Dr. Anshuman, J. – Learned counsel Mr. Akhilesh Dutta Verma for the petitioner and counsel for State present. 2. The present writ petition has been filed for issuance of writ in the nature of certiorari for setting aside the order dated 13.10.2020 issued vide Memo No. 4125 whereby and whereunder 100% pension and gratuity has been forfeited and also for payment of full consequential benefit by way of arrear of salary and others on and from 06.06.2014, to restore the pension of the petitioner from the salary and on from the date of his retirement i.e. 31.01.2020 and further for appropriate direction to the respondent to restore the full consequential benefits by way of payment of arrears of salary on and from 06.06.2014 or for grant of any other order which may deem fit and proper. 3. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was joined as a Supply Inspector in the Department of Food and Consumer Protection on 21.11.1989. On 02.08.2009, the D.M. Gopalganj directed to the petitioner to file an F.I.R. against one supplier Mohammad Nizamudin who by way of committing forgery enrolled 19 different names as registered supplier about which a report was received from the Branch Manager of Canara Bank, Bhore (Gopalganj district). The petitioner complied the said order. 4. The petitioner has sanctioned application on 19.01.2010 of Daya Shanker Manjhi along with other persons (Annexure-2 series). After sanction of the application, the said Daya Shanker Manjhi filed one complaint to Vigilance Department on 11.02.2010 with allegation that petitioner has not sanctioned the quota and he is asking for payment of Rs. 2,000/-. On this information made by him, a Vigilance raid was made on 16.02.2010 and petitioner was taken into custody on 17.02.2010. 5. During pendency of petitioner in custody, the department had issued an order dated 09.03.2010 by which the petitioner had suspended in contemplation of departmental proceedings in terms of Bihar Government Servants C.C.A. (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005. (Hereinafter called as Bihar C.C.A. Rules, 2005). The petitioner was suspended on 09.03.2010, departmental charge-sheet was issued on 28.04.2010, Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed during his judicial custody. On 23.07.2010, petitioner was granted bail by this Hon’ble Court. He joined office on 23.07.2010. His joining was accepted U/R 9(3) of Bihar C.C.A. Rules, 2005. (Hereinafter called as Bihar C.C.A. Rules, 2005). The petitioner was suspended on 09.03.2010, departmental charge-sheet was issued on 28.04.2010, Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed during his judicial custody. On 23.07.2010, petitioner was granted bail by this Hon’ble Court. He joined office on 23.07.2010. His joining was accepted U/R 9(3) of Bihar C.C.A. Rules, 2005. On 31.08.2010, the petitioner filed his show-cause refuting from all charges, his suspension was revoked U/R 9(3) (1) of Bihar C.C.A. Rules, 2005. On 19.11.2010, Inquiry Officer submitted report as charge no.2 has not proved and charge no.1 be kept in abeyance, as matter pending before Vigilance Court. Petitioner was posted as Block Supply Officer, Dobhi Block, Gaya. 6. On 17.03.2011, 2nd show-cause was issued holding petitioner guilty. On 08.02.2014, petitioner was again suspended without assigning any reasons, show-cause notice was asked from the petitioner and he was directed to file his show-cause vide letter dated 12.02.2014 by Special Duty Officer. The Special Duty Officer was appointed as Presenting Officer for the departmental charge-sheet dated 12.04.2010. The Inquiry Officer again started fresh departmental inquiry on the basis of same departmental charge-sheet dated 12.04.2010 i.e. Annexure-8. 7. The petitioner moved before this Hon’ble High Court in CWJC. No.7815 of 2014 for quashing of Memo No.1921 dated 19.03.2014 whereby a fresh inquiry was initiated against the petitioner. The petitioner started appearing before the Inquiry Officer on day to day basis and requested to provide the copy of charge-sheet. But without supplying the charge-sheet, petitioner was forced to submit his show-cause and ultimately, petitioner has submitted his show-cause on the basis of earlier departmental charge-sheet refuting all the charges. 8. The Inquiry Officer without giving any opportunity of hearing and without examining any evidence either by way of documentary or by way of oral evidence submitted his inquiry report on 02.05.2014 holding the petitioner guilty without any evidence and thereafter the 2nd show-cause was issued to the petitioner along with inquiry report. The petitioner replied to the 2nd show-cause refuting all the charges. 9. On 02.06.2014, the Principal Secretary, Food and Consumer Protection had passed dismissal /termination against the petitioner without assigning any reasons. The petitioner filed fresh CWJC of 06 /2016 challenging the order dated 02.06.2014 whereby and whereunder petitioner was terminated from his service by way of major punishment. The petitioner replied to the 2nd show-cause refuting all the charges. 9. On 02.06.2014, the Principal Secretary, Food and Consumer Protection had passed dismissal /termination against the petitioner without assigning any reasons. The petitioner filed fresh CWJC of 06 /2016 challenging the order dated 02.06.2014 whereby and whereunder petitioner was terminated from his service by way of major punishment. The said Writ Petition of 06/2016 was allowed vide order dated 02.03.2017 by which the departmental charge-sheet, inquiry report and the punishment order were set aside with liberty to proceed afresh. 10. There was typographical error in the order dated 02.03.2017 passed in CWJC No.06/2016 which was rectified vide order dated 16.05.2018 in MJC No. 1019/2017. 11. The State/ Respondent preferred Latent Patent Appeal No.1371/2017 challenging the order passed in CWJC No. 06/2016. The said LPA was dismissed by Hon’ble Division Bench vide order dated 14.08.2018. 12. Petitioner was taken back in service and by virtue of issuing a fresh Memo No.2869 dated 03.07.2020, but a fresh departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner and he was again suspended with effect from 06.04.2014 that is the initial date of termination of petitioner which was already quashed vide order dated 02.03.2017 passed in CWJC No. 06/2016 and affirmed by order dated 14.08.2018, LPA No. 1371 of 2017. 13. Petitioner was superannuated on 31.01.2020 and vide order dated 03.07.2020, the decision was taken against the petitioner to proceed afresh under Section 14(3) of Bihar Pension Rule. Without initiation of any proceeding, the 2nd show-cause was asked to the petitioner on 10.08.2020 vide Memo No. 3321. The petitioner had submitted his 2nd showcause refuting all charges again and subsequently, vide letter no. 4125 dated 13.10.2020, the fresh punishment order has been passed by which 100 % of the petitioner’s pension forfeited. Against the said decision, the petitioner has preferred fresh writ petition bearing CWJC No.14895 of 2021. 14. Counsel for petitioner submits that by virtue of said memo, two charges were made. In Clause 5 of memo which states that ^^vkjksih inkfèkdkjh dks funsZ'k fn;k tkrk gS fd vkjksi i= izkfIr ds 15 fnuksa ds vanj viuk cpko lapkyu inkfèkdkjh dks vo'; lefiZr dj nsaxsA** 15. 14. Counsel for petitioner submits that by virtue of said memo, two charges were made. In Clause 5 of memo which states that ^^vkjksih inkfèkdkjh dks funsZ'k fn;k tkrk gS fd vkjksi i= izkfIr ds 15 fnuksa ds vanj viuk cpko lapkyu inkfèkdkjh dks vo'; lefiZr dj nsaxsA** 15. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the said Clause 5 is in gross violation of Rule 17(5) of Bihar C.C.A. Rules because Rule 17(5) of Bihar C.C.A. Rules states as follows: – “(a) On receipt of the written statement of defence, the disciplinary authority may himself inquire into such of the articles of charge which are not admitted, or, if it thinks necessary to appoint, under sub-rule (2) of this Rule, an inquiry authority for the purpose he may do so and where all the articles of charges have been admitted by the Government Servant in his written statement of defence, the disciplinary authority shall record his findings on each charge after taking such evidence as it may think fit and shall take action in the manner laid down in Rule 18. (b) If no written statement of defence is submitted by the Government Servant, the disciplinary authority may itself inquired into the articles of charge or may, if it thinks necessary to appoint, under Sub-rule (2) of this Rule an inquiry authority for the purpose, it may do so. (c) where the disciplinary authority itself inquires into any article of charge, it may, by an appoints an inquiring authority for holding an inquiry about such charge, it may, by an order, appoint a government servant or a legal practitioner to be known as the “Presenting Officer’ to present on his behalf the case in support of the articles of charge.” 16. Counsel further submits that the said izi=&d (Annexure-7, Page-60) has also been made in gross violation of Rule 17(4) of C.C.A. Rule which states as follows: – “The disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the Government Servant a copy of the articles of charge, such statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and a list of documents and witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be sustained and shall require the Government Servant to submit, within such time as may be specified, a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person”. 17. 17. Counsel for the petitioner further submits that the delinquent has filed W.S. on the basis of which Enquiry Officer has submitted report (Annexure-13). The said Enquiry report finding has come: – I. Charge 2 has not been proved. II. Charge 1 to be kept in abeyance as matter is pending before the Vigilance Court. In the said report, the Enquiry Officer has reported that the Presenting Officer has neither laid any evidence to support the charge nor raised objection to the explanation given by the petitioner rather the Presenting Officer has said that there has never been any allegation against the petitioner on his integrity and that he has been made a victim of conspiracy. Thereafter, the petitioner was served second show-cause of which the petitioner was filed reply thereafter, for 3 years, matter was kept pending and then after lapse of 3 years, petitioner was served another suspension order vide Memo No. 1038 dated 08.02.2014 followed by further Memo No. 1921 dated 19.03.2014 showing the same charge as contained in annexure. The petitioner has challenged the same in CWJC No. 7815 of 2014. 18. In the meantime, the petitioner has been dismissed on the basis of Memo No. 3282 dated 06.06.2014 as a consequence, the said writ petition was dismissed affording liberty to the petitioner to question the independent application. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed CWJC No. 06 of 2016. In the said writ, vide order dated 02.03.2017, the entire exercise beginning the initiation vide order bearing Memo no 1921 dated 19.03.2014, the enquiry report dated 02.05.2014, the second show-cause notice dated 05.05.2014 and final order bearing Memo No. 3282 dated 06.06.2014 as held perse illegal, contrary to the statutory provision and wholly without jurisdiction and accordingly, quashed as set aside. 19. Hon’ble court has pleased to observe in the said Judgment dated 02.03.2017 in CWJC No.06 of 2016 that the choice now lies with the disciplinary authority whether or not to take earlier proceeding to its logical conclusion how to drop the same. 20. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed in CWJC No. 06/2016, the respondent state has preferred LPA no. 1371 of 2017 which was dismissed vide order dated 14.08.2018. 21. Thereafter, the petitioner was retired on 31st January, 2020 and vide Memo no. 20. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed in CWJC No. 06/2016, the respondent state has preferred LPA no. 1371 of 2017 which was dismissed vide order dated 14.08.2018. 21. Thereafter, the petitioner was retired on 31st January, 2020 and vide Memo no. 2869 dated 03.07.2020, a order was served upon him that petitioner was reinstated in the service and again, he was declared suspended from 06.06.2014 to 31.01.2020 and during this period only admissible subsistence allowance shall be payable during the said period. It has also been decided that his departmental proceeding shall be started from submission of enquiry report dated 28.04.2010 vide Memo No. 2577 and the departmental proceedings has been converted from CCA rule to 43(B) of Bihar Pension rule and thereafter, vide Annexure-31, the second show-cause was demanded. In this regard, second show-cause was submitted by the petitioner and subsequently, final order has been passed annexed in Annexure-33 contained in Memo No. 4125 dated 13.10.2020 in which measure punishment has been imposed. 22. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the said order of punishment has been passed in gross violation of Rule 17(4), Rule 17(6), Rule 17(11), Rule 17(14) and the most important is violation of Rule 18(2) have also been made. Rule 17(4) states as follows: – “The disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the Government Servant a copy of the articles of charge, such statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and a list of documents and witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be sustained and shall require the Government Servant to submit, within such time as may be specified, a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person”. Rule 17(11) states as follows: – “The inquiring authority shall, if the Government Servant fails to appear within the specified time or refuses or omits to plead, require the Presenting Officer to produce the evidence by which he proposes to prove the articles of charge, and to produce the evidence by which he proposes to prove the articles of charge, and shall adjourn the case to a later date not exceeding thirty days, after recording an order that the Government Servant may, for the purpose of preparing his defence, – (i) Inspect within five days of the order or within such further time not exceeding five days as the inquiring authority may allow, the documents specified in the list in sub-rule (3); (ii) Submit a list of witnesses to be examined on his behalf; Note. – If the Government Servant applies in writing for the supply of copies of the statements of witnesses mentioned in the list referred to in sub-rule(3), the inquiring authority shall furnish him with such copies as early as possible. (iii) Give a notice within ten days of the order or within such further time as the inquiring authority may allow for the discovery or production of any documents which are in the possession of Government but not mentioned in the list specified in sub-rule (3) of this Rule: Provided that the Government Servant shall indicate the relevance of the documents required by him to be discovered or produced by the Government”. Rule 17(5) states as follows: – “(a) On receipt of the written statement of defence, the disciplinary authority may himself inquire into such of the articles of charge which are not admitted, or, if it thinks necessary to appoint, under sub-rule (2) of this Rule, an inquiry authority for the purpose he may do so and where all the articles of charges have been admitted by the Government Servant in his written statement of defence, the disciplinary authority shall record his findings on each charge after taking such evidence as it may think fit and shall take action in the manner laid down in Rule 18. (b) If no written statement of defence is submitted by the Government Servant, the disciplinary authority may itself inquired into the articles of charge or may, if it thinks necessary to appoint, under Sub-rule (2) of this Rule an inquiry authority for the purpose, it may do so. (b) If no written statement of defence is submitted by the Government Servant, the disciplinary authority may itself inquired into the articles of charge or may, if it thinks necessary to appoint, under Sub-rule (2) of this Rule an inquiry authority for the purpose, it may do so. (c) where the disciplinary authority itself inquires into any article of charge , it may, by an appoints an inquiring authority for holding an inquiry about such charge, it may, by an order, appoint a government servant or a legal practitioner to be known as the “Presenting Officer’ to present on his behalf the case in support of the articles of charge.” Rule 17(14) states as follows: – “On the date fixed for the inquiry, the oral and documentary evidence by which the articles of charge are proposed to be proved shall be produced by or on behalf of the disciplinary authority. The witnesses shall be examined by or on behalf of the Presenting Officer and may be cross-examined by or on behalf of the Government Servant. The Presenting Officer shall be entitled to re-examine the witnesses on any points on which they have been cross-examined, but not on any new matter, without the leave of the inquiring authority. The inquiring authority may also put such questions to the witnesses, as it thinks fit. And final Rule 18(2) states as follows: – “The disciplinary authority, after receipt of the enquiry report as per Rule 17 (23) (ii) or as per sub-rule (1), shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the inquiring authority on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own finding on such charge, if the evidences on record is sufficient for the purpose. 23. There is absolute absence of compliance of Rule 18(2) Counsel for the petitioner has made a reliance on various Judgments. Firstly on Roop Singh Negi vs. P.NB. & Ors reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 , Para 14 states as follows: – “Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence”. 24. Secondly on case of Vijendra Prasad, vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in (2019) 4 PLJR 1046 , Para 9-14 states as follows: – 9. “Learned AC to AAG-7, while defending the disciplinary action has relied on the averments made in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State respondents and has submitted that the charge of accepting bribe leading to his arrest by the Vigilance Team is a serious misconduct and, therefore, the same being an admitted fact, the disciplinary authority was correct in rejecting the report of the Enquiry Officer and imposing punishment of dismissal from service. He has referred to the impugned order of the disciplinary authority to contend that the disciplinary authority did consider the explanation submitted by the petitioner and considering the gravity of the charge levelled against the petitioner, he decided to impose punishment of dismissal from service which cannot be said to be disproportionate to the proved misconduct against the petitioner. He has also submitted that the order of the appellate authority is speaking and reasoned and does not require any interference of this Court”. 10. “I have perused the pleadings on record and the documents, copies of which have been annexed thereto. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made on behalf of the parties”. 11. “It is evident from the chargesheet that the only allegation, which was made against the petitioner, was of his arrest by the Vigilance Team, while accepting bribe of Rs. 2,000/-. The factum of arrest needed no proof, which was an admitted fact. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made on behalf of the parties”. 11. “It is evident from the chargesheet that the only allegation, which was made against the petitioner, was of his arrest by the Vigilance Team, while accepting bribe of Rs. 2,000/-. The factum of arrest needed no proof, which was an admitted fact. The allegation against the petitioner of having accepted bribe does not have any proof nor there is any material indicated in this regard either in the report of the Enquiry Officer or in the order passed by the disciplinary authority. Only on the ground that the petitioner was arrested by the Vigilance Team, the disciplinary action against him cannot be justified unless the misconduct, for which he was arrested by the Vigilance Team, was made the specific charge in the departmental proceeding and proved during the departmental enquiry”. 12. “Be that as it may, this is not in dispute that the Enquiry Officer did not hold the charge framed against the petitioner to have been proved. It was open for the disciplinary authority to have disagreed with the report of the Enquiry Officer after giving the petitioner an opportunity to deal with the tentative notes of his disagreement with the report of the Enquiry Officer, which was never supplied to him. The petitioner was simply asked to submit his explanation by letter dated 30.05.2014 issued by the disciplinary authority after rejecting the report of the Enquiry Officer”. 13. “I have carefully examined the letter dated 30.05.2014, issued by the disciplinary authority, which is totally unreasoned and non-speaking. It does not refer to any material on record of the departmental enquiry on the basis of which the disciplinary authority could form his view that the petitioner was found accepting the said bribe money. Further, I have carefully perused the order of the disciplinary authority also. The order of the disciplinary authority is in seven paragraphs, five paragraphs of which refer to the circumstances in which the departmental enquiry was initiated against him. The sixth paragraph has two sentences, the first refers to submission of report of the enquiry Officer and the second sentence simply states rejection of the report of the Enquiry Officer and the explanation submitted by the petitioner after submission of the report of the Enquiry Officer. The sixth paragraph has two sentences, the first refers to submission of report of the enquiry Officer and the second sentence simply states rejection of the report of the Enquiry Officer and the explanation submitted by the petitioner after submission of the report of the Enquiry Officer. There is absolutely no discussion in the order of the disciplinary authority as to how the charge against the petitioner of accepting bribe could be said to have been proved. Seventh paragraph is completely formal in nature, which contains the imposition of punishment of dismissal from service on ‘analysis’ of the report of the Enquiry Officer, explanation of the petitioner and pretrap and post-trap memorandum by the Vigilance team. The petitioner had preferred appeal, as has been noted above. The appellate order is equally unreasoned inasmuch as the said order also does not refer to any material on the basis of which the disciplinary action taken against the petitioner could be said to be justified. The appellate authority has not at all discussed the grounds taken by the petitioner in his memo of appeal and as to why such grounds were not acceptable to him. The only fact, which was proved and which was not at all in dispute during the departmental proceeding, was that the petitioner was arrested by the Vigilance team. His arrest cannot be said to be constituting a misconduct.” 14. “In the aforesaid background, the entire action of imposition of punishment of dismissal of petitioner from service and subsequent order passed by the disciplinary authority become vulnerable and, therefore, require interference by this Court. This writ application deserves to be allowed. I order accordingly.” Thirdly on Judgment of Arun Kr. vs. State of Bihar reported in 2019 (3) BLJ 221 , Para 6 to 13 states as follows: – 6. “ Be that as it may, the Enquiry Officer has not relied upon any evidence or witness while holding the charges proved against the petitioner and only a reference has been made to a pretrap memorandum, which was prepared prior to the petitioner’s arrest in the Vigilance Police Station Case No. 009 of 2007 which by itself is not a reliable piece of evidence in light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank reported in (2009) 2 Supreme Court Cases 570. Since the Enquiry Report does not contain any evidence whatsoever, the conclusions arrived at by the Enquiry Officer are unsustainable and contrary to the mandates of Rule 17 (14) of the Bihar CCA Rules, 2005 which requires that in the enquiry, oral and documentary evidence, by which the articles of charges are proposed to be sustained, are to be produced by or on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority. No such procedure has been adopted in the instant proceeding. On the very same day on which the reply to charge memo has been submitted that is on 24.03.2014, the Enquiry Report has been prepared and submitted. There is no reference to any evidence other than the pre-trap memorandum. No witness has appeared in support of the case of the Department.” 7. “The conclusions of the Enquiry Officer are, therefore, held unsustainable as being based on no evidence, and product of a procedure in violation of the provisions of Rule 17 (3) as well as Rule 17 (14) of the Bihar CCA Rules, 2005.” 8. “From the records, another flaw, which appears, is non-service of the second show cause notice upon the petitioner. This plea has specifically been raised by the petitioner. Even the order of the Disciplinary Authority dated 30.04.2014 does not record that second show cause notice was ever served upon the petitioner though there is reference that second show cause notice has been issued to the petitioner. Issuance of the second show cause notice, by no stretch of imagination, can mean that the same has been served. Since there is no specific finding regarding actual service of the second show cause notice upon the petitioner, the findings of the Disciplinary Authority affirming the illegal order of the Enquiry Officer under the order of dismissal dated 30.04.2014 is also unsustainable in the eyes of law, and in view of the facts recorded herein above. There appears to be a gross violation of the procedure in the entire proceedings conducted against the petitioner right from issuance of the charge memo up till the order of dismissal dated 30.04.2014.” 9. “The petitioner has also tried to highlight the aforesaid illegality in the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority in his appeal filed before the Principal Secretary, Social Welfare Department, Government of Bihar, Patna. “The petitioner has also tried to highlight the aforesaid illegality in the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority in his appeal filed before the Principal Secretary, Social Welfare Department, Government of Bihar, Patna. The Principal Secretary has merely reaffirmed the said illegal order issued by the Disciplinary Authority and by order dated 03.09.2014, the appeal of the petitioner has been dismissed by the Appellate Authority.” 10. “In view of the grave irregularity in the procedure adopted by the authorities in the proceedings conducted against the petitioner, the irresistible conclusion is that the order of punishment is unjust being in violation of the principles of nature justice as also in teeth of the provisions contained in the Bihar CCA Rules, 2005, as noticed above.” 11. “Learned counsel for the respondent-State, relying upon the averments made in the counter-affidavit, has submitted that the entire proceeding against the petitioner has been conducted after due opportunity and in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Bihar CCA Rules, 2005.” 12. “The records are to the contrary as has been noticed herein above.” 13. “This Court would, therefore, quash the order of punishment of dismissal from service dated 30.04.2014 bearing Memo No 2672 issued by the Disciplinary Authority as also the order passed by the Appellate Authority dated 03.09.2014 whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner has been rejected.” 26. Counsel for the State submits that learned Hon'ble Single Judge vide order dated 02.03.2017 passed in CWJC No. 06 of 2016, has ordered that entire exercise beginning the initiation vide order bearing Memo No. 1921 order dated 09.03.2014 inflicting including inquiry report dated 02.05.2014 and second show cause dated 15.05.2014 and final order passed vide Memo No. 3282 order dated 06.06.2014, held those order to be per-se illegal, contrary to the statutory provisions and wholly without jurisdiction and accordingly quashed and set aside those orders. But in the said order itself, the Hon'ble Single Judge has pleased to grant liberty to the Disciplinary Authority that the choice now lies with the Disciplinary Authority, whether or not, to take earlier proceeding to its logical conclusion or to drop the same. But in the said order itself, the Hon'ble Single Judge has pleased to grant liberty to the Disciplinary Authority that the choice now lies with the Disciplinary Authority, whether or not, to take earlier proceeding to its logical conclusion or to drop the same. Thereafter, the State preferred L.P.A. In L.P.A., Hon'ble Division Bench has affirmed the order passed by Hon'ble Single Bench, meaning there by the choice was left at the hand of disciplinary authority, either to take or not to take the entire proceeding to its logical conclusion or to drop the same. 27. Counsel for the petitioner submits that, thereafter, the disciplinary authority passed another order on 03.07.2020 with a view to switch over the departmental proceedings under CCA rule 2005 to 43 (b) Bihar Pension Rule to the reason that the petitioner was retired on 31.01.2020. 28. Counsel further submits that this matter was placed before the Cabinet Secretariat, Bihar, Patna and the Committee has recommended that the dismissal of the petitioner with effect from 06.06.2014, has been set aside. And instead of dismissal he should be kept under suspension with the same date. 29. It has been further held that petitioner was initially suspended vide order Memo No. 1038 order dated 08.02.2014. After setting aside the said order of dismissal dated 06.06.2014, the said letter dated 08.02.2014 was revived and his suspension was continued from 06.06.2014 to the date of retirement i.e. 31.01.2020. For this period the subscription allowances were payable. 30. It is important to mention here that the said decision was taken on 03.07.2020 in Memo No. 2869 by which, his suspension was made from 06.06.2014 to 31.01.2020, meaning thereby, the said suspension was made with retrospective effect. The question is, “whether a suspension order with retrospective effect in service law is permissible is a legal question to be answered in this case?”. As payment of arrear of salary shall depend upon the said question. As Hon'ble Court by the Divisional Bench has categorically heard that dismissal during this period was set aside and the said decision acquires finality. 31. Counsel for the respondents subsequently submits that vide letter no. As payment of arrear of salary shall depend upon the said question. As Hon'ble Court by the Divisional Bench has categorically heard that dismissal during this period was set aside and the said decision acquires finality. 31. Counsel for the respondents subsequently submits that vide letter no. 3321 dated 10.08.2020, a second show cause was demanded and the letter by which the second show cause was demanded, the disciplinary authority differs from the findings of the inquiry report on three grounds – the first is that the petitioner was caught red-handed while taking bribe. This is the event that took place on 16.02.2010 but statement of Assistant Godown Manager was taken on 01.10.2010 i.e. about after 9 months. Similarly, the 6 persons who were witnesses of trap had submitted their affidavits on 23.07.2010 and 07.07.2010 i.e. after 5 months of the said event, which creates suspicion. It has also been mentioned that petitioner was arrested on the allegation of receiving bribe from the complainant Daya Shankar Manjhi. The account number mentioned in pre-tap memorandum from G.C. Note are same due to which the allegation has been proved, therefore, an explanation is necessary to be submitted. 32. Counsel for the petitioner submits that second show cause has been filed by the delinquent petitioner. At after considering the same, the disciplinary authority has passed the final order vide Memo No. 4125 dated 13.10.2020 by which his charges was found to be proved of grave nature, therefore, order of removal from his service was passed. 100% pension and full gratuity was fixed and there is nothing wrong in the said order sheet. It has been on submitted by the counsel for State that all the points taken by petitioner in the second show cause has been taken into consideration and discussed in the said order and therefore this amount to be a reasoned order and required no interference. 33. Upon going through the documents, law and the arguments, the following points have come out for just decision of this case whether the disciplinary authority has power to differ from the findings of the inquiry officers or not. And if he has, then, what are the basic legal ingredients which are necessary. 33. Upon going through the documents, law and the arguments, the following points have come out for just decision of this case whether the disciplinary authority has power to differ from the findings of the inquiry officers or not. And if he has, then, what are the basic legal ingredients which are necessary. In this regard, Rule 18(2) of Bihar CCA Rule, 2005 is very clear and it stats that “The discipliner authority after receipt of the inquiry report as per rule 17(23)(II) or as per the Sub-rule (1), shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the inquiring authority on any article of charge, records its reason for such disagreements and record its own finding on such charge, if the evidences on record are sufficient for the purpose. 34. Meaning thereby, the disciplinary authority has to discuss primarily on the findings of the inquiry authority on article of charge shall enter into evidences of record if found sufficient for the purpose then shall record its own reasoning for such disagreement and then record its own finding on surcharge. 35. Here in the present case, the inquiry authority has categorically stated on the point of first article of charge that neither any material oral or documentary, have been placed by the presenting officer before him. Meaning thereby, there was no evidences on record before inquiring officer. But even then the disciplinary authority have discussed the entire case, taking material from the written statement produced by the petitioner before the inquiry officer, which is absolutely illegal and not permissible in law. The position of law is very clear. Every party has to develop its own case, on its own evidence, oral or documentary, here disciplinary authority has tried to develop and prove its case on the documents and materials, provided by the petitioner in his defence. 36. Similarly, in the charge Memo no. 2577 dated 28.04.2010, it was directed to the delinquent that after receiving the charge Memo produced in his defence before inquiry officer. This observation was in gross violation of Rule 17(5) of CCA Rule. As per the Rule, 5(A) 17 (4) (A) on receipt on written statement of defence, the disciplinary authority may itself inquire into such article of charge, which may not be admitted. This observation was in gross violation of Rule 17(5) of CCA Rule. As per the Rule, 5(A) 17 (4) (A) on receipt on written statement of defence, the disciplinary authority may itself inquire into such article of charge, which may not be admitted. “The disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the Government Servant a copy of the articles of charge, such statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehavior and a list of documents and witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be sustained and shall require the Government Servant to submit, within such time as may be specified, a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person.” 37. The content of this rule is that the disciplinary authority itself has to inquire into article of charge. But here in the present case no such thing was made. 38. Similarly, in the inquiry report it is the categorical finding that second charge has not been proved and first charge could not be treated true till decision from the Vigilance Court could not come. But here in the present case no such thing was made. 38. Similarly, in the inquiry report it is the categorical finding that second charge has not been proved and first charge could not be treated true till decision from the Vigilance Court could not come. The inquiry official has hold that – Jh ;ksxsUnz izlkn flag] iz[kaM vkiwfrZ inkfèkdkjh] Hksjs ds fo:} foHkkx }kjk xfBr vkjksiksa ,oa blds lacaèk esa miyCèk djk;s x;s lk{; ds vkyksd esa foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh ds lapkyu ds nkSjku miLFkkiu inkfèkdkjh }kjk vkjksiksa dh iqf"V gsrq vyx ls u rks dksbZ lk{; gh miyCèk djk;k vkSj u gh vkjksih inkfèkdkjh }kjk lefiZr Li"Vhdj.k ij fdlh izdkj dh vkifÙk O;Dr dh x;hA cfYd muds }kjk fyf[kr c;ku fn;k x;k fd dk;Zdky esa Hkh flag ds fo:} Hkz"Vkpkj ls lacafèkr dksbZ f'kdk;r izkIr ugha gqbZ gS] bruk gh ugha mUgksaus ;g Hkh dgk fd tgk¡ rd ?kVuk ds i'pkr tkudkjh feyh fd Jh flag dks lkft'k ds rgr Q¡lk;k x;k gSA bl izdkj izLrqr Li"Vhdj.k ds lkFk layXu dkxtkrksa] foHkkx }kjk miyCèk djk;s x;s lk{; ,oa miLFkkiu inkfèkdkjh ds c;ku ,oa xgu leh{kk ds i'pkr~] eSa bl fu"d"kZ ij igwWprk gw¡ fd vkjksi lañ 1 ls lacafèkr ekeyk fuxjkuh U;k;ky; esa izkjaHk gks pqdk gSA blfy, blds esa U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr fd, tkus okys vkns'kksa dh izrh{kk dh tk ldrh gSA vkjksi lañ 2 Hkh dqN gn rd vkjksi lañ 1 la lacafèkr gS] ijUrq 1 rc rd lgh ugha ekuk tk ldrk tc rd fd fuxjkuh U;k;ky; }kjk bldk fu.kZ; ugha gks tkrk gSA vr% Jh ;ksxsUnz izlkn flag] iz[kaM vkiwfrZ inkfèkdkjh] Hkksjs ds fo:} xfBr vkjksi lañ 2 iw.kZr% izekf.kr ugha gks blfy, vkjksi lañ 2 bUgsa cjh fd;k tk ldrk gS ,oa vkjksi lañ 1 ds lacaèk esa U;k; fu.kZ; dh izrh{kk dh tk ldrh gSA 39. The disciplinary authority has not discussed a whisper nor discussed about any evidence, which was proceeded before the inquiry officers nor assigned any reason as to why he differs from the findings of the inquiry petitioners. Particularly, on the basis of evidence, which was proceeded in the form of oral and documenting before the inquiring officer, it is gross violence of Rule 18(2) of the CCA Rule. 40. Particularly, on the basis of evidence, which was proceeded in the form of oral and documenting before the inquiring officer, it is gross violence of Rule 18(2) of the CCA Rule. 40. Similarly, the directions for issuance demanding second cause is itself bad in law as no reason has been assigned that why he is differing from the opinion of the Inquiry Officer. And as such any further subsequent action shall itself bad in law, in result this writ petition is allowed. And the order Annexure-31 and 33 both are set aside. The petitioner shall be entitled for all its retiral benefits. 41. On the point of suspension power of making suspension is listed in Bihar Service Code, Rule 97. After going through the same, it is hereby ordered that petitioner shall be treated as a period spent on duty. 42. In this view of the matter the decision of suspending him form 06.06.2014 to his date of retirement i.e. 31.05.2020 inflicted on 30.07.2020 is bad in law and not sustainable, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to all his arrears of his salary during the said period. All payments are directed to be made within 4 months from production of this order. With this direction, this Civil Writ Application is hereby allowed.