ORDER : 1. The instant intra-court appeal, preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order dated 26.08.2019, passed by learned Single Judge in WP(S) No. 4053 of 2014, by which, the petitioner now dead, was appointed on the post of Routine Clerk on the basis of absorption made through Commission vide order dated 09.01.2014 has been cancelled and the writ petitioner (now dead) was allowed to work as Routine Clerk on contract basis on a fixed amount of Rs.16,188/-. 2. Brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ proceeding, which are required to be enumerated herein, read as under: It is the case of the writ petitioner that he was appointed to the post of Routine Clerk by absorbing in service by order dated 9/1/2004 which was later on cancelled by order dated 21.01.2014. 3. The writ petitioner being aggrieved thereof has approached this court by filing this writ petition and the learned single judge on consideration of the fact that the Commission on its own wisdom absorbed the writ petitioner but cancelled such absorption without following the principle of natural justice and therefore vide order dated 26.08.2019, the aforesaid order has been quashed and the matter has been remitted back to the Commission to proceed De novo by way of providing full opportunity to the petitioner. 4. This case is barred by limitation since has been filed after delay of 227 days and, as such, the same is required to be dealt with first. This Court is to consider as to whether the explanation furnished in the interlocutory application can be said to be sufficient cause to condone the delay and, as such, after going through the stand taken therein it is evident that the reasons has been assigned as it would appear from paragraph 5 that the appellant, who was respondent in the writ petition, the Jharkhand Public Service Commission, JPSC, in compliance with the judgment dated 26.08.2019 passed in the writ petition had issue an order as contained in memo number 437 dated 19/02/2020 cancelled the earlier office order dated 26/6/2014 and 10/3/2017 and had further issued a direction to issue a fresh show-cause to the petitioner communicating all relevant facts / documents. Accordingly, the explanation was sought for from the writ petitioner (now dead) vide letter No. 438 dated 19.02.2020. Accordingly, the explanation was sought for from the writ petitioner (now dead) vide letter No. 438 dated 19.02.2020. The writ petitioner (now dead) submitted his reply vide its letter dated 03.03.2020. The reason has been explained that due to surge in the COVID-19 pandemic, no decision could be taken by the JPSC and in meanwhile the original writ petitioner had died on 29/7/2020 and as such, the request was made on behalf of the wife of deceased employee for payment of the arrear of salary. The appellant, JPSC, thereafter, had sought for an opinion from the Law Department Government of Jharkhand as to what step is to be taken in the circumstances of death of the concerned employee. The opinion was given to pass a reasoned order, after the reply of the writ petitioner was received. Based upon the same, the decision was taken to file an appeal in view thereof the delay of 227 days has been caused in filing the appeal. 5. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court is to consider the application of condonation of delay before entering into the merit of the lis. 6. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as has been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar and Others vs. State of Haryana and Others, (2014) 11 SCC 351 . 7. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd. vs. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, (1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied upon the writings of Mr. 7. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd. vs. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, (1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it has been said that: “A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by law.” 8. In P.K. Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556 , the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held at paragraph-6 as under: “6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.” 9. While considering the similar issue, this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 , wherein, it has been held as under: “21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 10. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 10. It is settled position of Law that when a litigant does not act with bona fide motive and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part, the period of limitation for filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona fide and gross inaction and negligence are the vital factors which should be taken into consideration while considering the question of condonation of delay. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat and Another vs. Kanubhai Kantilal Rana, 2013 SCC Online Guj. 4202, wherein, at pargraph-17, it has been held that “Law having prescribed a fixed period of limitation of 30 days for preferring the appeal, the Government cannot ignore the provisions of the period of limitation as it was never the intention of the legislature that there should be a different period of limitation when the Government is the appellant.” 11. In the case of Post Master General and Others vs. Living Media India Limited and Another, (2012) 3 SCC 563 , it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 27 to 29 as under: “27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” 12. Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh and Another vs. Chaitram Maywade, (2020) 10 SCC 667 , after referring to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Post Master General and Others vs. Living Media India Limited and Another (supra) has held at paragraphs 1 to 5 as hereunder: “1. The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do the same thing again and again and the conduct seems to be incorrigible. The special leave petition has been filed after a delay of 588 days. We had an occasion to deal with such inordinately delayed filing of the appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh in State of M.P. vs. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 in terms of our order dated 15-10-2020. 2. We have penned down a detailed order in that case and we see no purpose in repeating the same reasoning again except to record what are stated to be the facts on which the delay is sought to be condoned. 2. We have penned down a detailed order in that case and we see no purpose in repeating the same reasoning again except to record what are stated to be the facts on which the delay is sought to be condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is stated that the Government Advocate was approached in respect of the judgment delivered on 13-11-2018 [Chaitram Maywade vs. State of M.P. 2018 SCC Online HP 1632] and the Law Department permitted filing of the SLP against the impugned order on 26-5-2020. Thus, the Law Department took almost about 17 months' time to decide whether the SLP had to be filed or not. What greater certificate of incompetence would there be for the Legal Department. 3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh to look into the aspect of revamping the Legal Department as it appears that the Department is unable to file appeals within any reasonable period of time much less within limitation. These kinds of excuses, as already recorded in the aforesaid order, are no more admissible in view of the judgment in Postmaster General vs. Living Media (India) Ltd. (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649. 4. We have also expressed our concern that these kinds of the cases are only “certificate cases” to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue. The object is to save the skin of officers who may be in default. We have also recorded the irony of the situation where no action is taken against the officers who sit on these files and do nothing. 5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, the wastage of judicial time involved, we impose costs on the petitioner State of Rs 35,000 to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited within four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officer(s) responsible for the delay in filing and sitting on the files and certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said period of time. The amount be deposited within four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officer(s) responsible for the delay in filing and sitting on the files and certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said period of time. We have put to Deputy Advocate General to caution that for any successive matters of this kind the costs will keep on going up.” 13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. (1962) 2 SCR 762 , has held that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder: “12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground.” 14. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part. 15. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of ‘sufficient cause’. The consideration of meaning of ‘sufficient cause’ has been made in Basawaraj and Another v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 , wherein, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder: “9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive.” However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. [See Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. vs. Bhutnath Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 1336 , Mata Din vs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953 , Parimal vs. Veena, (2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150 and Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629 ]. 10. In Arjun Singh vs. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause.” 11. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause.” 11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. [Vide Madanlal vs. Shyamlal, (2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100 and Ram Nath Sao vs. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201 ]. 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts - The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. [See Popat and Kotecha Property vs. SBI Staff Assn. (2005) 7 SCC 510 , Rajender Singh vs. Santa Singh, (1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537 and Pundlik Jalam Patil vs. Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 ]. 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao vs. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578 this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 . 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 16. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive.” However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. vs. Bhutnath Banerjee and Others, AIR 1964 SC 1336 , Lala Matadin vs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770 , Parimal vs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 . 17. 17. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu and Others vs. Gobardhan Sao and Others, (2002) 3 SCC 195 , wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder: “12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient cause” or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hyper-technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.” 18. It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove, wherein, expression ‘sufficient cause’ has been dealt with which means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive.” 19. It is just evident from the delay condonation application by stating the ground claiming to be sufficient for condoning delay that the JPSC, at the first instance, has decided to act upon on the basis of the order passed by the learned single judge dated 26.08.2019 in WP(S) No. 4053 of 2014, but subsequent to the death of the concerned employee, the instant appeal has been filed along with one another interlocutory application being I.A. No. 2841 of 2022, for the impleadment of the legal heirs as the party to the proceeding. This Court is conscious of the fact that while dealing with the interlocutory application, there cannot be any consideration of the issue on merit. But, herein, since the ground in the interlocutory application has been taken by discussing the issue which has got bearing with the case, as to whether the same can be said to be sufficient cause for condoning the delay as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as referred hereinabove. Therefore, this Court also deems it fit and proper to deal with the legal position so as to assess as to whether the grounds so shown in the delay condonation application can be said to be sufficient cause. 20. This Court has put a specific query that under which provision of service code is applicable to the concerned employee by which the order regarding misconduct will be passed upon legal heirs of the deceased employee. 21. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has fairly submitted that there is no such provision. 20. This Court has put a specific query that under which provision of service code is applicable to the concerned employee by which the order regarding misconduct will be passed upon legal heirs of the deceased employee. 21. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has fairly submitted that there is no such provision. Such provision cannot be there, since, the misconduct is subjective one and it is upon the person concern who commits a conduct, which is said to be not proper in course of discharge of his official function, therefore once the allegation of misconduct is there, it is upon individual and the person concerned and he is the best person to defend his case. The order has been passed, during the lifetime of the concerned employee but without providing any opportunity, which was the reason to interfere with the order impugned with an order of remand to pass a fresh order, but the concerned employee had died in the meanwhile when the explanation was already issued. The JPSC, in that pretext has filed the instant appeal along with the impleadment application as under I.A. No. 2841 of 2022 with the delay condonation application being I.A. No. 49 of 2023. 22. It is a trite of law that if a departmental proceeding is pending against a delinquent and the said delinquent dies during the course of the pendency of such departmental proceeding, the departmental proceeding stands abated. Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Basudeo Tiwary vs. Sido Kanhu University and Others, (1998) 8 SCC 194 , which reads as under: “14. The appellant has since demised during the pendency of these proceedings, no further direction either as to further inquiry or reinstatement can be given. We declare that the termination of the appellant by the respondent as per the notification referred to by us is invalid. Consequently, it would be deemed that the appellant had died in harness. Needless to say that the appellant would become entitled to the payment of arrears of salary from the date of termination of his services up to the date of his death on the basis of the last pay drawn by him. Consequently, it would be deemed that the appellant had died in harness. Needless to say that the appellant would become entitled to the payment of arrears of salary from the date of termination of his services up to the date of his death on the basis of the last pay drawn by him. Let the respondent take action within a period of three months from today to work out the arrears due to the appellant from the date of his termination till his death and pay the same to his legal representatives.” 23. Likewise the Hon’ble Apex Court held in the case of A.K.S. Rathore (Dead) through LRs. vs. Union of India and Another, which has been passed in Civil Appeal No. 7028 of 2022 vide order dated 28.09.2022 as under: “7. Admittedly, no final order was passed by the Disciplinary Authority, before the death of the original appellant. Though the order of remand passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, is dated 02.02.2015, the Disciplinary Authority could not perhaps pass the final order, due to the pendency of the writ petition before the High Court and the pendency of the above appeal before this Court. 8. Today even if we dismiss the above appeal, no final order can be passed in the disciplinary proceedings, against a dead person. The disciplinary proceedings have actually abated…” 24. This Court on consideration of the fact that there is no provision to continue with the departmental proceeding after demise of the concerned employee, is of the view that the JPSC, which is a constitutional body was restrained itself in filing this appeal, but very surprisingly the instant appeal has been filed along with the impleadment application for impleading the legal heirs. The question arises that if a person has committed any misconduct as per the allegation, how the accountability of the commission of such misconduct can be shifted upon the legal heirs, since, misconduct is always upon the individual, who has committed the misconduct and it cannot be shifted upon the legal heirs. Considering the aforesaid legal position, we are of the view that the same cannot be said to be sufficient ground to condone the delay and, as such, the delay condonation application is hereby rejected. 25. Considering the aforesaid legal position, we are of the view that the same cannot be said to be sufficient ground to condone the delay and, as such, the delay condonation application is hereby rejected. 25. Be that as it may, the fact remains that if there is no provision to continue with the proceeding after demise of the public servant, there was no occasion for the JPSC to file this appeal along with the impleadment application that too after a delay of 227 days. 26. According I.A. No. 49 of 2023 is dismissed. 27. This Court in view of the aforesaid fact is of the view that the instant appeal is nothing but a misuse of the judicial proceeding and therefore the same is required to be dismissed with the exemplary cost 28. Accordingly, the Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed. 29. This Court needs to refer herein that it is a case where the order of refund has been issued without holding any enquiry and in the garb thereof the pensionary benefit has not been paid and when the employee/pensioner died after the order of remand passed by the learned Single Judge, the J.P.S.C. has proceeded by issuing explanation upon the legal heirs of the deceased employee when the claim for post death/retiral benefit has been made. The J.P.S.C. thereafter, has filed the instant appeal along with the impleadment application being I.A. No. 2841 of 2022 as also with the delay condonation application being I.A. No. 49 of 2023 for condoning the delay of 227 days, which has been rejected by us as per the order referred hereinabove. The J.P.S.C. being the constitutional body, is expected to aware with the legal position and when law does not permit to continue with the proceeding, it was incumbent upon the J.P.S.C. to close the proceeding in pursuance to the law as referred hereinabove in the case of Basudeo Tiwary vs. Sido Kanhu University and Others (Supra) and A.K.S. Rathore (Dead) through LRs. vs. Union of India and Another (Supra) but instead of doing the same, which can only be said to be in consonance with the legal position, the J.P.S.C. has delayed the matter by filing this type of frivolous Letters Patent Appeal. The widow of the deceased employee, therefore, has been deprived with the post death/retiral benefit due to the illegal proceeding. 30. The widow of the deceased employee, therefore, has been deprived with the post death/retiral benefit due to the illegal proceeding. 30. This Court, in view thereof, is of the view that exemplary cost is to be imposed upon the appellant and as such, the exemplary cost is imposed to the tune of Rs.25,000/- to be paid in favour of Jharkhand High Court Advocates’ Clerks Association and the compliance report is to be filed. 31. Accordingly, all the pending interlocutory applications gets disposed of.