ORDER : 1. Rule. Returnable today. 2. Considering the issue involved and with the consent of Counsel of both parties, the Petition is taken for final hearing and disposal today. 3. This petition is filed challenging the action of the Respondents denying benefit of the Government Resolution dated 05.07.2011 to the Petitioners. It is also prayed that the Respondents may be directed to offer compassionate appointment to any one member of the family, as the respective husbands of the respective Petitioners died during their service. The service details of the deceased who were in service of the Respondents are as under : Sr. No. Name Date of Birth Joining Date Date of death Date of Pension Total year of service 1. Late Bhil Chimanbhai Koyajibhai Heirs – wife, Shantaben C. Bhil 1.6.1950 21.4.1976 4.4.2009 5.4.2009 33 2. Late Tadavi Gopalbhai Chhitabhai Heirs – wife, Shavitaben G. Tadavi 1.6.1956 21.07.1982 13.10.2007 14.11.2007 25 3. Late Bachubhai Bhayjibhai Bhil Heirs – wife, Ujamben B. Bhil 1.6.1960 1.4.1979 22.12.2014 23.12.2014 35 4. Late Jayantibhai Mohanbhai Bhil Heirs – wife, Lilaben J. Bhil 1.6.1955 21.4.1975 6.12.2010 9.12.2010 35 4. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Dipak Dave for the Petitioners. 5. He submitted that the husbands of the Petitioners were serving as “Rojmdar’ in the Office of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3. The employees (Rojamdar) with Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 died during service. It is the case of Petitioners that as their respective husbands died during service, and prior to that as they were extended benefits of Government Resolution dated 17.10.1988, they are entitled for the benefits flowing from the Government Resolutions from time to time. It is the case of the Petitioners that as the husbands of the Petitioners died during service, they made their respective representations seeking benefits of compensation in lieu of compassionate appointment. In their representations the Petitioners have relied upon the Government Resolutions dated 05.07.2011 and 10.03.2000. Under Government Resolution dated 05.07.2011, a policy decision has been taken not to give compassionate appointment but to grant compensation in lieu of compassionate appointment. All the petitioners are entitled for the benefits recommended under Government Resolution dated 05.07.2011. In their representations the Petitioners have relied upon the Government Resolutions dated 05.07.2011 and 10.03.2000. Under Government Resolution dated 05.07.2011, a policy decision has been taken not to give compassionate appointment but to grant compensation in lieu of compassionate appointment. All the petitioners are entitled for the benefits recommended under Government Resolution dated 05.07.2011. 5.1 Learned advocate for the Petitioners relying upon the communication dated 27.04.2020, submitted that pursuant to the representation of the Petitioners, a communication was addressed to Executive Engineer, District Road and Building, Department, Chhotaudepur to do needful in the cases as the employees died during their service. Relying upon representation dated 09.09.2020, he submitted that the same has not been considered and therefore, direction may be issued at least to consider the representation in accordance with law. He heavily relied upon the decision dated 10.02.2022, of this Court in Special Civil Application No.30 of 2017 with the submission that the Respondents accordingly be directed to consider the representations. On delay, he submitted that since the representation of the Petitioners has not been considered, the delay may have to be ignored. 6. Per contra, learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms. Nirali Sarda for the Respondent – State opposed the Petitions and relied upon the decision of this Court in Radhaben Manubhai Sarvaiya Wd/o. Manubhai Jagabhai Sarvaiya vs. State of Gujarat in Special Civil Application Nos. 9958 of 2023 with 9960 of 2023. She submitted that in present petition, the application seeking compensation in lieu of compassionate appointment is made in the year 2022, after delay of more than 10 years. Further the initial intimation of death of the employee during service is not available on record. Therefore, the decision of this Court in Radhaben Manubhai Sarvaiya Wd/o. Manubhai Jagabhai Sarvaiya (supra) dated 19.6.2023 would squarely be applicable. 7. Considered the submissions. It is noticed that in this case the husbands of the Petitioners, who were working with the Respondent – Department, died in the years 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2014 respectively. Thus, there is delay of more than 10 years in preferring present Petition. Even, the first representation of the Petitioners is dated 16.03.2020, and prior thereto they have not made any application seeking compensation in lieu of compassionate appointment. Thus, there is delay of more than 10 years in preferring present Petition. Even, the first representation of the Petitioners is dated 16.03.2020, and prior thereto they have not made any application seeking compensation in lieu of compassionate appointment. In the opinion of this court some internal communication dated 27.04.2020, would not create any right in favour of the Petitioners, particularly, when the relief claimed is beyond the aim and object of grant of compassionate appointment. 8. Moreover, by the decision of this Court dated 19.6.2023, in Radhaben Manubhai Sarvaiya Wd/o. Manubhai Jagabhai Sarvaiya (supra) it has been held as under:- “7. For the prayer of grant of lumpsum compensation under Government Resolution dated 05.07.2011, it is noticed that there is a delay of more than 10 years and 6 years respectively in seeking the said benefit. No application seeking compassionate appointment or lumpsum compensation was made at the relevant time. Most importantly, the Government Resolution dated 05.07.2011, refers to parent Resolution dated 10.03.2000, and therefore it would not be appropriate to go beyond the aim and object to provide compassionate appointment. Admittedly, the aim and object for compassionate appointment is to provide immediate financial assistance to the family in distress and therefore, I do not agree with the submission of learned advocate for the petitioners that prayer for grant of lumpsum compensation is to be granted automatically irrespective of delay in preferring the application. The aim and object of compassionate appointment shall have to be seen and it is to provide immediate financial assistance to the family in distress and therefore, contention that delay is to be ignored, in my opinion is not correct. First para of Government Resolution dated 05.07.2011, refers earlier Resolution dated 10.03.2000. The second para of G.R. dated 05.07.2011, refers to the difficulties faced by the administration in considering cases of compassionate appointment and therefore need arose to amend the G.R dated 10.03.2000 by which, it has been decided to give lumpsum compensation in lieu of compassionate appointment. Therefore, one of the clauses of G.R. dated 05.07.2011, cannot be read in isolation. Thus, the G.R. dated 05.07.2011, is the substituted policy of the State to be considered in place of grant of compassionate appointment. Therefore, one of the clauses of G.R. dated 05.07.2011, cannot be read in isolation. Thus, the G.R. dated 05.07.2011, is the substituted policy of the State to be considered in place of grant of compassionate appointment. 7.1 The decision relied upon by the petitioners in the case of Divyarajsinh Dilubha (supra), the authority rejected the application on the ground that Government Resolution dated 05.07.2011 is not applicable in the case of daily wager and casual workman. In that context this Court held that Government Resolution dated 05.07.2011 is applicable to the daily wager and casual worker. XXXX 7.3 It would be apt to refer to the decision in the case of Rajeshkumar Vishnuprasad Joshi v. State of Gujarat & Anr. reported in 2023 (2) GLR 996, wherein Division Bench of this Court has held as under: XXXX 6.2 Learned single Judge rightly noticed from N.C. Santosh (supra) the following paragraphs, “13. It is well settled that for all government vacancies equal opportunity should be provided to all aspirants as is mandated under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. However, appointment on compassionate ground offered to a dependent of a deceased employee is an exception to the said norms. In Steel Authority of India Limited vs. Madhusudan Das & Ors. It was remarked accordingly that compassionate appointment is a concession and not a right and the criteria laid down in the Rules must be satisfied by all aspirant. In the most recent judgment in State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr. vs. Shashi Kumar the earlier decisions governing the principles of compassionate appointment were discussed and analysed. Speaking for the bench, Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud reiterated that appointment to any public post in the service of the State has to be made on the basis of principles in accord with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule. The Dependent of a deceased government employee are made eligible by virtue of the policy on compassionate appointment and they must fulfill the norms laid down by the State’s policy.” 6.3 It is also trite principle that the policy of compassionate appointment is intended to give immediate relief to the family of the deceased upon death of the deceased. It is a one-time succor when the family lunges into economic crises upon death of bread earner. It is a one-time succor when the family lunges into economic crises upon death of bread earner. While on one hand the compassionate benefit is not a matter of right and would offend the principle of equality in employment, on the other hand the passage of time would further negate the claim of a person to be given a compassionate benefit, for, the belated grant of benefit could not be justified as it would lose the very purpose against the compassionate appointment to be offered and the scheme for such appointments to be implemented. The compassionate appointment is always an immediate consideration and has to be a matter of urgent relief when the family of the deceased employee would have needed it. Element of immediacy has to be a sine qua non for such kind of appointment. XXXXX 6.5 The benefit of lump-sum compensation under the said Resolution was a substituted relief for appointment as per the changed policy of the State Government. The principles which apply for grant of appointment would also apply in considering the case of a claimant under said Resolution for lumpsum compensation. In other words, if the delay was to be the ground to deny the compassionate appointment, the very factor of delay would disentitle the petitioner to be considered for lumpsum compensation, both having the object of providing immediate relief at the relevant point of time to the person and his family. After five years, the grant of benefit of lump-sum compensation was not justified in law.” 7.4 Applying the same principle and considering delay occasioned in preferring applications in the present case, I do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned communication dated 23.01.2023, inter alia rejection by the authorities to grant benefit of lumpsum compensation in lieu of compassionate appointment under Government Resolution dated 05.07.2011.” 9. Moreover, in the recent decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Debabrata Tiwari reported in AIR 2023 SC 1467 it has been held as under: “7.2. On consideration of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles emerge: iii. Compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. Compassionate employment cannot be claimed or offered after a lapse of time and after the crisis is over. XXXXX 7.4. On consideration of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles emerge: iii. Compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. Compassionate employment cannot be claimed or offered after a lapse of time and after the crisis is over. XXXXX 7.4. As noted above, the sine qua non for entertaining a claim for compassionate appointment is that the family of the deceased employee would be unable to make two ends meet without one of the dependents of the deceased employee being employed on compassionate grounds. The financial condition of the family of the deceased, at the time of the death of the deceased, is the primary consideration that ought to guide the authorities’ decision in the matter. 7.5. Considering the second question referred to above, in the first instance, regarding whether applications for compassionate appointment could be considered after a delay of several years, we are of the view that, in a case where, for reasons of prolonged delay, either on the part of the applicant in claiming compassionate appointment or the authorities in deciding such claim, the sense of immediacy is diluted and lost. Further, the financial circumstances of the family of the deceased, may have changed, for the better, since the time of the death of the government employee. In such circumstances, Courts or other relevant authorities are to be guided by the fact that for such prolonged period of delay, the family of the deceased was able to sustain themselves, most probably by availing gainful employment from some other source. Granting compassionate appointment in such a case, as noted by this Court in Hakim Singh would amount to treating a claim for compassionate appointment as though it were a matter of inheritance based on a line of succession which is contrary to the Constitution. Since compassionate appointment is not a vested right and the same is relative to the financial condition and hardship faced by the dependents of the deceased government employee as a consequence of his death, a claim for compassionate appointment may not be entertained after lapse of a considerable period of time since the death of the government employee. 8. Since compassionate appointment is not a vested right and the same is relative to the financial condition and hardship faced by the dependents of the deceased government employee as a consequence of his death, a claim for compassionate appointment may not be entertained after lapse of a considerable period of time since the death of the government employee. 8. Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conduct of a person in approaching a Court of Equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled him for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. vs. Prosper Armstrong, (1874) 3 PC 221 as under: “Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of Justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled grant of relief to a party by Equity Court of England, could disentitle the grant of relief to a person by the High Court in the exercise of its power under Article 226 of our Constitution, came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. vs. M. R. Meher, President, Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1450 . In the said case, it was regarded as a principle that disentitled a party for grant of relief from a High Court in the exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution. In State of M.P. vs. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 this Court restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements in the following words: “9. ... the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the Petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this Rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” While we are mindful of the fact that there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, ordinarily, a writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time, vide Jagdish Lal vs. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538 ; NDMC vs. Pan Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 278 . XXXXX 10. Applying the said ratio to the facts of the present case, we hold that the Respondents-Writ Petitioners, upon submitting their applications in the year 2006-2005 did nothing further to pursue the matter, till the year 2015 i.e., for a period of ten years. Notwithstanding the tardy approach of the authorities of the Appellant-State in dealing with their applications, the Respondent-Writ Petitioners delayed approaching the High Court seeking a writ in the nature of a mandamus against the authorities of the State. Notwithstanding the tardy approach of the authorities of the Appellant-State in dealing with their applications, the Respondent-Writ Petitioners delayed approaching the High Court seeking a writ in the nature of a mandamus against the authorities of the State. In fact, such a prolonged delay in approaching the High Court, may even be regarded as a waiver of a remedy, as discernible by the conduct of the Respondents-Writ Petitioners. Such a delay would disentitle the Respondents-Writ Petitioners to the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. Further, the order of the High Court dated 17th March, 2015, whereby the writ petition filed by some of the Respondents herein was disposed of with a direction to the Director of Local Bodies, Government of West Bengal to take a decision as to the appointment of the Respondents-Writ Petitioners, cannot be considered to have the effect of revival of the cause of action.” 9. In view of above, and applying the same principle the Petition being meritless does not deserve consideration and therefore, the same is dismissed. Rule discharged with no order as to costs.