JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for petitioner and learned State Counsel for respondent No.2/Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Lucknow through its Registrar. 2. Petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India has been filed seeking a direction to the Additional District & Sessions Judge to entertain a fresh application for withdrawal of claimed amount which has been deposited with it in terms of award made by erstwhile Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Second prayer is for a direction to disburse the claimed amount within a specified time period already deposited by the insurance company. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, late Rashid Kamal who was husband of the petitioner No.1 and father of petitioners 2,3 and 4 passed away due to accidental death in the year 1999 leading to filing of claim petition No. 317 of 2000, which was allowed by means of judgment and award dated 31st May, 2006 awarding an amount of Rs.1,60,720/- along with 7 & 1/2 % interest per annum on the amount of compensation. It is submitted that against aforesaid award, the petitioners as well as the insurance company filed separate appeals which were registered as F.A.F.O. No. 750 of 2006 and F.A.F.O. No. 826 of 2006, which were heard and decided by common judgment dated 4th December, 2017 whereby appeal for enhancement of compensation by the petitioners was allowed while the appeal filed by insurance company was dismissed. Compensation as claimed by the petitioners was enhanced to Rs.9,10,000/- along with applicable rate of interest and the insurance company was directed to deposit entire amount within a period of two months from the date of judgment. It was also directed that in case the amount was not deposited within aforesaid time period, the learned tribunal was to proceed in accordance with law. Deposit of statutory amount was also directed to be remitted to learned Tribunal for payment of compensation to petitioners/claimants. 4. It is submitted that in pursuance to the aforesaid judgment, an application for enforcement of award was filed and registered as Misc. Case No. 1232 of 2018 in which the insurance company on 4th February, 2019 informed in writing that cheque No. 528242 dated 21st March, 2018 for a sum of Rs.16,41,782/- had been deposited on 28th April, 2018 and as such compliance of award had been made. Case No. 1232 of 2018 in which the insurance company on 4th February, 2019 informed in writing that cheque No. 528242 dated 21st March, 2018 for a sum of Rs.16,41,782/- had been deposited on 28th April, 2018 and as such compliance of award had been made. Learned counsel further submits that in pursuance to the aforesaid information, the petitioners filed an application in the court of Additional District Judge, Court No.8, Lucknow for withdrawal of the award amount in Claim Petition No. 317 of 2000 but the same was returned with a direction dated 8th August, 2022 requiring the petitioners to file application before appropriate forum. 5. It is submitted that subsequent to the award of Tribunal and judgment rendered by this Court, a notification was issued by the State Government on 9th January, 2019 through gazette in terms of Section 165 of Motor Vehicles Act 1988 constituting Motor Accident Claims Tribunal for 75 places within the State of U.P. for disposal of motor accident claim cases. The Registrar General of Allahabad High Court also vide letter dated 6th November, 2020 has issued directions to the District Judges of the aforesaid districts to transfer motor accident claims cases pending in the district to the newly created Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in the respective judgeship in pursuance of the government notification dated 9th January, 2019. 6. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that due to the aforesaid notification and letter, a confusion has prevailed upon the court concerned that amount of award is required to be released by the newly constituted Motor Accident Claims Tribunal instead of court of Additional District Judge which had passed its award in Claim Petition No. 317 of 2000. It is submitted that once initial claim petition has been decided and award has been passed prior to creation of new motor accident claims tribunals in the year 2019, there was no occasion for the court of Additional District Judge to have refused to entertain application for withdrawal of award particularly since the notification dated 9th January, 2019 is not retrospective and would be applicable only on the pending cases. 7. 7. Learned State Counsel on the basis of instructions received from newly constituted Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has submitted that amount awarded in favour of petitioners is still with the court of Additional District Judge which was earlier functioning as the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal prior to the notification dated 9th January, 2019 and the amount has not yet been received by the newly constituted Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Lucknow. 8. Considering submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties, it is quite apparent from material on record that the claim petition No. 317 of 2000 filed by petitioners was allowed by means of judgment and award dated 31st May, 2006 and was not only affirmed but the compensation award was enhanced by this Court by means of judgment and order dated 4th December, 2017. As per submission of learned counsel for petitioner, the award amount was also deposited by the insurance company concerned on 28th April, 2018. As such it is quite apparent that the entire process of filing and decision on the claim petition has taken place prior to issuance of notification dated 9th January, 2019 constituting new Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. The notification dated 9th January, 2019 issued in terms of Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 merely constitutes new Motor Accident Claims Tribunals for the purposes of disposal of motor accident claims and does not indicate the same to be applicable on cases already decided. Letter dated 6th November, 2020 issued by Registrar General of High Court also indicates the jurisdiction of newly constituted Motor Accident Claims Tribunals only with regard to cases which are pending in the district court. As such neither the statute nor the notification dated 9th January, 2019 or the letter dated 6th November, 2020 has any condition indicating retrospective application of the aforesaid notification dated 9th January, 2019. 9. With regard to retrospective application of notifications and statutes, Hon'ble Supreme Court has already held in the case of Assistant Excise Commissioner, Kottayam Versus Esthappan Cherian reported in AIR 2021 SC 4214 as follows:- "14. There is profusion of judicial authority on the proposition that a rule or law cannot be construed as retrospective unless it expresses a clear or manifest intention, to the contrary. In CIT v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd., (2015) 1 SCC 1 this Court, speaking through a Constitution Bench, observed as follows : "31. There is profusion of judicial authority on the proposition that a rule or law cannot be construed as retrospective unless it expresses a clear or manifest intention, to the contrary. In CIT v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd., (2015) 1 SCC 1 this Court, speaking through a Constitution Bench, observed as follows : "31. Of the various rules guiding how a legislation has to be interpreted, one established rule is that unless a contrary intention appears, a legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective operation. The idea behind the rule is that a current law should govern current activities. Law passed today cannot apply to the events of the past. If we do something today, we do it keeping in view the law of today and in force and not tomorrow's backward adjustment of it. Our belief in the nature of the law is founded on the bedrock that every human being is entitled to arrange his affairs by relying on the existing law and should not find that his plans have been retrospectively upset. This principle of law is known as lex prospicit non respicit : law looks forward not backward. As was observed in Phillips v. Eyre, (1870) LR 6 QB 1, a retrospective legislation is contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated when introduced for the first time to deal with future acts ought not to change the character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law. 32. The obvious basis of the principle against retrospectivity is the principle of "fairness", which must be the basis of every legal rule as was observed in L'Office Cherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd., (1994) 1 AC 486 : (1994) 2 WLR 39 (HL) Thus, legislations which modified accrued rights or which impose obligations or impose new duties or attach a new disability have to be treated as prospective unless the legislative intent is clearly to give the enactment a retrospective effect; unless the legislation is for purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former legislation or to explain a former legislation. We need not note the cornucopia of case law available on the subject because aforesaid legal position clearly emerges from the various decisions and this legal position was conceded by the counsel for the parties. We need not note the cornucopia of case law available on the subject because aforesaid legal position clearly emerges from the various decisions and this legal position was conceded by the counsel for the parties. In any case, we shall refer to few judgments containing this dicta, a little later. 15. Another equally important principle applies : in the absence of express statutory authorization, delegated legislation in the form of rules or regulations, cannot operate retrospectively. In CIT v. M.C. Ponnoose, (1969) 2 SCC 351 : (1970) 1 SCR 678 this rule was spelt out in the following terms : "The courts will not, therefore, ascribe retrospectivity to new laws affecting rights unless by express words or necessary implication it appears that such was the intention of the legislature. Parliament can delegate its legislative power within the recognized limits. Where any rule or regulation is made by any person or authority to whom such powers have been delegated by the legislature it may or may not be possible to make the same so as to give retrospective operation. It will depend on the language employed in the statutory provision which may in express terms or by necessary implication empower the authority concerned to make a rule or regulation with retrospective effect. But where no such language is to be found it has been held by the courts that the persons or authority exercising subordinate legislative functions cannot make a rule, regulation or bye-law which can operate with retrospective effect." 10. Considering the aforesaid aspects, it is clear that in the present case, the filing of claim petition, award and the decision in appeal thereagainst and even deposit of compensation awarded has taken place prior to notification dated 9th January, 2019. As such clearly jurisdiction of Additional District Judge, Court No.8, Lucknow which has decided initial claim petition No. 317 of 2000 was not ousted and the learned court has clearly erred in rejecting the application for withdrawal of the compensation amount for filing before appropriate court while ignoring the fact that said court itself was the appropriate court particularly in view of instructions provided to learned State Counsel that compensation is still lying deposited with the court of Additional District Judge, Court No.8, Lucknow and has not yet been remitted to the newly constituted Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 11. 11. Considering aforesaid facts and point, the petitioners are granted liberty to file a fresh application for withdrawal of compensation awarded to them in terms of judgment and award dated 31st May, 2006 in claim petition No. 317 of 2000 as enhanced by this Court vide its judgment and order dated 4th December, 2017 in First Appeal From Order No. 750 of 2006. In case such an application is filed before the court of Additional District Judge, Court No.8, Lucknow, the same is directed to be entertained and payment of compensation deposited before the said court is directed to be released in favour of petitioners in terms of directions issued by this Court earlier in the aforesaid appeal preferably within a period of two months from the date a copy of this order is brought on record in the aforesaid proceedings. 12. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ petition stands allowed at the admission stage itself.