JUDGMENT : MANISH MATHUR, J. 1. Heard Mr. Kartikey Dubey, learned counsel for petitioner and Mr. Shobhit Mohan Shukla, learned counsel for opposite party No. 1. 2. In view of order being proposed to be passed, notices to opposite party No. 2 stand dispensed with. 3. Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed seeking a direction to the Real Estate Regulatory Authority for taking necessary steps to ensure execution of order dated 22.3.2022 passed in Complaint No. LKO162/08/57523/2020, Anupma Sinha v. M/s. Ansal Properties and Infrastructure Limited. Further relief for issuance of Recovery Certificate under Section 40 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 read with Rule 23 of Rules, 2016 has also been sought. 4. Initially as noticed in order dated 22.3.2023, a preliminary objection has been raised with regard to maintainability of petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India that the Real Estate Regulatory Authority is neither a Court nor a Tribunal. 5. Learned counsel for petitioner in response to the preliminary objection has placed reliance on judgment rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Others, 2021 (11) ADJ 280 (SC), as well as judgment rendered by Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Pan Realtors Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Others passed in W.P. No. 27631 of 2021 to submit that the aforesaid authority has been held to be a quasi judicial authority by Hon'ble the Supreme Court and has been held to be covered under the connotation 'Tribunal' and as such petition would be maintainable. 6. With regard to aforesaid preliminary objection, it would be necessary to advert to whether the Real Estate Regulatory Authority can be construed to be either a Court or a Tribunal. The aspect of when an authority can be said to be a Court or a Tribunal has been discussed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma and Another, AIR 1965 SC 1595 : “9. Tribunals which fall within the purview of Article 136(1) occupy a special position of their own under the scheme of our Constitution. Tribunals which fall within the purview of Article 136(1) occupy a special position of their own under the scheme of our Constitution. Special matters and questions are entrusted to them for their decision and in that sense, they share with the Courts one common characteristic; both the Courts and the tribunals are “constituted by the State and are invested with judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions” [vide Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh, (1955) 1 SCR 267 at p. 272]. They are both adjudicating bodies and they deal with and finally determine disputes between parties which are entrusted to their jurisdiction. The procedure followed by the Courts is regularly prescribed and in discharging their functions and exercising their powers, the Courts have to conform to that procedure. The procedure which the tribunals have to follow may not always be so strictly prescribed, but the approach adopted by both the Courts and the tribunals is substantially the same, and there is no essential difference between the functions that they discharge. As in the case of Courts, so in the case of tribunals, it is the State's inherent judicial power which has been transferred and by virtue of the said power, it is the State's inherent judicial function which they discharge. Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State, and on considerations of policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the Courts established by the Constitution; but that does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures, to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties. It is really not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features which are common to the tribunals and the Courts, and features which are distinct and separate. The basic and the fundamental feature which is common to both the Courts and the tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign State. 44. An authority other than a Court may be vested by statute with judicial power in widely different circumstances, which it would be impossible and indeed inadvisable to attempt to define exhaustively. 44. An authority other than a Court may be vested by statute with judicial power in widely different circumstances, which it would be impossible and indeed inadvisable to attempt to define exhaustively. The proper thing is to examine each case as it arises, and to ascertain whether the powers vested in the authority can be truly described as judicial functions or judicial powers of the State. For the purpose of this case, it is sufficient to say that any outside authority empowered by the State to determine conclusively the rights of two or more contending parties with regard to any matter in controversy between them satisfies the test of an authority vested with the judicial powers of the State and may be regarded as a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136. Such a power of adjudication implies that the authority must act judicially and must determine the dispute by ascertainment of the relevant facts on the materials before it and by application of the relevant law to those facts. This test of a tribunal is not meant to be exhaustive, and it may be that other bodies not satisfying this test are also tribunals. In order to be a tribunal, it is essential that the power of adjudication must be derived from a statute or a statutory rule. An authority or body deriving its power of adjudication from an agreement of the parties, such as a private arbitrator or a tribunal acting under Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not satisfy the test of a tribunal within Article 136. It matters little that such a body or authority is vested with the trappings of a Court. The Arbitration Act, 1940 vests an arbitrator with some of the trappings of a Court, so also the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 vests an authority acting under Section 10-A of the Act with many of such trappings, and yet, such bodies and authorities are not tribunals. 45. The word “tribunal” finds place in Article 227 of the Constitution also, and I think that there also the word has the same meaning as in Article 136.” 7. In another case of All Party Hill Leaders Conference v. Captain W.A. Sangma, (1977) 4 SCC 161 ; it has been held as follows: 23. 45. The word “tribunal” finds place in Article 227 of the Constitution also, and I think that there also the word has the same meaning as in Article 136.” 7. In another case of All Party Hill Leaders Conference v. Captain W.A. Sangma, (1977) 4 SCC 161 ; it has been held as follows: 23. The earliest decision of this Court as to the ambit of Article 136(1) with reference to the order of a tribunal came up for consideration in Bharat Bank Ltd. Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd. AIR 1950 SC 188 : (1950) 1 SCR 459 : 950 Lab LJ 21. The question whether an Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was a tribunal within the scope of Article 136 was raised in that case. By majority the Constitution Bench of this Court held that the Industrial Tribunal was a tribunal for the purpose of Article 136. Having regard to the scheme of Article 136, this Court was not prepared to place a narrow interpretation on the amplitude of Article 136. This Court observed at p. 476/478 of the Report as follows: “As pointed out in picturesque language by Lord Sankey, L.C. in Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, 1931 AC 275, there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a Court which, nevertheless, are not Courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power. It seems to me that such tribunals though they are not full-fledged Courts, yet exercise quasi-judicial functions and are within the ambit of the word 'tribunal' in Article 136 of the Constitution. Tribunals which do not derive authority from the sovereign power cannot fall within the ambit of Article 136. The condition precedent for bringing a tribunal within the ambit of Article 136 is that it should be constituted by the State. Again a tribunal would be outside the ambit of Article 136 if it is not invested with any part of the judicial functions of the State but discharges purely administrative or executive duties. Tribunals, however, which are found invested with certain functions of a Court of justice and have some of its trappings also would fall within the ambit of Article 136.... 25. Tribunals, however, which are found invested with certain functions of a Court of justice and have some of its trappings also would fall within the ambit of Article 136.... 25. From a conspectus of the above decisions it will be seen that several tests have been laid down by this Court to determine whether a particular body or authority is a tribunal within the ambit of Article 136. The tests are not exhaustive in all cases. It is also well-settled that all the tests laid down may not be present in a given case. While some tests may be present others may be lacking. It is, however, absolutely necessary that the authority in order to come within the ambit of Article 136(1) as tribunal must be constituted by the State and invested with some function of judicial power of the State. This particular test is an unfailing one while some of the other tests may or may not be present at the same time. 8. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Bar Association, (2012) 10 SCC 353 ; it has been held as follows: 18. Tribunals have primarily been constituted to deal with cases under special laws and to hence provide for specialised adjudication alongside the Courts. Therefore, a particular Act/set of rules will determine whether the functions of a particular tribunal are akin to those of the Courts, which provide for the basic administration of justice. Where there is a lis between two contesting parties and a statutory authority is required to decide such dispute between them, such an authority may be called as a quasi-judicial authority i.e. a situation where, (a) a statutory authority is empowered under a statute to do any act; (b) the order of such authority would adversely affect the subject; and (c) although there is no lis or two contending parties, and the contest is between the authority and the subject and (d) the statutory authority is required to act judicially under the statute, the decision of the said authority is a quasi-judicial decision. An authority may be described as a quasi-judicial authority when it possesses certain attributes or trappings of a “Court”, but not all. An authority may be described as a quasi-judicial authority when it possesses certain attributes or trappings of a “Court”, but not all. In case certain powers under CPC or CrPC have been conferred upon an authority, but it has not been entrusted with the judicial powers of State, it cannot be held to be a Court. [See Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees, AIR 1950 SC 188 , Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 153 : 1956 Cri LJ 326, Engg. Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd. AIR 1963 SC 874 , Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma, AIR 1965 SC 1595 , Rama Rao v. Narayan, (1969) 1 SCC 167 : AIR 1969 SC 724 , State of H.P. v. Mahendra Pal, (1999) 4 SCC 43 : AIR 1999 SC 1786 , Keshab Narayan Banerjee v. State of Bihar, (2000) 1 SCC 607 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 272, Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare, (2002) 5 SCC 685 : AIR 2002 SC 2158 , K. Shamrao v. Asstt. Charity Commr. (2003) 3 SCC 563 , Trans Mediterranean Airways v. Universal Exports, (2011) 10 SCC 316 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 148 and Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 745 ]. 9. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Pan Realtors Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Others, 2021 (12) ADJ 317 (LB) has also considered when an authority can be said to be Tribunal in the following manner: “16. Considering the aforesaid including the judgments referred hereinabove, this Court is of the view that in this case for determining that as to whether an “Authority” i.e. “State Government” is a “Tribunal” or not, as in this case the power of State Government under Section 41(3) of the Act of 1973 is in issue, which is as per above observations of this Court is revisional power, the basic test(s)/parameter(s) can be summarized as under: (a) That the power of adjudication should be conferred on the concerned 'Authority' by a statute. (b) That such adjudicating power is the part of State's inherent power exercised in discharging its judicial function. (c) That the 'Authority' concerned is under obligation to act judicially. (d) That the decision of the 'Authority' on the 'lis' before it is binding between the parties and final. (b) That such adjudicating power is the part of State's inherent power exercised in discharging its judicial function. (c) That the 'Authority' concerned is under obligation to act judicially. (d) That the decision of the 'Authority' on the 'lis' before it is binding between the parties and final. In this case, the power of adjudication is conferred upon 'State Government' by the statute, the 'State Government' is under obligation to act judicially and is also required to follow principle of natural justice, as appears from the proviso to sub-section 3 of Section 41 of the Act of 1973, the State Government in this Sub-section decides the lis between the parties and decision of 'State Government', as per Sub-section 4 of Section 41 is binding and final. Thus, all test(s)/parameter(s), aforesaid, are satisfied and being so it is held that the State Government under Section 41 Sub Clause 3 of the Act of 1973, is a Tribunal.” 10. It is thus seen that the preliminary aspect whether the authority can be a Tribunal or not in terms of Article 227 of the Constitution of India is that it is a statutory authority which is empowered under special enactment and setup by the State to decide a lis between contending parties in a judicial manner but under exercise of quasi-judicial powers since it has been invested with some function of judicial powers of the State. 11. The aforesaid aspect has also been considered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P and Others, 2021 (11) ADJ 280 (SC); in the following manner: “117. The further submission made by learned Counsel for the Appellants that Section 81 of the Act permits the authority to delegate such powers and functions to any member of the authority which are mainly administrative or clerical, and cannot possibly encompass any of the core functions which are to be discharged by the authority, the judicial functions are non-delegable, as these are the core functions of the authority. The submission may not hold good for the reason that the power to be exercised by the authority in deciding complaints Under Section 31 of the Act is quasi-judicial in nature which is delegable provided there is a provision in the statute. The submission may not hold good for the reason that the power to be exercised by the authority in deciding complaints Under Section 31 of the Act is quasi-judicial in nature which is delegable provided there is a provision in the statute. As already observed, Section 81 of the Act empowers the authority to delegate its power and functions to any of its member, by general or special order.” 12. The authority as indicated in the judgment has reference to Section 31 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 regarding filing of complaints with the authority or the adjudication officer. The term 'authority' has been defined under Section 2(i) to mean the Real Estate Regulatory Authority Established under Section 20(1) of the Act. 13. In view of aforesaid judgments, particularly Newtech Promoters (supra) it is evident that the authority therefore exercises quasi-judicial powers and would thus come within the term of tribunal as envisaged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India due to which petition against the said authority would be maintainable under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 14. In view of aforesaid fact, preliminary objection raised is rejected. 15. Learned counsel for petitioner has submitted that the petitioner had filed the aforesaid complaint case which has been decided on 22.3.2022 whereafter execution of the sale has been required by filing of an application. It is submitted that in the meantime the authority itself has framed standard operating procedure on 2.9.2020 which is not being adhered to. As such, it is submitted that execution order is required to be made in terms thereof. 16. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for petitioner, opposite party No. 1 i.e. Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Rajya Niyojan Sansthan, Naveen Bhavan, Kalakankar House Road, Old Hyderabad, Lucknow Uttar Pradesh is directed to ensure execution of order dated 22.3.2022 filed in Complaint No. LKO162/08/57523/2020, Anupma Sinha v. M/s. Ansal Properties and Infrastructure Limited passed by Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Rajya Niyojan Sansthan in terms of its standard operating procedure dated 2.9.2020 in case there is no other legal impediment. 17. Benefit of this order shall be available only in case petitioner cooperates in early conclusion of the application/trial. 18. With the aforesaid direction, the petition stands disposed of.