JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 397 of Cr.PC read with Section 401 Cr.PC, lays challenge to judgment dated 20.8.2019, passed by the learned Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge (CBI) Shimla, District Shimla, H.P., in Criminal Appeal No. 29-T/10 of 2017, affirming the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 5.7.2017/4.9.2017, in criminal Case No. 253-3 of 2012, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Theog, District Shimla, H.P., whereby the learned trial Court while holding the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the “Act"), convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two months and pay compensation to the tune of Rs. 5,80,000/- to the complainant. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are that respondent/complainant lodged complaint under Section 138 of the Act before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Theog, stating therein that accused with a view to discharge his liability, issued cheque bearing No. 967431 dated 7.8.2012 (Ext.C-1) amounting to Rs. 4,00,000/-, drawn at UCO Bank Branch Kotkhai, Shimla, H.P., but fact remains that aforesaid cheque on its presentation to the bank concerned, was dishonoured. Since accused failed to make the payment good within the stipulated period despite his having received legal notice issued to him, complainant had no option but to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the competent court of law. 3. Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record by the respective parties, vide judgment/order dated 5.7.2017/4.9.2017, held the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per the description given herein above. 4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of conviction recorded by the court below, petitioner-accused preferred appeal before the learned first appellate Court, but same was dismissed vide judgment dated 20.8.2019. In the aforesaid background, accused has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to setaside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by the court below. 5. In the aforesaid background, accused has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to setaside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by the court below. 5. Vide order dated 27.9.2019, this Court suspended the substantive sentence imposed by the court below subject to petitioner’s depositing 50% of the compensation amount within a period of four weeks, however fact remains that aforesaid order never came to be complied with despite sufficient opportunity. On 25.8.2022, petitioner came present before this Court and stated that he is ready and willing to make the entire compensation amount awarded by the court below within three months and as such, this Court adjourned the matter for 5.12.2022, however fact remains that even on that day also, petitioner accused failed to make the payment good and by way of indulgence, this Court adjourned the matter for today’s date. 6. Since today petitioner accused has neither come present nor has complied with order dated 27.9.2019, this Court has no option but to decide the petition on its own merits. Mr. Rajeshwar Thakur, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-accused submits that despite repeated communications, petitioner is not coming forward to impart instructions and as such, this Court may proceed to decide the petition on its own merits. 7. Having perused material available on record, especially evidence led on record by the respective parties, this Court is not persuaded to agree with Mr. Rajeshwar Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner that courts below have not appreciated the evidence in its right perspective, rather same being based upon the proper appreciation of facts as well as law calls for no interference. 8. In the case at hand, at no point of time, petitioner disputed the factum with regard to his having issued cheque to the complainant, rather his defence simplicitor as put forth was that cheque in question was issued as security, but same was misused. While making his statement under Section 313 Cr.PC, accused admitted issuance of cheque as well as signatures thereupon. He claimed that though he had returned the entire money borrowed by him from the complainant, but yet he failed to return the cheque obtained by him as security and subsequently, he mis-used the same. While making his statement under Section 313 Cr.PC, accused admitted issuance of cheque as well as signatures thereupon. He claimed that though he had returned the entire money borrowed by him from the complainant, but yet he failed to return the cheque obtained by him as security and subsequently, he mis-used the same. Since there is no dispute, if any, with regard to issuance of cheque as well as signature thereupon of petitioner, presumption as available under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act comes into play, which clearly provides that there is presumption available in favour of the holder of the cheque that same was issued in discharge of the lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but for that purpose, accused is/was under obligation to raise probable defence. Probable defence could be raised by the accused by referring to the documents adduced on record by the complainant or by leading some cogent and convincing evidence. However, in the case at hand, accused, despite ample opportunities, failed to raise the probable defence. 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to 25 of the judgment herein:- “23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities. 24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant. 25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.” 10. If the entire evidence led on record by the complainant is read in its entirety, it clearly suggests that he successfully proved all the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act. While examining himself as CW1, complainant successfully proved on record that since accused owed sum of Rs. 4.00 lac to him, he with a view to discharge his lawful liability issued the cheque in question amounting to Rs. 4.00 lac., but same was dishonoured on account of insufficient funds vide memo Ext.C/2. He also proved on record that before instituting proceedings under Section 138 of the Act, he had issued registered demand notice (Ext.C-3) to the accused on 25.10.2012 as is evident from postal receipt Ext.C-4. Since despite notice, accused neither sent any reply nor made the payment, he had no option but to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act. Cross-examination conducted upon this witness, if perused in its entirety, clearly suggests that accused was unable to extract something contrary to what he stated in his examination-in-chief. Accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.PC nowhere disputed factum with regard to his having issued the cheuqe, rather he claimed that cheque was issued as security. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that accused had issued a blank cheque to the complainant’s father as security for repayment of Rs. 3.00 lac. He submitted that loan was though repaid, but yet complainant misused the cheque by filling it for Rs.4.00 lac. However, aforesaid stand taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner never came to be proved in accordance with law. To the contrary, complainant while examining himself as CW1 categorically testified that he had borrowed sum of Rs. 3.00 lac. He submitted that loan was though repaid, but yet complainant misused the cheque by filling it for Rs.4.00 lac. However, aforesaid stand taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner never came to be proved in accordance with law. To the contrary, complainant while examining himself as CW1 categorically testified that he had borrowed sum of Rs. 4.00 lac from him, for which he had issued cheque Ext.C-1, which was subsequently dishonoured. 11. Accused besides examining himself also examined official namely Kamal Raj as DW1 from SBI Branch Kotkhai, who deposed that payment of the cheque amounting to Rs. 90,000/-was made in favour of the complainant, whereas payment of cheque amounting to Rs. 2.10,000/- was made in favour of the complainant’s father. He submitted that both these cheques pertain to year 2010 and were drawn at SBI Branch Kotkhai. If the statement made by this witness is perused in its entirety, it can be safely inferred that accused miserably failed to connect the payment made through cheques Ext.DW1/A and Ext.DW1/ with the present cheque Ext. C- 1. 12. Moreover, by now it is well settled that dishonour of cheque issued as security can also attract offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Sripati Singh v. State of Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No. 1269-1270 of 2021, decided on 28.10.2021, has held as under: “16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial transaction cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper under every circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the state of being safe and the security given for a loan is something given as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to which the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer the payment of amount, the cheque which is issued as security would mature for presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to present the same. On such presentation, if the same is dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section 138 and the other provisions of N.I. Act would flow. 13. Having scanned the entire evidence led on record, this Court finds that respondent/complainant successfully proved on record that cheque in question was issued by the accused in discharge of his lawful liability, but same was dishonored on account of insufficient funds. Since despite notice, accused failed to make the payment good within the stipulated time of 15 days, complainant had no option but to initiate the proceedings under Section 138 of the Act. 14. In the case at hand, complainant successfully proved on record all the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act and as such, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the courts below while holding the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and as such, same has been rightly upheld by the learned Sessions Judge Shimla. 15. Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held as under:- “In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 16. Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if any, committed by the courts below while passing impugned judgments, and as such, there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power. 17. True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below. 18. Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid reason to interfere with the well reasoned finding recorded by the courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld. 19. Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself before the learned trial Court forthwith to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction, if any, stands vacated. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.