JUDGMENT Ajit Kumar, J. Heard Sri Bheem Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Committee of Management Vaidik Kanya Inter College, Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar in Writ A No. 7096 of 2020 and on behalf of Smt. Anupama in Writ A No. 3608 of 2021 and Sri Jagannath Singh, learned counsel appearing for petitioner Smt.Ratan Prabha in Writ A No. 866 of 2020 and Writ A No. 9586 of 2021. In all the writ petitions controversy relates to seniority between one Smt. Ratan Prabha and Anupama in the institution so as to hold charge of officiating Principal. Smt. Anupama has been permitted by the Committee of Management to officiate as Principal of the institution. In Writ A No. 7096 of 2020 and in Writ A No. 3608 of 2021, the order passed by the Regional Joint Director of Education dated 25.10.2019 holding the petitioner senior most lecturer is under challenge. In Writ A No. 866 of 2020, the prayer is to the effect to direct the Committee of Management to give effect to the order passed by the Regional Joint Director of Education i.e. directing the petitioner to be the senior most teacher in the institution, whereas in Writ A No. 9586 of 2021, the officiating charge given to Smt. Anupama by order dated 24.8.2019 and attestation of signature of Smt. Anupama was given on 17.10.2019. The case has a checkered history, and, therefore, needs lucid detail of facts which are stated as under: 2. The petitioner Ratan Prabha applied for the post of lecturer (Civics) pursuant to advertisement being no. 1 of 2004 issued by U.P. Secondary Services Selection Board (hereinafter referred as 'Board'). In the selection held by the Board, petitioner Ratan Prabha got selected and was recommended initially for being appointed as a lecturer (Civics) in Nagar Palika Inter College, Badaun. However, in the absence of vacancy, there at Badaun she was not permitted to join and consequently filed writ petition before this Court being Writ A No. 19955 of 2006. The said writ petition was disposed of, vide order dated 10.4.2006, issuing a direction to the Board to make a recommendation for adjustment of petitioner in some other institution where vacancy exists. The said writ petition was disposed of, vide order dated 10.4.2006, issuing a direction to the Board to make a recommendation for adjustment of petitioner in some other institution where vacancy exists. The order passed by this Court dated 10.4.2006 is quoted below:- "The petitioner is a selected candidate and was recommended by the Board to join the institution concerned but was not allowed to join. The District Inspector of Schools has intimated that the post in question has already been filled up by way of promotion and? therefore there is no vacancy. Sri A.K. Yadav, the learned counsel for the Selection Board, upon instructions received by him, admits this fact. In view of the aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed and a mandamus is issued to the Selection Board to pass fresh orders, recommending the name of the petitioner in another institution, where a vacancy exists, within one month from the date of the production of a certified copy of this order. " 3. In compliance of the orders so passed above by the Court, the Board made recommendation on 17.5.2006 adjusting the petitioner as a lecturer (Civics) in Vaidik Kanya Inter College, District Gautam Budh Nagar, the institution been run by the petitioner in writ petition no. 7096 of 2020. It appears that when the recommendation was not being put to action at the end of the institution, a clear directive was issued by the Director Secondary Education U.P. Lucknow on 20.7.2006 asking the District Inspector of Schools to ensure joining of the petitioner Ratan Prabha and in the event of failure on the part of the Committee of Management not issuing the appointment order, take action under Regulation 17 of 1998 Regulations. The letter issued by the Director of Secondary Education U.P. Lucknow dated 20.7.2006 for its better appraisal is reproduced hereinunder: ^^izs"kd] f'k{kk funs'kd ek/;fed] mÙkj izns'k] 'kkluA lsok esa] ftyk fo|ky; fujh{kd] xkSrecq) uxj i=kad Mh0bZ0@708@2006&07 fnukad tqykbZ 20]2006 fo"k;%& lqJh jRuizHkk p;uksMZ }kjk p;fur izoDrk ukxfjd 'kkL= dh oSfnd dU;k baVj dkWyst nknjh xkSrecq) uxj esa dk;ZHkkj xzg.k djkus ds laca/k esaA egksn;] d`i;k mi;qZDr fo"k;d vij f'k{kk funs'kd ek/;fed ds i=kad lkekU; 1046@2006&07 fnukad 30-06-2006 dk lanHkZ xzg.k djsa ftlds }kjk lqJh jRuizHkk dks vfoyac dk;ZHkkj xzg.k djk;s tkus ds funZs'k fn;s x;s gSaA bl laca/k esa vkidk /;ku vkids i=kad ek0&2@92&93&06&07 fnukad 17-04-2006 dh vksj vkd`"V fd;k tkrk gS ftlds }kjk vkius lfpo] p;ucksMZ dks lqJh jRuizHkk dks oSfnd dU;k b.Vj dkWyst] nknjh xkSrecq) uxj esa vuqlwfpr tkfr gsrq vf/k;kfpd in ds izfr lek;ksftr djus dh laLrqfr Lo;a dh gSA d`i;k lqJh jRuizHkk dks dk;ZHkkj xzg.k djk;s tkus dh fu;ekuqlkj dk;Zokgh djsa rFkk fo|ky; izca/kd }kjk fu;qfDr i= fuxZr u djus dh fLFkfr esa /kkjk 17 ds varxZr dk;Zokgh lqfuf'pr djsaA lacaf/kr f'kf{kdk lqJh jRuizHkk dk bl dk;kZy; esa izkIr vkosnu i= ewy:i ls layXu gSA layXud% mDror~ Hkonh; lat; eksgu f'k{kk funs'kd ek0 m0iz0** 4. It is upon the above order been passed by the Director of Secondary Education that petitioner was given joining directly in the institution by the Principal of the institution on 1.7.2006. This joining report is endorsed by the then Principal of the institution. However, one Kamal Verma. filed a Writ Petition before this Court challenging the order of Board being Writ-A No. 41691 of 2006. The said writ petition was entertained by this Court and expressing prima facie view that Board had no power to make adjustment of an impaneled candidate against a vacancy not advertised, granted interim order to the effect that present petitioner who was respondent no. 5 in the said petition would not be permitted to join and if already joined she may be permitted to work but shall not be paid salary without leave of the Court. The operative portion of the order of this Court dated 21.8.2006 is reproduced hereinunder: "In the opinion of the Court, adjustment so made is apparently contrary to the provisions of U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act and Rules framed therein. The operative portion of the order of this Court dated 21.8.2006 is reproduced hereinunder: "In the opinion of the Court, adjustment so made is apparently contrary to the provisions of U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act and Rules framed therein. A selected candidate, in pursuance of an advertisement if not permitted to join in the institution for certain reasons in the institution, for which he has been empanneled, has right to be considered in accordance with the merit secured in the selection against other vacancy, which were subject matter of advertisement qua the sme selection. Adjustment against subsequent vacancies, which may be subject matter of another advertisement, is not contemplated by the rules. Petitioner has, therefore, made out a case for grant on interim order. Till the next date of listing respondent no. 5 shall not be permitted to join at Vaidik Kanya Inter College, Dadri, Gautam Buddh Nagar. In case she has already joined, she may be permitted to work but she shall not be paid salary without leave of the Court." (emphasis added) 5. Ultimately, the said writ petition came to be allowed by this Court holding that unadvertised vacancy cannot be filled up from amongst the candidates who have been selected in previous selections. The order was passed on the basis of judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Satish Kumar v. State of U.P. and others. Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the said judgment is reproduced hereinunder:- "6. The order was passed on the basis of judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Satish Kumar v. State of U.P. and others. Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the said judgment is reproduced hereinunder:- "6. The question is whether such a candidate can be adjusted or appointed against a post which was not advertised in a particular selection has been considered by Division Bench of this Court in Satish Kumar v. State of U.P. and Others, decided on 22.09.2006 wherein the Division Bench has held : "For the reasons and the conclusions drawn herein above, our answer to Question No. 1 is: "An unadvertised vacancy cannot be filled up from amongst the candidate who has been selected in any previous selections and to that extent we declare that the pronouncement of the learned Single Judge in the case of Savita Gupta v. State of U.P. and Ors; 2004(2) UPLBEC 2739, does not lay down the law correctly and is hereby overruled." and to Question No.2 is: "The U.P. Secondary Education Services Selected Board constituted under the U.P. Act No. 5 of the 1982 cannot, with the aid of the Government Order dated 12th March has been intimated and notified but not advertised. " 7. Hence the law is now well settled that the vacancy which was not advertised in a particular selection, the candidate selected therein cannot be adjusted against such unadvertised vacancy. 8. Learned counsel for the Commission informed that Rules have been amended in the year 2007 wherein such adjustment is permitted and the validity thereof is under consideration before this court. Be that as it may, it is evident that the aforesaid rules having been notified in January 2007 would not cover the question involved in the present case because admittedly the rule did not exist at the relevant time. 9. In view thereof, the writ petition is accordingly allowed. 10. The impugned order dated 20.07.2006 is hereby quashed. However, this order shall not preclude the respondents from adjusting respondent no. 5 against any other vacancy which was part and parcel of the recruitment made in 2004 wherein she (respondent no.5) was selected." 6. 9. In view thereof, the writ petition is accordingly allowed. 10. The impugned order dated 20.07.2006 is hereby quashed. However, this order shall not preclude the respondents from adjusting respondent no. 5 against any other vacancy which was part and parcel of the recruitment made in 2004 wherein she (respondent no.5) was selected." 6. Against the said judgment, petitioner Ratan Prabha filed Special Appeal being No. 873 of 2012 and the Division Bench this time set aside the judgment of learned Single Judge dated 30.11.2010 in the light of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 10808 of 2017 wherein it was held that the Board had the power to make adjustment against the available vacancies may or may not be advertised. Operative portion of the order of the Division Bench dated 12.1.2018 is reproduced hereinunder:- "Heard learned counsel for the appellant and Sri A.K.Yadav, learned counsel for the respondent/Board. The appeal questions the correctness of the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 30.11.2010 whereby the petition filed by the respondent no. 7/petitioner has been allowed in relation to the selection and appointment of the appellant and on the post of Lecturer in Civics in Vaidik Kanya Inter College, Dadri, district Gautam Budh Nagar. The respondent no. 7/petitioner is represented by Sri Anoop Trivedi but it appears that on account of the fact that the respondent no. 7 Smt. Kamlesh Verma has already attained the age of superannuation, the case is not being contested by her and Sri Trivedi is also not present. The appellant is aggrieved by the impugned judgment as her placement after selection by the Board as Lecturer in Civics in the institution has been quashed by the learned Single Judge, who came to the conclusion that in view of the Division Bench judgment in the case of Satish Kumar v. State of U.P. and others, decided on 22.09.2006 and the answer given by the Division Bench therein since the vacancy was not advertised for selection on the post in the institution, the appellant could not be adjusted against an unadvertised vacancy. The very same legal issue was raised before the Apex Court by the respondent/Board in Civil Appeal No.10808 of 2017 and the Apex Court disposed of the appeal holding that the Board had the power to make such adjustments and further indicated that the accommodation will have to be made either in available or even in a vacancy arising further. The appellant being a selected candidate by the Board contends that she deserves to be considered as per the view expressed by the Apex Court that alters and modifies the ratio of the judgment in the case of Satish Kumar v. State of U.P. and others (Supra). Sri A.K.Yadav, learned counsel for the respondent/Board could not dispute the directions issued by the Apex Court to be available for consideration in the present case as well. No one else has opposed the appeal. In the aforesaid circumstances we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment dated 30.11.2010. We dispose of the writ petition and appeal with a direction that the claim of the appellant shall be considered by the Board as expeditiously as possible keeping in view the nature of the vacancy available preferably within a period of three months from the date of production of the certified copy of this order, in the event her selection is valid in accordance with the Rules and the vacancy is available to accommodate her in view of the directions issued by the Apex Court vide judgment dated 23.08.2017." 7. It is after the judgment was passed in special appeal that the District Inspector of Schools issued an order dated 12.8.2018 directing the Committee of Management to ensure joining of the petitioner. It is after the judgment was passed in special appeal that the District Inspector of Schools issued an order dated 12.8.2018 directing the Committee of Management to ensure joining of the petitioner. It is relevant here to quote the two last paragraphs of the order of District Inspector of Schools dated 8.2.2018 and the same is reproduced hereinunder:- ^^iz'uxr izdj.k ds lanHkZ esa vuqdzekad 080531931 jRu izHkk iq=h fo".kq n;ky bZ&29@, fl)kFkZ uxj iks0 taxiqjk ubZ fnYyh&14 izoDrk ukxfjd 'kkL= oxZ&02 in ij vkoafVr laLFkk oSfnd dU;k baVj dkWyst nknjh xkSrecq) uxj ds izfr p;u@lek;kstu dk;kZy; ds i=kad@ek0 f'k0p&cks0@7979&80@fnukad&20-05-2006 ds ek/;e ls Hkstk x;k gSA ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; esa ;ksftr fo'ks"k vihy la0&873@2012 jRu izHkk cuke m0iz0 jkT; o vU; esa ikfjr fnukad&12-01-2018 ds vuqikyu esa dk;ZHkkj xzg.k djk;saA vr% vkidks funZsf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; esa ;ksftr fo'ks"k vihy la0&873@2012 jRu izHkk cuke m0iz0 jkT; o vU; esa ikfjr fnukad&12-01-2018 ds vuqikyu esa vuqdzekad 080531931 jRu izHkk iq=h fo".kq n;ky bZ&29@, fl)kFkZ uxj iks0 taxiqjk ubZ fnYyh&14 izoDrk ukxfjd 'kkL= oxZ&02 in ij dk;ZHkkj lqfuf'pr djsaA** 8. The petitioner Ratan Prabha in her claim has taken a plea that at no point of time any appointment order was issued to the petitioner and the petitioner was directly given joining in the year 2006 and it was the management who was not permitting him to sign attendance register on the plea that there was order operating in the writ petition filed by one Kamal Verma. It was after the fresh order was issued by the District Inspector of Schools as quoted above that the petitioner was permitted to sign the attendance register and so started getting salary. 9. In writ petition no. 3608 of 2021 the petitioner Anupama Verma has pleaded that she was selected and recommended by the Board pursuant to the advertisement no. 02 of 2010 against the post of lecturer (Sanskrit) in the institution and so she submitted her joining pursuant to the letter of the District Inspector of Schools dated 27.7.2012 and the consequential letter issued by the Manager of the institution on 7.8.2012. 02 of 2010 against the post of lecturer (Sanskrit) in the institution and so she submitted her joining pursuant to the letter of the District Inspector of Schools dated 27.7.2012 and the consequential letter issued by the Manager of the institution on 7.8.2012. The letter issued by the District Inspector of Schools dated 27.7.2012 is reproduced hereinunder:- ^^fnukad&27-07-12 fo"k;& foKkiu la0 2@2010 izoDrk inksa ds izfr m0iz0 ek/;fed f'k{kk lsok p;u cksMZ fu;ekoyh 1998 ds fu;e ¼12½ mi fu;e ¼a½ rFkk ¼10½ ds v/khu fufeZr oxZ baVjehfM,V fo"k; laLd`r oxZ 1 o 2 ds in ds fy, mi;qZDr vH;FkhZ ds fy, 1 iSuy dk fu;e 12¼11½ ds v/khu izs"k.kS egksn;] mi;qZDr fo"k;d lfpo m0 iz0 ek0 f'k0 lsok p;u cksMZ bykgkckn dh foKfIr la0ek0f'k0p0cks0@1044@2012&13 fnukad 07-08-12 ds mijkar p;u cksMZ ds i=kad@ek0f'k0p0cks0@p;u@2605&2666@2012&13 fnukad 08-00-12 esa fn;s x;s funZs'kksa ds vuq:i lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd vkids fo|ky; esa ekSfyd :i ls izoDrk fo"k; laLd`r oxZ 1 o 2 ds fjDr in ij lfpo m0 iz0 uk0 f'k0 lsok p;u cksMZ bykgkckn ds p;fur vH;FkhZ dk uke fu;qfDr gsrq vFkdksa izsf"kr fd;k tk jgk gSA lacaf/kr vH;FkhZ dks izca/kdh; ladYi ds v/khu fu;ekuqlkj fu;qfDr i= layXu izk:i ij tkjh djsaA dz0la0 uke irk 1 Jherh vuqiek nsoh iRuh dqoj papy flag tkfr&vuq0tkfr vuq0&020601871 349@4ch] pkaniqjlysjh ¼vksexk;=h uxj½ iks0 rsfy;jxat bykgkcknA mDr ds lanHkZ esa ;g Hkh lwP; gS fd ;fn vkids fo|ky; esa izoDrk laLd`r oxZ 1 o 2 ds fjDr in ij ek0 mPp U;k;ky; bykgkckn ds vkns'k ls dk;Zjr gS vFkok fofu;fer gS rks d`i;k mlds vkns'kksa dh izfr lfgr bl dk;kZy; dks rRdky miyC/k djk;sA vkidks p;u cksMZ fu;ekoyh 1908 ds fu;e 13¼1½ ds [k.M ¼d½] ¼nks½ rFkk rhu ds varxZr ,oa 13 ds mifu;e ¼20½ ds fd;k tkrk gS fd vki layXu ifjf'k"V ij fu;qfDr i= lacaf/kr vH;FkhZ dks fu;ekuqlkj Hkstrs gq;s fu;qfDr ds vkns'k dh izfr bl dk;kZy; ,oa lacaf/kr vf/kdkjh dks rRdky Hksts dk;ZHkkj xzg.k djkus ls iwoZ 'kSf{kd ;ksX;rk laca/kh izek.k&i=ksa dk HkfyHkkafr ijh{k.k djus iw.kZ mÙkjnkf;Ro vkidk gksxk rFkk lkFk gh izek.k i= rFkk vH;FkhZ dh vgZrkvksa ls lacaf/kr izek.k i=ksa dh izfr;ka vius Lrj ij ,d izfr j[krs ,d izfr v/kksgLrk{kjh dks izkIr djkuk lqfuf'pr djsaA layXud& fu/kkZfjr izk:i i= Hkonh; ¼T;ksfr izlkn½ ftyk fo|ky; fujh{kd xkSrecq) uxjA** (emphasis added) 10. Pursuant to the above order of the District Inspector of Schools, the Manager issued a letter to the rival petitioner Anupama Verma on 7.8.2010 which is reproduced hereinunder:- ^^egksn;k] ^^vki }kjk vxzlkfjr izkFkZuk i= fnukad 06-08-2012 tks fd Jhefr vuqiek nsoh dk laLd`r fo"k; dh izoDrk in ij dk;ZHkkj xzg.k djus ds laca/k esa gS ,oa ftyk fo|ky; fujh{kd xkSre cq) uxj ds dk;kZy; vkns'k i=kad u0 i`0 la0@p0oks0@1796&1800@2012&13 fnukad 27-07-12 dk lanHkZ xzg.k djrs gq;s] vkidks funZsf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd Jhefr vuqiek nsoh dk laLd`r fo"k; dh izoDrk in ij ftudks ek0 f'k0 lsok p;u cksMZ us fu;qfDr iznku dh gS] dk;ZHkkj xzg.k djk nsA dk;ZHkkj xzg.k ,oa nSfud mifLFkfr iaftdk esa uke iathdj.k ls iwoZ budh 'kSf{kd ;ksX;rk lacaf/kr izek.k i=ksa dk Hkfy&Hkkafr ijh{k.k dj ysaA ijh{k.k mijkar 'kSf{kd izek.k i=ksa dh ,d izfr fo|ky; fjdkMZ esa latksdj j[ksA lHkh izek.k i=ksa ij vkn }kjk seen dj ,d&,d izfr ftyk fo|ky; fujh{kd xkSre cq) uxj ds dk;kZy; dks Hkh miyC/k djk nsA** (emphasis added) 11. This is how the rival petitioner Anupama Verma has been working in the institution since 7.8.2012 as lecturer (Sanskrit) and has been drawing salary. The petitioner Ratan Prabha took a plea that she being the senior most having been recommended and appointed as lecturer (Civics) in institution way back in the year 2006 should be taken to be the senior most and raised a seniority issue and so filed a writ petition before this Court being Writ-A No. 5797 of 2019 in which a direction was issued to the Regional Joint Director of Education to consider the claim of the petitioner. 12. The Regional Joint Director of Education after hearing the petitioner and the Committee of Management, has come to pass an order dated 25.10.2019 holding the petitioner to be the senior most lecturer working in the institution and directed payment of salary since 26.7.2006 and so also accorded seniority w.e.f. 26.7.2006 and also directed for payment of arrears of salary accordingly. The payment of arrears of salary was made subject to the certificate to be obtained by the Committee of Management regarding petitioner's working in the institution during the period in question. 13. The Committee of Management filed writ petition no. 7096 of 2020 questioning the Regional Joint Director of Education holding petitioner Ratan Prabha to be the senior most having taken charge on 26.7.2006. 13. The Committee of Management filed writ petition no. 7096 of 2020 questioning the Regional Joint Director of Education holding petitioner Ratan Prabha to be the senior most having taken charge on 26.7.2006. Subsequently, Smt. Anupama the other petitioner also filed a writ petition before this Court being Writ A No. 3608 of 2021 assailing the order passed by the Regional Joint Director of Education, Ist Region, Meerut. Smt. Anupama has taken the plea that she has not been heard in the matter of determination of seniority even though she was a necessary party. It is further argued that since the petitioner Ratan Prabha has been reinstated only in the year 2018 under the orders of the High Court dated 12.1.2018, there would be break in service between 2006 and 2018 and therefore, the petitioner Ratan Prabha would not be entitled to seniority over and above, the petitioner Anupama. 14. The two legal questions that arise for consideration in this case are: (i) whether petitioner Ratan Prabha who had been given charge and had been permitted to join as assistant teacher on 26.7.2006 but she could not function thereafter on account of the interim order passed by this Court, can be denied seniority, over and above, the teachers appointed during interregnum period, (between her first joining and her resuming charge vide order dated 18.2.2018); and (ii) whether looking the facts undisputed, an opportunity of hearing if given to petitioner Anupama would have changed the order, impugned in her petition, compelling the authority to arrive at a different conclusion and so order would be bad for violation of principles of natural justice. 15. Yet another question arises about the maintainability of the writ petition at the instance of Committee of Management in a seniority dispute between the two teachers. 16. On the first question, Sri Bheem Singh, learned counsel appearing for second petitioner Ms. Anupama Verma has raised following grounds:- i. There was no appointment order issued to the petitioner Ratan Prabha, so as to entitle her to join institution and therefore, her joining was null and void; ii. The order issued by the District Inspector of Schools dated 8.2.2018 as a consequence to the order passed by Division Bench of this Court dated 12.1.2018, in Special Appeal No. 873 of 2012 itself, demonstrates that the Committee of Management was directed to ensure joining of the petitioner no. The order issued by the District Inspector of Schools dated 8.2.2018 as a consequence to the order passed by Division Bench of this Court dated 12.1.2018, in Special Appeal No. 873 of 2012 itself, demonstrates that the Committee of Management was directed to ensure joining of the petitioner no. 1 on the post of lecturer (Civics). Therefore, according to him petitioner had never been given joining prior to 8.12.2018; iii. The third point argued in that he ought to have been given one opportunity to represent her case before Regional Joint Director of Education as this Court under its order dated 15.4.2019 passed in Writ A No. 5797 of 2019 had provided that opportunity of hearing was to be given not only to the Committee of Management but also any other person likely to be affected by decision; 17. Thus, it is argued that the order being in violation of principles of natural justice as well as the non compliance of the order of High Court, is liable to be set aside and matter should be remitted to be decided as fresh. 18. Per Contra, it is argued by Learned Counsel appearing for the first respondent Ratan Prabha that the petitioner was given joining by the Order of the Director of Education exercising power under Section 17 of 1998 Regulations and it is in consequence to the said order that petitioner was given joining. He submits that the order dated 20.07.2006 had been acted upon 01.07.2006 and the petitioner was not being paid salary only on account of the order passed by this Court dated 21.08.2006 in Writ Petition No. 41691 of 2006. However, petitioner's interest was protected by observing that if she had joined, she would be permitted to work. 19. It is further argued that in the event Committee of Management did not permit the petitioner to work and sign attendance register, it was in violation to the interim protection granted under the said order. However, petitioner's interest was protected by observing that if she had joined, she would be permitted to work. 19. It is further argued that in the event Committee of Management did not permit the petitioner to work and sign attendance register, it was in violation to the interim protection granted under the said order. As far as the order dated 18.02.2018 is concerned, he submits that the legal position since has been that the law declared by constitutional court is to be taken always to be the law in existence, the interim order passed by the Court Writ Petition No. 41691 of 2006 and the final judgment passed in the said Writ Petition in which it was held that adjustment of selected candidates against a non advertised post was bad, could be taken to be a wrong view in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court and thus the interim order as well as the Judgment of the Leaned Single Judge merged with the Judgment of Special Appeal No. 873 of 2012 which held the adjustment of the petitioner to be valid in law. According to Learned Counsel, the order dated 08.02.2018 for the reinstatement was only for the reason that committee of Management did not cooperate with the petitioner and did not permit him to sign attendance register. He argues that matter since had remained pending in this court at the instance of a 3rd Party, the pendency by itself would not negate the rights of a litigant which he would have been otherwise entitled to. He takes the plea of maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit'. 20. On the question that other petitioner Smt. Anupama Verma had not been heard, learned counsel for first petitioner Ratan Prabha, has argued that the matter should not be remanded just for the sake of opportunity of hearing if otherwise facts are admitted to the parties. He submits that the opportunity of hearing cannot be put into a straight jacket formula to be applied in every case more especially in cases where even after the remand the result is bound to be same as per the legal position. He argues that the petitioner no. He submits that the opportunity of hearing cannot be put into a straight jacket formula to be applied in every case more especially in cases where even after the remand the result is bound to be same as per the legal position. He argues that the petitioner no. 2 has not been able to demonstrate as to how petitioner's initial appointment was bad and could not be able to dispute that the petitioner was a duly selected candidate by the Board when she was permitted to join the institution and Petitioner Anupama was nowhere in scene. 21. On the point of locus of the Committee of Management to file writ petition to question the decision, it is argued by the learned counsel for petitioner Ratan Prabha that Committee of Management can have no grievance in the matter of seniority inter se amongst the lecturers. As far as question of payment of arrears of salary is concerned, it is argued that order permits the Committee of Management to verify the period but state being the paying authority, Management should not have any technical objection. 22. Having heard learned counsel for respective parties and having perused the records, pleadings raised, as well as the order impugned, I find that basic issue to be whether petitioner should be taken to be validly selected and appointed lecturer in the institution way back in the year 2006. It is a case and so also the admitted position on record that petitioner after having been selected by the Board, and an impaneled candidate to be appointed in a particular institution in the name of Nagar Palika Inter College, Badaun was not being permitted joining so he filed a writ petition before this Court being Writ No. 19955 of 2006 in which a judicial order was passed issuing a writ of mandamus to the Selection Board to pass fresh order recommending the name of the petitioner for another institution. This was a judicial order passed on 10.4.2006 which was never appealed against. This was a judicial order passed on 10.4.2006 which was never appealed against. It was in compliance of this Order that a fresh panel was issued on 20.5.2006 directing adjustment of the petitioner in the institution in question and so, when the petitioner was not being issued any appointment and not permitted joining, the then the Director of Education on 20.7.2006 passed an order directing the District Inspector of Schools to ensure joining even in the event no appointment order was issued by the management, taking recourse to Regulation 17 of 1998 Regulations. Pursuant to this direction, the District Inspector of Schools immediately ensured joining of petitioner in the institution in question and the petitioner was given joining on 1.7.2006. In the meanwhile, the writ petition no. 41691 of 2006 was filed in which interim order was passed only on 21.8.2006 which provided that the respondent if had already joined, she would be permitted to work. Ratan Prabha was respondent in said case who had already joined. Thus, she was to be permitted to work but she was not to be paid salary. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner Ratan Prabha continued to report in the institution continuously and yet she was not permitted to sign in the attendance register and obviously was not paid salary. Her joining was held bad by the learned Single Judge of this Court while allowing writ petition no. 41691 of 2006 but that order got reversed in the order of Special Appeal filed by Ratan Prabha wherein adjustment of the appellant was held to be in accordance with law as had been held by the Supreme Court. It is worth noticing here that after the Division Bench passed the order on 12.1.2018, no fresh appointment order was issued and the District Inspector of Schools only directed the management under its order dated 8.2.2018 to ensure joining to the petitioner. 23. Thus, in the total circumspect of the facts that emerge it is clear that interim order passed by Court in writ petition no. 4169 of 2006 being subsequent to the joining of the petitioner would be taken to have protected the interest of the petitioner Ratan Prabha and thus, it would be absolutely wrong to hold now that though she was lawfully selected but wrongly permitted joining without there being any appointment order. 4169 of 2006 being subsequent to the joining of the petitioner would be taken to have protected the interest of the petitioner Ratan Prabha and thus, it would be absolutely wrong to hold now that though she was lawfully selected but wrongly permitted joining without there being any appointment order. It is well settled legal position that mere pendency of a litigation cannot deny a rightful claim which otherwise vests in a party. The interim order would be taken to have partially eclipsed Ratan Prabha's status and even if final judgment upset her status, it got revived in the final order of special appeal as it is well settled that appeal is continuation of original proceedings. So, it will be taken that petitioner was lawfully adjusted against the vacancy and in my considered view, status would not be lost for mere pendency of the writ petition, which ultimately stood dismissed in appeal. 24. In the present case and looking to the facts as discussed above, the interim order was passed by the Court in the earlier petition to the effect that fifth petitioner namely Ratan Prabha herein would not be permitted to join and if already joined would not be paid salary. Petitioner has established the case of joining and nonpayment of salary to her was only for the interim order passed by this Court. Ultimately when the interim order resulted in the final order allowing the writ petition and when came to be reversed in Special Appeal, then obviously a plea cannot be permitted to be taken by either the State or the private respondent that since petitioner did not work or was not paid salary for certain period because of pendency of the case, said period cannot be taken into account even for the purposes of pay protection and seniority. Thus, the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit' would be applicable very much to this case. The maxim means no party should suffer due to the act of the Court. Thus, the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit' would be applicable very much to this case. The maxim means no party should suffer due to the act of the Court. In this case, once the petitioner had been directed to be given joining under the order passed by the authorities, but the orders came to be challenged before this Court and which remained pending adjudication for number of years and even though the orders ultimately were set aside but since they have been upheld in the Special Appeal, petitioner cannot be permitted to run the risk of being given joining. It is the respondent State authorities who were required to balance the equity by not only giving notional pay protection but also seniority. In the case of Odisha Foresh Development Corporation v. M/s Anupam Traders (2020) 15 SCC 146 , it has bee held that interim order was passed for protection and the subsequent auction for Kendu leaves was deferred for such interim order and if the Court directed to make certain deposits to the petitioner towards agreement and the writ petitioner himself withdrew the writ petition then department cannot be made to suffer. Whether a writ petition is dismissed as withdrawn or is dismissed, the result was bound to be the same. In the present case also petitioner was not permitted to pay salary and so the management did not permitted her to sign the attendance register but for the interim order. Vide paragraph 20, the Supreme Court has held thus:- "20. As noticed above, the Appellant in any event would have the right to detrmine the loss suffered and recover the same in accordance with law as the process to re-tender, was at the '. cost and risk' of the private Respondent as stated in the notice of termination. In that circumstance, when it is prima-facie indicated that due to the delay caused at the instance of the privatye Respondents the value of the Kendu leaves had reduced, thereby, causing loss, in view of legal proceedings initiated by the private Respondents, the Court will have to bear in mind the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, namely, no party should suffer due to the act of Court. In such event, since the opinion be permitted to retain the amount and complete the process by providing opportunity to the private Respondents." 25. In such event, since the opinion be permitted to retain the amount and complete the process by providing opportunity to the private Respondents." 25. I may also observe here that it is not the seniority as such in dispute for any fact there being that both were selected and appointed under the same advertisement but one could join earlier than the other one. Questioning the joining of the petitioner, in the light of the interim order passed earlier by this Court would be questioning the very appointment of the petitioner which in my considered view, another teacher claiming seniority does not have the locus. It has been held time and again that while examining the matter of inter se seniority the authority cannot go into question of legality of appointment. 26. In the case of Vijay Narain Sharma v. District Inspector of Schools and Others, 1985 Law Suits (All) 480 it has been held that in the matters of adjudication of seniority dispute on the question of right to promotion in preference to the other teachers, it is not open for such a teacher claiming seniority to challenge validity of selection and appointment of another colleague teacher. Vide para 18 and 19, the Court took judicial notice of growing tendency amongst the teachers to question validity of appointment of colleagues while issue of inter-se seniority crops up to occupy the position of officiating Principal. Thus, vide paras 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 the Court held that appointment of a teacher who has acquired substantive position, cannot be questioned while adjudicating inter-se seniority. Paragraph nos. 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 of the judgment are reproduced hereunder:- "'18. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that in this State, in every College, there are series of litigation amongst the teachers challenging the seniority list prepared by the various colleges. The question of seniority has assumed great importance because of the provisions in the Act and the Regulations framed thereunder governing these colleges. It has been Laid down that; the senior-most teacher in the college shall officiate as Principal of the college in the absence of the Principal. As a result of these litigations inter se, fighting and groupism amongst the teachers has taken the upper hand which has completely shattered the discipline in the college. It has been Laid down that; the senior-most teacher in the college shall officiate as Principal of the college in the absence of the Principal. As a result of these litigations inter se, fighting and groupism amongst the teachers has taken the upper hand which has completely shattered the discipline in the college. It has come to my notice that in cases relating to seniority, it has almost become a practice to challenge the appointments and promotion of all the teachers creating a state of uncertainty and making a sword of democles hang on every teacher. This creates great dissatisfaction and aggressive teachers take an upper hand. This also results in the lack of proper teaching because most of the time the teachers are involved in maintaining the validity of their appointments and promotion rather than concentrating on the teaching which is their primary duty. 19. It has been often found that appointments and promotion are challenged after more than one or two decades. The position of the records is that neither the Managing Committees maintain proper records in a regular manner nor the records are available with the District Inspector of Schools. In fact, the Managing Committees change so often and they are also litigating so frequently that a decision by one Managing Committee is not supported by a succeeding Managing Committee. The post of the District Inspector of Schools is also transferable and it often transpires that the District Inspector of Schools, who had earlier passed the order, is not available to justify the approval given by him to the appointment or promotion made of a teacher. It is in the light of these circumstances that the contention raised by the Learned Counsel for Dinesh Chandra Dube has to be examined. 23. It is, therefore, clear that even in the case of a promotion of a teacher to the lecturer's grade or to the L.T. grade, a teacher aggrieved by the decision of the Committee of Management has got a remedy to challenge the said decision before the District Inspector of Schools. From the above provisions therefore, the scheme of the Act is that at the time when the appointment is made or when the promotion is made, the said appointment or promotion made by the Managing Committee can be challenged to the higher authority prescribed under the Act and the regulations framed thereunder. 24. From the above provisions therefore, the scheme of the Act is that at the time when the appointment is made or when the promotion is made, the said appointment or promotion made by the Managing Committee can be challenged to the higher authority prescribed under the Act and the regulations framed thereunder. 24. Regulation 3 of Chapter II lays down the principles on which the seniority list has to be prepared. I have already quoted Regulation 3 of Chapter II, which lays down the manner in which the seniority is to be determined. The relevant factors for determining the validity of the seniority list are the grade in which the teacher is working, whether he is appointed on the substantive post or not, whether the appointment is permanent or temporary, the date of the appointment or promotion and the age of the teachers. 25. On a reading of Regulation 3 of Chapter II, it is clear that it nowhere contemplates that the teacher who challenges the seniority list can again challenge the validity of the appointment or promotion of a teacher in the college. He can only be aggrieved by the factors, if wrongly decided, as mentioned in Regulation 3. That dispute can be taken in appeal under Clause (f) of Regulation 3, quoted above. In my-opinion, it is clear that while disputing the validity of the seniority list, it is not open to a teacher to challenge the appointment and promotion which had already been done. The challenge to the appointment and promotion has been specifically provided. If no challenge is made at that stage then the appointment and promotion becomes final. If the Legislature intended that the appointment and promotion can be challenged at the time of determining seniority, the Legislature would have specifically provided in the Regulations. This has not been done. 26. There is another aspect of the matter that once the appointment or promotion becomes final, a vested right is created in favour of a teacher. A colleague of his in the institution having acquiesced to the appointment and promotion cannot be, subsequently, permitted to raise the dispute. 27. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the contention raised by the Learned Counsel for the Respondent is well founded. A colleague of his in the institution having acquiesced to the appointment and promotion cannot be, subsequently, permitted to raise the dispute. 27. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the contention raised by the Learned Counsel for the Respondent is well founded. In proceedings for determining the validity of the seniority list prepared by the college, it is not open to a teacher of the said college to challenge the appointment or promotion of any other teacher in the same college. 28. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has cited a decision of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 471 of 1974, Madan Pal Sharma v. The Chancellor, Meerut University, decided on 2nd July, 1980. In that case, while challenging the seniority list it was sought to be urged that the appointment of the teacher in the R. G. College, Meerut, was not a valid appointment. In that case, a Division Bench of this Court observed as under: "In our opinion, it is not open to the Petitioner to challenge the validity of the selection or appointment of Smt. Usha Rani Gupta as lecturer in Raghunath Girls College in the present collateral proceedings." 27. Again in the case of Vir Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors, 2015 (11) ADJ 637 (DB), this Court has held that while considering the dispute of inter-se seniority between two teachers at the time of promotion, the person claiming the seniority over and above the other colleague teacher working in the same Institution, does not have any locus to challenge appointment of such other teacher. Vide para 21 and 22 the Division Bench has held thus: "21. Additionally we find that quite apart from the seventh respondent not having any locus standi to challenge the appointment and adjustment of the appellant [in the sense of the appellant being a Lecturer in Physics and the seventh respondent being a Lecturer in Chemistry] he only assailed the consequential orders of adjustment made in respect of the appellant. The parent order of the Director and the Board directing adjustment of the appellant were never subjected to challenge till the filing of the writ petition which gives rise to the present appeal. 22. The parent order of the Director and the Board directing adjustment of the appellant were never subjected to challenge till the filing of the writ petition which gives rise to the present appeal. 22. More fundamentally when one views the reliefs sought by the seventh respondent in his writ petition it is apparent that the primary cause for challenge to the adjustment of the appellant was the consequential effect it would have on the inter se seniority. In our opinion the validity of an appointment cannot be the subject matter of scrutiny or adjudication while deciding the issue of inter se seniority. We therefore find that the learned Single Judge has clearly erred in proceeding to annul and set aside the initial appointment and adjustment of the appellant. Consequently we are of the view that the Special Appeal preferred by the appellant is liable to succeed and the writ petition of the seventh respondent must consequentially stand dismissed. For reasons noted above, we find merit in the conclusions arrived at by the learned Single Judge in respect of the status of the seventh respondent being reverted to that of an L.T. Grade teacher. The appeal of the seventh respondent must consequentially fail. " 28. So far as the third argument is concerned, that opportunity of hearing ought to have been afforded to the petitioner no. 2 Anupama Verma also before order was to be passed by the Regional Joint Director of Education, this argument in my view, does not hold water for there being no dispute of different selections and appointments of the respective petitioner. It is a case where petitioner Ratan Prabha was selected and empaneled pursuant to an advertisement issued being no. 2 of 2010. Her joining is being questioned only at the strength of an interim order passed by this Court in writ petition No. 4169 of 2006 which I have already discussed, had been protected petitioner's joining in its interim order. Still further, for interpretation of a particular provision of law, if petitioner was not paid salary and that interpretation ultimately got reversed by the Supreme Court, the petitioner automatically had become entitled to her joining and salary and continuance thereafter cannot be questioned. The petitioner Anupama having been empanelled on 27.7.2012 and given joining on 7.8.2012 cannot score any seniority over and above the petitioner Ratan Prabha. The petitioner Anupama having been empanelled on 27.7.2012 and given joining on 7.8.2012 cannot score any seniority over and above the petitioner Ratan Prabha. It is worth also noticing here that the order dated 7.8.2012 which is being relied upon by the petitioner Anupama in her writ petition being no. 3608 of 2021, cannot itself be said to be an appointment order technically sound. It records that the Selection Board had made an appointment so she was to ensure her joining by producing her credentials. These are not the recitals that would form an appointment order and appointment should be clear enough that a candidate upon being recommended by the Board is being hereby appointed by the Committee of Management. This I am referring only for the argument raised on behalf of Ms. Anupama to question appointment of Ms. Ratan Prabha. So if petitioner had no appointment order as claimed by the petitioner Anupama, she also had no appointment order, technically and yet she was permitted joining and she has been working. These observations are not made to demerit the appointment and working of the petitioner Anupama in the institution but only to appreciate the argument raised in her behalf to question appointment of petitioner Ratan Prabha, to be ultimately rejected and is hereby rejected. 29. Upon a pointed query made, learned counsel for petitioner Anupama as to what is the clinching evidence to show that if matter is remitted, that would reverse the findings recorded in the order impugned, learned counsel for petitioner Anupama argued that given an opportunity of hearing, appropriate evidence would be placed to be appreciated. In my considered view, it is highly misplaced an argument. A matter can be remitted provided some factual dispute is in issue. I have already discussed above and find no controversy except working period of the petitioner for the purposes of payment of arrears of salary. That is an issue with the management only and management is left free to put up such objection as it may want on the question of payment of arrears of salary. As far as notional seniority as well as the protection of pay is concerned that finds favour with petitioner Ratan Prabha in law. Hence, I do not find this case to be remitted only on the question of opportunity of hearing. 30. As far as notional seniority as well as the protection of pay is concerned that finds favour with petitioner Ratan Prabha in law. Hence, I do not find this case to be remitted only on the question of opportunity of hearing. 30. In the case of Ashwin S. Mehta and Another v. Union of India and Others (2012) 1 SCC 83 , Supreme Court has dealt with the law relating to principles of opportunity of hearing more especially in the field of administrative law developed for exercise of administrative and quasi judicial powers. Elaborating the principles vide paragraphs 40, 41 and 42, the Court has held thus:- "40. It is true that the rules of "natural justice" are not embodied rules. The phrase "natural justice " is also not capable of a precise definition. The underlying principle of natural justice, evolved under the common law, is to check arbitrary exercise of power by any authority, irrespective of whether the power which is conferred on a statutory body or Tribunal is administrative or quasi-judicial. The concept of "natural justice" implies a duty to act fairly i.e. fair play in action. As observed in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262 the aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice. "41. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 664 , R.S. Sarkaria, J., speaking for the majority in a three-Judge Bench, lucidly explained the meaning and scope of the concept of "natural justice". Referring to several decisions, His Lordship observed thus: (SCC p. 666) "Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Being means to an end and not an end in themselves, it is not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. But there are two fundamental maxims of natural justice viz. (i) audi alteram partem (ii) memo judex in re sua. The audi alteram partem rule has many facets, two of them being (a) notice of the case to be met; and (b) opportunity to explain. This rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity. But there are two fundamental maxims of natural justice viz. (i) audi alteram partem (ii) memo judex in re sua. The audi alteram partem rule has many facets, two of them being (a) notice of the case to be met; and (b) opportunity to explain. This rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity. The general principle--as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application--seems to be that where a statute does not, in terms, exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits, then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. Conversely if the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature, and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided, courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing, shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. In short, this rule of fair play must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. The court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications. But, the core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise." (emphasis supplied by us) 42. It is thus, trite that the requirement of giving reasonable opportunity of being heard before an order is made by an administrative, quasi judicial or judicial authority, particularly when such an order entails adverse civil consequences, which would include infraction of property, personal rights and material deprivation for the party affected, cannot be sacrificed at the alter of administrative exigency or celerity. Undoubtedly, there can be exceptions to the said doctrine and as aforesaid the extent and its application cannot be put in a strait-jacket formula. Undoubtedly, there can be exceptions to the said doctrine and as aforesaid the extent and its application cannot be put in a strait-jacket formula. The question whether the principle has to be applied or not is to be considered bearing in mind the express language and the basic scheme of the provision conferring the power; the nature of the power conferred; the purpose for which the power is conferred and the final effect of the exercise of that power on the rights of the person affected." 31. The Constitution Bench in the case of Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1480 has discussed the issue of post decisional hearing also while observing that the principles of natural justice cannot be put into a cast iron formula. Vide para 109 the Constitution Bench has held thus: "109. The fact that ................. the phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of static and precise definition. It could not be imprisoned in the straight-jacket or a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence, it was not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. This Court reiterated that audi ateram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected the administrative decision after post-decisional hearing was good. " 32. The Constitution Bench further took the view that principles of natural justice must be seen with circumstantial flexibility. If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected the administrative decision after post-decisional hearing was good. " 32. The Constitution Bench further took the view that principles of natural justice must be seen with circumstantial flexibility. No doubt that in the earlier order passed by this Court while remitting the matter, direction was issued that affected party may also be heard, but now since I have granted hearing to Sri Bheem Singh, learned counsel appearing for petitioner Anupama who could be the affected party, I have accept appointment of petitioner Ratan Prabha raising the issue of there being no appointment order and so the consequential joining to be bad, Mr. Singh could not dispute that petitioner Ratan Prabha was empaneled in the year 2006 and there was a direction of this Court to her joining in some other Institution. He could also not dispute that it is for this joining given to her that a writ petition came to be filed being Writ Petition No. 41691 of 2006 in which interim stay order was passed. 33. If one applies the above law to the facts of the case, one would find that selection of the petitioner Ratan Prabha to be prior in point of time than that of petitioner Anupama, is not in disputed. This Court has already held joining of petitioner Anupama to be valid as the Committee was not issuing appointment order. Naturally even after the interim order was passed protecting her interest by this Court in a writ petition questioning her appointment in the institution, which was not subject matter of advertisement, the management did not permit her to sign the attendance register. If the joining part of the petitioner Ratan Prabha's selection and appointment is held to be valid, no further fact remains in dispute. The payment of salary is the part to be performed by Committee of Management by finalizing bills and so forwarding the same and, therefore, petitioner Anupama cannot have any grievance. In such circumstances and background of facts, petitioner Anupama even if was allowed to be heard, it would not have changed the legal position that she was subject to subsequent selection to join subsequently. 34. In such circumstances and background of facts, petitioner Anupama even if was allowed to be heard, it would not have changed the legal position that she was subject to subsequent selection to join subsequently. 34. Thus, even after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner Anupama through her counsel, I do not find that the order passed by the authority deserves to be interfered with. So in my considered view remitting the matter for hearing afresh would only be an empty formality as the result ultimately is bound to be the same. 35. All these issues cannot be raised possibly by Mr. Singh for simple reason that his client petitioner Anupama was no where in the scene in the year 2006. Mr. Singh could not argue anything further. 36. All the three arguments, therefore, raised by the counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner Anupama, are hereby rejected. 37. On the question of locus standi of the Committee of Management to challenge the order Sri Bheem Singh who appears as counsel for Committee of Management also, could not show any law which supports the petition. The only issue that could have been, the arrears of payment of salary as it is the management which is to forward the bills. In my view management's right stands protected in the order impugned passed by the Regional Joint Director of Education and to that extent Committee of Management is always free to take up this issue with the authority, if legally permissible. 38. In view of the above, therefore, I hold that the writ petition of Committee of Management to be not maintainable for challenging the order passed by the Regional Joint Director of Education to be not maintainable and so the petition filed by the Committee of Management being no. 7096 of 2020 is, dismissed subject to what has been observed above. 39. Writ petition filed by petitioner Anupama being no. 3608 of 2021 is also dismissed for what has been discussed and held above in this judgment. Writ petition no. 866 of 2020 and writ petition no. 9586 of 2021 succeed and are allowed. The order dated 24.08.2019 passed by the Committee of Management as well as the consequential order passed by the District Inspector of Schools dated 17.10.2019 are hereby set aside. Writ petition no. 866 of 2020 and writ petition no. 9586 of 2021 succeed and are allowed. The order dated 24.08.2019 passed by the Committee of Management as well as the consequential order passed by the District Inspector of Schools dated 17.10.2019 are hereby set aside. The Committee of Management is directed to appoint petitioner as officiating Principal of the institution till any regularly selected Principal comes and joins and also forward her papers for attestation of signatures as officiating Principal of the institution. With the attestation of signatures of the petitioner Ratan Prabha as Principal of the institution, she will be paid regular salary of the Principal of the institution without any fail, month by month as it falls due. 40. There will be no order as to cost.