ORDER : 1. This Civil Revision Petition is directed against the Order dated 09.03.2023 passed in I.A.No. 43 of 2023 in C.O.S.No. 13 of 2022 on the file of Special Court for Trial and Disposal of Commercial Disputes, Vijayawada. 2. Sri K.V.L.Narasimha Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner/defendant submits that the respondent/plaintiff filed the suit against the petitioner/defendant vide C.O.S.No. 13 of 2022. The said suit is a commercial suit. Summons were sent to the defendant directing to appear in-person on 20.02.2023. Accordingly, he sent his vakalat through Registered Post to his counsel and the said vakalat was delivered to his counsel on 23.02.2023 and due to lack of vakalat and instructions from him, his counsel at Vijayawada was unable to represent the matter on 20.02.2023 before the trial Court. The trial Court was pleased to pass an order setting him ex-parte as no representation in the matter. An application is filed to set aside the order on the ground that the non-representation of the matter neither wanton nor deliberate and it was only due to late arrival of his signed vakalat, his counsel at Vijayawada could not file the same. 3. As against the same, Sri J.U.M.V. Prasad, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff contends that the petitioner/defendant has sent the vakalat through speed post and it was received by his advocate on 23.02.2023, but he did not mention the date when he had sent the vakalat through post and that petitioner/defendant has dispatched the vakalat through speed post on 21.02.2023 i.e., day after he was set ex-parte on 20.02.2023. Concealing the said fact, he simply stated that vakalat was received by the advocate on 23.02.2023. Thereby, he attempted to mislead the Court by suppressing the facts. 4. In view of the above rival contentions, the issue for decisions is: “Whether there are any justifiable grounds to set aside the order passed on 09.03.2023 in I.A.No. 43 of 2023 in C.O.S.No. 13 of 2022 on the file of Special Court for Trial and Disposal of Commercial Disputes, Vijayawada?” 5. No doubt, the learned trial judge analyzed the matter, framed the point for determination, thereafter came to conclusion and passed an order for dismissal under application Order IX Rule 7 of Code ofCivil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’) 6. Before determining the said point, this Court intends to refer to the settled law in this type of applications. No doubt, the learned trial judge analyzed the matter, framed the point for determination, thereafter came to conclusion and passed an order for dismissal under application Order IX Rule 7 of Code ofCivil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’) 6. Before determining the said point, this Court intends to refer to the settled law in this type of applications. In Kailash vs. Nanhku, (2005) 4 SCC 480 the Hon’ble Supreme Court at Para No. 28 held that: 28. All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express and specific language of the statute, the provisions of CPC or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice. The observations made by Krishna Iyer, J. in Sushil Kumar Sen vs. State of Bihar, (1975) 1 SCC 774 are pertinent: (SCC p. 777, Paras 5-6) “The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a judge's conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer. Processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex debito justitiae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. … Justice is the goal of jurisprudence - processual, as much as substantive.” 7. In this context the Bench refers to another judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while deciding an application under Order IX Rule 7 of CPC, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court made certain observations and principles to be adopted while interpreting any portion of CPC. This is Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425 and the Hon’ble Supreme Court highlighted three principles, while interpreting any portion of CPC that: (i) A Code of procedure must be regarded as such. This is Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425 and the Hon’ble Supreme Court highlighted three principles, while interpreting any portion of CPC that: (i) A Code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is “procedure” something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to “both” sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. (ii) There must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. (iii) No forms of procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of the litigant’s defence unless there be an express provision to the contrary. 8. In this connection, there is another judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in Arjun Singh vs. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 wherein at Para No. 16 it was held as follows: 16. The scope of a proceeding under Order IX Rule 7 and its place in the scheme of the provisions of the Code relating to the trial of suits was the subject of consideration in Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal. Dealing with the meaning of the words “The Court may proceed ex-parte” in Order IX. Rule 6(1)(a) Bose, J. speaking for the Court said: “When the defendant has been served and has been afforded an opportunity of appearing, then, if he does not appear, the Court may proceed in his absence. But, be it noted, the Court is not directed to make an ex-parte order. Rule 6(1)(a) Bose, J. speaking for the Court said: “When the defendant has been served and has been afforded an opportunity of appearing, then, if he does not appear, the Court may proceed in his absence. But, be it noted, the Court is not directed to make an ex-parte order. Of course the fact that it is proceeding ex-parte will be recorded in the minutes of its proceedings but that is merely a statement of the fact and is not an order made against the defendant in the sense of an ex-parte decree or other ex-parte order which the court is authorized to make. All that Rule 6(1)(a) does is to remove a bar and no more. It merely authorizes the Court to do that which it could not have done without this authority, namely to proceed in the absence of one of the parties.” 9. It is further discussed in the same judgment (Arjun Singh case) that: “If it is for final hearing, an ex-parte decree can be passed, and if it is passed, then Order IX, Rule 13 comes into play and before the decree is set aside the Court is required to make an order to set it aside. Contrast this with Rule 7 which does not require the setting aside of what is commonly, though erroneously, known as ‘the ex-parte order, No order is contemplated by the Code and therefore no order to set aside, the order is contemplated either.”Referring to the effect of the rejection of application made under O. IX Rule 7, he added:”If a party does appear on the day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, he cannot be stopped from participating in the proceedings simply because he did not appear on the first or some other hearing. But though he has the right to appear at an adjourned hearing, he has no right to set back the hands of the clock. Order 9 Rule 7 makes that clear. Therefore, unless he can show good cause, he must accept all that has gone before and be content to proceed from the stage at which he comes in.” 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner/defendant submits that if an ex-parte decree is passed by the trial Court, if the order is not set aside; it will cause irreparable loss to the defendant. Learned counsel for the petitioner/defendant submits that if an ex-parte decree is passed by the trial Court, if the order is not set aside; it will cause irreparable loss to the defendant. He highlights the fact that the petitioner is residing at Kurnool, which is nearly about 400 K.M. from the trial Court and there was no known person at Vijayawada to approach and engage the advocate at Vijayawada to defend his case within a period of three days from 16.02.2023 (the date of receipt of summons by the petitioner). Besides this difficulty of engaging counsel at Vijayawada, there are multiple litigation between him and respondent in Kurnool Courts and that there are no latches on the part of the petitioner/defendant to approach the trial Court in appropriate time and opportunity may be given to defend his case. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the counsel on record before the trial Court filed affidavit and petition without narrating all the facts and circumstances and difficulties in approaching the trial Court in-time i.e., on 20.02.2023 and the petitioner who is suffering from illness and old-age ailments was unable to travel Kurnool to Vijayawada on 20.02.2023. Therefore, he prays to permit him to participate in the proceedings by setting aside the ex-parte order. 12. In many of the judgments the Hon’ble Supreme Court was liberally construing the provisions of CPC. In G.P. Srivastava vs. R.K. Raizada, (2000) 3 SCC 54 while deciding the application under IX Rule 13 at Para No. 7 the Apex Court held as follows: “7. Under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. an ex-parte decree passed against a defendant can be set aside upon satisfaction of the Court that either the summons were not duly served upon the defendant or he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. Unless “sufficient cause” is shown for non-appearance of the defendant in the case on the date of hearing, the Court has no power to set aside an ex-parte decree. The words “was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing” must be liberally construed to enable the court to do complete justice between the parties particularly when no negligence or inaction is imputable to erring party. The words “was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing” must be liberally construed to enable the court to do complete justice between the parties particularly when no negligence or inaction is imputable to erring party. Sufficient cause for the purpose of Order 9 Rule 13 has to be construed as elastic expression for which no hard and fast guidelines can be prescribed. The courts have wide discretion in deciding the sufficient cause keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. The “sufficient cause” for non appearance refers to the date on which the absence was made a ground for proceeding ex-parte and cannot be stretched to rely upon other circumstances anterior in time. If “sufficient cause” is made out for non appearance of the defendant on the date fixed for hearing when ex-parte proceedings initiated against him, he cannot be penalized for his previous negligence which had been overlooked and thereby condoned earlier. In a case where defendant approaches the Court immediately and within the statutory time specified, the discretion is normally exercised in his favour, provided the absence was not malafide or intentional. For the absence of a party in the case the other side can be compensated by adequate costs and the lis decided on merits.” 13. From the above it is clear that the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Court which is deciding the point, “was prevented by any good cause from appearing” must liberally construe the same to enable the court to do complete justice between the parties particularly when no negligence or inaction is imputable to the erring party. Further it is held that the Courts have a wide discretion in deciding the “sufficient cause” keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case and in a case where the defendant approaches the Court immediately and within the statutory time specified, the discretion is normally exercised in his favour, provided that the absence was not mala-fide or intentional. 14. Herein this case, within four or five days after service of the notice, the petitioner/defendant approached the Trial Court with an affidavit to set aside the ex-parte order. Nothing is specifically pleaded or placed before this Court that there was malafides or intentional avoidance by the petitioner for not filing the petition before the trial Court. 15. 14. Herein this case, within four or five days after service of the notice, the petitioner/defendant approached the Trial Court with an affidavit to set aside the ex-parte order. Nothing is specifically pleaded or placed before this Court that there was malafides or intentional avoidance by the petitioner for not filing the petition before the trial Court. 15. In this connection, it is appropriate to refer the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arjun Singh case (referred to supra), that: “every good cause is a sufficient cause and must offer an explanation for non-appearance. The only difference between a “good cause” and “sufficient cause” is that the requirement of a good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of a “sufficient cause.” To know whether the cause shown by the petitioner is a ‘good cause’ or not, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments held that there cannot be a straitjacket formula of universal application, while deciding the Order IX Rule 7 or Rule 13 CPC applications. 16. The provision under Order IX of CPC are never meant to be a penal provision, and it is only in clear cases of gross negligence and misconduct that a party should be deprived of the opportunity of having a satisfactory disposal of the case which evidently can only be done when both parties have the full opportunity of placing their case and their evidence before the Court. 17. One more opposition raised by the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff is that this revision petition is not maintainable against the order passed by the Commercial Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner/defendant, however, relied upon judgment reported in M/s. Harpreet Singh Chhabra vs. Mrs. Suneet Kaur Sahney, 2019 (2) ALD 62 which empowers the Court to entertain this application and this Court after perusing the said judgment, this court is having jurisdiction to maintain the petition. 18. The learned counsel for the petitioner/defendant, however, relied upon judgment reported in M/s. Harpreet Singh Chhabra vs. Mrs. Suneet Kaur Sahney, 2019 (2) ALD 62 which empowers the Court to entertain this application and this Court after perusing the said judgment, this court is having jurisdiction to maintain the petition. 18. To sum up the case, it is the petitioner, who filed this revision, due to medical issues, stating that he could not timely respond to the summons and delay of four days occurred in sending his vakalat and that even if the petition is allowed it will not cause any prejudice to the plaintiff/ respondent in this petition and after passing the ex-parte decree, he filed application in I.A.No. 43 of 2023 and that the several pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to supra clearly speak that the Court should has a wide discretion in deciding the “good cause”; keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. The present petitioner/defendant approached the Court within five days and filed a petition before the trial Court. In-order to do substantial justice to the parties and as this Court feels that the technicalities of the law should not prevent the Court from doing substantial justice, considering the overall situation as a party should be given opportunity to contest the matter on merits, this Court is of the opinion that the order impugned is liable to be set aside and allowed permitting the petitioner/defendant to file written statement and to contest the matter, so that it can be decided on merits. 19. Accordingly, this Civil Revision Petition is allowed by setting aside the order dated 09.03.2023 in I.A.No. 43 of 2023 in C.O.S.No. 13 of 2022 on the file of Special Court for Trial and Disposal of Commercial Districts, Vijayawada. There shall be no order as to costs. 20. Interim orders granted earlier if any, stand vacated. 21. Miscellaneous petitions pending if any, stand closed.