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2023 DIGILAW 912 (BOM)

Sunita, w/d. Chandrika Sharma v. Kantabai, wd/o. Vasantrao Alone

2023-04-10

M.S.JAWALKAR

body2023
JUDGMENT : (M.S. Jawalkar, J.) Heard. 2. The present second appeal is filed being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court of District Judge 7, Nagpur, in Regular Civil Appeal No.428/2014 upholding the judgment and decree dated 30/08/2014 in Regular Civil Suit No.43/1999 passed by the Court of 7th Junior Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nagpur. 3. The facts in the present appeal are as under: The plaintiff has purchased the suit property Plot No.5 of Mouza Wathoda, P.H. No.34, Pardi, Field No.75/3 admeasuring 4000 sq.ft. from Chandrashekhar Shankarrao Neralwar by registered sale deed dated 22/07/1988, he is in peaceful and lawful possession of the suit property along with construction therein i.e. Zopada. The plaintiff immediately mutated his name in the Municipal Corporation and paid up to date taxes. The plaintiff contended that the suit property was purchased by Chandrashekhar Shankarrao Neralwar from Pujya Ruikar Nagar Sahakari Gruha Nirman Sanstha, Nagpur by a registered sale deed dated 23/02/1988 and thereafter plaintiff purchased the suit property along with Zopada construction. 4. Plaintiff’s case is that, on 20/10/1998 plaintiff along with his family had been to Hiwara for Diwali festival and taking the advantage of absence of plaintiff, the defendant trespassed on the suit property of plaintiff without any legal right or locus standi and removed the construction of zopada and fencing wire compound forcibly and affixed name plate showing defendant is in possession. The said fact came to know by the plaintiff on 03/11/1998 when he reached to Nagpur and visited the suit property. Hence, on 03/11/1998, plaintiff lodged written complaint to Sakkardara police station against the defendant and thereafter issued notice on 20/11/1998 to the defendant thereby calling the defendant to hand over the vacant possession of the suit property within three days. Inspite of receipt of notice, defendant failed to comply it. Hence, plaintiff has constrained to file the suit for possession and damages. The defendant denied that the plaintiff had purchased the suit plot from Chandrashekhar Shankarrao Neralwar. The defendant contended that said Chandrashekhar Neralwar had sold the suit property to the predecessor of the defendant from whom the defendant has purchased the suit property by a registered sale deed dated 21/07/1998, hence the defendant has become the owner of the suit property. 5. The defendant contended that said Chandrashekhar Neralwar had sold the suit property to the predecessor of the defendant from whom the defendant has purchased the suit property by a registered sale deed dated 21/07/1998, hence the defendant has become the owner of the suit property. 5. The learned Trial Court came to the conclusion that plaintiff has proved his ownership and is entitled for the possession of the suit plot from the defendant and decreed the suit with cost and directed the defendant to deliver the vacant possession of the suit property to the plaintiff within two months from the date of the order. It is also directed to conduct separate inquiry for mesne profits from the date of institution of the suit till the delivery of possession of the suit property in favour of plaintiff. Being aggrieved by the same, the defendant preferred appeal before the learned Appellate Court. The learned lower Appellate Court dismissed the appeal. The said judgment and decree is the subject matter of challenge in the present appeal. 6. The contention of the appellant is that both the Courts below erred in committing serious errors in appreciation of evidence on record by ignoring the material evidence and considering the irrelevant evidence. Despite failure of the plaintiff to prove his ownership of suit plot, Appellate Court dismissed appeal. When the ownership was in dispute and in view of the claim of the ownership of the defendant based on his independent sale deed, the Appellate Court ought to have allowed the appeal. The appellant i.e. the original defendant can be deprived of his possession of the suit plot in view of subsistence of a valid and registered sale deed in his favour. The learned Courts below committing serious errors in decreeing the suit for possession in absence of any decree of declaration of ownership is sought. Despite the fact that the ownership of the plaintiff was disputed and the assertion of ownership by the defendant based on a registered sale deed, Court ought not to have granted relief prayed for. 7. Learned Counsel for appellants relied on following citations: 1) Khoday Distilleries Limited and others Vs. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal (under liquidation), reported in (2019) 4 SCC 376 2) T.V. Ramakrishna Reddy Vs. M. Mallappa and Anr., in Civil Appeal No.5577/2021(SLP (C) No.10621/2020) 3) Akella Lalitha Vs. 7. Learned Counsel for appellants relied on following citations: 1) Khoday Distilleries Limited and others Vs. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal (under liquidation), reported in (2019) 4 SCC 376 2) T.V. Ramakrishna Reddy Vs. M. Mallappa and Anr., in Civil Appeal No.5577/2021(SLP (C) No.10621/2020) 3) Akella Lalitha Vs. Konda Hanumantha Rao and another, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 928 8. The learned Counsel for the respondent/plaintiff submitted that plaintiff has proved that he is the owner of the suit property and was in possession of the suit property till the year 1998. The sale deed of plaintiff is earlier than the sale deed of defendant. The impugned judgment is just and proper and requires no interference. It is vehemently argued by respondent that sale deed in favour of respondent is in earlier point of time which was registered one. Once Chandrashekhar Neralwar sold the property by registered sale deed to the plaintiff/respondent, there is no title to pass over with the said Chandrashekhar Neralwar. As per the said sale deed, mutation entries were also carried out and all municipal taxes are also paid. He had possession till 1998 when the defendant trespassed in the suit property. 9. Learned Counsel for respondents relied on following citations: 1) Narendra Kumar Johar Vs. A. Shahjahan, in S.A. (MD) Nos.550 and 551 of 2008 of Madurai Bench of Madras High Court 2) Narendra Kumar Johar Vs. A. Shahjahan and ors., in SLP (C) No.7394/2022 3) Abhishek Sharma and Ors. Vs. Jyoti Makhija, in RFA No.966/2018 in the High Court of Delhi 4) Abhishek Sharma and Ors. Vs. Jyoti Makhija,in SLP (C) No.30247/2019 5) B.M. Devarajappa and Ors. Vs. S. Gayathri, in Misc. First Appeal No.9386/2017 in High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru 6) Sajjadanashin Sayed Md. B.E. Edr. (D) by Lrs. Vs. Musa Dadabhai Ummer and Ors., AIR 2000 SC 1238 7) Gurnam Singh (D) by LRs. and Ors. Vs. Lehna Singh (D) by LRs., reported in AIR 2019 SC 1441 10. Heard both the parties at length. It was agreed by both the parties that matter will be heard finally on following Substantial Questions of Law: “1. Whether the Courts below committed serious illegality in decreeing the suit for possession in absences of any declaration of ownership in favour of the plaintiff and despite the clinching and undisputed evidence of the defendant’s ownership and possession of the suit plot? 2. Whether the Courts below committed serious illegality in decreeing the suit for possession in absences of any declaration of ownership in favour of the plaintiff and despite the clinching and undisputed evidence of the defendant’s ownership and possession of the suit plot? 2. Whether the appellant i.e. the original defendant can be deprived of his possession of the suit plot in view of subsistence of a valid and registered sale deed in his favour? 3. Whether the findings of the learned trial Court as well as learned Appellate Court are perverse in ignoring the evidence of ownership and possession in favour of the defendant?” 11. It is the case of plaintiff that on 23/02/1988, a Society (Pujaya Ruikar nagar Sahakari Gruha Nirman Sanstha) sold the suit plot to Chandrashekhar Neralwar and on 22/07/1988, the said Chandrashekhar Neralwar sold the plot to Vasantrao Alone i.e. plaintiff/present respondent. Thereafter, said Chandrashekhar Neralwar sold the suit property to one Chandrashekhar Ahirrao on 06/02/1993 and said Chandrashekhar Ahirrao sold the same to Dnyaneshwar Bhonde on 18/12/1993. It is alleged by the defendant that in November, 1994, Chandrashekhar Neralwar sold the plot to Vinod Deshmukh and said Vinod Deshmukh on 21/07/1998 sold the plot to Chandrika Mohan Sharma, Proprietor of Rakesh Engineering i.e. defendant/appellant. Dnyaneshwar Bhonde filed Civil Suit on 13/11/1998 against the Chandrika Sharma vide Regular Civil Suit No.1586/1986. It was renumbered as Special Civil Suit No.780/2002. In the said civil suit filed by Dnyaneshwar Bhonde, the said Chandrashekar Neralwar gave evidence and stated in examination in chief that they did not sell plot to Vasantrao Alone. Vasantrao Alone present plaintiff was not party to the said suit. On 17/01/2005, civil suit filed by Dnyaneshwar Bhonde came to be partly decreed and Dnyaneshwar Bhonde is declared to be owner and Chandrika Sharma was directed to hand over the possession to Dnyaneshwar Bhonde. The appeal filed by Chandrika Sharma vide Regular Civil Appeal No.133/2005 disposed of by passing decree on compromise and the said Bhonde surrendered his right of ownership and possession in favour of Chandrika Sharma. As such, defendant is claiming title over the suit property as the said Dnyaneshwar Bhonde surrendered his right of ownership and possession in favour of Chandrika Sharma on compromise. 12. As such, defendant is claiming title over the suit property as the said Dnyaneshwar Bhonde surrendered his right of ownership and possession in favour of Chandrika Sharma on compromise. 12. The learned Trial Court after appreciating evidence on record, recorded his findings that plaintiff purchased suit property from Chandrashekhar Neralwar by a registered sale deed dated 22/07/1988 for total consideration of Rs.7,000/- and since he was in continuous peaceful possession. He had mutated his name in the record of Municipal Corporation, Nagpur and was regularly paying his Municipal Taxes. The defendant after taking advantage of plaintiff, had been out of town for Diwali festival, the defendant encroached upon the suit plot. The learned Trial Court held that plaintiff proved that he become the owner of the suit house in view of the registered sale deed executed by Chandrashekhar Neralwar and was in possession of the suit plot since execution of the sale deed till he was dispossessed by defendant. The plaintiff has proved his sale deed by examining one of the witness Suresh Tapase who is categorically deposed that Chandrashekhar Neralwar executed the sale deed in his presence. He has also stated that another witness has also signed the sale deed in his presence. 13. The case of the defendant is that the said Chandrashekhar Neralwar had sold out the suit plot to one Vinod Deshmukh on 21/11/1994 vide registered sale deed and thereafter Vinod Deshmukh sold out the plot to the defendant vide registered sale deed dated 21/07/1998. The learned Trial Court rightly appreciated this fact that the dates on which defendant claimed that the said Chandrashekhar Neralwar executed sale deed in favour of one Vinod Deshmukh on 21/11/1994 and the date of purchase by the defendant from the said Vinod Deshmukh dated 21/07/1998. Both the dates are subsequent to the purchase of property by the plaintiff on 22/07/1988. As such, from 22/07/1998, Chandrashekhar Neralwar is not having any salable interest title to pass over. Though, defendant examined Vinod Deshmukh and Dilip Deshmukh. The witnesses did not take the defendant any further except execution of sale deed of subsequent dates i.e. 18/12/1993. So far as Regular Civil Suit No.780/2002 filed by Dnyaneshwar Bhonde is concerned, the finding is not binding on the present plaintiff. Though, defendant examined Vinod Deshmukh and Dilip Deshmukh. The witnesses did not take the defendant any further except execution of sale deed of subsequent dates i.e. 18/12/1993. So far as Regular Civil Suit No.780/2002 filed by Dnyaneshwar Bhonde is concerned, the finding is not binding on the present plaintiff. As such, finding recorded by the learned Trial Court that once Chandrashekhar Neralwar had sold out the suit property to the plaintiff, he had no right to sell it out to either Vinod Deshmukh or Dnyaneshwar Bhonde and therefore, it is the plaintiff who is the exclusive owner of the suit property. This finding is confirmed by learned Appellate Court. I do not see any perversity in the order passed by both the Courts below, specifically when mutation entries were taken to that effect in the name of plaintiff. 14. The learned Counsel for appellant relied on Akella Lalitha (supra), in support of his contention that it is settle law that relief not found in pleadings should not be granted. If a Court considers or grants a relief for which no prayer or pleading was made depriving the respondent of an opportunity to oppose or resist such relief, it would lead to miscarriage of justice. However, in my considered opinion, this issue does not involved at all as there is no relief claimed for declaration nor in that term relief is granted. Who was in lawful possession is only ascertained by the learned Trial Court as well as Appellate Court. 15. The learned Counsel for appellant also relied on judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.5577/2021, T.V. Ramakrishna Reddy (supra), however, the facts involved in the said matter before the Hon’ble Apex Court is distinguishable. There was suit for injunction however, plaintiff in the said suit claiming to be the owner on the basis of sale deed executed on 30/04/1992 whereas defendant in the said suit claimed to be the owner of the suit property on the basis of sale deed dated 05/04/1984. Here the said sale deed executed in favour of plaintiff by Chandrashekhar Neralwar is of 1984 and defendant’s sale deed are subsequent. The defendant has not examined the said Chandrashekhar Neralwar to establish their defence. In the present matter, neither there is any relief of ownership granted nor prayed. No effect on decree which is in respect of possession only. 16. The defendant has not examined the said Chandrashekhar Neralwar to establish their defence. In the present matter, neither there is any relief of ownership granted nor prayed. No effect on decree which is in respect of possession only. 16. The learned Counsel for respondents vehemently argued that there is no substance in the second appeal and it is liable to be dismissed. The learned Counsel for respondents relied on Narendra Kumar Johar (supra), wherein it is held that in view of Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act where a person purports to create by transfer at different times rights in or over the same immovable property and such rights cannot all exits or be exercised to their full extent together, each later created right shall, in the absence of a special contract or reservation binding the earlier transferees, be subject to the rights previously created. It is further held that the gift deed executed in favour of the plaintiff is prior in point of time and therefore, the sale deed executed in favour of the appellant would be subject to the settlement deed earlier executed in the name of the plaintiff. It is held that the suits for injunction are maintainable even without seeking any declaratory relief. 17. The learned Counsel for respondents also relied on Abhishek Sharma and Ors. (supra), wherein it is held that the principle of law contained in Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act is that earlier documents executed for a property prevail over subsequently executed documents for the same property. Thus, the conveyance deed executed by the appellant/defendant from the DDA, subsequent to the transfer of right in favour of plaintiff, the same is null and void on the principles of priority and validity contained in Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act. 18. The learned Counsel for respondents also relied on B.M. Devarajappa and Ors. (supra), in support of his contention that when property is a vacant site, which is not physically possessed, used or enjoyed, in such cases the principle is that possession follows title. If establish title thereto will be considered to be in possession, as against the person who is not able to establish title. The Karnataka High Court in B.M. Devarajappa and Ors. If establish title thereto will be considered to be in possession, as against the person who is not able to establish title. The Karnataka High Court in B.M. Devarajappa and Ors. (supra) held that applying this principle to the facts of the case, it can be said that since the said property is a vacant land and that the title of the plaintiff can be inferred, it can be presumed that the plaintiff is in possession over the suit property. Thins finding of the trial court cannot be said to be perverse, illegal and capricious. 19. The learned Counsel for respondents relied on Sajjadanashin Sayed Md. B.E. Edr. (D) by Lrs. (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “19. We have here to advert to another principle of caution referred to by Mulla (p. 105). “It is not to be assumed that matters in respect of which issues have been framed are all of them directly and substantially in issue. Nor is there any special significance to be attached to the fact that a particular issue is the first in the list of issues. Which of the matters are directly in issue and which collaterally or incidentally, must be determined on the facts of each case. A material test to be applied is whether the Court considers the adjudication of the issue material and essential for its decision.” 20. The learned Counsel for respondents relied on Gurnam Singh (D) by LRs. and Ors. (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction while deciding second appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Jurisdiction of the High Court, in an appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, is strictly confined to the case involving substantial question of law and while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code., it is not permissible for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence on record and interfere with the findings recorded by the Courts below and/or the First Appellate Court and if the First Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in Second Appeal. The jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the second appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law. 21. On appreciating evidence on record, I do not see any reason to interfere with concurrent finding recorded by both the Courts below. The plaintiff is having registered sale deed in his favour earlier in point of time. There are mutation entries in his favour. As such, the subsequent sale deed executed by Chandrashekhar Neralwar, after the registered sale deed dated 22/07/1988 are null and void, as he was not having any salable interest in the property to pass it on. When it is an open plot he was in possession will be ascertained from the better title. In my considered opinion, both the Courts below have rightly appreciated the facts on record and there is no need to interfere in the finding recorded by both the Courts below or decreeing a suit for possession. It is not always necessary to seek declaration of ownership specifically when it is registered sale deed. The finding recorded by Trial Court as well as Appellate Court are neither perverse nor illegal, substantial question of law answered accordingly. Appeal stands dismissed. At this juncture, learned Counsel for the appellants prays for continuation of the interim order for further period of eight weeks. At the request of learned Counsel for the appellants, the interim order granted on 19/10/2022 to continue for further period of eight weeks only.