JUDGMENT : SUNITA AGARWAL, J. 1. We have heard Mr.Dipen Desai, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, Mr.K.M.Antani, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the State respondent and Mr.S.P.Majmudar, learned counsel assisted by Mr.Meet Kakadia, learned counsel appearing for the private respondents. 2. This intra-court appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 03.08.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge in allowing the writ petition, setting aside the order dated 12.06.2006 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No.TEN.B.S. 88 of 1991, consequently restoring the order dated 30.11.1990 passed by the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms), Surat. The appellant No.2 herein claims to be the tenant of the land in question namely land bearing Revenue Survey No.591/7 admeasuring 1-Acre 7-Gunthas, situated in village Kosad, Taluka Choryasi, District Surat, which was initially recorded in the name of Bai Fatima widow of Yusuf Ibrahim Ghanchia, on the basis of a declaration dated 18.11.1974 under Section 32(G) and 32(O) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (in short referred to as “the Act 1948”). 3. The brief facts of the case relevant to note at this juncture are that in the Tenancy Case No.1580 of 1974, the application preferred by the appellants herein – respondent Nos.4 and 5 in the writ petition, the original petitioners were not impleaded as parties. The declaration dated 18.11.1974 by Mamlatdar and ALT was against Bai Fatima, declaring respondent No.4 – appellant No.2 herein as a tenant in respect of the land in question. The writ petitioners claiming themselves to be owners of 1/3rd share in Survey No.591/7 preferred an appeal before the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms), Surat in Tenancy Appeal No.144 of 1990. 4. Prior to initiation of the proceedings in appeal challenging the declaration dated 18.11.1974, Special Civil Suit No.51 of 1975 between the petitioners and Bai Fatima was pending. The said suit was instituted by Ibrahim Suleman Narot (petitioner) whose heirs and legal representatives are arrayed as respondent Nos.1.1 to 1.7.2 herein. The said suit was for declaration of share of the plaintiff in Survey No.591/7, which was decreed declaring 3/8th share of plaintiff and defendant Nos.2, 3, 4 and 5, collectively. It may be noted that the decree dated 16.05.1988 has attained finality in the year 1988, as there has been no further challenge. 5. The said suit was for declaration of share of the plaintiff in Survey No.591/7, which was decreed declaring 3/8th share of plaintiff and defendant Nos.2, 3, 4 and 5, collectively. It may be noted that the decree dated 16.05.1988 has attained finality in the year 1988, as there has been no further challenge. 5. In the Tenancy Appeal No.144 of 1990, which was initiated after the decree of the Civil Court, the Deputy Collector while allowing the appeal vide order dated 30.11.1990 had set aside the order dated 18.11.1974 passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT, Choryasi, in Tenancy Case No.1580 of 1974. It was recorded by the Collector that on perusal of the case documents, it transpired that the Tenancy/32-O/32-G Case No.1580 of 1974 decided on 18.11.1974, on calling for the tenancy case original documents from the Mamlatdar, Choryasi, in the report dated 22.06.1990, it was stated that the said record was not found and the documents are squandered away. The certified copy of the original case documents was produced on behalf of the appellants. The land under dispute was in fragment and under Section 32(O) of the Tenancy Act, the right to purchase could not be granted. On the contrary, in the inquiry the party had admitted having made the Satakhat/Agreement to Sell, therefore, the defendant No.1 therein (appellant herein) cannot have any tenancy rights arising. It was further noted that on the same date, the application under the Tenancy Act was filed, hearing had taken place and on the same day, the judgment was delivered. The impugned judgment by the Mamlatdar and Agriculture Land Tribunal was, thus, held to be abinitio nullity. It was, thus, concluded by the Collector that the appeal cannot be said to be barred by limitation and the plea of the respondent to reject the appeal being barred by limitation was not proper and legal. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it was held that the matter was required to be decided on merits. 6. As against this finding, the extract of the order passed by the Civil Court while decreeing the suit namely Civil Suit No.51 of 1975, is also to be noted herein. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it was held that the matter was required to be decided on merits. 6. As against this finding, the extract of the order passed by the Civil Court while decreeing the suit namely Civil Suit No.51 of 1975, is also to be noted herein. The findings record that the appellant No.1 herein, who was examined by the Civil Court at Exhibit-102 and asserted that his wife Kanuben (Appellant No.2 herein) had purchased the land in Survey No.591/7, was a Sarpanch of the town. The allegation before the Civil Court was that he had managed to get the entries in favour of his wife with respect to the sericulture land and also managed to get the land sold to his wife. Noticing the said contention, the Civil Court recorded that since the Sale Deed executed under Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, has not been set aside by any Court and it was not possible for the Civil Court to set aside the same being collusive, it was open for the plaintiff to apply to the Tenancy Court or the Revenue Tribunal. It was, however, held that Bai Fatima alone was not entitled to the said price as the plaintiff and defendant Nos.2 to 5 therein were collectively entitled to 3/8th share of Survey No.591/7. 7. It seems that after decree was prepared in the year 1988 based on the preliminary decree dated 22.08.1978 in Civil Suit No.51 of 1975, the writ petitioner had initiated the proceedings before the Deputy Collector in Tenancy Appeal No.144 of 1990, which was allowed vide judgment and order dated 30.11.1990. The order passed by the Deputy Collector was, however, set aside in Revision Application No.TEN.B.S.88 of 1991, by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal vide order dated 12.06.2006 and hence, the occasion for filing the writ petition, out of which the instant appeal has arisen, occurred. 8. The learned Single Judge while setting aside the order passed by the Tribunal dated 12.06.2006 has recorded that once the declaration with regard to the share of the writ petitioner to the extent of 3/8th share had attained finality in the year 1988, further challenge to their entitlement/right towards the property cannot be entertained, by putting them at predicament where the collusive order is passed. The learned Single Judge has noted that the order passed by the Mamlatdar conferring tenancy right upon the respondents - appellants herein under Section 32(G) and 32(O) of the Tenancy Act, was a collusive order and hence, the petitioners could not be non-suited on the ground of delay. Moreover, the Civil Court decreed the suit on 16.05.1988 and within two years, there was challenge to the order conferring tenancy rights upon the respondents – appellants herein. 9. These findings returned by the learned Single Judge are sought to be assailed with vehemence by the learned counsel for the appellants on the ground that the fact of declaration dated 18.11.1974 of tenancy rights of the appellants was very well within the knowledge of the petitioners. The fact that there was a declaration in favour of the appellants herein was brought before the Civil Court and was noted in the order passing preliminary decree passed on 28.02.1978, itself. The writ petitioners chose to remain silent and did not challenge the order passed by the Mamlatdar dated 18.11.1974 till the year 1990 when Tenancy Appeal No.144 of 1990 was instituted, which was not accompanied by any application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was urged that it is settled law that unless and until application is made giving explanation for delay, it cannot be condoned. The contention is that this infirmity in the order of the Deputy Collector in allowing the appeal was conveniently ignored by the learned Single Judge. The provisions of Sections-3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Limitation Act were pressed into service to substantiate the said argument. 10. The attention of the Court is invited to the order passed by the Tribunal wherein it was noted that knowledge of Tenancy Court’s order affecting sale of disputed land of Survey No.591/7 in which the writ petitioners (opponents therein) had 3/8th share was with the opponents in the year 1978. They also knew that the order of Mamlatdar would become final unless the appellate proceedings were undertaken before the appropriate tenancy forum. The gross delay and latches in approaching the appellate tenancy forum for which no worthwhile explanation was given by the appellant, he was not entitled to the discretionary relief of condonation of delay in filing the appeal. They also knew that the order of Mamlatdar would become final unless the appellate proceedings were undertaken before the appropriate tenancy forum. The gross delay and latches in approaching the appellate tenancy forum for which no worthwhile explanation was given by the appellant, he was not entitled to the discretionary relief of condonation of delay in filing the appeal. Even an order which is termed as nullity does not cease to be binding unless the party aggrieved approaches the competent forum for challenging such order within the applicable period of limitation. The Tribunal has held that the gross delay of over 10 years could not have been condoned without sufficient cause being shown by the Deputy Collector and hence, the order in appeal was held illegal and improper. 11. These findings were placed before us in order to impress that in absence of the application for condonation of delay, there was no occasion for the Deputy Collector to condone the delay. The Tribunal, thus, cannot be said to have erred in law in setting aside the order passed by the Deputy Collector allowing the appeal and holding the order dated 18.11.1974 for declaration of tenancy rights of the appellants as final. Reliance is placed on the decisions of this Court in Sursangji Ambaram and others [Sursangji Ambaram and others vs. State of Gujarat and another – 2002 (3) GLH 95 ] and Hansaben w/o. Bhagwanbhai Ratnabhai and Legal Guardian and others [Hansaben w/o. Bhagwanbhai Ratnabhai and Legal Guardian and others vs. State of Gujarat and others – 2009 (3) GLH 271 ] and decision of Apex Court in Board of Trustees of Port of Kandla [Board of Trustees of Port of Kandla vs. Hargovind Jasraj – 2013 (0) GLHEL-SC 52575], to substantiate the above submissions. The decision of the Apex Court in Ragho Singh[Ragho Singh vs. Mohan Singh and others – (2001) 9 SCC 717 ]; Heirs of Kashiram Khodabhai, Mahendrabhai Kashibhai and others[Heirs of Kashiram Khodabhai, Mahendrabhai Kashibhai and others vs. State of Gujarat and others – 2009 SCC Online Guj. 9592]; State of Punjab and others[State of Punjab and others vs. Gurdev Singh – (1991) 4 SCC 1 ] and Jadav Prabhatbhai Jethabhai and others[Jadav Prabhatbhai Jethabhai and others vs. Parmar Karsanbhai Dhulabhai and others – AIR 2001 Guj. 9592]; State of Punjab and others[State of Punjab and others vs. Gurdev Singh – (1991) 4 SCC 1 ] and Jadav Prabhatbhai Jethabhai and others[Jadav Prabhatbhai Jethabhai and others vs. Parmar Karsanbhai Dhulabhai and others – AIR 2001 Guj. 118 ], were placed before us to assert that in absence of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay, there was no jurisdiction with the Collector to allow the appeal and it is well-established that even a null and void order has to be challenged within the period of limitation. 12. It was vehemently asserted that once the appellant No.2 was declared tenant by the order dated 18.11.1974 and a certificate dated 11.02.1975 under Section 32(M) was issued to her on payment of full purchase price to the landlady, the entry made in the record about the name of the appellant No.2 dated 24.02.1974 could not have been expunged, as the appellant had perfected her right as a tenant in the proceedings under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. It was further argued that the petitioners kept silent till the land in question was acquired in an acquisition proceeding for the purposes of Gujarat Housing Board. The petitioners showed interest in the land by filing appeal only after the compensation was determined and disbursed to the appellants. This fact has been taken note of by the Tribunal while allowing the revision setting aside the order passed in appeal by the Deputy Collector, restoring the order dated 18.11.1974 passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT, Choryasi. 13. Shri S.P.Majmudar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners – private respondents herein has invited attention of this Court to the findings returned by the Collector and the Civil Court as noted above. He has further relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa and others [State of Orissa and ors. vs. Brundaban Sharma and another - 1995 Suppl. (3) SCC 249], to submit that no title can be conferred by a void order and its validity can be challenged at any stage in any proceedings. He has further relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa and others [State of Orissa and ors. vs. Brundaban Sharma and another - 1995 Suppl. (3) SCC 249], to submit that no title can be conferred by a void order and its validity can be challenged at any stage in any proceedings. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in A.V.Papayya Sastry[A.V.Papayya Sastry vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh - 2007 (4) SCC 221 ], to assert that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the Court, Tribunal or authority is a nullity and non-est in the eye of law, which can be challenged in any Court at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings. The decision of the Apex Court in S.P.Chengalvarya Naidu (Dead) By LRS[S.P.Chengalvarya Naidu (Dead) By LRS vs. Jagannath (Dead) by LRS - 1994 (1) SCC 1 ], has been placed to assert that fraud avoids all judicial act and a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the Court is a nullity and non-est in the eyes of law. Same principle has been reiterated in the decision of this Court in Bhanumatiben D. Soni[Bhanumatiben D. Soni vs. State of Gujarat - 2003 (4) GLR 2808 ], which has been placed before us to assert that such an order can be challenged beyond the period of limitation. The judgments in Raj Kumar Soni [Raj Kumar Soni vs. State of Uttar Pradesh - 2007 (10) SCC 635 ] and Pagi Aataji Kacharaji [Pagi Aataji Kacharaji Vs. State of Gujarat - 2011 (2) GLR 149], have been placed to submit that any interference in the order of the learned Single Judge would result in resurrection of any illegal and void order. Interference in an illegal order on the ground of technicality is not permissible, inasmuch as, a writ cannot be issued to give life to an illegal order. 14. Having considered the submissions of learned counsels for the parties and perused the record, from the finding returned by the Collector in tenancy appeal, it is more than evident that the appellants had succeeded in getting declaration of tenancy rights over the land in question in a proceeding which was found to be result of fraud and collusion by the Collector. In view of the finding returned by the Collector that in the report dated 22.06.1990, it was indicated that the original documents from the Mamlatdar, Choryasi, were not found and that the hearing in the application moved by the appellants was conducted on the same day of filing and judgment was delivered, it is evident that there was no inquiry by the Mamlatdar with regard to the rights of the landlord therein, before making declaration in favour of the appellant. It was noted that the provisions of Section 32(B) cannot be made applicable to land fragments. Bai Fatimabibi has admitted that Satakhat / Agreement to Sell was made. Moreover, the Civil Court passed a decree in favour of the petitioners and noted that the appellant No.1 herein was a Sarpanch of the town and has fraudulently got a declaration in favour of his wife appellant No.2 herein. This finding recorded by the Deputy Collector in appeal and the Civil Court while declaring 3/8th share of the petitioners has not been assailed by the appellants. Their only contention is that the memo of appeal before the Deputy Collector was not accompanied with an application to condone the delay. The act of the Deputy Collector in condoning the delay in filing the appeal after a period of more than 10 years is found to be illegal by the Tribunal. 15. The contentions of the counsel for the appellants pointing illegality in the order of the Deputy Collector are technical objections which have to be examined in the light of the finding about fraud and collusion. It is settled principle of law that if any judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to be a decision in law. Such an order obtained by playing fraud on the Court, Tribunal or authority is a nullity and non-est in the eyes of law. It can be challenged in any Court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings. Fraud and justice never dwell together. The principle of ‘finality of litigation’ cannot be stressed to the extent of absurdity that it can be utilized as engine of operation by dishonest and fraudulent litigants. The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. Fraud and justice never dwell together. The principle of ‘finality of litigation’ cannot be stressed to the extent of absurdity that it can be utilized as engine of operation by dishonest and fraudulent litigants. The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. Property grabbers, tax evaders, bank loan dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the Court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal means indefinitely. A person whose case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of litigation. [Reference: A.V.Papayya Sastry (supra)]. 16. We may further note that any interference in the order of the learned Single Judge on the technical plea raised by the appellant would result in revival of the order dated 12.06.2006 passed by the Tribunal, consequently restoration of the order dated 18.11.1974 in declaration of the appellant No.2 as tenant. The result would be that by the order of this Court, the order dated 18.11.1974 passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT, which is proved to be an outcome of fraud and collusion, would be revived, no interference as such can be made in this appeal. 17. While affirming the findings of the learned Single Judge, for the reasons recorded hereinabove, we dismiss the appeal being devoid of merits. All pending application/s are also disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.