JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Irfan Raza Khan, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Mohammad Mustafa, learned counsel for petitioners and Sri Awadhesh Kumar, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of State. 2. A Madaras namely, Al-Jamiyatul Islahiya situated at Mohammadnagar Kathela, District-Siddharthnagar is registered with Arabic and Farsi Examination, U.P. in terms of decision taken in the meeting of Recognising Committee took place on 18.04.1998. 3. The Management of Madarsa is run by a Society namely, Al-Jamiyatul Islahia is registered under Societies Registration Act on 21.02.1992, renewed for 5 years, from 20.02.2017 4. The State of U.P. took said Madarasa on the grant-in-aid that by a letter dated 30.08.2012. At that time petitioner was Principal of Madarasa (appointed in year 2001). 5. In year 2006, a process was commenced to fill the post of Principal. According to petitioners advertisement was published in two daily newspapers. In paragraph 17 of writ petition it is declared that it was published in newspaper ‘Rastriya Sahara’ also, however, Annexure Nos. 5 and 6 are photocopy of two newspapers namely, ‘Gorakhpur Kesri’ dated 16.09.2006 and ‘Narad Charcha’ dated 13.11.2006, however, copy of advertisement published in ‘Rastriya Sahara’ is not placed on record. 6. The requirement for post of Principal as mentioned in above referred two newspapers were under following headings i.e. Post, Eligibility, Age, Minimum marks required and Salary. 7. The petitioner No.1 who allegedly fulfilled all criteria was selected and appointed as Principal of Madarsa and Committee of Management issued a letter dated 02.12.2006 in this regard. However, other details such as number of applicant applied for post and number of applicant called and appeared for interview as well as merit are not on record. 8. According to order-sheet notice was issued to respondent No.4 on 21.06.2022 (Management Committee of Madarsa), however, according to office report dated 14.07.2022, learned counsel for petitioners has not taken steps, therefore, no one has entered appearance on behalf of respondent No.4 and relevant documents referred above, which are under custodian of respondent No.4 are not on record. 9. Petitioners No.2 and 3 have claimed that they were selected on post of Assistant Teacher Alia and Tehtania respectively through a selection process. 9. Petitioners No.2 and 3 have claimed that they were selected on post of Assistant Teacher Alia and Tehtania respectively through a selection process. According to them, advertisement was published on 11.09.2006 in an Urdu newspaper, though contents of advertisement are translated but name of newspaper is not translated from Urdu to Hindi/English language as well as it appears that all requisite details were not published. Petitioner No.3 has retired. 10. Initially, there was some objection in date of appointment of petitioner as Principal, however, later on it was cured and accordingly, letter was issued from concerned department. 11. A complaint was filed that due process was not followed in the selection process of appointment of petitioners. An inquiry was set up and irregularities were detected in selection process. A copy of inquiry report is placed on record along with counter affidavit filed by respondent State. 12. As per report advertisement was not verified from original copy of newspaper as no one from office of newspaper has responded. The advertisement for Adhyapak i.e. Alia, Tehtania, Fokania was not complete. So far as advertisement for the post of Principal, only advertisement published in ‘Gorakhpur Kesri’ appears to be correct but it also remains incorrect as per salary on record. 13. The District Minority Welfare Officer acted upon inquiry report and since appointment of petitioners were irregular, their financial approval were withdrawn. 14. Petitioners have challenged order dated 20.04.2022 and 21.04.2022 issued by Madarsa Education Board and District Minority Welfare Officer. 15. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioners has submitted that : (i) The photocopy of advertisement are annexed along with present writ petition wherein all requisite details were published. (ii) The petitioners were not provided any opportunity of hearing before impugned orders were passed. (iii) Order for inquiry was passed after ten years of service on a complaint an inquiry was initiated and concluded behind their back. (iv) Procedure prescribed in Madarsa Manyata Evam Sewa Niyamawali, 1987 was followed during their appointment. (v) Learned Senior counsel has placed reliance on Judgment of Supreme Court in Dr. M.S. Mudhol Vs. S.D. Halegkar, 1993 0 SCC 555 decided on 13.07.1993 and Anant R. Kulkarni Vs. Y.P. Education Society & Others, 2013 LawSuit(SC) 362 decided on 26.04.2013. 16. Learned Standing counsel for State submits that :- (i) Original record of newspaper were not provided by publisher of newspaper. M.S. Mudhol Vs. S.D. Halegkar, 1993 0 SCC 555 decided on 13.07.1993 and Anant R. Kulkarni Vs. Y.P. Education Society & Others, 2013 LawSuit(SC) 362 decided on 26.04.2013. 16. Learned Standing counsel for State submits that :- (i) Original record of newspaper were not provided by publisher of newspaper. (ii) Newspapers were not widely circulated in Districts as well as State and since process was not duly adopted, therefore, appointments were found per se illegal. (iii) The financial approval was granted with condition that in case any irregularity is found it could be withdrawn. 17. Before going into the controversy whether due process for appointment of petitioners were followed or not, the court finds that since the impugned orders have directly effected the petitioners, therefore, they ought to have given a chance to respond to inquiry report, however, admittedly no notice was issued to petitioners to submit their respective reply to inquiry report. 18. Thus in the present case, principle of natural justice are violated. On this issue it is apt to refer some paragraphs of a recent judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India and Others vs. Rajesh Agarwal and Others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 342 that :- “74.In E P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu , (1974) 4 SCC 3 , this Court held that an arbitrary state action is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Again, in Maneka Gandhi (supra) this court reiterated that the principle of non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14. An administrative action can be tested for constitutional infirmities under Article 14 on four grounds : (i) unreasonableness or irrationality; (ii) illegality; (iii) procedural impropriety; (see. State of AP v. McDowell, (1996) 3 SCC 709 ; Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 ), and (iv) proportionality. However, the scope of such judicial review is limited to ascertaining the deficiency in the decision-making process, and not the correctness of the choice made by the administrator, (Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank v. P C Kakkar, (2003) 4 SCC 364 ) 75. Fairness in action requires that procedures which permit impairment of fundamental rights ought to be just, fair, and reasonable. The principles of natural justice have a universal application and constitute an important facet of procedural propriety envisaged under Article 14. Fairness in action requires that procedures which permit impairment of fundamental rights ought to be just, fair, and reasonable. The principles of natural justice have a universal application and constitute an important facet of procedural propriety envisaged under Article 14. The rule of audi alteram partem is recognized as being a part of the guarantee contained in Article 14. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Tulsiram Patel (supra) has categorically held that violation of the principles of natural justice is a violation of Article 14. The court held that any state action in breach of natural justice implicates a violation of Article 14: “95. The principles of natural justice have thus come to be recognized as being a part of the guarantee contained in Article 14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation given by this Court to the concept of equality which is the subject-matter of that article. Shortly put, the syllogism runs thus : violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination; where discrimination is the result of State action, it is a violation of Article 14 : therefore, a violation of a principle of natural justice by a State action is a violation of Article 14. Article 14, however, is not the sole repository of the principles of natural justice. What it does is to guarantee that any law or State action violating them will be struck down. The principles of natural justice, however, apply not only to legislation and State action but also where any tribunal, authority or body of men, not coming within the definition of State in Article 12, is charged with the duty of deciding a matter. In such a case, the principles of natural justice require that it must decide such matter fairly and impartially.” 76. In Cantonment Board v. Taramani Devi, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 501, a two-judge bench of this Court held that the rule of audi alteram partem is a part of Article 14. Similarly, in Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress,1991 Supp (1) SCC 600, this Court observed that the rule of audi alteram partem enforces the equality clause in Article 14. Therefore, any administrative action which violates the rule of audi alteram partem is arbitrary and violative of Article 14. 77. Similarly, in Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress,1991 Supp (1) SCC 600, this Court observed that the rule of audi alteram partem enforces the equality clause in Article 14. Therefore, any administrative action which violates the rule of audi alteram partem is arbitrary and violative of Article 14. 77. Administrative proceedings which entail significant civil consequences must be read consistent with the principles of natural justice to meet the requirement of Article 14. Where possible, the rule of audi alteram partem ought to be read into a statutory rule to render it compliant with the principles of equality and non-arbitrariness envisaged under Article 14. The Master Directions on Frauds do not expressly provide the borrowers an opportunity of being heard before classifying the borrower's account as fraud. Audi alteram partem must then be read into the provisions of the Master Directions on Frauds. 78. In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545 , a Constitution Bench of this Court was called upon to adjudge the validity of Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. The provision enabled the Municipal Commissioner to remove, without notice, any object, structure or fixture which was set up in or upon any street. Chief Justice Y V Chandrachud delivering the judgment of the Constitution Bench held that the impugned provision must be construed to ensure that the procedure contemplated is fair and reasonable. It was further held: 44. […] What Section 314 provides is that the Commissioner may, without notice, cause an encroachment to be removed. It does not command that the Commissioner shall, without notice, cause an encroachment to be removed. Putting it differently, Section 314 confers on the Commissioner the discretion to cause an encroachment to be removed with or without notice. That discretion has to be exercised in a reasonable manner so as to comply with the constitutional mandate that the procedure accompanying the performance of a public act must be fair and reasonable. We must lean in favour of this interpretation because it helps sustain the validity of the law. Reading Section 314 as containing a command not to issue notice before the removal of an encroachment will make the law invalid.” (Emphasis Supplied) 19. We must lean in favour of this interpretation because it helps sustain the validity of the law. Reading Section 314 as containing a command not to issue notice before the removal of an encroachment will make the law invalid.” (Emphasis Supplied) 19. In view of above discussion and since a valuable right of ‘audi alteram partem’ has clearly being violated and, therefore, impugned action of withdrawal of their financial approval becomes arbitrary, therefore, writ petition is allowed and impugned orders are set aside, however, respondent-State will be at liberty to act upon the inquiry report only after granting an opportunity to petitioners and after considering their response to inquiry report.