JUDGMENT 1. This Criminal Revision Case is preferred against the impugned judgment in Criminal Appeal No.149 of 2008 on the file of the learned V Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Guntur dtd. 5/6/2009 confirming the judgment passed in C.C.No.289 of 2006 on the file of the learned V Additional Junior Civil Judge, Guntur dtd. 17/4/2008 convicting the revision petitioner for the offence punishable under Sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short, 'the N.I. Act') and sentencing him to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of four months and to pay fine of Rs.500.00, in default to suffer Simple Imprisonment for one month. 2. The revision petitioner herein was the accused and the Respondent No.2 was the complainant before the trial Court. The Respondent No.1 is pro forma party, the State represented by Public Prosecutor. 3. Case of the Complainant 3.1. The complainant approached the Court by filing a private complaint stating that the accused borrowed an amount of Rs.70,000.00 from him on 10/4/2004 and executed a promissory note in his favour agreeing to repay the same with interest at 24% per annum. 3.2. Thereafter, accused issued a cheque dtd. 19/7/2005 for Rs.70,000.00 towards part payment of the debt. The complainant presented the cheque, but it was returned dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds. As requested by the accused, the cheque was presented again on 20/12/2005, but it was dishonoured. Then, complainant got issued a notice to the accused. Despite receiving the notice, the accused did not respond. 4. On appearance before the trial Court, the accused denied the substance of accusation made against him and claimed to be tried and the trial went on. 5. The complainant himself was examined as PW1 and got marked Exs.P.1 to P.6. On behalf of accused, he himself was examined as DW1 and his wife named Smt. P.Prameela was examined as DW2. 6. On appreciation of evidence on record and on hearing both the counsel, the learned Magistrate found the accused guilty for the offence punishable under Sec. 138 of the N.I. Act and convicted him under Sec. 255(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'the Cr.P.C.') and sentenced him to undergo rigorous Imprisonment for a period of four months and to pay fine of Rs.500.00, in default Simple Imprisonment for one month. 7. 7. Being aggrieved by impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed against him, the accused preferred Criminal Appeal No.148 of 2008 challenging validity of correctness of judgment of the trial Court. No additional evidence was adduced before the appellate Court. 8. After hearing the learned counsel on both sides, the learned appellate Judge dismissed the appeal confirming the judgment of the trial Court and also the sentence against the accused. 9. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment of the Courts below, the accused preferred this revision on the ground that the Courts below failed to appreciate the evidence on record in right perspective; that though the burden is again shifted to the complainant after rebuttal of presumption under Sec. 139 of the N.I. Act, the Courts below lost sight of it; that the accused never denied his signature on the document, but he explained circumstances under which the documents are under the possession of the complainant and how they were misused; and that the complainant did not file any suit against the accused for recovery of the amount under the promissory note, therefore an adverse inference can be drawn against the complainant. Accordingly, prays to allow the revision by setting aside the judgments of the Courts below. 10. Heard Sri S.Siva Rama Krishna Prasad, learned counsel for the revision petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor on behalf of the accused. The Respondent No.2 being the complainant and having received the notice did not choose to appear before the Court to submit his objections against the revision petition. Point for Determination 11. Now, the point for determination that arises from the material available on record is " " Whether the concurrent finding of fact and law recorded by the Courts below are perverse and not sustainable in law? Determination by the Court 12. Before venturing into the facts of the present case and determination thereon, it is apposite to revisit certain settled principles of law governing Sec. 138 of the N.I.Act. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel v. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel1 detailed the ingredients essentia, (2023) 1 SCC 578 to attract the offence under Sec. 138 as follows; "11. Before venturing into the facts of the present case and determination thereon, it is apposite to revisit certain settled principles of law governing Sec. 138 of the N.I.Act. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel v. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel1 detailed the ingredients essentia, (2023) 1 SCC 578 to attract the offence under Sec. 138 as follows; "11. Sec. 138 of the Act provides that a drawer of a cheque is deemed to have committed the offence if the following ingredients are fulfilled: (i) A cheque drawn for the payment of any amount of money to another person; (ii) The cheque is drawn for the discharge of the "whole or part" of any debt or other liability. "Debt or other liability" means legally enforceable debt or other liability; and (iii) The cheque is returned by the bank unpaid because of insufficient funds. However, unless the stipulations in the proviso are fulfilled the offence is not deemed to be committed. The conditions in the proviso are as follows: (i) The cheque must be presented in the bank within six months from the date on which it was drawn or within the period of its validity; (ii) The holder of the cheque must make a demand for the payment of the "said amount of money" by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within thirty days from the receipt of the notice from the bank that the cheque was returned dishonoured; and (iii) The holder of the cheque fails to make the payment of the "said amount of money" within fifteen days from the receipt of the notice." 13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418 has capsulated the law on presumption and burden of proof in the following terms; "25. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in the above cases on Ss. 118(a) and 139, we now summarise the principles enumerated by this Court in following manner: 25.1. Once the execution of cheque is admitted Sec. 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability. 25.2. The presumption under Sec. 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities. 25.3. 25.2. The presumption under Sec. 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities. 25.3. To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or the accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely. 25.4. That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence, Sec. 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden." 14. It is obvious that the initial burden to prove that the accused borrowed an amount of Rs.70,000.00 and executed the promissory note in his favour is on the complainant. PW1/complainant reiterated contents of the complaint and his chief-examination affidavit/Ex.P.3 is filed to show that the cheque was returned by the bank saying that it was dishonoured for want of sufficient funds. Exs.P.4 and P.5 would show that a legal notice had been issued and it was received by the accused under due acknowledgement under Ex.P.5. On the other hand, the contention of the accused is that his wife joined as a member of a chit conducted by the complainant and during that time, the complainant obtained four blank signed cheques from the accused as a security and forged the signature on Ex.P.1 and filed the case against the accused. 15. Nothing has been elicited by cross-examining PW1 to discredit his testimony. On the other hand, the accused and his wife deposed that DW2 was a member of the chit conducted by the complainant and relating to the said chit transaction the complainant obtained the blank cheques and forged his signature and a false case has been lodged. 16. It is also contention of the accused that though they have paid the entire chit amount, the complainant did not choose to return the said cheques on the ground that they were misplaced but filed a false case. It is pertinent to say that the accused admitted his signature on the cheque even in the grounds of revision before this Court. It is pertinent to say that the accused admitted his signature on the cheque even in the grounds of revision before this Court. It is his contention that though they have discharged the due amount to PW1, the complainant did not return the blank cheques. Had this version of the accused been correct, he would have taken proper steps to secure his blank cheques which were given as a security. Therefore, this Court finds no strength in the contention about issuing blank cheques to the complainant in relation to chit transaction. It is apt to recollect that the accused kept silent after receipt of notice issued by the complainant and he did not choose to issue any reply disowning his liability. 17. The evidence of PW1 coupled with Exs.P.1 to P.6 would prima facie prove that the accused borrowed the amount and issued the cheque. Hence, the presumption under Sec. 139 of the N.I. Act comes to play and the Court shall presume that the cheque was issued towards discharge of legally enforceable debt and till it was disproved by the accused the presumption will run in force in favour of the complainant. 18. Moreover, in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, AIR 2010 SC 1898 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held thus: "A presumption available under Sec. 139 of N.I. Act is rebuttable presumption and such presumption can be rebutted by raising any defence. There can be no doubt that there is initial presumption in favour of the complainant and such presumption can be rebutted in view of reverse onus by adducing independent evidence or by eliciting something in the crossexamination of complainant." 19. In the case on hand, the accused failed to adduce any rebuttal evidence to dispel the presumption under Sec. 139 of the N.I. Act. Nothing has been elicited in the crossexamination of PW1 to discard his testimony and to rebut the presumption under Sec. 139 of the N.I. Act i.e., burden is now on the accused. Though the accused and his wife deposed before the Court, their evidence does not inspire confidence of the Court. No iota of evidence is placed on record to show that any point of time the complainant used to run the private chit business. 20. The complainant followed the procedure as contemplated by law by serving notice before filing the complaint. Though the accused and his wife deposed before the Court, their evidence does not inspire confidence of the Court. No iota of evidence is placed on record to show that any point of time the complainant used to run the private chit business. 20. The complainant followed the procedure as contemplated by law by serving notice before filing the complaint. It is not contention of the accused that he was not served with the notice or that there are procedural lapses. This Court does not find any force in the contention of the accused that simply because the complainant has not filed any civil suit against him for recovery of the money, the liability under the cheque cannot be considered as a legally enforceable debt. 21. Before parting with the issue, it is appurtenant to cite the objective of the offence under Sec. 138 as interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel v. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel4 ,: "19. This Court in NEPC Micon Ltd. v. Magma Leasing Ltd. [NEPC Micon Ltd. v. Magma Leasing Ltd., (1999) , (2023) 1 SCC 578 SCC 253 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 524 : AIR 1999 SC 1952 ] held that the courts must interpret Sec. 138 with reference to the legislative intent to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. The objective of the Act in general and Sec. 138 specifically is to enhance the acceptability of cheques and to inculcate faith in the efficacy of negotiable instruments for the transaction of business. [Sunil Todi v. State of Gujarat, (2022) 16 SCC 762 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1174] Sec. 138 criminalises the dishonour of cheques. This is in addition to the civil remedy that is available. Through the criminalisation of the dishonour of cheques, the legislature intended to prevent dishonesty on the part of the drawer of a negotiable instrument. [Electronics Trade and Technology Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Indian Technologists and Engineers (Electronics) (P) Ltd., (1996) 2 SCC 739 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 454]. The interpretation of Sec. 138 must not permit dishonesty of the drawee of the cheque as well. A cheque is issued as security to provide the drawee of the cheque with a leverage of using the cheque in case the drawer fails to pay the debt in the future. The interpretation of Sec. 138 must not permit dishonesty of the drawee of the cheque as well. A cheque is issued as security to provide the drawee of the cheque with a leverage of using the cheque in case the drawer fails to pay the debt in the future. Therefore, cheques are issued and received as security with the contemplation that a part or the full sum that is addressed in the cheque may be paid before the cheque is encashed." 22. Viewed from any angle, this Court does not find any legal infirmity or irregularity in the findings recorded by the Courts below warranting interference and thereby the criminal revision case deserves to be dismissed. 23. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner during the course of hearing also submitted that the accused is the sole breadwinner of the family and he is eking out his livelihood by attending daily coolie work and his wife is suffering from ill-health and mercy may be shown while awarding the sentence. Taking into consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and also the present condition of the accused coupled with the fact that the litigation is pending since 2006, if Rigorous Imprisonment for four months is reduced to Simple Imprisonment for three months, it would meet the ends of justice. 24. Hence, the conviction recorded by both the learned V Additional Junior Civil Judge, Guntur in C.C.No.289 of 2006 vide judgment dtd. 17/4/2008 and the learned V Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Guntur in Crl.A.No.149 of 2008 vide judgment dtd. 5/6/2009 is confirmed. However, sentence of Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of four (4) months is reduced to Simple Imprisonment for a period of three (3) months for the offence punishable under Sec. 138 of N.I. Act and the order of sentence to pay fine stands confirmed. The period of imprisonment already undergone by appellant/accused is set off under Sec. 428 of Cr.P.C. 25. Accordingly, the Criminal Revision Case is partly allowed to the extent indicated above. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.