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2023 DIGILAW 894 (GUJ)

Amreli Municipality v. Dinesh Karsan Solanki Ex-Daily Wager Octroi Nakedar

2023-07-24

BIREN VAISHNAV

body2023
JUDGMENT : BIREN VAISHNAV, J. 1. The record indicates that on 19.09.2017, this Court (Coram: Hon’ble Smt. Justice Abhilasha Kumari) passed the following order: “The petition has been called out thrice. None appears for the petitioner even on the third call. The petition could have been dismissed for non-prosecution. However, in the interest of justice, it is adjourned to 03.10.2017.” 2. On 12.12.2017, this Court (Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mohinder Pal) passed the following order: “Nobody is present on behalf of the petitioner. In the interest of justice, matter is adjourned to 28th December, 2017.” 3. On 10.01.2023, this Court (Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Aniruddha P. Mayee) passed the following order: “Even on the second call in the second session, none appears for the petitioner. Dismissed for non-prosecution.” 4. On 18.04.2023, this Court (Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Aniruddha P. Mayee) passed the following order: “Even on the second call in the second session, none appears. Dismissed for non-prosecution.” 5. However, the petition was thereafter restored vide an order dated 17.07.2023. Today also, on two calls, the petitioner - Amreli Municipality has gone unrepresented. 6. Ms. Abha Makwana learned advocate appearing for the respondent has fairly stated that on an earlier occasion, Mr. Deepak Sanchela learned advocate has sought time to file his appearance. It appears that no appearance has been filed. The petition is therefore taken up for hearing. 7. Challenge in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is to the award passed by the Labour Court, Amreli, in Reference (LCA) No. 44 of 2001. By the aforesaid award, the petitioner - Municipality has been directed to reinstate the workman with 20% back-wages. 8. Briefly stated, it was the case of the respondent- workman before the Labour Court, in the statement of claim filed at Exh.3 that he was working as a clerk with the petitioner Municipality. He joined the department on 14.10.1997 and was terminated from services with effect from 08.01.2001. At Exh.7, the Municipality filed a response to the statement of claim stating that the workman was engaged on a temporary basis by way of a stopgap arrangement and therefore his services were not continuous. That, he had not completed 240 days in each year of service. At Exh.7, the Municipality filed a response to the statement of claim stating that the workman was engaged on a temporary basis by way of a stopgap arrangement and therefore his services were not continuous. That, he had not completed 240 days in each year of service. It was the case of the petitioner-Municipality that the workman was not engaged through a regular recruitment procedure and therefore, his services were no longer required once collection of octroi was stopped. 9. The Labour Court based on the evidence produced before it by the respective parties, came to the conclusion that when it was the case of the workman that he had uninterruptedly worked for the period from 14.10.1997 to 08.01.2001 and that he had filed an application at Exh.33 for a direction that the employer be directed to produce the relevant muster rolls so as to substantiate their contention that the workman had not worked for 240 days, the Labour Court found that once a production application was made by the workman and the employer failed to produce the necessary documents as the burden of proof has shifted on the employee, there was no reason to disbelieve the version of the workman. 10. Based on this finding, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the workman had in fact worked for the period of 240 days in each year of service before his termination. It was therefore in violation of provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. 11. Further perusal of the award of the Labour Court would indicate that a reference preceding the present one viz. Reference No. 155/2000 was filed by the workman prior to his termination for regularization of his services. The Labour Court found that pending the reference, if the Municipality wanted to terminate the services of the workman, they could not have done so without following the requisite procedure under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act i.e. of seeking approval/permission of the Labour Court/Industrial Court in the pending reference. 12. Ms. Abha Makwana learned counsel for the respondent has also brought to the notice of this Court an oral judgment dated 30.11.2021 rendered in case of Amreli Municipality vs. Nilesh Jivrajbhai Mejpara rendered in Special Civil Application No. 11611 of 2008, wherein, the Municipality had challenged an award of the Labour Court directing reinstatement of a workman with 20% of back-wages. Abha Makwana learned counsel for the respondent has also brought to the notice of this Court an oral judgment dated 30.11.2021 rendered in case of Amreli Municipality vs. Nilesh Jivrajbhai Mejpara rendered in Special Civil Application No. 11611 of 2008, wherein, the Municipality had challenged an award of the Labour Court directing reinstatement of a workman with 20% of back-wages. As is in the present case, the tenure of service of workman was about 3 years before he was discontinued. After extensively appreciating the award of the Labour Court and considering the judgments of the Supreme Court on the question of compensation, a coordinate bench of this Court awarded compensation to the extent of Rs.5 lakhs lump-sum compensation rather than confirming the award of reinstatement with 20% back-wages. 13. In case of R.M. Yellatti vs. Asstt. Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106 , the Supreme Court has considered the question of onus to prove by leading evidence as to the question of a workman completing 240 days of service. The Supreme Court has held that once it is shown that there was non-production of muster rolls, adverse inference has to be drawn dependent on the facts of each case. In the facts of the present case, evident it is that though the workman had filed an application at Exh.33 seeking production of muster rolls from the Municipality, the Municipality failed to do so. Adverse inference therefore drawn by the Labour Court, in the opinion of this Court, was just and proper in light of the decision in case of R.M. Yellatti (supra). 14. In case of Gauri Shanker vs. State of Rajasthan, (2015) 12 SCC 754 , the Supreme Court has reiterated the stand on the question of law regarding adverse inference. Paragraph no. 20 of this decision reads as under: “20. It is not in dispute that the workman was employed with the respondent- Department in the year 1987 and on the basis of material evidence adduced by both the parties and in the absence of the non-production of muster rolls on the ground that they are not available, which contention of the respondent-Department is rightly not accepted by the Labour Court and it has recorded the finding of fact holding that the workman has worked from 1.1.1987 to 1.4.1992. The Labour Court has drawn adverse inference with regard to non-production of muster rolls maintained by them, in this regard, it would be useful to refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar vs. Mohd. Haji Latif and Others, wherein it was held thus: “5..........Even if the burden of proof does not lie on a party the Court may draw an adverse inference if he withholds important documents in his possession which can throw light on the facts at issue. It is not, in our opinion, a sound practice for those desiring to rely upon a certain state of facts to withhold from the Court the best evidence which is in their possession which could throw light upon the issues in controversy and to rely upon the abstract doctrine of onus of proof. In Murugesam Pillai vs. Gnana Sambandha Pandara Sannadhi, Lord Shaw observed as follows: “A practice has grown up in Indian procedure of those in possession of important documents or information lying by, trusting to the abstract doctrine of the onus of proof, and failing, accordingly, to furnish to, the, Courts the best material for its decision. With regard to third parties, this may be right enough-they have no responsibility for the conduct of the suit but with regard to the parties to the suit it is, in their Lordships' opinion an inversion of sound practice for those desiring to rely upon a certain state of facts to withhold from the Court the written evidence in their possession which would throw light upon the proposition.” This passage was cited with approval by this Court in a recent decision - Biltu Ram and Others vs. Jainandan Prasad and Others. In that case, reliance was placed on behalf of the defendants upon the following passage from the decision of the Judicial Committee in Mt. Bilas Kunwar vs. Desraj Ranjit Singh: “But it is open to a litigant to refrain from producing any documents that he considers irrelevant; if the other litigant is dissatisfied it is for him to apply for an affidavit of documents and he can obtain inspection and production of all that appears to him in such affidavit to be relevant and proper. If he fails so to do, neither he nor the Court at his suggestion is entitled to draw any inference as to the contents of any such documents.” 15. If he fails so to do, neither he nor the Court at his suggestion is entitled to draw any inference as to the contents of any such documents.” 15. Therefore, it is evident that the award of the Labour Court in drawing adverse inference and holding that the respondent workman had completed 240 days in service cannot be faulted. 16. The question therefore now has to be decided is whether the award can be modified and though the award directs reinstatement and 20% of back-wages with the passage of time and in light of judgment of the coordinate bench rendered in Special Civil Application No. 11611 of 2008 needs to be followed. 17. In the case of Amreli Municipality (supra), the coordinate bench of this Court has held as under: “8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in number of decisions has held that in all cases of illegal termination of service, reinstatement in service may not be the norm and reasonable compensation in lieu of reinstatement may be granted by the Court depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It has been now clearly recognized that the reinstatement is not an automatic consequence of wrongful termination specially when the workman has not rendered any services during the pendency of the litigation. In view of this recent jurisprudence which has evolved as per the various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in respect of the compensation in lieu of reinstatement in the cases of illegal termination of the services, this Court is of the opinion that the ends of justice would be served if the award of reinstatement with 20% back-wages is modified with monetary compensation in the present case. 9. In Allahabad Bank and Others vs. Krishan Pal Singh in SLP (C) No. 19648 of 2019 decided on 20th September 2021, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “8. The directions issued by the High Court of Allahabad for reinstatement were stayed by this Court on 23.08.2019. During the pendency of these proceedings, the respondent - workman had attained age of superannuation. Though, there was strong suspicion, there was no acceptable evidence on record for dismissal of the workman. However, as the workman has worked only for a period of about six years and he has already attained the age of superannuation, it is a fit case for modification of the relief granted by the High Court. Though, there was strong suspicion, there was no acceptable evidence on record for dismissal of the workman. However, as the workman has worked only for a period of about six years and he has already attained the age of superannuation, it is a fit case for modification of the relief granted by the High Court. The reinstatement with full back wages is not automatic in every case, where termination/dismissal is found to be not in accordance with procedure prescribed under law. Considering that the respondent was in effective service of the Bank only for about six years and he is out of service since 1991, and in the meantime, respondent had attained age of superannuation, we deem it appropriate that ends of justice would be met by awarding lump sum monetary compensation. We accordingly direct payment of lump sum compensation of Rs.15 lakhs to the respondent, within a period of eight weeks from today. Failing to pay the same within the aforesaid period, the respondent is entitled for interest @ 6% per annum, till payment.” 10. Even in Ranbir Singh vs. Executive Eng. P.W.D. in Civil Appeal No. 4483/2010, decided on September 2, 2021, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “6.....In other words, we find that reinstatement cannot be automatic, and the transgression of Section 25F being established, suitable compensation would be the appropriate remedy. 7. In such circumstance, noticing that, though the appellant was reinstated after the award of the Labour Court in 2006, the appellant has not been working since 2009 following the impugned order, and also taking note of the fact that the appellant was, in all likelihood, employed otherwise, also the interest of justice would be best sub-served with modifying the impugned order and directing that in place of Rs. 25000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand), as lumpsum compensation, appellant be paid Rs. 3.25 lakhs (Rupees Three Lakhs and Twenty Five Thousand), as compensation, taking into consideration also the fact that the appellant had already been paid Rs. 25000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand) as compensation.” 11. In K.V. Anil Mithra and Another vs. Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit and Another, 2021 SCC Online SC 982, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “31. 25000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand) as compensation.” 11. In K.V. Anil Mithra and Another vs. Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit and Another, 2021 SCC Online SC 982, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “31. The consistent view of this Court is that such non-observance has been termed to be void ab initio bad and consequence in the ordinary course has to follow by reinstatement with consequential benefits but it is not held to be automatic and what alternative relief the workman is entitled for on account of nonobservance of mandatory requirement of Section 25F of the Act 1947 is open to be considered by the Tribunal/Courts in the facts and circumstances of each case. 32. What appropriate relief the workman may be entitled for regarding non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Act 1947 has been considered by this Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vs. Bhurumal. The relevant paras are as under: 33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally and/or mala-fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view that in such cases reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious. 34. The reasons for denying the relief of reinstatement in such cases are obvious. It is trite law that when the termination is found to be illegal because of non-payment of retrenchment compensation and notice pay as mandatorily required under Section 25- F of the Industrial Disputes Act, even after reinstatement, it is always open to the management to terminate the services of that employee by paying him the retrenchment compensation. It is trite law that when the termination is found to be illegal because of non-payment of retrenchment compensation and notice pay as mandatorily required under Section 25- F of the Industrial Disputes Act, even after reinstatement, it is always open to the management to terminate the services of that employee by paying him the retrenchment compensation. Since such a workman was working on daily-wage basis and even after he is reinstated, he has no right to seek regularisation [See State of Karnataka vs. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 ]. Thus when he cannot claim regularisation and he has no right to continue even as a daily- wage worker, no useful purpose is going to be served in reinstating such a workman and he can be given monetary compensation by the Court itself inasmuch as if he is terminated again after reinstatement, he would receive monetary compensation only in the form of retrenchment compensation and notice pay. In such a situation, giving the relief of reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would not serve any purpose. 35. We would, however, like to add a caveat here. There may be cases where termination of a daily-wage worker is found to be illegal on the ground that it was resorted to as unfair labour practice or in violation of the principle of last come first go viz. while retrenching such a worker daily wage juniors to him were retained. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him were regularised under some policy but the workman concerned terminated. In such circumstances, the terminated worker should not be denied reinstatement unless there are some other weighty reasons for adopting the course of grant of compensation instead of reinstatement. In such cases, reinstatement should be the rule and only in exceptional cases for the reasons stated to be in writing, such a relief can be denied. 33. It has been further followed in District Development Officer and Another vs. Satish Kantilal Amralia, (2018) 12 SCC 298.” 12. In the present case, the respondent workman came to be appointed on 14.05.1997 and his services were terminated on 08.02.2000. After award dated 13.02.2008 given by the learned Labour Court, Amreli, the petitioner Municipality has filed the present Special Civil Application No. 11611 of 2008 on 05.04.2008. 13. By order dated 04.08.2009, this Hon’ble Court was pleased to pass the following order: “Rule. After award dated 13.02.2008 given by the learned Labour Court, Amreli, the petitioner Municipality has filed the present Special Civil Application No. 11611 of 2008 on 05.04.2008. 13. By order dated 04.08.2009, this Hon’ble Court was pleased to pass the following order: “Rule. By way of interim relief, the award impugned is stayed subject to compliance of Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. As this order is passed ex-parte, it would be open for the respondent to approach this Court in case of difficulty for modification/vacation of the interim relief with a copy to other side.” 14. It is seen from the record that despite the interim order, no application under Section 17B has been filed by the respondent workman claiming any compliance of Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act nor any application for modification/vacation of interim relief has been preferred. 15. When this matter was taken up for final hearing, an affidavit dated 01.12.2021 came to be filed during the course of the hearing stating that the respondent workman has not been paid any wages under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act from the date of the award of the learned Labour Court. However, the said affidavit is silent on the aspect of he not being gainfully employed during the pendency of this Special Civil Application. In such circumstances, noticing that the respondent workman herein has not been working with the petitioner Municipality since 08.02.2000 i. e. the date of his oral termination and taking note of the fact that in all likelihood, he has not remained unemployed for such a long period of 22 years and may have been employed for himself and his family, the ends of justice would be appropriately sub-served by modifying the impugned order and directing to pay a lump-sum compensation to the respondent workman. 16. In the aforesaid circumstances, the present Special Civil Application is partly allowed. The order of reinstatement of the respondent workman in service with 20% back-wages is hereby modified and the petitioner Municipality herein is directed to pay a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 5 Lacs to the respondent workman within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, failing which, the said amount shall carry interest @ 6% per annum. 5 Lacs to the respondent workman within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, failing which, the said amount shall carry interest @ 6% per annum. The aforesaid compensation awarded to the respondent workman shall be towards full and final settlement of all the claims of the respondent workman against the petitioner Municipality. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, the Special Civil Application stands partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No order as to costs.” 18. Ends of justice therefore will be served if looking to the fact that the respondent-workman had rendered uninterrupted service from 14.10.1997 to 08.01.2001 i.e. approximately for three and a half years, award of the Labour Court is required to be modified. 19. In the aforesaid circumstances, the present Special Civil Application is partly allowed. The award of reinstatement of the respondent workman in service with 20% of back-wages is hereby modified and the petitioner-Municipality herein is directed to pay a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 5 Lakhs to the respondent workman within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, failing which, the said amount shall carry interest @ 6% per annum. The aforesaid compensation awarded to the respondent workman shall be towards full and final settlement of all the claims of the respondent workman against the petitioner Municipality. 20. For the aforesaid reasons, the Special Civil Application stands partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No order as to costs.