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2023 DIGILAW 905 (MP)

Trimurti Charitable Public Trust v. Muni Kumar Razdan

2023-11-08

SUNITA YADAV

body2023
JUDGMENT 1. The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant under section 96 of Civil Procedure Code (for brevity, CPC) assailing the judgment and decree dated 12.3.2018 passed by VI Additional District Judge, District Gwalior in civil Suit No. 14-A/2014, by which, the civil suit for declaration of title, permanent injuction as well as cancellation of order of Registrar Public Trust dated 10.11.99 filed by respondent No.-1/plaintiff Muni Kumar Razdan was decreed. 2. For the sake of convinience the respondent No.-1 will be addressed as the plaintiff and the appellants and respondents No.-2 and 3 will be addressed as the defendants hereinafter. 3. It is not disputed between the parties that plaintiff Muni Kumar and Chaitanya Kumar (since dead) were real brothers. Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan was the father and Khemrani Razdan was the mother of plaintiff Muni Kumar and his brother Chaitanya Kumar. Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan died on 28.10.99 and Chaitanya Kumar died on 4.7.99. Khemrani Razdan died before the death of her husband Maharaj Narayan. 4. Brief facts of the case leading to filing of this appeal are that the plaintiff filed this civil suit seeking declaration to the effect that the order dated 10.11.1999 be declared as null and void so also he be declared exclusive owner of property shown under attached map as "A" and it is to be declared not to be of property of public trust and also sought injunction against defendant and in the alternative relief prayed for possession so also mesne profit to the tune of rupees 2,000/- per month. As per plaint pleadings, Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan and his family were one of the reputed, renouned and educated family in the City of Gwalior (M.P.) and are having their owned movable and immovable property situated at Roshani Ghar Road, Lashkar, District Gwalior (M.P.) which was in existence from the time of Gwalior State, which is shown in the plaint map by green line marking the same as 'A' (herein after called as disputed property) and on rest of the portion of the property their tenant are residing. Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan, who was working as Military Doctor has also started his own clinic at Daulatganj, Lashkar, District Gwalior (M.P.), which was ran by him till his death and also resided in the disputed property along with his family till he died on 4.7.1994. 5. Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan, who was working as Military Doctor has also started his own clinic at Daulatganj, Lashkar, District Gwalior (M.P.), which was ran by him till his death and also resided in the disputed property along with his family till he died on 4.7.1994. 5. The plaintiff started his business in Gwalior and has expanded the same upto Mumbai and thereafter, the plaintiff has settled in Mumbai and has been living in Mumbai for last more than 25 years along with his two daughters. Hence, the plaintiff is residing at Mumbai and come occasionally at Gwalior as and when his brother or his parents called him. During his life time, Dr. Razdan managed the property in questions, and before Dr. Razdan his wife expired on 19.7.1993, thereafter on 4.7.1994 Dr. Razdan has died. The elder son of Dr. Razdan i.e. Chetanya Razdan was a highly educated person, but he used to spend the money lavishly and spend most of his life time in enjoyment and amusement. He was very short tempered and also in shortage of money all the time, hence, to to meet his demand of money, he used to demand money from the plaintiff as well as his parents. Chetanya Razdan had bitter relationship with his parents as he used to torture and harass his parents for demand of money, due to which, the parents of the plaintiff were very unhappy by the unusual and unexpected behaviour of Chetanya Razdan, therefore, they started neglecting him and loved the plaintiff, due to which, Chetanya Razdan developed enmity with the plaintiff. The plaintiff, thereafter, used to visit Gwalior on a call given by his parents only. 6. It has also been pleaded in the plaint that after the death of plaintiff's father, Chetanya Razdan became alone and due to bad and unwanted habits of living a lavish life and doing extravagent expenditure unnecessarily, Chetanya Razdan suffered Glucoma in his eyes, due to which, before the death of his parents, he became blind and on account of the same, his behaviour was very abnormal and physically as well as mentally he became very week and short tempered and thereafter, he died. Before death, Chetanya Razdan became very short tempered and to fulfill his demand of money for living a lavish life, he felt need for some help and taking advantage of the same defendant Nos. Before death, Chetanya Razdan became very short tempered and to fulfill his demand of money for living a lavish life, he felt need for some help and taking advantage of the same defendant Nos. 1 to 4 with the help and cooperation of one Manoj Sharma and Lady Nazma had made two forged, fabricated and concocted documents. Firstly, they made a forged and fabricated Will dated 11/03/1994 in the name of Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan in relation to property of plaintiff's father and thereafter by making forged and fabricated signature of Chetanya Razdan dated 16/01/1998 has created a Forged Trust Deed in regard to entire movable and immovable property of the plaintiff's father and having hand in glove and in connivance with the then Registrar Shri J.C. Bhatt on 7.11.1999 a forged resolution was passed and with the help of forged Trust deed, the disputed property was declared as Public Trust Property and after the death of Chetanya Razdan on 28.10.1999 on the basis of forged and fabricated resolution dated 7.11.1999, the disputed property was declared as Public Trust Property and the defendants No. 1 to 4 become Trustees of the said Trust, though the fact remains that no application /affidavit/prayer was made by Chetanya Razdan for creation of said Public Trust, but it was found that the said affidavit/application was given by defendent Sanjay Gupta on 19.5.1998, in which, neither plaintiff nor Chetanya Razdan was party. 7. It has further been pleaded that in the life time of Chetanya Razdan, neither any enquiry was carried out in regard to property of the plaintiff's father, nor any statement of Chetanya Razdan was recorded before the Registrar, nor plaintiff was issued any notice and nor the said forged, fabricated and concocted Will was produced before the Registrar, but by mentioning false and fabricated facts in the application /affidavit filed by said Sanjay Gupta, the Chetanya Razdan was shown as exclusive owner of property of plaintiff's father and the order dated 10.11.1999 was passed in favour of defendants in connivance with the then Registrar J.C. Bhatt, possibility of which, cannot be ruled out. 8. 8. It has also been pleaded that after receiving information of Chetanya's death dated 28.10.1999, the plaintiff along with his family members came to his ancestral place in Gwalior for the cremation of Chetanya, but on the spot, the defendants Sanjay Gupta, Yashwant Rai and other members were present who created hindrance in the cremation of Chetanya Razdan, thereafter, plaintiff had lodged a report in the Inderganj police station, District Gwalior and thereafter, the plaintiff was allowed to do cremation of the deceased Chetanya. After completion of cremation, when the plaintiff tried to enter into his residential home at Gwalior, at that time, the plaintiff was not permitted to enter into his own residential home at Gwalior and on investigation, the plaintiff came to know for the first time after 28.10.1999 that disputed property was illegally taken over by the defendants in their possession with the help of Manoj Sharma, Najma, etc. and the defendants have taken over possession of all the movable and immovable property in a planned manner with the help of the above mentioned fake documents. 9. It has also been pleaded in the plaint that Chetanya had never submitted any application for formation of a trust before his death, but this application was found to have been submitted by the defendant Sanjay Gupta on 19.5.1998, in which, the plaintiff and Chetanya were not parties. Neither Chetanya's statement was made during this period nor he appeared before the Public Trust Registrar, nor any investigation was done regarding property of plaintiff, nor any notice was given to the plaintiff, nor the fake Will made in the name of Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan was presented before the Registrar. It has also been pleaded that when plaintiff made a report to the police in this regard an action was initiated by the police, then to save himself from the crime, a suit was presented in the court on 18.11.1999 in which prayer for temporary injunction was made. The plaintiff has filed his reply in the said suit filed by the defendants. The plaintiff has filed his reply in the said suit filed by the defendants. It has also been pleaded that the order dated 10.11.1999 is void and illegal and the rules 1 to 8 made under section 5 of Public Trust Act and rules 1 to 17 made under section 8 of Public Trust Act have not been followed and passed the order dated 10.11.1999, which is illegal, arbitrary and against the settled principles of law and the same deserves to be declared as null and void. 10. It has also been pleaded that there was no need to give notice to the defendants, but still the plaintiff gave a notice dated 12-3-2000 to the Madhya Pradesh State & Registrar Public Trust and defendant Sanjay Gupta prior to two months for vacation of the suit premises before presentation of the suit and within a period of six months from the date of passing the order dated 10.11.1999, the present suit was filed. If Madhya Pradesh State & Registrar Public Trust wishes to become party to the suit then in such case, the plaintiff reserves the right to make them party. The defendants are taking free benefit from the property of the plaintiff's family with the help of nefarious elements and are enjoying the looted property and the entire immovable property is being destroyed/sold by them. 11. It has also been pleaded that defendants conspired to acquire the property kept in the name of the plaintiff's parents by making Chetanya Razdan as the sole heirs of the locker number 32 of Central Bank of India, Branch Jayendraganj, Lashkar, District Gwalior (M.P.) and on getting information, plaintiff immediately informed the bank about the same. After exposure of this conspiracy, defendant Sanjay Gupta falsified the documents of the proceedings of this conspiracy and made it disputed by striking out the names of Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan and the plaintiff in locker number 32. It has also been pleaded that the property in question belonged to Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan and Mrs. Khemrani Razdan and after their death the plaintiff and his elder brother Chetanya were to get half share each and there was never any partition between them and the alleged fake will and the alleged fake trust deed are untouched by the plaintiff and hence the alleged will and trust deed are fake, null and void. Khemrani Razdan and after their death the plaintiff and his elder brother Chetanya were to get half share each and there was never any partition between them and the alleged fake will and the alleged fake trust deed are untouched by the plaintiff and hence the alleged will and trust deed are fake, null and void. It has also been stated that although as per law, the property in dispute should be considered to be the property of the plaintiff and in alternatively the plaintiff is entitled to get the possession of the residential disputed property which is shown by the green line marking 'A' in the plaint map. The defendant does not have the status of a settler, and alleged fake will is unproven. 12. It has also been pleaded that the said trust deed is based on a fake will, letter of probate for such trust and will must be obtained under section 11 of the Public Trust Act before registration of the trust. In the absence of which the trust cannot be registered and the order dated 10.11.1999 is void and liable to be quashed. It has also been pleaded that in the place in dispute, defendant No.1- Sanjay Gupta has been living with his family for last 12-13 years and is also running his advocacy business from this place. Therefore, till the time of getting the possession, the plaintiff is also entitled to receive interim benefit at the rate of Rs 15000/- per month. The order dated 10.11.1999 passed by the Registrar of Public Trust is liable to be dismissed. The plaintiff had presented the writ petition bearing W.P. No. 789/2000 before this Court which was allowed on 19.6.2000 and against this decision the defendants No. 1 & 2 presented LPA bearing number- 156/2000 which was allowed vide order dated 29.3.2004, in which the civil suit number 30-A/1999 presented by the defendants along with the plaintiff was ordered to be decided by an analogous decision by consolidating it and this order was confirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court in SLP No. 16046/2004. Therefore, after the discovery of the conspiracy that took place at the time of cremation of Chetanya after 28.10.1999 and against the information given in the order dated 10.11.1999, the suit for property in question needed to be presented within 6 months and the cause of action has arisen. Therefore, after the discovery of the conspiracy that took place at the time of cremation of Chetanya after 28.10.1999 and against the information given in the order dated 10.11.1999, the suit for property in question needed to be presented within 6 months and the cause of action has arisen. On the basis of aforesaid, plaintiff prayed to allow the suit. 13. The defendants No. 1 & 2 have jointly filed the written statetement and the defendant No.4 has separately filed the written statement and apart from the admitted facts, have specifically denied the pleadings made in the plaint. It has been stated that the property under dispute was purchased by late Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan and Mrs. Khemrani from Sardar Sarjerao son of Shri Apa Saheb Sitole through a registered sale deed dated 27.2.1953. Therefore, this property was not the property of his ancestors but of his sole ownership and possession. The actual location of the spot has not been shown by the plaintiff in Nazari Map and such property does not exist at the spot. There is no part shown with green line in the copy of the map nor any tenant of the Razdan family is residing in the disputed property. It has been argued that Chetanya Kumar, being a philosopher, lived a social and philanthropic life and discharged his responsibilities by participating in the happiness and sorrow of every person. 14. It has also been pleaded that Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan and Mrs. Khemrani had given the plaintiff's share of the property to him through a deed of donation. After which Muni Kumar got the money by selling it to Premnarayan Agarwal. It is also stated that the above mentioned two parents had given part of their property to Chetanya Kumar Razdan through a registered donation deed dated 31.3.1970 and through a will dated 11.3.1994, they had given their property to Chetanya Kumar and Chetanya during his life time had executed the Trust Deed dated 16.1.98 in his full senses and understanding without undue influence and coercion and was present in the office of Sub- Registrar for execution of the same. The Photographs of all the trustees including Chetanya Kumar were affixed on Trust deed and after getting them identified by the subregistrar, signatures and thumb impressions of all were taken and Trust deed was registered which was duly signed by the trustees as consentors and on the basis of which the trust has been duly registered by the Registrar, Public Trust in relation to the entire property of Mr. Chetanya Kumar, in which the plaintiff has no right to interfere and after the transfer, the entire property will be transferred to the Trust which is in the true ownership and possession of the Trust. 15. It has also been pleaded that during lifetime of plaintiff's parent, the partition of the property in question was done on the basis of metes and bounds and the plaintiff got his share of the property and in lieu of share of the property the plaintiff got the money and thereafter, he had shifted to Bombay. The plaintiff had no attachment with his parents and brother Chetanya Kumar and the plaintiff wanted to harass Chetanya Kumar and wanted to take him along with him to Bombay so that he could take over the illegal possession over the movable and immovable property of Chetanya Kumar situated in Gwalior. Plaintiff's father did not have cordial relations with the plaintiff, but on the contrary, they have good and cordial relationship with Chetanya Kumar, due to which, plaintiff's father used to live with Chetanya Kumar in Gwalior. The plaintiff used to behave rudely with his parents and Chetanya Kumar. Due to this, the plaintiff's father had deprived Muni Kumar of his inheritance and Chetanya Kumar had formed the Public Interest Trust to avoid plaintiff's interference in his property. Chetanya Kumar had definitely become helpless due to his eye problem, but his behavior was peaceful and he knew about good and bad and he was also familiar with every kind of worldly affairs. Defendants No. 1 to 4 had domestic relationship with late Shri Maharaj Narayan Razdan and for this reason they were made the trustees. 16. Chetanya Kumar had definitely become helpless due to his eye problem, but his behavior was peaceful and he knew about good and bad and he was also familiar with every kind of worldly affairs. Defendants No. 1 to 4 had domestic relationship with late Shri Maharaj Narayan Razdan and for this reason they were made the trustees. 16. It has also been stated that the order dated 10.11.99 passed by the Registrar Public Trust was published in the gazette notification of the Trust and before the said order was passed, the general information was also affixed on the public domain and the information regarding the passing of the said order was not necessary to be given to the plaintiff. It has also been pleaded that the plaintiff has no right to file the present suit for raising objection regarding trust registration, because before the presentation of the suit, the remedy for raising the objection before the Registrar of Trusts was available to the plaintiff under the Public Trust Act. The objection has not been taken up before the Registrar. herefore this suit is not maintainable. Apart from this, Registrar, Public Trust as well as Manoj Kumar and Najma are necessary party in this case, but not making the party to the aforesaid, the suit filed by the plaintiff deserves to be dismissed. It has also been pleaded that it is not legally necessary to obtain probate from any Cour to claim title on the basis of the will in respect of the property situated in the state of Madhya Pradesh. It has also been pleaded that contradictory statements have been made by the plaintiff in paragraph No. 7 of the plaint that will dated 11.3.94 and the registered trust deed 16.1.94 are fake and forged and the signature made on the trust deed of Chetanya Kumar is fake, concocted and forged. On the other hand, the plaintiff by luring Chetanya Kumar and by taking unfair and undue advantage of his weak physical and mental condition stated himself to be the owner of the disputed property. 17. It has also been pleaded that after the death of Maharaj Narayan Razdan, the plaintiff tried to extort money by assaulting Chetanya Kumar, against which, Chetanya Kumar filed a written complaint against the plaintiff in Police Station Inderganj on 22.4.96. 17. It has also been pleaded that after the death of Maharaj Narayan Razdan, the plaintiff tried to extort money by assaulting Chetanya Kumar, against which, Chetanya Kumar filed a written complaint against the plaintiff in Police Station Inderganj on 22.4.96. On getting information about this, the plaintiff immediately fled away to Bombay on the same day, which shows that there were not cordial relationship between the plaintiff and his brother Chetanya Kumar. 18. It has also been pleaded that the precious jeweleries were kept in the locker of Central Bank of India, situated at Jayendraganj, Lashkar branch, Gwalior and the same are kept even today in the said Bank and the trust property is not being tampered, damaged or sold by the trustees, whereas, the plaintiff by selling the trust property on throw away rates to anti- social elements by claiming the same of his ownership wanted to run away to Mumbai. It has also been pleaded that plaintiff had asked the tenants to pay the rent to plaintiff only, but instead of paying the rent to the plaintiff, the tenants are paying the rent to the Trust. A suit was presented by the Trust regarding interference by the plaintiff in the property under dispute, due to which, the plaintiff has filed the present suit. The Registrar, Public Trust has duly taken action in its ex officio capacity and the suit filed by the plaintiff is time barred. The plaintiff should have submitted advelorum court fee on the basis of market value of the suit property of Rs. 10 lakh, in the absence of which, the suit is liable to be dismissed. Registrar, Public Trust Manoj Kumar and Najma have not been made parties by the plaintiff in the suit, who are exorbitantly important and necessary parties, on this count also, the suit filed by the plaintiff deserves to be dismissed. On these grounds, prayed to dismiss the suit filed by the plaintiff. 19. On the basis of pleadings, learned VI Additional District Judge, District Gwalior has framed as many as 13 issues and directed the parties to lead their oral and documentary evidence. On these grounds, prayed to dismiss the suit filed by the plaintiff. 19. On the basis of pleadings, learned VI Additional District Judge, District Gwalior has framed as many as 13 issues and directed the parties to lead their oral and documentary evidence. After recording the evidence of both the parties, learned trial court allowed the civil suit filed by the plaintiff and declared the order dated 10.11.1999 passed by the Registrar, Public Trust as null and void and directed the defendants to hand over the peaceful possession of the disputed property to the plaintiff within a period of one month and further directed the defendant No. 2/Sanjay Gupta to pay Rs. 15,000/- per month to the plaintiff as mesne profits from 05/05/2000 till the vacant possession of the disputed property is handed over to the plaintiff. Hence, this first appeal. 20. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the impugned judgment and decree is manifest illegal, arbitrary that too without jurisdiction, hence, liable to be set aside. The judgment writing of the trial court is against the section 101 to 104 of the Indian Evidence Act treating the defendant being plaintiff, who has to prove case has evaluate the evidence and committed serious error of law. The learned trial court exceeds it jurisdiction while granting the decree for mesne profit to the tune of rupees 15000/- P.M. contrary to prayer asked by plaintiff himself that too without any evidence in this regard. The learned trial court further erred in law in granting mesne profit @ Rs.15000/- per month since 6.5.2000 i.e. institution of plaint till possession is delivered against the order dated 26.4.2017. 21. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that it is also worth notable that undisputedly the property in question forms part of the trust deed i.e. Ex. D-9 and no prayer is made to declare Ex. D-9 as null & void nor the same has been declared by the learned trial court. Therefore, the possession of the appellants cannot be said to be illegal upon which the learned trial court directed payment of mesne profit. 22. D-9 and no prayer is made to declare Ex. D-9 as null & void nor the same has been declared by the learned trial court. Therefore, the possession of the appellants cannot be said to be illegal upon which the learned trial court directed payment of mesne profit. 22. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that the trust deed dated 16.1.1998 is registered document and has been executed by the Chetanya Kumar Razdan, who has authority to execute the same, but no relief seeking setting side or avoiding such deed was asked by the plaintiff, (without admitting anything contain) as per averments itself, the deed may be voidable, but is good till set aside by competent court of law. Hence, the trial court has committed serious error of law in decreeing the suit declaring the plaintiff to be exclusive owner of the property without setting aside or declaring the trust deed dated 16.1.1998 to be void. It is further argued that Learned trial court has relied over the document Ex. P-71 and 72 (Notary Register of Late Vidhya Tambat) in the cross examination of the defendant No.7 Gopal Das Goyal, and objection regarding admissibility of such document was raised as it is photocopy (which is so mentioned in para No. 13 and 20 of PW-7), same objection was kept open for decision of Court, but despite delivering final judgment the court has not decided such objection, hence the judgment is vitiated having been incomplete in the eye of law, beside such documents could not have been relied on. 23. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that the defendant has duly proved will Ex. D-80 (D-14) and D -81 (D-13) as per requirement of law and called attesting witness Gopal Das Goyal DW-7 and Prakash Narayan Shrivastava S/o Ramswaroop Shrivastava as DW-2, so also as per case of plaintiff regarding bad relation of executants with plaintiff, itself shows the circumstances in which a prudent man can execute will" but learned trial court only applying surmises and conjecture doubted the will. 24. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that no notice under section 80 of the C.P.C. was given to before filing civil suit challenging the order passed by Registrar Public Trust that too without impleading the Registrar Public Trust as Party. 24. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that no notice under section 80 of the C.P.C. was given to before filing civil suit challenging the order passed by Registrar Public Trust that too without impleading the Registrar Public Trust as Party. He also submits that the Registrar Public Trust discharge its public duty and while exercising such power he is public officer, hence he is necessary or proper party but has not been impelded and without impleading the Registrar Public Trust suit itself was not maintainable. The provision of sub-section 2 of section 8 of the Trust Act is not applicable, hence, the Registrar was necessary party, plaintiff having failed, his suit must have been dismissed. 25. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that vide Ex. D-26 notice dated 18.9.1998 Chetanya Kumar Razdan through his counsel Anil Agrawal had duly given to Muni Kumar Razdan, such notice was not considered by trial Court saying its postal receipt does not show clear address, but did not peruse Ex P-50 which is the postal envelop bearing postal receipt No. 1606 dated 18.9.1998 submit plaintiff himself, but trial court ignored to consider this aspect and committed serious error of law by creating unnecessary doubts. 26. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that learned trial Court has failed to appreciate legal position and committed error of law that the trust deed is registered deed which was not sought to be canceled or declaring it to be void and till such deed is not canceled, Muni Kumar Razdan cannot be a successor of Chetanya Kumar, then the constitution of trust to the extent of share of Chetanya Kumar Razdan is valid as the trust deed shows his intention to create trust but this aspect has totally been ignored by trial Court. 27. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that the share which was received by Muni Kumar Razdan from his father has been sold by him to one Prem Narayan then till Muni Kumar Razdan prove himself to be a successor of Chetanya Razdan, he has no locus to file suit itself as he has not civil right which could have been decided, and Chetanya Kumar Razdan had already executed trust deed (Ex. D-9A) then any person interested in public trust can file application, but in the case in hand, the application was filed during life time of Chetanya Kumar Razdan and he himself was appeared before Public Trust Registrar then Muni Kumar has no locus to file a suit having no cause of action. 28. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that learned trial Court has also failed to understand the setted law that as per section 101 and 102 the burden to prove the will to be forged was on the plaintiff as he is saying it to be forged. Registered trust deed was very important, but plaintiff intentionally did not challenge such trust deed, hence on the vague suit and relief asked in the plaint the sult has been decreed. 29. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that Trial Court has failed to appreciate evidence and evidence of Dr. Sethia has totally been misinterpreted, the witness Dr. Sethia having expertise in medical eye side field, he has given evidence that the Chetanya Kumar has weak eyes, but he was not blind and there is distinction between blind and weak eye side and Dr. Sethia has also given statement that Chetanya was sound mind, but same has been discarded by Court for not good reason. 30. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that the findings in para No.53 are perverse, because it is beyond the jurisdiction of court and it can be dealt with by the Registrar, Public Trust or on the request of the Registrar, Public Trust or any trustee under the direction of public trust, but trial Court on the instance of stranger cannot looked into the working performance to achieve and not to achieve the object of the trust. 31. It is further argued that Learned trial Court by misreading decision of Supreme Court in case of Abdul Karim and other v. Municipal Committee Raipur reported in AIR 1965 SC page No.1744 has said that suit under section 8 is maintainable. It is further argued that no notice under section 80 of C.P.C. was ever issued before filing the suit. Trial court in para No. 58 has said that in W.P. the State Government was appeared and given finding that notice was issued, whereas, no such evidence was produced like as to postal received or acknowledge, hence, such finding is perverse. 32. Trial court in para No. 58 has said that in W.P. the State Government was appeared and given finding that notice was issued, whereas, no such evidence was produced like as to postal received or acknowledge, hence, such finding is perverse. 32. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that the suit was filed seeking declaration to the effect that order dated 10.11.1999 to be void, but neither such order was produced by plaintiff nor was exhibited before trial Court, but trial Court without having such order has said it to be void which is totally illegal. The findings of trial court on issue No. 7 is totally illegal and arbitrary, because when the High Court granted permission to the court for issuing notice under section 8(2) of M.P. Public Trust Act, till then the suit was under section 8 of the Such Act 1951, but after converting such suit into under section 9 of the C.P.C. regular suit, the notice is necessary. The issue in regard to limitation has also wrongly decided by trial court, and committed jurisdictional error to discuss the suit on merit. On these grounds, prayed to allow the instant first appeal filed by the appellants. 33. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1/defendant supported the impugned judgment passed by the court below and prayed for dismissal of the instant appeal being bereft of merit and substance. 34. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the materials available on record. 35. In this case, it is not disputed that property in dispute was originally owned by Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan and his wife Khemrani Razdan who are the father and mother respectively of Munikumar Razdan and the deceased Chetanya Kumar Razdan. It is also not in dispute that Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan died on 4.7.1994 before the death of his wife Khemrani Razdan. Thus, unless the execution of alleged wills by Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan and Khemrani Razdan and constitution of trust by Chaitanya Kumar are proved, Chetanya Razdan and Munikumar Razdan would become owners of 1/2 share each of the property of Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan and Khemrani Razdan and after death of Chaitanya Kumar Razdan the plaintiff Muni Kumar would be the sole owner of property. 36. Maharaj Narayan Razdan and Khemrani Razdan and constitution of trust by Chaitanya Kumar are proved, Chetanya Razdan and Munikumar Razdan would become owners of 1/2 share each of the property of Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan and Khemrani Razdan and after death of Chaitanya Kumar Razdan the plaintiff Muni Kumar would be the sole owner of property. 36. It is a settled position of law that the burden of proof of execution of a Will as also to remove the suspicious circumstances attached to execution of such Will always lies on the propounder of the Will who has to prove the due execution of Will as per the provisions of sections 63 of Indian Sucession Act and section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act. Propounder of will has to remove the suspicious circumstances from the mind of the court by cogent and satisfactory evidence as laid down by the apex Court in the cases of Girja Datt Singh v. Gangotri Datt Singh reported in AIR 1955 SC 346 , Janki Narayan Bhoir v. Narayan Namdeo Kadam, AIR 2003 SC 761 . In the case of Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. Smt. Amrit Kaur and Ors., AIR 1977 SC 74 the apex Court held that: " (a) In cases where the execution.of a will is shrouded in suspicion its proof ceases to be a simple lis between the plaintiff and the defendant. What generally is an adversary proceeding becomes in such cases a matter of the court's conscience. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the initial onus heavier and, therefore, in cases where the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the will excite the suspicion of the Court the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicions before the document can he accepted as the last will of the testator." 37. In the case in hand execution of wills is also required to be proved for the right to creat the Public Trust involving disputed property. If wills are not proved then the alleged creators of trust Chaitanya Kumar would not have right for ceation of trust involving disputed property as Chaitanya Kumar was not the sole owner of property inherited by his parents. 38. In this case, the defendants claimed that deceased Khemrani executed Ex. Will D-14 and Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan executed will Ex. D-13. 38. In this case, the defendants claimed that deceased Khemrani executed Ex. Will D-14 and Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan executed will Ex. D-13. Therefore, as per aforesaid settled principle of law, the burden is on defendants to prove the said Wills as per the provisions of section 63 of Indian Succession Act and section 68 of Indian Evidence Act. 39. Defendant Sanjay Gupta has been examined as DW-1. This witness has deposed that Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan executed a Will Ex. D-13 in favour of Chetanya Razdan and Khemrani executed will Ex.-D-14. As per the contents of alleged will executed by Khemrani Razdan, if her death occures before the death of her husband then her share in the property would be given to her husband Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan and if Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan dies before the death of Khemrani Razdan then Chetanya Razdan would get her share in the property. It is not disputed that Khemrani Razdan died before her husband Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan, therefore, as per her alleged Will Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan owned her share in the property. In his affidavit of examination in chief dated 2.1.2014, defendant Sanjay Gupta deposed that both the said wills are in possession of plaintiff Munikumar Razdan, therefore, the application dated 13.11.2013 was filed under section 65-A of Evidence Act for admission of copy of the Wills as secondary evidence alleging that the plaintiff took the original Will Ex. D-13 & D-14 to Mumbai and are in his possession. In support of that application, an affidavit of one Sunil Palway S/o Rao Saheb was filed stating therein that on 01.4.2013, Munikumar Razdan had come to his photocopy shop for getting the photo copies of the wills done and after getting photo copies of the wills done, he handed over the original Wills to Munikumar Razdan, who kept the same into his bag. However, contrary to his earliar version defendant – Sanjay Gupta filed an application for calling Sunil Shukla said to be the domestic help of Chetanya Razdan as a witness stating therein that the wills are in possession of Sunil Shukla. 40. Sunil Shukla-DW/6 in his statement deposed that he was working with Chetanya Razdan from 1997 to 1999 as a domestic help. His duties were to answer door bell, make tea, payment of telephone bills etc. 40. Sunil Shukla-DW/6 in his statement deposed that he was working with Chetanya Razdan from 1997 to 1999 as a domestic help. His duties were to answer door bell, make tea, payment of telephone bills etc. As per this witness, Chetanya Razdan handed over him two Wills for keeping it into safe custody. In September, 2014, defendant-Sanjay Gupta came to meet him and he showed the said Wills to defendant-Sanjay Gupta. Thereafter, he was called for recording of the evidence. 41. The evidence of Sunil Shukla-DW/6 is highly un natural, improbable and does not gather the confidence because this witness was a temporary domestic help having no intimacy with Chatanya Kumar as reflected in his statement. According to this witness in November, 1999, he came to know about the death of Chetanya Razdan; however, he did not inform anyone about the said Wills and did not give the wills to defendant Sanjay Gupta when he had come to meet him in the year 2014. This witness at para 13 of his statement mentioned that he never gave the wills to anyone for getting it photocopied. In the light of his statement the evidence of defendants Sanjay Gupta becomes false that that Muni Kumar Razdan got the photocopies of wills done in a photocopy shop and thereafter kept them in his custody. 42. Under these circumstances, when the defendants had placed two contradictory stories in respect to the custody of alleged Wills Ex. D-13 & D-14, they are duty bound to remove the suspicious circumstances in regard to execution of the said Wills as having the prepounder of the wills. However, defendant Sanjay Gupta has failed to explain why in application under section 65-A of Evidence Act dated 13.11.2013, it was stated that the said Wills are in custody of Muni Kumar who took it to Mumbai and thereafter entirely changing the said story stated that the wills were given to the domestic help Sunil Shukla (DW-6). However, defendant Sanjay Gupta has failed to explain why in application under section 65-A of Evidence Act dated 13.11.2013, it was stated that the said Wills are in custody of Muni Kumar who took it to Mumbai and thereafter entirely changing the said story stated that the wills were given to the domestic help Sunil Shukla (DW-6). If original Wills were in possession of Munikumar Razdan, who got them photo copied from the shop of Sunil Palway and took them to Mumbai then the evidence of Sunil Shukla becomes false that he was in possession of the Wills because as per his statement, he never gave the said Wills for photo copy and if the Wills were in posession of Sunil Shukla-DW-6 then how Munikumar Razdan got the Wills for getting photocopies is unexplained. The defendant-Sanjay Gupta has also failed to explain how he got the knowledge that Wills are in possession of Sunil Shukla for almost 20 years, who was only a temporary domestic help of deceased Chetanya Razdan, without revealing the fact of custody of wills to anyone even after the death of\ Chetanya Razdan. Therefore, learned trial Court has not erred in disbeliving the execution of aforesaid Wills Ex. D-13 & D-14 as defendants failed to remove suspicious circumstances around the Wills as their propounder. 43. The defendants have examined Prakash Shrivastava (DW-2) and Gopal Das (DW-7) to prove the execution of the Wills. Prakash Shrivastava is son of Ramswaroop Shrivastava, one of the alleged attesting witness who had died. As per affidavit of examination of chief of this witness DW-2 Prakash Shrivastava, signatures of his father are there on the Wills Ex. D-13 & D-14 between the space marked as 'C' to 'C'. However, in his cross examination at para 12, this witness has admitted that affidavit of his examination-in-chief was prepared by the defendantSanjay Gupta and he simply signed on it without perusal of Ex. D-13 & D-14. This witness has further stated that before his evidence he had never seen the signature of his father. On 14.10.2015, this witness has deposed that his father signatures are on Ex. D-80 & D-81, however, he has failed to file any document for comparision of his father's signature. D-13 & D-14. This witness has further stated that before his evidence he had never seen the signature of his father. On 14.10.2015, this witness has deposed that his father signatures are on Ex. D-80 & D-81, however, he has failed to file any document for comparision of his father's signature. Under these circumstances, when this witness has specifically mentioned that before his evidence he had never seen the signature of his father, learned trial Court has not erred in disbelieving the evidence of this witness. 44. The second attesting witness Gopal Das, examined as DW-7, has deposed that Khemrani had signed the Will Ex. D-14, thereafter, Ramswaroop Shrivastava and this witness have signed the Will Ex. D-14. Similarly, this witness has deposed that Ex. D-13 was signed by Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan. Thereafter, Ramswaroop and this witness have made their signatures on it. According to this witness, the wills were notorized by Notary Mrs. Vidya Tamat. 45. In view of evidence of DW -7 Gopal Das, notorial register Ex. P-71 becomes important. Simple reading of Ex. P-71 indicates that the entries in respect to the Will said to be executed by Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan is made at serial No. 224 on 11.3.1994/. From the naked eyes it can be seen that the entries are in a different ink on the bottom of the page. DW -7-Gopal Das has deposed that he had signed between the place marked as 'A' to 'A' on Ex. P-71 . However, the said entry is highly doubtful because the next entry is made on 10.3.1994, at the same serial No. i.e. 224, however, word 'A' is written before it. If the entries in respect to Will had been made at serial No. 224 on 11.3.1994, in that case the next entry ought to have been at next serial number i.e. Serial No. 225. Similarly after making any entry on 11.3.1994 at serial No. 224 next entry ought to have been made in respect to next date i.e. 12.3.1994. However, the next entry is made showing the previous date i.e. 10.3.1994. In the said register Ex. D-71, next entry at serial number 225 is made on 10.3.1994 and therefore, the entry made at seriol No. 224 showing the date 11.3.1994 becoms doubtful. However, the next entry is made showing the previous date i.e. 10.3.1994. In the said register Ex. D-71, next entry at serial number 225 is made on 10.3.1994 and therefore, the entry made at seriol No. 224 showing the date 11.3.1994 becoms doubtful. In view of above reasons, the entries in notorial register and the statement of Gopal Das regarding execution of Will is found to be unreliable. 46. DW-7 Gopal Das also deposed about his signing the notorial register Ex. P72 in respect to the Will Ex. D-14 on which notorial number 59 dated 11.1.1993 is mentioned. In notorial register Ex. P-72 serial number 59 is written on two places. In first place agreement to sale is written and thereafter, "to sale" has been cut and Will by Khemrani in favour of Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan is written. Thus the manipulation in notorial register to prove the entries of the alleged wills on it is very obvious. 47. The above circustance coupled with the fact that the production of the Will from the custody of Sunil Shukla (DW-6) is also highly suspicious, the execution of the Wills Ex. D-13 & D-14 is found to be unreliable. 48. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the trial court has relied over the Document Ex. P-71 and 72 (Notary Register) in the cross examination of the defendant No.7 Gopal Das Goyal, and objection regarding admissibility of such document was raised as it is a photocopy but same objection was kept open for decision of Court, but despite delivering final judgment the court has not decided such objection, hence the judgment is vitiated having been incomplete in the eye of law, beside such documents could not have been relied on. However, the above arguement is not acceptable because the perusal of record indicates that both the documents have been admitted by the author Gopal Das during his cross-examination which was appreciated by learned trial court in impugned judgement at paragraph 29 to 33. Therefore, even if for the sake of arguments same are believed to be photocopies then also the same is admissible in evidence as has been held in case of Zahira Siddiqui v. A Ramalingam reported in (2015) 1 sec 708 observing that: "23. Therefore, even if for the sake of arguments same are believed to be photocopies then also the same is admissible in evidence as has been held in case of Zahira Siddiqui v. A Ramalingam reported in (2015) 1 sec 708 observing that: "23. It is the plaintiff, who produced the xerox copy of the registered power of attorney, which was shown to the DW-1 during cross- examination, who admitted the signature in the power of attorney. All these relevant pieces of evidence have not been appreciated by the High Court in its right perspective. Instead of drawing adverse inference against the defendant, in not producing the original power of attorney, which was in their power and possession, the High court has committed grave error in holding that the power of attorney has not been proved as required under sections 65 and 66 of the Evidence Act. In our view, when the xerox copy of power of attorney produced by the plaintiff in evidence and the signature and the contents of the said power of attorney were admitted by the defendant, there was no question of proving the said document as required under the Evidence Act." 49. So far as the arguement regarding the non-deciding of objection Ex-D-71 and D-72 being photocopy is concerned, the said document was marked exhibit in evidence of defendant/appellant's witness and the documents are not merely photocopies but a copy certified by the notary and the defendant witnesse admitted the genuiness of the document and the respective signs on it. It is a settled law that document can be marked exhibit during examination of person who is a party to it, or who is author/ signatory of the same, or who is acquainted with the writing of the author. In accordance with said principle, plaintiff exhibited the notary register of the person who notarized the so- called will, during the examination of the attesting witnesses of the will. Therfore merely on the basis of mistake of court for not deciding the objection the party can not suffer. 50. Learned counsel for the appellant futher argued that most of the document marked exhibits by the plaintiff during the cross examination of defendant witnesses. However, this arguement has no weight because it is the out look of a party as to how he wishes to prove his case. 50. Learned counsel for the appellant futher argued that most of the document marked exhibits by the plaintiff during the cross examination of defendant witnesses. However, this arguement has no weight because it is the out look of a party as to how he wishes to prove his case. The party must be given full freedom to prove his case in the manner he wants unless the said manner is impermissible. 51. As discussed above, defendant has failed to prove allged will executed by Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan Ex. D-13 as well as Khemrani Rajdhan Ex. D-13; therefore, the the formation of trust is against the law because after the death of Maharaj Narayan Razdan and Khemrani Rajdhan their property devolved to both Chetanya Rajdhan and Muni Kumar Rajdhan in equal shares and after the death of Chetnya Kumar, plaintiff Muni Kumar Rajdhan became the sole owner of the property. 52. The question that Chetanya Kumar prepared the document of public trust is also doubtful in the light of the fact that he almost became blind due to glucoma. In the letters written by Chatanya Kumar Ex. D/11 and D/12 it is mentioned that Muni Kumar was taking advantages due to blindness of Chetanya Kumar. These letters were written in the year of 1996. Similarly, in Ex. D/12 it is written that Muni Kumar is taking advantage due to his being visually handicapped. Defendant Sanjay Gupta filed written statement in case No. 3-A/2010 (Ex. P/5) in which it is pleaded that Chetanya Kumar Rajdhan became blind much before 1990. The copy of Ex. P/45 was annexed in W.P. No. 5049 of 2011 by defendant trust supported by an affidavit of Sanjay Gupta. Even in Ex. P-65 the service report dated 19.9.1995 it is noted down that Chetanya Kumar informed that he was not able to see and therefore, Manoj Kumar received the notice and the notice was read over to Chetanya Kumar who refused to take the notice. This fact shows that Chetanya Kumar Rajdhan could not see in 1995. Therefore, learned trial Court has not erred in holding that at the time of execution of trust deed Ex. D-9, Chetanya Kumar Rajdhan was visually handicapped. 53. This fact shows that Chetanya Kumar Rajdhan could not see in 1995. Therefore, learned trial Court has not erred in holding that at the time of execution of trust deed Ex. D-9, Chetanya Kumar Rajdhan was visually handicapped. 53. As per the arguement of learned counse for appellants the trust deed was not put to challenge by the plaintiff and therefore, it can not be declared as null and void and it may be true that registration is faulty but merely by execution of trust deed, the property stood vested in the trustee by virtue of section 4 of Indian Trust Act. However, the above arguement is not teneble because the reading the plaint it is evident that ample pleadings are available on it to show that the said deed was challenged and claimed to be as null & void. It is trite law that the requirement of pleading is only to make the other party aware of what is being contested in the case and what is going to be adjudicated and the only purpose of the pleading is to make the other party aware of the case of the other party. Issues framed in this case clearly depicts what all has been challenged and the order Passed in LPA Court specifies what is under challenge. In the case of Bhagwati Prasad v. Shri Chandramaul, AIR 1966 SC 735 it is held:- "15 But cases may occur in which though a particular plea is not specifically included in the issues, parties might know that in substance, the said plea is being tried and might lead evidence about it. It is only in such a case where the Court is satisfied that the ground on which reliance is placed by on eorthe other of the parties , was in sub stance, at issue between them and that bot hof them have had opportunity to lead evidence about it at the trial and the formal requirement of pleadings can be relaxed.” 54. Even otherwise the documents relied upon by defendant are Wills and the Settlement /Trust Deed and both these documents are governed by Section 68 of Evidence act and therefore, the burden of proving the d oc u m e n t s lies upon the propounder and unless the same is discharged the document itself is not admissible and accordingly no pleading in that regard is required in the light of the provision of Order 6 rule 13 CPC wherein it is provided that:- "13. Presumptions of law-Neither party need in any pleading allege any matter of fact which the law presumes in his favour or as to which the burden_ of proof lies upon the other side unless the same has first been specifically denied.” 55. A will in favour of Chaitanya Kumar is not required to be necessarily challenged by the plaintiff as the burden of proving the will always lies upon the propounder i.e. defendant in the present case. Similar conclusion can also be drawn from the provision of Section 68 of the Evidence Act which distinguishes will from other documents by putting a Proviso which has the effect that admission of execution of other documents has the effect of proving of said documents but will is unaffected by any admission, as is governed by main part of the section 68 of Evidence Act. However, in the present case attesting witness mention in the deed Yogesh is different from the one examined before the court and therefore also the trust/ settlement deed is not found to be proved. In addition thereof the attesting witness Jagdish Shrivastav (DW-5) has not stated even in chief statement basic facts which are required for proving attestation, regarding presence of the other witness. The attesting witness stated that the author Chaitanya Razdan had read the document, however, as discussed above the author was visually handicapped. This witness has also stated that he is saying that the sign of Chaitanya are on the deed because Sanjay Gupta told him. In view of the above execution of trust deed by Chaitanya Razdan is not found to be proved. 56. This witness has also stated that he is saying that the sign of Chaitanya are on the deed because Sanjay Gupta told him. In view of the above execution of trust deed by Chaitanya Razdan is not found to be proved. 56. Under the provision of section 68 Evidence Act, just like will, trust deed which is basically in nature of settlement deed as mentioned LPA order and the deed itself, wherein C.K.Razdan is referred as settlor and deed as settlement deed, is required to be proved by an attesting witness to the said deed and in absence thereof the same is inadmissible in evidence, having no probative value the same does not create any cloud over title of the plaintiff and even not required to be cancelled as laid down in the case of Bharat Singh v. Kunwar Singh And Anr., AIR 1991, MP, 368 in which it is held: "Every single act of the Respondent does not give rise to challenge to title of Plaintiff, unless threat is caused to title by the act of Respondent." 57. In the case of Abdul Karim Khan v. Municipal Committee Raipur, AIR 1965 SC 1744 also it is laid down: "14 Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding_ that the Courts below were right in coming to the conclusion that the fact that the property now in suit was added to the list of properties belonging to the wakf, cannot affect the respondent's title to it." 58. As per the arguement of learned counsel for appellant registration of Trust could not have been cancelled and therefore the order is bad in law as the order was not mark as exhibit. In addition to the fact that non-marking of exhibit despite same being on record is a mistake on part of court and party cannot be punished for the same, the said argument has no legal sanction in eyes of law in light of findings of Supreme Court in Abdul Karim's Case (supra) wherein it has been specifically held that merely because name of one's property is included in the list of properties of trust issued by registrar do not affect title of such person. Accordingly, such title holder cannot be said to be effected by it and aggrieved by it to get it set aside. 59. Accordingly, such title holder cannot be said to be effected by it and aggrieved by it to get it set aside. 59. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that the suit was filed seeking declaration to the effect that order dated 10.11.1999 to be void, but neither such order was produced by plaintiff nor was exhibited before trial Court, but trial court without having such order has said it to be void which is totally illegal. However, the said argument is not teneble because in this case by perusal of impugned judgement from para 36 it is apparant that the entire record of the case was before the trial court. It is a settled principle law of law nonexhibition of document when the same was before the court is a mistake on the part of Court for which Party cannot be punished as has been held in case of Vimladevi v. National Insurance reported in (2019) 2 SCC 186 , which reads thus :- "20.8 Seventh, if the Court did not exhibit the documents despite the appellants referring them at the time of recording evidence then in such event, the appellants cannot be denied of their right to claim the compensation on such ground. In our opinion, it was nothing but a procedural lapse, which could not be made basis to reject the claim petition. It was more so when the appellants adduced oral and documentary evidence to prove their case and the respondents did nothing to counter them." 60. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the plaintiff was given the information about the formation of trust which is proved on the basis of Ex. D-12, D-13 and D-50. As per his aguement the plaintiff, during cross examination of defendant has admitted service of D-13 upon him by producing EX-P-50 (Envelope) and since Ex-D- 13 contains the averment regarding existence of Trust, Wills and since the same was written during the lifetime of Chaitanya Kumar Razdan and therefore by virtue of EX-D-13 plaintiff had been given knowledge of the existence of trust. 61. The said argument is not acceptable because the plaintiff has not exhibited the envelope saying that he received Ex-D-13. 61. The said argument is not acceptable because the plaintiff has not exhibited the envelope saying that he received Ex-D-13. On the other hand plaintiff exhibited the envelope suggesting that he received Ex-D-12, which was shown to be written by Chaitanya Kumar Razdan but was infact written by Sanjay Gupta himself and therefore what was suggested by plaintiff that he has only received Ex-D-12 and has not said anything about genuiness of the same. 62. The contents of Ex-D-12 allegedly written by Chaitanya Kumar Razdan creat doubt over the creation of trust because by virtue of this letter he denies accepting any monthly emoluments but by virtue of trust deed he has been given a meagre amount of Rs.1500 per month and has been restricted from any interference in the property as indicated at Point No.2 on Page No.4 of Trust deed Ex.D-9. By virtue of Ex-D- 12, he proclaims that no force can stop him from protecting the property made by sweat of his parents but in fact by virtue of trust deed the disputed property is alleged to have been already alienated in the month of January 1998 while the letter was written in September 1998 then there was no occasion to write such things in the letter D -12. Similarly by virtue of EX-D- 12 he wants all the assets for his maintenance during his old age but contrary to the same he has lost all the interest in the property vide trust deed to defendant/appellant with no say in title & possession of property and also in the management of trust and even he has no right in the income of property as indicated at Point No. 2 on Page No. 4, Point no.VIII on page No.5, 2nd last clause on Page No.7 of Trust deed. Under aforesaid circumstance the creation of trust by C.K.Razdan becoms unreliable. 63. Counsels for the partis argued at length in respect to Ex- D-26 allegedly written on instruction of Shri C.K. Razdan by the advocate, however, the difference between the dates of the two Letters Ex-D-12 & D-26 reveals that Ex-D-26 was not written at all as there was no receipt of its service. 63. Counsels for the partis argued at length in respect to Ex- D-26 allegedly written on instruction of Shri C.K. Razdan by the advocate, however, the difference between the dates of the two Letters Ex-D-12 & D-26 reveals that Ex-D-26 was not written at all as there was no receipt of its service. The service of the same was tried to be proved, during oral arguments by means of suggestion of Plaintiff to DW-1 in Para 49 & 50 Cross-Examination but that suggestion is with respect to the fact that Ex-D-12 was sent in post through P- 50 to Plaintiff & not with respect to D -26. 64. Ex- D-26 allegedly written on instruction of Chetanya Kumar Razdan by the advocate on 16.9.1998 and before the same could even by posted, it is alleged that a notice was sent, to be written by the advocate, to Plaintiff on 18.9.1998 (D-26). If that said letter, Ex-D-26 was directed to be written by Advocate then there was no reason for Chetanya Kumar Razdan to post the said letter, Ex-D-12. Even otherwise Ex-D-26 is alleged to be written to Plaintiff but a bare perusal of D -26 indicates that it is not a copy of anything but an original in itself bearing the original signature of the Advocate. More so, the document is typed by type writer and therefore the copy thereof could either be in form of carbon copy made by same stroke of machine or Photocopy. However, the document is none of the two. In such a scenario, it cannot be deemed to be a letter written on instructions of Chetanya Kumar Razdan. The basic difference between D-12 & D-26 is that D-26 is in Signature of Chetanya Kumar Razdan and bears no information about execution of any Will or Tust Deed while D-26 which is written by defendant witness contains, mentions all of these. 65. Under these circumstances learned trial Court has not erred in disbelieving the formation of trust. Therefore, the arguement of learned counsel for appellant regarding the vesting of property in trustee by operation of Indian Trust Act is found to be misconceived as Indian trust act has no applicability to Public trust. 66. 65. Under these circumstances learned trial Court has not erred in disbelieving the formation of trust. Therefore, the arguement of learned counsel for appellant regarding the vesting of property in trustee by operation of Indian Trust Act is found to be misconceived as Indian trust act has no applicability to Public trust. 66. The registration of trust was also time barred as the time stipulated in the Act had expired and therefore, the trust itself could not have been registered as the principles of section 5 of Limitation Act does not apply to the Trust Act. Even on the basis of evidence of Sanjay Gupta the object of the trust ae not proved. Before the registration of trust Chatanya Razdan had died, but no information was given to the registrar. 67. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the learned trial Court has ignored the fact that the parents of the respondents/plaintiffs Munikumar and his brother Chetanya Kumar partitioned their property, which can be presumed on the basis of the gift deed Ex. D-1 and gift deed Ex. D-7 executed in favour of Munikumar and Chetanya. However, the appellants/defendants did not file any partitioned deed. To prove, the oral partition, DW-3-Harsh Raina was examined. As per this witness, Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan informed him about the fact of partition and the partition was done around 1970 and at that time, he was five years old. Therefore, the evidence of this witness is not found to be reliable and cogent in respect to allege oral partition because the evidence of this witness is hear-say and he heard about the partition when he was just five years old. 68. Learned counsel for the appellants further argued that in Ex. D-11 dated 6.2.1996, said to be written by Chetanya Kumar, the fact of partition is mentioned. The said argument is not acceptable because in the year 1996 Dr. Maharaj Narayan Razdan had already died and alleged will is stated to be executed in the year 1994. If by will in 1994 Chetanya Kumar had received all the property of his father then it ought to have been mentioned in Ex. D-11. All these circumstances and facts make the will as well as partition suspicious and unreliable. 69. Maharaj Narayan Razdan had already died and alleged will is stated to be executed in the year 1994. If by will in 1994 Chetanya Kumar had received all the property of his father then it ought to have been mentioned in Ex. D-11. All these circumstances and facts make the will as well as partition suspicious and unreliable. 69. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that in this case Registrar Public Trust is a necessary party; however, it has not been arrayed as party, therefore, present suit is not maintainable. However, it can clearly be said that Registrar is not a necessary party as his action does not affect the Plaintiffs right and by his action the Plaintiff cannot be said to be aggrieved in the light of the case of Abdul Karim Khan (supra) in which the apex Court held that the Registrar is not an authority to decide the question related to title. The record also revealed that the defendants filed an application to array the Registrar in the suit which was decided on 4.7.2016 and the order was passed to array the Registrar Public Trust, however, the said order was dismissed by this Court on 29.7.2016 in W.P. No. 4731/2016 holding that Public Trust is not a necessary party. Thereafter, name of Public Trust was deleted from the array by order dated 18.7.2017. Therefore, the objection is not tenable. 70. Learned counsel for the appellant has further argued that the suit is not maintanable because there is no pleading in the plaint about giving notice to the Govt. under section 80 of CPC in relation to section 8 of the M.P. Trust Act. However, the above arguementis not acceptable because in plaint para 6 the (page 7) there is specific pleading in respect to prior notices to Govt. of M.P. and to Registrar. As per the provisions of section 8 of the Act, it was the duty of Court to send notice to State Govt. through the Registrar and the compliance of this provision had already been done by the trial court as reflected in the order passed on the order sheet dated 5.10.17. Thereafter, notice was also sent through Dispatch No.129/17 by the court and the notice was received by the SDM on 23.10.17. Even otherwise the litigant should not suffer on account of any lack on the part of the court. Thereafter, notice was also sent through Dispatch No.129/17 by the court and the notice was received by the SDM on 23.10.17. Even otherwise the litigant should not suffer on account of any lack on the part of the court. It is also settled that no party other than State can raise objection regarding section 80 CPC notice as held by the apex Court in the case of State of Madras v. C.P. Agencies AIR 1960 SC 1399. The litigant can not suffer on account of any lack on the part of the Court. 71. In respect to all the objections raised about the competency of civil court to decide the validity of trust deed, provisions of Section 11, explanation-V of CPC is relevant which provides that:- “Explanation (v) - Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused." 72. In light of aforesaid provision, the findings of LPA Court, subsequently confirmed by Supreme Court that merits of validity of trust deed and competency thereof be decided in Civil suit after considering all the technical objections would clearly constitute Res-Judicata in present appeal and therefore, the argument of respondent Munikumar is having weight that these objections cannot be raised by the appellant at this stage. 73. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the learned trial Court erred in holding the Wills as forged because no such relief has been sought by the plaintiff. However, the above argument is not acceptable because in this case the larger relief for declaration of title is sought by the plaintiff and the relief of declaration being larger relief includes other types of reliefs, including relief of cancellation of order, Will to be declare forged and fabricated. Therefore, the finding of trial court in respect to Wills Ex. D-13 and D-14 being forged and fabricated being smaller reliefs, be deemed to be included in the relief of declaration of title already sought by plaintiff in the plaint and therefore, it cannot be said that the prayer in the suit for declaring the Will to be forged, fabricated and ab initio void, was necessary. In the case A.I.R. 1956 Bombay 243 it is held: "9. Mr. In the case A.I.R. 1956 Bombay 243 it is held: "9. Mr. Paranjape has contended that it is not open to the Court to grant a declaration in a form other than the one in which it has been claimed by the plaintiff. In my view the contention cannot be seriously considered. The court has jurisdiction to adjust the rights of the parties as ascertained by it and to grant a declaration, accordingly, if it is necessary in the ends of istice to do so, and the Court's jurisdiction cannot be restricted because the plaintiff has asked for a more extensive declaration er a declaration in a different form. " 74. The appellant has raised an objection that trial court has granted mesne profit more than what has been claimed in prayer clause of the Plaint. The perusal of plaint reveals that the plaintiff has also claimed future mesne profit which would increase as time passes. For future mesne profit no pleading is required. In case of Amar Singh v. Chandra Shekhar reported in AIR 1984 MP 1 it has been held that:- "5. As regards future mesne profits all that is necessary is that the suit is of a nature contemplated by Order 20, rule 12 of Code of Civil Procedure and making of a claim for future mesne profits is not essential." 75. Therefore, the impugned judgment can not be thrown away merely on the ground that mesne profit granted is higher then claimed by the plaintiff. However, in view of the fact that the plaintiff himself claimed the mesne profit @ Rs. 15,000/- per month from the date of amendment in the plaint i.e.11.4.17 the findings of learned trial court granting mesne profit at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- per month from the date of filing of the suit is found to be erroneous. 76. Since formation of trust has not been proved; therefore, the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant are not acceptable that the defendant Sanjay Gupta was occupying the property as care taker on behalf of trust, and he was occupying such premises under authority given by trust, hence, there is no question of mesne profit. 77. In view of the above discussion, the appeal is partly allowed in respect to mesne profit directing that the mesne profit at the rate of Rs. 77. In view of the above discussion, the appeal is partly allowed in respect to mesne profit directing that the mesne profit at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- per month shall be payable from the date of filing of suit to the date of amendment i.e. 11.4.17 and mesne profit at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- per month shall be payable from the date of amendment i.e. 11.4.17 till possession of disputed property is delivered.