the above settlement, the petitioner’s father filed O.P.No.53 of 1993 on the file of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada and the learned Judge determined the compensation amount at Rs.800/- per sq.yard. Aggrieved thereby, the 4th respondent filed A.S.No.836 of 2003 before this Court. 15. The specific stand taken by the petitioner in this writ petition is that, as per condition No.4 of the memorandum of settlement in SLP (C) No.19302 of 1991, the compensation amount determined should be paid within eight weeks thereafter. Since the 4th respondent failed to deposit the said amount within the stipulated period; condition No.4 became operative and consequently the acquisition proceedings stood set aside. 16. Admittedly, the respondents have not deposited the compensation amount determined by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada. In fact, the Division Bench of this Court in A.S.No.836 of 2003 initially granted interim stay subject to condition of depositing 1/4th of the enhanced compensation. 16. Admittedly, the respondents have not deposited the compensation amount determined by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada. In fact, the Division Bench of this Court in A.S.No.836 of 2003 initially granted interim stay subject to condition of depositing 1/4th of the enhanced compensation. However, the respondents could not comply the said condition in spite of extension of time. 17. It is relevant here to note that the appeal filed by the 4th respondent vide A.S.No.836 of 2003 was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court by its judgment dated 09.06.2006. In the said judgment the Division Bench has considered the similar contentions now raised in this writ petition and also took note of the failure on the part of the respondent authorities in depositing even 1/4th of the enhanced amount, observed as under: “From the above, it was agreed that the appellants should pay the compensation determined earlier by the reference Court within a period of eight weeks and in default, the acquisition will stand set aside and the rights and the liabilities of the parties will be determined in accordance with law. There has been much argument on the interpretation on this particular clause from both the sides. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that in spite of such specific agreement and the terms contained therein which not only become final but it is amply binding, there is utter disregard thereto and there is a clear default and therefore, the appellants would not be entitled to any indulgence. There is no dispute on this aspect on behalf of the appellants. Except the amount as initially determined and deposited on 28.01.1980 in pursuance of the initial award by the Land Acquisition Officer, no amount has been deposited so far. Even the interim order granted by this Court with a condition was not complied with and no amount was deposited. Admittedly, in this case, the acquisition dates back to 08.06.1978 and except the amount determined by the Land Acquisition Officer, no further amount has been paid to the claimants in respect of the enhancement made by the Court below. It is also pointed out that though initially the time as granted for deposit of 1/4th of the enhanced amount was extended, yet no amount was deposited. It is also pointed out that though initially the time as granted for deposit of 1/4th of the enhanced amount was extended, yet no amount was deposited. By taking into consideration the said term and on a reading of the same along with all other terms contained in the said compromise, the endeavour was apparently to see that immediately the amount has to be paid to the respondents/ claimants and having regard to delay, any payment made would be subject to ultimate determination in regard to the market value if any appeals from any side. Now that the main appeal itself is being taken up at the instance of both the parties, we cannot hold that the entire acquisition as such can be washed away, which will be detrimental to both the sides.” 18. The observations made by a Division Bench of this Court qua condition No.4 of the memorandum of settlement are to the effect that the endeavour was apparently to see that immediately the amount has to be paid to the respondents/claimants and noncompliance of the said condition would not wash away the entire acquisition. 19. The Division Bench further held as follows: “Even otherwise as already pointed out there being no serious attempt on the part of the appellants to abide by varied terms to which they are agreed before the Supreme Court under the compromise entered into between the parties, which are squarely binding on them, no inference also need be shown.” 20. Thus, the Division Bench had observed that the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 herein did not make any serious attempts to abide by condition No.4 of the memorandum of settlement which is squarely binding on them. 21. Ultimately the above A.S.No.836 of 2003 was dismissed finding no merits therein, making it clear that the claimants are entitled to all the statutory benefits including the interest on solatium and the additional market value as per the amended provisos of the Act. 22. Subsequently, the respondent No.4 preferred CRP No.4410 of 2007 and pursuant to the interim direction dated 11.10.2007, an amount of Rs.13,28,21,533/- was deposited into the reference Court. According to the respondents the entire compensation due and payable in terms of the reference court order came to be deposited to the credit of O.P.No.53 of 1993. 22. Subsequently, the respondent No.4 preferred CRP No.4410 of 2007 and pursuant to the interim direction dated 11.10.2007, an amount of Rs.13,28,21,533/- was deposited into the reference Court. According to the respondents the entire compensation due and payable in terms of the reference court order came to be deposited to the credit of O.P.No.53 of 1993. There is a dispute between the petitioner and respondents as to what would be the actual compensation payable as per the orders of the reference Court. 23. Aggrieved by the orders passed in A.S.No.836 of 2003, the petitioner’s father preferred SLP (Civil) 5983 of 2007 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court contending that he is entitled for delivery of the subject land, since the respondent No.4 did not comply with condition No.4 of the memorandum of settlement and failed to deposit the entire compensation as granted by the reference Court, within the stipulated time of eight (08) weeks. The Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the SLP rejecting the claim made by petitioner’s father. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are extracted hereunder: “13. Admittedly, the order passed by the Second Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, was to be the basis of the compensation to be awarded to the appellants herein. However, the said order also came to be challenged in the High Court and a stay was also granted to the execution thereof, which lasted till the appeal was finally dismissed on 09.06.2006. It is only after the dismissal of the appeal and the vacation of the stay order that the respondents began to take steps for deposit of compensation amount as per the Memorandum of Settlement. It is therefore, obvious that because of intervening circumstances, the time schedule contemplated in the Memorandum of Settlement for deposit of the compensation amount by the respondent stood disturbed. Because of the stay order granted by the High Court, the respondents were released from the obligation of making such deposit within eight weeks from the date on which the compensation was determined by the learned Subordinate Judge, Kakinada (Second Additional Senior Civil Judge). Because of the stay order granted by the High Court, the respondents were released from the obligation of making such deposit within eight weeks from the date on which the compensation was determined by the learned Subordinate Judge, Kakinada (Second Additional Senior Civil Judge). In our view, once the respondents stood released of the obligation of making the deposit within the time specified in the Memorandum of Settlement by the orders of Court, it will no longer be available to the appellant to claim that because of the default in making the deposit, the acquisition should stand set aside in terms of the Memorandum of Settlement. The questions posed by Mr. Nariman at the beginning of the submissions, have therefore, to be answered against the appellant and in favour of the respondent. Firstly, the acquisition proceeding does not stand set aside on account of the default o the part of the respondents in making the deposit within 8 weeks from the determination of the value of the acquired land by the learned Subordinate Judge, Kakinada. Consequentially, even the second question raised by Mr. Nariman that the High Court had acted without jurisdiction in extending the time for making the deposit cannot also be sustained. 14. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court and the appeal is accordingly dismissed. Since the deposits are said to have already been made pursuant to the permission granted by the High Court, the claimants to the said compensation will be entitled to withdraw the same upon proper identification.” 24. Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly and categorically observed that the interim order granted by High Court in A.S.No.836 of 2003 released the respondents from the obligation of making deposit as stipulated in condition No.4 of the Memorandum of Settlement and hence the said contention will no longer be available to the appellant to claim that because of the default in making the deposit, the acquisition should stand set aside in terms of the Memorandum of Settlement. 25. With the above background, it is appropriate to mention that this Writ Petition was initially filed for declaration that 4(1) notification dated 08.06.1978 is deemed to have been lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 for non-payment of compensation amount within the statutory period. 25. With the above background, it is appropriate to mention that this Writ Petition was initially filed for declaration that 4(1) notification dated 08.06.1978 is deemed to have been lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 for non-payment of compensation amount within the statutory period. Subsequent to the pronouncement in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal ( (2020)8 SCC 129 ) clarifying the purpose of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, the prayer of the writ petition was amended. As it now stands the writ petition is filed seeking to declare that the preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, 1894 is invalid for violation of non compliance of the settlement/compromise recorded by the parties in SLP No.19302 of 1991 dated 29.09.1992. 26. Thus, it is evident that the petitioner seeks invalidation of the 4(1) notification on the ground that the respondents failed to deposit the compensation determined by the reference Court within eight (08) weeks as stipulated in condition No.4 of the memorandum of settlement recorded by the parties in SLP No.19302 of 1991. 27. The questions now raised in this writ petition and the contentions now advanced have been argued before the Division Bench of this Court in A.S.No.836 of 2003 and also in SLP (C) No. 5983 of 2007 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The relevant portions of the observations extracted above made by both the Courts make it evident that the contentions so advanced were negated by both the Courts. 28. At the cost of repetition it is relevant here to mention that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (C) No. 5983 of 2007 clearly and categorically observed that the respondents were released from the obligation of making deposit within eight (08) weeks from the date of determination and when once the respondents stood released of the obligation, it will no longer available to the appellant to claim set aside of the acquisition on that ground. Curiously, this writ petition was filed seeking to set aside acquisition on the self same ground which was declared by the supreme Court to be no longer available to the petitioner. 29. In Hope Plantations Ltd referred to above their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court held thus: “26. It is settled law that the principles of estoppel and res judicata are based on public policy and justice. 29. In Hope Plantations Ltd referred to above their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court held thus: “26. It is settled law that the principles of estoppel and res judicata are based on public policy and justice. Doctrine of res judicata is often treated as a branch of law of estoppel though these two doctrines differ in some essential particulars. Rule of res judicata prevents the parties to a judicial determination from litigating the same question over again even though the determination may even be demonstratedly wrong. When the proceedings have attained finality, parties are bound by the judgment and are estopped from questioning it. They cannot litigate again on the same cause of action nor can they litigate any issue which was necessary for decision in the earlier litigation. These two aspects are “cause of action estoppel” and “issue estoppel”. These two terms are of common law origin. Again, once an issue has been finally determined, parties cannot subsequently in the same suit advance arguments or adduce further evidence directed to showing that the issue was wrongly determined. Their only remedy is to approach the higher forum if available. The determination of issue between the parties gives rise to, as noted above, an issue estoppel. It operates in any subsequent proceedings in the same suit in which the issue had been determined. If also operates in subsequent suits between the same parties in which the same issue arises. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure contains provisions of res judicata but these are not exhaustive of the general doctrine of res judicata. Legal principles of estoppel and res judicata are equally applicable in proceedings before administrative authorities as they are based on public policy and justice.” 30. In view of the above, since the issue involved in this writ petition has already been decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this court cannot reopen the self same issue in this writ petition. 31. Regarding the next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Division Bench lacks jurisdiction to relax the time frame fixed by the parties in the memorandum of settlement filed before the Hob’ble Supreme Court, in Jagmittar Sain Bhagat and others referred to supra, their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: “9. 31. Regarding the next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Division Bench lacks jurisdiction to relax the time frame fixed by the parties in the memorandum of settlement filed before the Hob’ble Supreme Court, in Jagmittar Sain Bhagat and others referred to supra, their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: “9. Indisputably, it is a settled legal proposition that conferment of jurisdiction is a legislative function and it can neither be conferred with the consent of parties nor by a superior court, and if the court passes a decree having no jurisdiction over the matter, it would amount to nullity as the matter goes to the root of the cause. Such an issue can be raised at any stage of proceedings. The finding of a court or tribunal becomes irrelevant and unenforceable/inexecutable once the forum is found to have no jurisdiction. Similarly, if a court/tribunal inherently lacks jurisdiction, acquiescence of party equally should not be permitted to perpetrate and perpetuate defeating of the legislative animation. The court cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the statute. In such eventuality the doctrine of waiver also does not apply. (vide United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Workmen ( AIR 1951 SC 230 ), Nai Bahu v. Lala Ramnarayan ( (1978) 1 SCC 58 ), Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios ( (1981) 1 SCC 523 and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar ( (1999) 3 SCC 722 .) 32. In the instant case, the Division Bench of this Court has only clarified the real intention of the parties in arriving at the terms embodies in the Memorandum of Settlement. Thus, transgression of jurisdiction conferred by the statute does not arise in the present case. Thus, the observations made in the above decision cannot be made applicable to the facts of the case on hand. 33. In D.B.Basnett (Dead), through Legal Representatives referred to above, their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court held thus: “16. We find a detailed discussion about the law as it evolved and the rationale for the said purpose in Vidya Devi vs. State of H.P., (2020) 2 SCC 569 of which the relevant paragraphs read as under: “12.1. xxxxxxxxxx **** 12.3 To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. xxxxxxxxxx **** 12.3 To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai ( (2005) 7 SCC 627 ), wherein this Court held that ‘6…………...’ 12.4. In N.Padmamma v. S.Ramakrishna Reddy ( (2008) 15 SCC 517 ) this Court held that: 21. If the right to property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300-A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in of the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed.” 34. In the instant case, admittedly, the subject land was acquired as per the procedure contemplated under Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The only question involved in this writ petition is whether the acquisition stood set aside or not due to non-fulfilment of one of the conditions of the Memorandum of Settlement. In view of the observations made in the preceding paras of this order, it can safely inferred that dispossession of the owner of the land from the land is not a forcible dispossession. Thus, this decision is not applicable to the facts of the case. 35. Regarding the contention of the petitioner that the original award made in the year 1986 was quashed by Division bench judgment dated 07.02.1991 and subsequently since no award was passed and hence the petitioner is entitled for compensation as per Act, 2013 in view of Section 24(1)(a) of Act, 2013 is concerned, the determination of compensation by the reference Court is as good as an award made under the Act. Thus, there is no strength in this contention. Moreover, the petitioner had never chosen to question the compensation determined by reference Court terming it being inadequate. The endeavour of the petitioner always was that the acquisition proceedings stood lapsed due to non compliance of condition No.4, which ultimately was set at rest by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as referred to supra. 36. Before parting, it is relevant also to state that there seems a dispute between the parties regarding the actual amount to be deposited before the reference Court. 36. Before parting, it is relevant also to state that there seems a dispute between the parties regarding the actual amount to be deposited before the reference Court. According to the respondents the entire compensation amount was deposited, whereas, according to the petitioner the amount deposited does not represent the actual compensation payable. 37. It is a settled principle of law that the Court exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution could not refrain from granting a relief to which a party is entitled, merely because a specific relief had not been sought in the petition. Therefore, in order to advance substantial justice, this Court is inclined to dispose of the writ petition with the following directions: (a) Both the parties are directed to file their respective calculation memos before the reference Court within a period of two (02) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; (b) The reference Court shall ascertain as to what was the exact compensation amount payable by the respondents in terms of the award passed by it as well as the judgment passed in A.S.No. 836 of 2003, after giving opportunity to both parties to put forth their case and also hearing, strictly confining the issue to the quantum of compensation to be deposited without leaving any scope to reopen the issue regarding fresh quantification, within a period of four (04) weeks thereafter; (c) On such quantification, the respondents are directed to deposit the balance amount, if any, within a period of six (06) weeks from the date of quantification, (d) On such deposit being made, the petitioner is entitled to withdraw the said amount as per the procedure contemplated under law; and (e) There shall be no order as to costs. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of. As sequel thereto, miscellaneous petition, if any, pending shall stand closed. Interim orders, if any, shall stand vacated.