JUDGMENT: 1. A Hindu male attempted to have joint family properties partitioned but failed in convincing two Courts below came up with this second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. assailing the judgments of the Courts below. 2. The present appellant filed O.S.No.197 of 2003 as against his mother, two brothers and his paternal grandmother who are family members and others who do not belong to their family. There are three items of immovable properties shown in the plaint schedule. Plaintiff sought for partition of those properties. After due trial, by a judgment dated 28.07.2010 learned trial Court dismissed the suit. Aggrieved of it, the plaintiff filed A.S.No.26 of 2010. Learned Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri by a judgment dated 06.08.2012 dismissed the appeal and thereby confirmed the judgment of the trial Court. It is against that judgment, the present second appeal is preferred. 3. On 22.04.2016 a learned Judge of this Court admitted the second appeal on two substantial questions of law. Subsequently, the appellant preferred I.A.No.1 of 2014 for reformulation of substantial questions of law. After due hearing, the said application was allowed and the following substantial questions of law were formulated in this second appeal: 1. Whether the judgment of first appellate Court is not in accordance with law as it failed to advert to any of the grounds that are mentioned in the memorandum of grounds of appeal and failed to formulate appropriate questions for its consideration and thereby violated Order 41 Rule 31 of C.P.C. leading to incorrect conclusions? 2. Whether the contents of Ex.B2 were incorrectly appreciated by both the Courts below leading to erroneous conclusions? 3. Whether there was no evidence on record to conclude relinquishment of share by the appellant in the share of their father and both the Courts below reached to perverse conclusions? 4. To appreciate the contentions raised here, it is required to see what transpired before the Courts below. A few facts are not in dispute. Smt. Alla Naga Siromani and Sri Vishnuvardhana Rao are wife and husband. They have got three sons. Plaintiff is one of the sons. His two siblings were shown as defendant Nos.2 and 3. Their mother was shown as defendant No.1. The said Vishnuvardhana Rao’s mother is Smt. Alla Saraswathi. She was shown as 6th defendant in the suit. Smt. Alla Naga Siromani and Sri Vishnuvardhana Rao are wife and husband. They have got three sons. Plaintiff is one of the sons. His two siblings were shown as defendant Nos.2 and 3. Their mother was shown as defendant No.1. The said Vishnuvardhana Rao’s mother is Smt. Alla Saraswathi. She was shown as 6th defendant in the suit. As the plaintiff suspected that pending suit the defendants would alienate the properties in favour of Sri Movva Sivaiah, the said individual was sued by showing him as defendant No.4. The SubRegistrar, Mangalagiri was shown as defendant No.5. During progress of the case, it was found that defendant Nos.4 and 5 have nothing to do and their participation was also not there during any phase of the litigation. 5. In the plaint it is mentioned that all the plaint schedule properties are ancestral properties and therefore, they are joint family properties and the joint family consisted of the wife and husband and their three children and the mother of Sri Vishnuvardhana Rao. It is alleged that among them there was no partition of these joint family properties. On 15.04.2003 Sri Vishnuvardhana Rao died intestate. Despite demands other sharers were not coming forward and therefore suit for partition is filed. The claim in the plaint indicates a claim for one share in the joint family properties for the plaintiff and one share from the share that fell to the share of plaintiff’s father Sri Vishnuvardhana Rao. It is with those allegations the suit was laid claiming for division of properties into 20 equal shares and allotment of 6/20th share to plaintiff and defendant Nos.2 and 3, 1/20th share to defendant Nos.1 and 6 and division was sought to be by metes and bounds by delivering possession to each share of his/her respective share and for mesne profits and for costs and such other reliefs. 6. Resisting the suit, the mother/defendant No.1 filed a written statement and her two children/defendant Nos.2 and 3 filed a memo adopting it. 6. Resisting the suit, the mother/defendant No.1 filed a written statement and her two children/defendant Nos.2 and 3 filed a memo adopting it. The pleaded case of these defendants is that this plaintiff for investing in his business demanded the family for a partition and as a consequence in the year 1990 (during the lifetime of Sri Vishnuvardhana Rao) properties were partitioned and two of the shares from the joint family, namely, plaintiff and defendant No.2 took their respective shares in the form of cash of Rs.50,000/- and went out of the joint family. Thus, plaintiff being divided son of joint family properties is not entitled for any share. It is further pleaded that after these two sharers went out of the family, Sri Vishnuvardhana Rao and his other son/defendant No.3 continued as joint family. This plaintiff took various amounts by way of hand loan from defendant No.1 and defendant No.3 and after the death of Sri Vishnuvardhana Rao, the plaintiff relinquished his share from the share of his father Vishnuvardhana Rao. This happened on the death ceremony date of his father Sri Vishnuvardhana Rao. It is also pleaded by the defendants that the plaintiff did not file the suit as against Smt. Alla Saraswathi who is the natural mother of Sri Vishnuvardhana Rao and paternal grandmother of plaintiff. This plaintiff also did not show Ac.0.70 cents of land in this suit. It is stated that at the time of partition that Ac.0.70 cents was given to defendant No.1. After partition the paternal grandmother relinquished her share from out of the share of her son late Vishnuvardhana Rao. It is for this reason plaintiff did not implead his grandmother and plaintiff did not bring Ac.0.70 cents into dispute. All this is indicated to show that it was in the year 1990 and thereafter in the year 2003 plaintiff relinquished his share over any of the properties and therefore his prayer for partition and mesne profits is not maintainable. 7. Defendant No.6 who is the paternal grandmother of the plaintiff filed a separate written statement wherein she had completely denied all the allegations made in the plaint and she sailed with the case set up by defendant Nos.1 to 3 and sought for dismissal of the suit. Defendant Nos.4 and 5 did not file any written statements. 7. Defendant No.6 who is the paternal grandmother of the plaintiff filed a separate written statement wherein she had completely denied all the allegations made in the plaint and she sailed with the case set up by defendant Nos.1 to 3 and sought for dismissal of the suit. Defendant Nos.4 and 5 did not file any written statements. To bring clarity to what is stated earlier it is to be mentioned that initially plaintiff did not implead his grandmother/defendant No.6. Plaintiff gave evidence as PW.1 in the year 2004 and even by then he did not implead his grandmother. It is only during the year 2006 he impleaded his grandmother as defendant No.6. 8. Basing on the rival pleadings and contentions, the learned trial Court settled the following issues: 1. Whether there was earlier oral partition between the parties to the suit, and their father or not? 2. If not, whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition as prayed for or not? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mesne profits as prayed for or not? Additional issue No. 4: Whether the share of the 6th defendant was given in earlier oral partition or not? 5. To what relief? 9. To prove their respective cases, plaintiff testified as PW.1 and he got exhibited Exs.A.1 to A.7. Ex.A.1 is the office copy of legal notice dated 10.07.2003 issued by the plaintiff to defendant Nos.1 to 4 just prior to the institution of the suit. Exs.A.2, A.3 and A.4 are postal acknowledgments received from the respective defendants indicating that they received the above referred notices. Exs.A.5, A.6 and A.7 are respective valuation certificates pertaining to item Nos.1, 2 and 3 of the plaint schedule. Thus, no documents of title or possession were placed on record by the plaintiff. As against this evidence, the mother of the plaintiff/defendant No.1 testified as DW.1 and produced Exs.B.1 and B.2 which are two inland letters. Ex.B.1 is dated 27.09.1990. Ex.B.2 is dated 27.04.1991. These two inland letters were written and signed by plaintiff and they were sent to father of the plaintiff during his lifetime. Defendants exhibited these documents by confronting them to PW.1 during the course of cross-examination and the plaintiff/PW.1 admitted his authorship of these letters. Defendants examined a third party as DW.2. Ex.B.1 is dated 27.09.1990. Ex.B.2 is dated 27.04.1991. These two inland letters were written and signed by plaintiff and they were sent to father of the plaintiff during his lifetime. Defendants exhibited these documents by confronting them to PW.1 during the course of cross-examination and the plaintiff/PW.1 admitted his authorship of these letters. Defendants examined a third party as DW.2. Learned trial Court completely brushed aside the evidence of DW.2 stating that he is a man of bad conduct and his evidence do not inspire confidence in anyone. Defendants got filed the examination in chief by way of affidavit of Sri Shaik Nagul Meera Vali showing him as DW.3, but they failed to secure his presence for cross-examination on several occasions and finally the learned trial Court eschewed that evidence. Thus, for appreciation the trial Court had on its file PW.1 on one side and DW.1 on another side. Exs.B.1 and B.2 seem to have played vital role for the Courts below in arriving at certain conclusions on facts. 10. After hearing arguments on both sides and after considering the total available evidence on record, the learned trial Court recorded the following findings: 11. All the plaint schedule properties are undisputedly the properties that came from ancestors to Sri Vishnuvardhana Rao towards his share. That Sri Vishnuvardhana Rao died intestate on 15.04.2003. The suit was filed on 25.07.2003. Thus, three months after the death of the father the son filed the suit. From the evidence on record, learned trial Court observed that since the year 1976 plaintiff has been living separately and thereafter there was oral partition of plaint schedule properties in the year 1990 and in that oral partition plaintiff received Rs.50,000/- towards his share and left the family and defendant No.2 also received Rs.50,000/- towards his share and left the family. Since then all the members of the earlier joint family have been living separately. It also observed that only the plaintiff from this family obtained education and rest of them are illiterates. That these persons belonged to a village and in a village the practice that has been observed is that family properties are partitioned on the oral command of the head of the family and there was nothing unusual in it. It also observed that only the plaintiff from this family obtained education and rest of them are illiterates. That these persons belonged to a village and in a village the practice that has been observed is that family properties are partitioned on the oral command of the head of the family and there was nothing unusual in it. It also observed that the contents of Exs.B.1 and B.2 showed that the conduct of plaintiff towards his own life and towards his family members was very harsh and against the culture among Hindus. It finally said that plaintiff obtained his share from the joint family in the year 1990 and thereafter on the date of death ceremony of his father he also relinquished his share from the share of his deceased father. With these observations it held all the issues against the plaintiff and dismissed the suit. 12. In his first appeal the plaintiff in his memorandum of grounds of appeal went on to narrate about failure of trial Court in appreciation of evidence stating that his own evidence ought to have been believed and the evidence of his mother ought to have been discarded. It criticized the findings of the trial Court about the earlier oral partition and subsequent relinquishment stating that it is all against evidence on record. He also contended that properties are joint family properties divisionable among him, defendant Nos.1 to 3 and defendant No.6 and he sought for reversal of the judgment. 13. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, on considering the material on record and on hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for appellant and on perusal of the grounds mentioned in the memorandum of grounds of appeal, felt that in the context of material on record the only question that could crop up for consideration is “Whether the plaintiff has got right to claim partition of plaint schedule properties on the premise that he is member of joint family?” It then went on to consider the evidence on record and the contentions raised by both sides and placed reliance on certain recitals in Ex.B.2-letter addressed by plaintiff to his father and that convinced it to hold the case against the plaintiff. They are in Telugu language. Those words are extracted here: 14. They are in Telugu language. Those words are extracted here: 14. After considering all the evidence, it held that the plaintiff had ceased to be member in the joint family as he got separated himself under the oral partition held under the supervision of his father and Ex.B.2 fully establishes that aspect of the matter. Therefore, his claim for partition assailing that these properties are joint family properties and that he has a share is incorrect and it found no reason to interfere with the elaborate and well considered judgment of the learned trial Court and so saying it dismissed the appeal. It is in the context of these facts and circumstances, the present appeal came up for consideration and the substantial questions of law that are referred earlier are to be now considered. 15. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for appellant submits that the learned first appellate Court committed an error when it stated that the claim of the respondents was ouster of this appellant. It is also argued that the order of the learned first appellate Court is not in accordance with Order XLI Rule 31 C.P.C. and that recitals in Ex.B.2-letter were incorrectly appreciated by the Courts below. It is further argued that with reference to the share of the father of the appellant there was no relinquishment, but the Courts below erroneously decided otherwise. 16. As against this, learned counsel for respondents argued that facts on record indicated that this appellant had left the family way back in the year 1976 even according to his own admissions during the course of cross-examination. That appropriate evidence was placed on record and Courts below appropriately considered them and first appellate Court reached to conclusions that were similar to the conclusions of the learned trial Court and in such an event broadly touching on the aspects was sufficient and therefore, the judgments of the learned first appellate Court could not be castigated by the appellant and finally learned counsel argued for dismissal of the appeal. 17. The averments in the plaint and the admissions of plaintiff as PW.1 go to show that all the three items of the plaint schedule belonged to the ancestors and in a partition they came to the father of the appellant Sri Vishnuvardhana Rao. 17. The averments in the plaint and the admissions of plaintiff as PW.1 go to show that all the three items of the plaint schedule belonged to the ancestors and in a partition they came to the father of the appellant Sri Vishnuvardhana Rao. This aspect of the matter has never been in dispute before this Court as well as before lower Courts. Therefore, they were properties of joint family that consisted of Sri Vishnuvardhana Rao and his wife/defendant No.1/respondent No.1 and his three sons and his mother/defendant No.6. According to appellant, the estate was never partitioned among them. According to rest of the family, it was partitioned in the year 1990. Thus, the controversy between both sides was whether there was no partition or whether there was partition. If there was an earlier partition, the suit for partition could not be maintained. The pleadings in the defence set up by all the defendants indicated that the entire family contended that there was oral partition in the year 1990. The properties could be partitioned orally and law permits it is not disputed at the bar and the learned counsel for respondents also cited Badami v. Bhali, (2012) 11 SCC 574 . The very mother, in proof of her written pleadings, entered the witness box, swore and stated that there was such partition in the year 1990. Was that believable or not was the question before the Courts below. They concluded that there was such partition. I have gone through the entire evidence. It is seen that since 1976 this appellant was away from his family. The evidence of DW.1/mother and the observations of the learned trial Court at para No.21 of its judgment do indicate that the appellant was not in the good books of his family as it seems that he was living with another woman at a different place and was not taking care of any interest in the affairs of the family and that reluctance went to the extent of not minding to attend the ailing father and reaching to the home long after the death of his father and just before his funeral. Evidence further indicated that the remaining sons of the mother of the parties have also been living separately since decades. These are some of the facts that influenced the Courts below for arriving at the conclusion that the joint family estate was partitioned. Evidence further indicated that the remaining sons of the mother of the parties have also been living separately since decades. These are some of the facts that influenced the Courts below for arriving at the conclusion that the joint family estate was partitioned. Neither incorrectness nor appreciation of the evidence in that regard by trial Court is canvassed here or is there anything to canvass in that regard for the appellant. In the context of such facts the evidence of DW.1 was considered by the Courts below and was believed by it, as she said that Rs.50,000/- was taken by this appellant towards his share in the joint family estate and he left the joint family and ceased to be the member of the joint family. It is in this regard Ex.B.2-letter gains lot of importance. Exs.B.1 and B.2 are the two letters written by this appellant to his father. Ex.B.1 is earlier in point of time. The gist of this letter could be stated in the following terms: That the appellant was asking Rs.10,000/- from his father and was pleading in various words not to neglect and he was asking this money for the purpose of settling down in life and he was telling his father not to trouble him and was informing him about the possible dates of his visit and he also told his father not to send him with empty hands on this occasion. This letter was dated 27.09.1990. The next letter is Ex.B.2 and it is dated 27.04.1991. Thus, seven months after the earlier letter he addressed this letter. This letter indicates certain confessions of faults on part of the appellant and then it states about his remorse and was pleading his father that he did not want to cheat or dupe anyone and he was not such a bad fellow and was asking his father and his family to understand him. He was also telling his father that he should not think that his son would mire him in debts. Then he mentioned that the money he was given towards his share (“ ”) would be returned by him even before his children gained their age. The learned first appellate Court emphasized these contents of Ex.B.2 and based on it concluded about earlier partition and approved findings of the trial Court. Then he mentioned that the money he was given towards his share (“ ”) would be returned by him even before his children gained their age. The learned first appellate Court emphasized these contents of Ex.B.2 and based on it concluded about earlier partition and approved findings of the trial Court. Thus, both the Courts concurrently held that there was oral partition and this appellant left the family and towards his share he received Rs.50,000/- and he relinquished all his claims over estate of joint family. The fervent submission of learned counsel for appellant is that Ex.B.2 may not be considered as an admission of earlier partition. Learned counsel seeks to support this contention based on one sentence recorded in the evidence of DW.1/mother. In her evidence she stated that her son got partitioned himself and obtained Rs.50,000/- and wrote a letter telling that the said amount should be deducted towards his share. Based on this language employed in the evidence of DW.1, learned counsel for appellant suggests that the construction of Ex.B.2 placed by the Courts below may not be correct. This Court has given anxious thought and has gone through the contents of Ex.B.2 and the oral evidence of PW.1 and DW.1 and the appreciation of Ex.B.2 by both the Courts below and find that the contentions raised by the learned counsel for appellant has no force for acceptance. Exs.B.1 and B.2 were shown to PW.1/appellant during his cross-examination. He went through the contents and admitted that he had written those letters to his father. Therefore it is for him to explain what did he mean by the money he obtained towards his share. He did not whisper one word in explanation. His mother understood this letter and said that her son obtained money and left the joint family by taking share in the estate of the joint family. Both the Courts below understood the same in the same fashion. When nothing contrary is there from the mouth of appellant, one could not criticize the thoughtful acceptance of contents of Ex.B.2 by both Courts below. The evidence of DW.1 which was referred to by the learned counsel for appellant is only to the effect that this appellant received Rs.50,000/- towards his share. When nothing contrary is there from the mouth of appellant, one could not criticize the thoughtful acceptance of contents of Ex.B.2 by both Courts below. The evidence of DW.1 which was referred to by the learned counsel for appellant is only to the effect that this appellant received Rs.50,000/- towards his share. As long as it is not the case of appellant that he received this money towards part of his share, he cannot criticize the evidence of his mother when she said the word deduction. Therefore, this argument of the learned counsel for appellant is negatived. The purport of the discussion made above indicates that the Courts below perfectly appreciated the evidence on record and came to right conclusion holding that contents of Ex.B.2 further indicate the earlier partition pleaded by defendants. 18. Learned counsel for appellant cited the law concerning duties of a Court hearing first appeal and cited Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar, (2015) 1 SCC 391 and Manjula v. Shyamsundar, (2022) 3 SCC 90 . Referring to Order XLI Rule 31 C.P.C. their Lordships held that first appellate Court must frame points for determination and record its satisfaction thereon and furnish reasons for arriving at such decision and then consider the relief and dispose of the appeal. Their Lordships further held that both questions of fact and law could be agitated before first appellate Court. It is the duty of the first appellate Court to reconsider the entire material on record in the light of the contentions raised in the first appeal. Any failure was considered as a failure leading to miscarriage of justice. Based on these principles appellant questions the validity of judgment of the first appellate Court in the present case. I have anxiously considered these submissions. It is true that the learned first appellate Court rendered a relatively short judgment. However, it gave its opinion by furnishing reasons. It cannot be said that it missed anything that was relevant for consideration or it failed to consider anything that was appropriate material for consideration. Many of the grounds of appeal are repetitions and they only dealt with the aspect of oral evidence on part of the witnesses urging the Court not to accept the evidence of the mother and accept the evidence of the son. The entire oral evidence was elaborately appreciated by the trial Court. Many of the grounds of appeal are repetitions and they only dealt with the aspect of oral evidence on part of the witnesses urging the Court not to accept the evidence of the mother and accept the evidence of the son. The entire oral evidence was elaborately appreciated by the trial Court. The learned first appellate Court was in agreement with all that. It had the view in its mind that Ex.B.2-letter would actually decide the entire dispute and therefore, it did not give any lengthy consideration of the oral evidence in its judgment. However, a reading of the judgment would not leave anyone in doubt that the first appellate Court came to its decision only after considering the entire evidence on record and after considering the contentions on both sides. Therefore, the short length of the judgment has not substantially violated the statute and precedent about the manner of disposal of a first appeal by the learned Senior Civil Judge. Therefore, there is no merit in what is contended here. 19. In the year 1990 by virtue of oral partition and by virtue of receiving Rs.50,000/- towards his share, this appellant ceased to be member of the joint family. Written statement do indicate that plaintiff and defendant No.3 remained joint. The evidence of the mother/defendant No.1/respondent No.1 is that her husband during the lifetime of himself gave away his share to her. This aspect remained unchallenged. In that view appellant would not get a share in the share of father. She then said that in the year 2003 her husband died and then the plaintiff on the death ceremony date relinquished his share in the share that fell to his father. She further said that this appellant was indebted to her and to other family members and he was away and it was in those circumstances considering what he borrowed as his share he relinquished it. That was accepted as true by the learned trial Court. How that evidence is incorrect and what perversity is there is to be shown to this Court. Nothing in this regard is shown by the appellant. It was in that context of facts, the learned first appellate Court adverted to the concept of ouster. In this second appeal learned counsel for appellant argued that concept of ouster is a flaw in the judgment of the first appellate Court. Nothing in this regard is shown by the appellant. It was in that context of facts, the learned first appellate Court adverted to the concept of ouster. In this second appeal learned counsel for appellant argued that concept of ouster is a flaw in the judgment of the first appellate Court. Explaining this concept of ouster learned counsel cited Vidya Devi Alias Vidya Vati v. Prem Prakash, (1995) 4 SCC 496 . Para No.28 of this judgment holds the ratio and the same is extracted for benefit: “28. ‘Ouster’ does not mean actual driving out of the co-sharer from the property. It will, however, not be complete unless it is coupled with all other ingredients required to constitute adverse possession. Broadly speaking, three elements are necessary for establishing the plea of ouster in the case of co-owner. They are (i) declaration of hostile animus, (ii) long and uninterrupted possession of the person pleading ouster, and (iii) exercise of right of exclusive ownership openly and to the knowledge of other co-owner. Thus, a co-owner, can under law, claim title by adverse possession against another co-owner who can, of course, file appropriate suit including suit for joint possession within time prescribed by law.” 20. In the case at hand, there is no claim of adverse possession. However, the pleadings and evidence of defendants forcefully project the situation that this appellant was out of the family and rest of the family holds the property and the family believed that it belonged only to them and nothing of it would ever belong to this appellant. That much is here. Though I shall record that the pleadings may not be very legalistic in expounding the concept of ouster, the content of it certainly make one to understand something called ouster. It was this context of the matter that was considered by the learned first appellate Court. Therefore, it cannot be said that appellate Court’s mentioning about doctrine of ouster is something that is out of the context. As stated earlier, it has been a case of separate living of all children and separate living of the appellant since 1976 and taking away his share from the properties in the year 1990. Therefore, it cannot be said that appellate Court’s mentioning about doctrine of ouster is something that is out of the context. As stated earlier, it has been a case of separate living of all children and separate living of the appellant since 1976 and taking away his share from the properties in the year 1990. Thereafter excepting Exs.B.1 and B.2 of the years 1990 and 1991 there is no indication from the evidence that this appellant ever went to family members or ever went to the properties or ever made a claim until he issued Ex.A.1-notice just a few days before instituting the suit. These facts when they were considered in proper perspective seems to have made the learned first appellate Court to think they amounted to constituting the doctrine of ouster. The law concerning ouster as indicated in the earlier paragraphs do show that long and uninterrupted possession by the opposite party and their hostile animus towards the appellant and their exercise of rights and exclusivity of their rights were shown and to the knowledge of one and all. All these facts are clear from the pleadings and evidence on both sides. It is for this reason, this Court holds that the learned first appellate Court has not committed any error when it considered the doctrine of ouster. It is in the light of the above referred facts and circumstances, the learned first appellate Court also came to the conclusion that this appellant had relinquished his share by obtaining money towards his share. These factual findings were recorded by Courts below based on evidence, facts and circumstances. I find no perversity in considering all these aspects by both Courts below. On these facts this Court should conclude that it is bound to accept these factual findings. For this reason this Court holds that the grounds urged in the appeal have no merit. 21. In the result, this Second Appeal is dismissed confirming the judgment dated 06.08.2012 of learned Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri in A.S.No.26 of 2010. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.