JUDGMENT : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. Union of India represented through its General Manager of the South Eastern Railway has challenged the judgment dated 24th March 2021 passed in Arbitration No. 14 of 2019 by which its challenge to the Award dated 07th June 2019 was rejected. 2. On 19th September 2011 the South Eastern Railway invited bids for Foot Overbridge at Tata Nagar Station and strengthening of the existing redundant old ROB including construction of PF Ramp and other allied works for conversion of ROB into 2nd FOB at Tata Nagar Station, and M/s Anup & Company (hereinafter referred to as claimant) was awarded the subject-works through Letter of Acceptance dated 14th September 2011. The total value of the aforesaid subject-works was Rs. 1,65,35,610/- and the period of completion of the subject-works was to end on 13th May 2012. According to the appellant, the work progress was not as per the time schedule and the claimant was granted extension of time for 5 months starting from 29th April 2013 till 30th September 2013 without penalty and, in relation thereto, a supplementary agreement was executed on 20th May 2013. Still, there was no substantial progress in work and a 7-day notice was issued to the claimant on 19th December 2013 for gearing up the resources and appreciable progress. Soon thereafter, another notice dated 8th January 2014 under clause 62 of the General Conditions of Contract (in short, GCC) was issued to the claimant giving 48-hour notice to commence work/ to make progress in work. Now challenging the notice dated 08th January 2014 the claimant moved the High Court of Jharkhand in WP(C) No. 237 of 2014 but, in the meantime, the contract was terminated on 16th January 2014 under clause 62 of GCC and the claimant was directed to attend the office of SSE/Works/West/TATA within 7 days for final measurement. The claimant therefore filed an amendment petition in the pending writ petition to challenge the termination order dated 16th January 2014. On 26th August 2015 the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to the claimant to invoke arbitration clause and, pursuant to the aforesaid liberty, the claimant sent legal notice dated 31st July 2017 to Sr. Divisional Engineer (East) of South Eastern Railway at Chakradharpur for appointment of an Arbitrator. On 26th August 2015 the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to the claimant to invoke arbitration clause and, pursuant to the aforesaid liberty, the claimant sent legal notice dated 31st July 2017 to Sr. Divisional Engineer (East) of South Eastern Railway at Chakradharpur for appointment of an Arbitrator. The claimant issued 2nd legal notice on 4th December 2017 for appointment of the Arbitrator but the South Eastern Railway did not respond to the aforesaid notices. 3. Aggrieved thereby, the claimant approached Calcutta High Court by filing AP No. 503 of 2018 under section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for appointment of the Arbitrator which was disposed of by an order dated 3rd October 2018. In the said order it has been indicated that; while deciding each of the claims raised by the claimant the Arbitrator shall first decide whether such claim is dependent on validity of the termination of contract and the same is barred by limitation or not. Following the order passed by Calcutta High Court, a former Chairman of the Railway Board was appointed as the Sole Arbitrator by the General Manager of South Eastern Railway vide letter dated 27th November 2018 to adjudicate and arbitrate the disputes and claims/counter-claims relating to the subject-contract with a stipulation that the Sole Arbitrator shall publish the Award in accordance with Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, except the matters which fall under the category of “Excepted Matters”. The Arbitrator entered upon the reference and after filing of the statement of claim/statement of defence/rejoinder conducted oral hearings on 13th and 28th May 2019 at Ranchi. 4. The issues (i) whether the claims made by the claimant fall under the category of “Excepted Matters” and (ii) whether arbitration was barred by limitation have been dwelt upon and decided by the Arbitrator against Union of India. The Arbitrator has held that the date of cause of action for invoking the arbitration clause shall be 26th August 2015 when WP(C) No. 237 of 2014 was disposed of. This finding has been rendered by the Arbitrator on the ground that the claimant shall be entitled to benefit under section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and thereby the time spent in the High Court of Jharkhand while prosecuting the writ petition shall be excluded. This finding has been rendered by the Arbitrator on the ground that the claimant shall be entitled to benefit under section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and thereby the time spent in the High Court of Jharkhand while prosecuting the writ petition shall be excluded. The Arbitrator has further held that the respondent took unusually long time in approving GAD and the approval was given on 8th August 2012 after expiry of the initial time for completion of subject-works on 13th May 2012. Another important finding recorded by the Arbitrator is that the respondent was responsible for breach of contract on account of delay in performing its contractual obligations and, as a consequence, the contract became voidable and the claimant was entitled for compensation for any loss sustained by it. On the issue of termination of contract by the Railway, the finding is that the contract has been rescinded under clause 62 of GCC without establishing any default on the part of the claimant and therefore its action was arbitrary, unfair and unlawful. The objection as to jurisdiction to arbitrate “Excepted Matters” has been dealt with by the Arbitrator with reference to “Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & Anr. v. Motorola India Private Limited”, (2009) 2 SCC 337 to hold that once default on the part of the claimant is not established the provision under clause 62 of GCC shall not apply. 5. Before the Commercial Court at Jamshedpur, the appellant reiterated its previous stand and set up the grounds of limitation, fraud and erroneous findings by the Arbitrator. The District Judge-I-cum-Commercial Court, East Singbhum at Jamshedpur has dismissed Arbitration No. 14 of 2019 filed by Union of India represented through its General Manager of South Eastern Railway at Calcutta under section 34(2)(a)(iii) & (iv) and (b) (ii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking setting-aside of the arbitral Award dated 7th June 2019. The District Judge-I-cum-Commercial Court, East Singbhum at Jamshedpur has dismissed Arbitration No. 14 of 2019 filed by Union of India represented through its General Manager of South Eastern Railway at Calcutta under section 34(2)(a)(iii) & (iv) and (b) (ii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking setting-aside of the arbitral Award dated 7th June 2019. The Presiding Officer of the Commercial Court at Jamshedpur seems to have rightly understood the restrictions against setting-aside of the arbitral Award while he has referred to “State of U.P. v. Allied Constructions” (2003) 7 SCC 396 , “Bhagawati Oxygen Ltd. v. Hindustan Copper Ltd.” (2005) 6 SCC 462 , “DDA v. R.S. Sharma and Co.” (2008) 13 SCC 80 , “P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. v. B.H.H. Securities (P) Ltd.” (2012) 1 SCC 594 and “Associate Builders v. DDA” (2015) 3 SCC 49 to hold that an Award can be challenged only under the grounds mentioned in section 34(2) of the Act of 1996 and, that, in a section 34 petition the Court does not sit in appeal over merits of the Award and no interference is called for if the view taken by the Arbitrator is permissible. 6. The Presiding Officer of the Commercial Court at Jamshedpur has held as under: “13. A perusal of impugned Award clearly shows that the learned Arbitrator has well dealt with the matter and after considering the entire evidence etc. the impugned Award has been passed. Hence this court is not required to re-appreciate and re-evaluate the findings given by the Tribunal. Therefore, in view of the above said discussion and after considering the contentions of the learned counsels for the parties and in view of the authoritative pronouncements discussed above and also as this court is not sitting in appeal against the impugned award the, court is not required to re-appreciate or re-evaluate the evidence led before the Arbitral Tribunal, I find that the Respondent/ Applicant herein has failed to make out a case for any interference with the impugned award dated 07-06-2019 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal, U/s. 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. In this regard I find no merit in the contention of learned counsel of the applicant/ claimant is that Ld. In this regard I find no merit in the contention of learned counsel of the applicant/ claimant is that Ld. arbitrator without applying his mind awarded and held that the claimant is entitled for payment a sum of Rs.26,31,193/-within a period of 60 days from the date of award payable by respondent, failing which respondent shall pay simple interest @ 8.5 % per annum after two months publication of award ie from 07.08.2019. in favour of the OP, well appreciating the pleadings, documents and evidence available on arbitral record. 14.On the basis of oral and documentary evidences of the parties and all the facts and materials available on record this court comes to the conclusion that there is no error appear on the face of the record or it has not come that the arbitrator has not followed the statutory legal position regarding passing award in favour of the claimant. There is no material available on the record which prove that the arbitrator had misconducted himself or the proceedings or the award, has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid that the court may set aside such award, so there is no required interfering with the award dated 07-06-2019 published by the Learned Sole arbitrator Sri Arunendra Kumar, former Chairman Railway Board in which the Hon'ble Arbitral Tribunal has awarded in favour of claimant The learned sole arbitrator awarded and held that the claimant is entitled for payment a sum of Rs.26,31,193/-within a period of 60 days from the date of award payable by respondent, failing which respondent shall pay simple interest @8.5% per annum after two months publication of award i.e from 07.08.2019, is a reasoned award and well discussed and no need to interfere in the Said award. There is no cogent reasons or material available on the record to set aside the award dated 07-06-2019 passed by the Learned Sole arbitrator and award published by the Learned Sole arbitrator Sri Arunendra Kumar, former Chairman Railway Board. 15. Hence, issue no.1 Whether the award is liable to be set aside in view of the objection of petitioner Union of India represented by the general Manager, South Eastern Railway awarded passed by the Learned Sole arbitrator Sri Arunendra Kumar, former Chairman Railway Board is decided in favour of Opposite party/ claimant against the applicant/Respondent. 15. Hence, issue no.1 Whether the award is liable to be set aside in view of the objection of petitioner Union of India represented by the general Manager, South Eastern Railway awarded passed by the Learned Sole arbitrator Sri Arunendra Kumar, former Chairman Railway Board is decided in favour of Opposite party/ claimant against the applicant/Respondent. Hence, in the light of the facts discussed above I find that Learned Sole arbitrator Sri Arunendra Kumar, former Chairman Railway Board has not committed any error of law or fact regarding partly allowed the claim of the OP/ claimant while passing award dated 07-06-2019. As such there is no infirmity found in the award dated 07-06-2019 passed by the Learned Sole arbitrator Sri Arunendra Kumar, former Chairman Railway Board and hence, the impugned award dated 07-06-2019 does not require any interference. Accordingly, I find that instant suit for setting aside the arbitral award dated 07-06-2019 passed by the Learned Sole arbitrator Sri Arunendra Kumar, former Chairman Railway Board is devoid of merit and liable to be dismiss. Therefore, it is hereby. ORDERED Accordingly, objections of the applicant regarding the award passed by Ld arbitrator who held that the claimant is entitled for payment a sum of Rs,26,31,193/-within a period of 60 days from the date of award payable by respondent, failing which respondent shall pay simple interest @ 8.5 % per annum after two months publication of award ie from 07.08.2019, is hereby overruled. In the result, this Arbitration Case u/s 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside the arbitral award dated 07-06-2019 passed by the Learned Sole arbitrator Sri Arunendra Kumar, former Chairman Railway Board, stand dismissed.….....” 7. Mr. Anil Kumar, the learned ASGI has made two-fold submissions viz. (a) claims raised by the claimant were not arbitrable in view of clause 62(vii) of GCC being “Excepted Matters” as decision of the Railway authority thereon was final and binding on the claimant and (b) invocation of arbitration clause through notice dated 31st July 2017 was barred by limitation. 8. Mr. Anil Kumar, the learned ASGI has relied on the judgments in (i) “Harsha Constructions v. Union of India & Ors.” (2014) 9 SCC 246 , (ii) “Thomas Mathew v. Construction Engineer, K.L.D.C. Limited” (2018) 12 SCC 560 , (iii) “Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. 8. Mr. Anil Kumar, the learned ASGI has relied on the judgments in (i) “Harsha Constructions v. Union of India & Ors.” (2014) 9 SCC 246 , (ii) “Thomas Mathew v. Construction Engineer, K.L.D.C. Limited” (2018) 12 SCC 560 , (iii) “Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI)” (2019) 15 SCC 131 , (iv)“Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Nortel Networks India Private Limited” (2021) 5 SCC 738 and (v) “Emaar India Ltd. v. Tarun Aggarwal Projects LLP” 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1328, to fortify the aforesaid submissions. 9. In re, Excepted Matters : Clause 63 of GCC encompasses all disputes and differences of every kind whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the contract. 10. Clause 63 of GCC reads as under: “63. Matters finally determined by the Railway—All disputes and differences of any kind whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the contract, whether during the progress of the work or after its completion and whether before or after the determination of the contract shall be referred by the contractor to the Railway and the Railway shall within 120 days after receipt of the Contractor's representation make and notify decisions on all matters referred to by the contractor in writing provided that matters for which provision has been made in Clauses 8, 18, 22(5), 39, 43(2), 45(a), 55, 55-A(5), 57, 57A, 61(1), 61(2) and 62(1) to (xiii)(B) of General Conditions of Contract or in any clause of the special conditions of the contract shall be deemed as “excepted matters” and decisions of the Railway authority, thereon shall be final and binding on the contractor provided further that 'excepted matters' shall stand specifically excluded from the purview of the arbitration clause and shall not be referred to arbitration.” 11. Clause 63 provides that all disputes and differences arising during the progress of the work or after its completion and whether before or after the determination of the work shall be referred by the contractor to the Railway which shall render its decision in writing within 120 days. However, the provisions under clause 63 are subject to clauses 8, 18, 22(5), 39, 43(2), 45(a), 55, 55-A(5), 57, 57-A, 61(1), 61(2) and 62 (i) to (xiii)(B) of GCC which are “Excepted Matters”. However, the provisions under clause 63 are subject to clauses 8, 18, 22(5), 39, 43(2), 45(a), 55, 55-A(5), 57, 57-A, 61(1), 61(2) and 62 (i) to (xiii)(B) of GCC which are “Excepted Matters”. Clause 63 of GCC further provides that decision of the Railway authority thereon shall be final and binding and such “Excepted Matters” are excluded from the purview of the arbitration clause and not to be referred to arbitration. 12. The learned ASGI has referred to 7-day notice dated 19th December 2013 and 48-hour notice dated 8th January 2014 for resorting to sub-clause (vii) of clause 62 of GCC which provides a ground for determination of the contract owing to persistent disregard to the instructions of the Engineer. This is the case set up by the appellant “in the present proceeding” that persistent disregard by the claimant of the instructions issued through 7-day and 48-hour notices would take out the issue of termination of contract dated 24th October 2011 from the purview of arbitration clause. 13. Clause 62 of GCC which provides grounds for termination of the contract reads as under: “62. Determination of contract owing to default of contractor – (1) if the contractor should...................... 13. Clause 62 of GCC which provides grounds for termination of the contract reads as under: “62. Determination of contract owing to default of contractor – (1) if the contractor should...................... (i) Becomes bankrupt or insolvent, or (ii) make an arrangement with of assignment in favour of his creditors, or agree to carry out the contract under a Committee of Inspection of his creditors, or (iii) being a Company or Corporation, go into liquidation (other than a voluntary liquidation for the purpose of amalgamation or reconstruction), or (iv) have an execution levied on his goods or property on the works, or (v) assign the contract or any part there-of otherwise than as provided in Clause 7 of these conditions or (vi) abondon the contract, or (vii) persistently disregard the instructions of the Engineer, or contravene any provision of the contract, or (viii) fail to adhere to the agreed programme of work by a margin of 10% of the stipulated period, or (ix) fail to remove materials from the site or to pull down and replace work after receiving from the Engineer notice to the effect that the said materials or works have been condemned or rejected under Clause 25 and 27 of these conditions, or (x) fail to take steps to employ competent or additional staff and labour as required under Clause 26 of the conditions, or (xi) fail to afford the Engineer or Engineer's representative proper facilities for inspecting the works or any part thereof as required under clause (28) of the conditions, or (xii) promise, offer or give any bribe, commission, gift or advantage either himself or through his partner, agent or servant to any officer or employee of the Railway or to any person on his or on their behalf in relation to the execution of this or any other contract with this Railway.” 14. This is trite law that the party alleging breach of the contract cannot be the adjudicator in his own cause. Therefore sub-clause (vii) of clause 62 of GCC falling under the category of “Excepted Matters” does not confer a power in the employer to reserve to himself the power to adjudicate whether the claimant has committed persistent breaches of the notices dated 19th December 2013 and 8th January 2014. Therefore sub-clause (vii) of clause 62 of GCC falling under the category of “Excepted Matters” does not confer a power in the employer to reserve to himself the power to adjudicate whether the claimant has committed persistent breaches of the notices dated 19th December 2013 and 8th January 2014. In “State of Karnataka v. Shree Rameshwara Rice Mills” (1987) 2 SCC 160 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made a distinction between adjudicating upon an issue relating to the breach of a condition of the contract and the right to assess damages arising from the breach of a condition. It has been held that the right to assess damages arising from a breach of the condition does not include a right to adjudicate upon a dispute relating to the very breach of the condition of the contract. In “Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & Anr. v. Motorola India Private Limited” (supra) clause 16.2 of the Tender document provided that on failure of the tenderer to deliver the goods and services within the specified period the purchaser shall be entitled to recover 0.5% of the value of the delayed quantity of the goods and services. The said clause further provided that the decision of the purchaser as regards quantum of liquidated damages shall be final and not challengeable by the supplier. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that to take out the issue of liquidated damages from the purview of arbitration it was first necessary to fix liability of the supplier and after a finding is entered that the supplier is liable for payment of liquidated damages on account of delay on his part then only clause 16.2 shall be attracted and decision of the supplier on quantification of the liquidated damages shall be final and not arbitrable. Therefore the issue whether there has been persistent disregard by the claimant to the instructions of the Engineer or contravention of any provision of the contract requires a conclusive decision by the Railway authority. So sub-clause (vii) to clause 62 of GCC which shall be construed as a default on part of the contractor for determination of the contract can be considered falling under the category of “Excepted Matters” only after a decision is made as regards default on the part of the claimant on account of persistent disregard to the instructions of the Engineer. 15. 15. In “Harsha Constructions v. Union of India & Ors.” (supra) the award of compensation in relation to extra work was found not arbitrable in view of clause 39 of GCC which provided that if the rate for extra work was not specified in the contract the issue was required to be discussed by the contractor with the Engineer concerned who shall ultimately decide the amount payable for extra/additional work done by the contractor. In those background facts which are quite different in the present case the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “14. Upon perusal of both the clauses included in the contract, which have been referred to hereinabove, it is crystal clear that all the disputes were not arbitrable. Some of the disputes which had been referred to in Clause 39 were specifically not arbitrable and in relation to the said disputes the contractor had to negotiate with the Engineer concerned of the respondent and if the contractor was not satisfied with the rate determined by the Engineer, it was open to the contractor to file an appeal against the decision of the Engineer before the Chief Engineer within 30 days from the date of communication of the decision to the contractor. 15. In the instant case, there was no finality so far as the amount payable to the contractor in relation to the extra work done by it is concerned, because the said dispute was never decided by the Chief Engineer. In the aforestated circumstances, when the disputes had been referred to the arbitrator, the disputes which had been among “excepted matters” had also been referred to the learned arbitrator. 16. Upon perusal of the case papers we find that before the learned arbitrator, the contractor did object to the arbitrability of the disputes covered under Clause 39, but the arbitrator had decided the said issues by holding that the same were not “excepted matters” but arbitrable. 17. The question before this Court is whether the arbitrator could have decided the issues which were not arbitrable. 18. Arbitration arises from a contract and unless there is a specific written contract, a contract with regard to arbitration cannot be presumed. Section 7(3) of the Act clearly specifies that the contract with regard to arbitration must be in writing. 17. The question before this Court is whether the arbitrator could have decided the issues which were not arbitrable. 18. Arbitration arises from a contract and unless there is a specific written contract, a contract with regard to arbitration cannot be presumed. Section 7(3) of the Act clearly specifies that the contract with regard to arbitration must be in writing. Thus, so far as the disputes which have been referred to in Clause 39 of the contract are concerned, it was not open to the arbitrator to arbitrate upon the said disputes as there was a specific clause whereby the said disputes had been “excepted”. Moreover, when the law specifically makes a provision with regard to formation of a contract in a particular manner, there cannot be any presumption with regard to a contract if the contract is not entered into by the mode prescribed under the Act. 19. If a non-arbitrable dispute is referred to an arbitrator and even if an issue is framed by the arbitrator in relation to such a dispute, in our opinion, there cannot be a presumption or a conclusion to the effect that the parties had agreed to refer the issue to the arbitrator. In the instant case, the respondent authorities had raised an objection relating to the arbitrability of the aforestated issue before the arbitrator and yet the arbitrator had rendered his decision on the said “excepted” dispute. In our opinion, the arbitrator could not have decided the said “excepted” dispute. We, therefore, hold that it was not open to the arbitrator to decide the issues which were not arbitrable and the award, so far as it relates to disputes regarding non-arbitrable disputes is concerned, is bad in law and is hereby quashed.” 16. “Thomas Mathew v. Construction Engineer, K.L.D.C. Limited” (supra)is in relation to a counter claim which was required to be treated as cross suit and the cause of action and limitation thereof to be decided on the date of the breach of contract. In “Emaar India Ltd. v. Tarun Aggarwal Projects LLP” (supra) there were two separate provisions for dispute resolution in respect of which no inquiry was conducted by the High Court. Similarly, “Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Nortel Networks India Private Limited” (supra) deals with the period of limitation for filing an application under section 11(6) for appointment of arbitrator. In “Emaar India Ltd. v. Tarun Aggarwal Projects LLP” (supra) there were two separate provisions for dispute resolution in respect of which no inquiry was conducted by the High Court. Similarly, “Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Nortel Networks India Private Limited” (supra) deals with the period of limitation for filing an application under section 11(6) for appointment of arbitrator. These judgments are therefore quite distinguishable on facts and do not lend any support to the appellant's stand. 17. In re, Limitation : Section 3 of the Limitation Act casts a duty upon the Court to dismiss a suit if made after the prescribed period even though limitation is not set-up as a defence. In “Maqbul Ahmad v. Pratap Narain Singh” AIR 1935 PC 85 the Privy Council has held that the Court is bound under section 3 of the Limitation Act to ascertain for itself whether the suit before it is within time and if the Court fails to do so and entertain a suit or claim which is barred by limitation the Court acts without jurisdiction. The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. The genesis of the laws of limitation can be traced to the latin maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium which means it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation. The period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act applies to a proceeding in the Court and not before an administrative or quasi-judicial authority. Therefore there was considerable debate in the early years as regards applicability of the law of limitation in arbitration proceedings. It was first in “Astley and Tyldesley Coal and Salt Co.” In re Astley and Tyldesley Coal and Salt Co. : (1899) 68 L.J. (Q.B.) 252 (B) where with reference to the English Statute of Limitations the Privy Council held that a submission to arbitration does not per se exclude the right of either party to raise the defence of limitation. Now this is no longer a debatable issue as section 43 of the Act of 1996 provides that Limitation Act would apply to arbitrations as it applies to the proceedings in the Court. 18. Now this is no longer a debatable issue as section 43 of the Act of 1996 provides that Limitation Act would apply to arbitrations as it applies to the proceedings in the Court. 18. Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act defines period of limitation to mean the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application under the schedule to the Limitation Act and prescribed period would mean the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of law. However, the Limitation Act does not provide a period of limitation for invoking the arbitration clause and therefore the provisions under Article 137 of the Limitation Act have to be invoked and a period of 3 years should be the period of limitation for invoking the arbitration clause from the date of accrual of the cause of action. The issue of limitation which has been raised by the appellant before the Arbitrator pertains to invocation of the arbitration clause through letter dated 31st July 2017. According to the appellant, counting from 16th January 2014 when the contract was terminated invocation of the arbitration clause has been made beyond the period of limitation of three years as provided under Article 137 of the Act of 1963. 19. The question of limitation for invoking the arbitration clause necessarily pertains to “breaking point”15 which has to be taken as the initial point for counting the period of limitation. In a certain set of facts and circumstances the period during which the parties were bonafide negotiating towards an amicable settlement may be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of limitation for reference to arbitration but the cause of action shall be deemed to have arisen on the discussions reaching a dead end. Therefore the Court upon careful considerations of the materials on record must find out what was the “breaking point”, B & T AG v. Ministry of Defence, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 657 at which any reasonable party would have abandoned efforts at arriving at the settlement and this breaking point would then be treated as the date on which the cause of action has arisen. 20. Evidently the cause of action becomes important for the purposes of calculating the limitation period for bringing an action through an application /plaint/petition. 20. Evidently the cause of action becomes important for the purposes of calculating the limitation period for bringing an action through an application /plaint/petition. The expression “cause of action” as understood in the legal parlance means the whole bundle of material facts which are necessary for the applicant to prove in order to entitle him to succeed in the suit. In “Whalley v. Whalley” (1816) 1 M.R. 436 it has been held that the cause of action arises when and only when the aggrieved party has the right to apply to the proper Tribunal for relief. 21. Under section 43(2) of the Act of 1996 an arbitration shall be deemed to have been commenced when one party to the arbitration agreement serves on the other party thereto a notice requiring the appointment of an Arbitrator and, in the present case, that was the notice for arbitration through letter dated 31st July 2017. This also is indisputable that the parties reached the dead end on 16th January 2014 when the contract was terminated and this becomes the “breaking point” for the purpose of counting the period of limitation. In “Panchu Gopal Bose v. Board of Trustees for Port of Calcutta”, (1993) 4 SCC 338 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply to arbitrations and, notwithstanding any term in the contract to the contrary, cause of arbitration for the purpose of limitations shall be deemed to have accrued to the party when it should have accrued but for the contract. 22. In “Panchu Gopal Bose” (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “11. Therefore, the period of limitation for the commencement of an arbitration runs from the date on which, had there been no arbitration clause, the cause of action would have accrued. Just as in the case of actions the claim is not to be brought after the expiration of a specified number of years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, so in the case of arbitrations, the claim is not to be put forward after the expiration of the specified number of years from the date when the claim accrued.” 23. The Limitation Act contains an elaborate procedure for computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal etc. The Limitation Act contains an elaborate procedure for computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal etc. and it also deals with the exclusion from the period of limitation of time wasted in other legal proceedings. Now taking the date of termination of the contract the “breaking point”15 the issue which falls for consideration is whether the benefit under section 14 of the Limitation Act is available to the claimant. Section 14 as it stands today is worded exactly in the similar manner as was section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Privy Council having regard to the English Statute of Limitation which did not contain a provision like section 14 of the Indian Law expressed its opinion that the Indian Legislature thought it necessary to incorporate a provision to protect a plaintiff acting bonafide but under some mistake prosecuting his claim in a different forum. It has further been held that the expression employed in section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908 shall cover civil proceedings before an Arbitrator who had no jurisdiction to enter upon the reference for resolving the dispute between the parties. This is also no more res integra that irrespective of nomenclature or the High Court Rules the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution are civil in nature and while so it must be concluded that the period spent in prosecuting WP(C) No. 237 of 2014 in the Jharkhand High Court shall be excluded for counting the period of limitation of 3 years from the date of termination of the contract. 24. A plausible view of the Arbitrator cannot be substituted by the Court on re-appreciation of the evidence and by substituting its own view or to do what it considers to be just. Now various communications between the parties reveal that approval of the competent authority on the General Approved Drawing (in short GAD) was not accorded even on 4th April 2012, as indicated in the said letter to the claimant. This is also true that the claimant was advised to submit a request for the extension of time vide letter dated 31st May 2012 but the claimant was reluctant to seek extension of time for completing the project. It further appears that the employer pressed hard upon the claimant through letter dated 8th March 2013 to move application for extension of time to complete the subject-works. It further appears that the employer pressed hard upon the claimant through letter dated 8th March 2013 to move application for extension of time to complete the subject-works. As the facts are recorded in the letters issued by the appellant, this stands admitted that GAD was approved by the Railway administration after about several months and time for completing the subject-works was extended at the instance of the appellant without penalty. The claimant itself wrote letter dated 3rd January 2014 to the Senior Divisional Manager, Senior Divisional Engineering (East), South Eastern Railways for closure of the agreement without any liability as approval for drawing was not given for about 1 year 7 months, payment for structural steel work was not finalized till the end and there were serious other difficulties in execution of the subject-works. 25. Before the Arbitrator, the claimant raised claims under 11 heads and the respondent made counter-claim of (i) Rs. 10 lakh towards harassment under section 75 of the Contract Act, 1872 and (ii) cost of Rs. 5 lakh towards cost of arbitration. Except the claims (i) for payment of final bill amounting to Rs. 14,51,794/-(ii) refund of EMD of Rs. 2,40,000/- (iii) Performance Bank Guarantee of Rs. 8,30,000/-and (iv) additional Security Deposit amounting to Rs. 1,09,399/-; other claims raised by the claimant for idle labor, machinery, overhead; price variation, prolongation cost, loss of profit on unexecuted work, cost of materials at site and legal and arbitration costs have all been declined by the Arbitrator and an Award of Rs. 26,31,193/-with simple interest @ 8.5% after 7th August 2019 has been made, as against total claim of Rs. 2,24,35,147/-. 26. The arbitral Award dated 7th June 2019 is in the following terms: a) No Claim of Claimant is barred by Section 3 of Act of Limitation, 1963. Claim No.1 regarding payment of Final Bill does not attract the provision of Section 3 of Act of Limitation, 1963 as it is an outstanding amount payable to Claimant for work done. b) The Award amount is Rs. 26,31,193 (Rupees Twenty Six Lakhs Thirty One Thousand One Hundred and Ninety Three) payable by Respondent to Claimant. Claim No.1 regarding payment of Final Bill does not attract the provision of Section 3 of Act of Limitation, 1963 as it is an outstanding amount payable to Claimant for work done. b) The Award amount is Rs. 26,31,193 (Rupees Twenty Six Lakhs Thirty One Thousand One Hundred and Ninety Three) payable by Respondent to Claimant. The Claimant shall also be entitled to simple interest @8.5% two months after the publication of award i.e. from 07/08/2019 which shall be payable by Respondent on the full value of the awarded amount as per section 31(7)(b) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 and Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015. The Counterclaims by Respondent are NIL. I order the Respondent to implement this “Arbitral Award” forth with. 27. This admits no doubt that intervention of the Court with an arbitral Award is envisaged only in supervisory role of the Courts. Therefore the Courts while exercising its powers under section 34 cannot reappreciate the evidence or examine correctness of the conclusions arrived at by the Arbitrator. The Award dated 07th June 2019 takes into consideration every aspect of the matter including objections raised by the respondent and this is not a case set-up by the respondent that any specific objection raised by it has not been dealt with by the Arbitrator. Now this is well settled that if the view taken by the Arbitrator is logical and acceptable merely because two views are possible the Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction shall not interfere with the arbitral Award. In “U.P. SEB v. Searsole Chemicals Ltd.” (2001) 3 SCC 397 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Court will refrain itself from interfering with an arbitral Award if it is demonstrated that the view of the Arbitrator is a plausible one. The proviso to sub-section (2-A) to section 34 puts a specific restrictions on the powers of the Court in as much as a wrong decision of the Arbitrator shall not be a ground to interference with the arbitral Award. 28. Following the aforesaid discussions, we do not find any ground to interfere in this matter and, accordingly, Commercial Appeal No. 3 of 2021 is dismissed. 29. Consequently, I.A. No. 62 of 2023 filed for stay of proceeding stands dismissed.