JUDGMENT : The decree in a suit for declaration that Ext.A6 and A8 sale deeds are null and void : For recovery of possession of plaint 'A' and B schedule properties, for partition of plaint 'C' and 'D' schedule properties and for prohibitory injunction against encumbering the properties was decreed by the trial court. The sixth defendant is in appeal. 2. An extent of 92 cents of property belonged to one Kannan Ayyappan. The parties to the suit except the sixth defendant-appellant herein, are the successors of Kannan Ayyappan being either grand children or great grand children. The sixth defendant – appellant is the assignee. 3. For an easy understanding of the relationship between the parties the genealogical tree is given hereunder :- Kannan Ayyappan had four children Kochappan, Kunjan, Kunjipennu and Karumbi. Kochappan had five children, plaintiffs 1 to 4 and late Sidharthan. Plaintiffs 5 to 7 are the widow and children of the said Sidharthan. Kunjan died unmarried and issueless in the year 1986. Kunjipennu died in the year 1993. She had a son Thankappan. The first plaintiff and defendants 4 and 5 and the 8th plaintiff are claimed to be the wife and children of Thankappan. Defendants 1 to 3 are the legal heirs of Karumbi. On 24.10.1980, the four children of Kannan Ayyappan had executed Ext.A5 partition deed allotting 23 cents each from out of the 92 cents to each of the children. 4. According to the plaintiffs they have come to know that on 17.10.1994 Kochappan and Karumbi claimed to have jointly executed Ext.A6=Ext.B6 sale deed in favour of the second defendant conveying the entire 92 cents of property that belonged to Kannan Ayyappan to him and that under Ext.A8=Ext.B5 dated 18.04.2008 the sixth defendant claimed to have purchased the property from the second defendant. It is accordingly that the suit is filed. 5. The plaint schedule consists of 'A' to 'D' schedule properties. Plaint 'A' schedule is the 23 cents of Kochappan, 'B' schedule is the 23 cents of Kunjipennu and 'C' schedule is the 23 cents of Kunjan allotted under Ext.A5 partition. The plaint 'D' schedule is another 10 cents of property owned by Kunjan situated in different survey number. 6. The suit is filed alleging that Ext.A6 sale deed is null and void and that it was not executed by Kochappan. The plaint 'D' schedule is another 10 cents of property owned by Kunjan situated in different survey number. 6. The suit is filed alleging that Ext.A6 sale deed is null and void and that it was not executed by Kochappan. The subsequent sale deed Ext.A8 was also sought to be declared as void. 7. Defendants 2 and 6 opposed the suit contending that Thankappan had died unmarried and issueless and that the rights of Kunjipennu had devolved on Kochappan and Karumbi and they jointly executed Ext.A6 sale deed in favour of the second defendant. They also raised a plea of adverse possession and limitation. 8. The trial court held that the first plaintiff is the widow and defendants 4 and 5 & 8th plaintiff are the children of Thankappan. It was also found that the due execution of Ext.A8 sale deed by Kochappan and Karumbi was not proved. Accordingly Exts.A6 and A8 sale deeds were declared as null and void and does not affect the title of plaintiffs and defendants 4 and 5 in respect of the plaint 'A' to 'C' schedule properties. A decree for recovery of possession as was sought and injunction sought were granted. 9. I have heard Sri.P.K.Ravisankar, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri.M.N.Manmadan, learned counsel for the contesting respondents. 10. The points that arises for determination are:- (i) Is the finding of the trial court that the first plaintiff is the legally wedded wife of Thankappan and that defendants 4 and 5 and the 8th plaintiff are their children, sustainable on the evidence on record ? (ii) Is the finding of the trial court that the due execution of Ext.A6 Sale Deed has not been proved, correct in law ? (iii) Was the trial court right in having negatived the plea of adverse possession and limitation? (iv) Is the plaintiff entitled for partition of plaint 'C' schedule property without seeking the relief of recovery of possession ? 11. The plaintiff got herself examined as PW1. She produced Exts.A11 to A14 documents to prove that she is a legally wedded wife of Thankappan and defendants 4, 5 and 8th plaintiff are their children. (iv) Is the plaintiff entitled for partition of plaint 'C' schedule property without seeking the relief of recovery of possession ? 11. The plaintiff got herself examined as PW1. She produced Exts.A11 to A14 documents to prove that she is a legally wedded wife of Thankappan and defendants 4, 5 and 8th plaintiff are their children. Though every attempt was made by the contesting defendants to make out a case that Thankappan “mentioned in Exts.A11 to A14” is not the son of Kunjipennu but some other person, the said attempt miserably failed in the light of the categoric admissions of DWs.1 and 2 in their cross-examination. They have in their evidence admitted about the marriage of Thankappan, the son of Kunjippennu with the first plaintiff and also with regard to the status of defendants 4, 5 and the 8th plaintiff. Ext.A11 birth certificate, Ext.A12 and A13 first page of SSLC book, Ext.A14 family pension order issued by the Department of Posts evidences that the first plaintiff is the wife and defendants 4, 5 and the 8th plaintiff are their children. DW1 has admitted that Thankappan was employed in the Postal Department and that on his death while in service, the first plaintiff got employment in service under the Dying-in-Harness Scheme. Though Exts.A11 to A14 are only photostat copies, the same having been admitted in evidence its admissibility is not open to challenge at this stage. That apart, the categoric admissions of DWs.1 and 2 as noticed above, leaves no room for doubt that the first plaintiff is the wife and defendants 4, 5 and 8th plaintiff are the children of Thankappan. Point No.(i) is answered accordingly. 12. The execution of Ext.A6 Sale Deed by Kochappan and Karumbi is denied by the plaintiffs. Relying upon the fact that it is a registered document, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that in the light of the presumption attached to registered documents, the burden is on the person who challenges the document to rebut the presumption of execution. The learned counsel relied on the decisions in Sumathi Amma v. Kunjulekshmi Amma 1964 KHC 256, Prem Singh v. Birbal 2006 (5) SCC 353 , Vishwanath Bapurao Sabale v. Shalinibai Nagappa Sabale & Ors. 2009(12) SCC 101 , and Jamila Begum (D) thr. Lrs. v. Shami Mohd. (D) thr. Lrs. and Another 2019 (2) SCC 727 to support the argument. 13. 2009(12) SCC 101 , and Jamila Begum (D) thr. Lrs. v. Shami Mohd. (D) thr. Lrs. and Another 2019 (2) SCC 727 to support the argument. 13. In Sumathy's case supra this Court held that, in a case where Section 68 of the Evidence Act has no application, the certificate of registration can, in fit cases, be accepted as evidence of execution. The Court noticed the distinction between the mode of proof required under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act which relates to documents which the law requires to be compulsorily attested, and the proof of other documents under Section 67. The Court took note of the fact that the endorsements of registration under Section 60 of the Indian Registration Act include admission of execution, receipt of consideration etc. 14. Section 60 of the Registration Act provides that the certificate of registration shall be admissible for the purpose of proving the due registration of the document and that the facts mentioned in the endorsements referred to in Section 59 have occurred. Section 59 provides for authentication by the registering officer with regard to all endorsements made under Sections 52 and 58 on the document. The endorsements under Sections 52 and 58 include the details of presentation, the signature of every person admitting the execution etc. Therefore, there is an initial presumption with regard to due execution of registered document. Then the question would be whether the propounder of the document could be rest satisfied on such presumption and contend that it is for the party who challenges document to prove its non-execution. In this context, it would be relevant to refer to Sections 67 and 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, the same read thus:- “67. Proof of signature and handwriting of person alleged to have signed or written document produced.?If a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person's handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting. 68. Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested. 68. Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested. If a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence:” Section 68 provides that if law mandates a document to be attested then except in the case of a Will, if the execution is denied, at least one attesting witness has to be examined to prove its execution. Therefore, in case of such documents which law requires to be attested, a particular mode of proof is stipulated. However, in respect of other documents, Sections 67 of the Act enables proof in any manner known to law. Therefore, in respect of documents which law does not mandate to be attested, the presumption available to registered documents would provide a prima facie proof of execution under Section 67 of the Evidence Act. Therefore it could be treated that the initial burden has been shifted to the person who challenges the document to prove its non-execution. However, if the circumstances brought out in the case cast doubt regarding due execution, the burden would be on the propounder to prove its due execution notwithstanding the presumption available to the registered document. In Sumathi Amma's case (supra), this Court observed that in cases where better evidence is available the court can insist on bringing in such evidence. In Prem Singh's case supra, the Apex Court while considering the challenge against a Sale Deed held :- “There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. . . . . .” Precedents as above hold that, registered documents, the proof of which is required only in the manner as provided under Section 67 of the Evidence Act, carries with it a presumption with regard to the matters contained in the statutory endorsements made by the Registrar at the time of registration. Such endorsements include admission of execution before the Registrar by the executant. The person who relies on the document would under normal circumstances be entitled for the benefit of presumption. Such endorsements include admission of execution before the Registrar by the executant. The person who relies on the document would under normal circumstances be entitled for the benefit of presumption. The burden of proof to prove the non-execution would rest upon the person who challenges the document. 15. Ext.A6 document which is under challenge in this suit being a Sale Deed, proof in terms of Section 68 of the Evidence Act is not necessary. All that is required is proof in terms of Section 67 of the Evidence Act. The question as to whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the defendants were entitled for the benefit of the presumption of execution under the Registration Act, and if so whether the plaintiff has discharged the burden to prove that Ext.A6 was not executed by Kochappan and Karumbi, have not been considered by the trial court. The trial court has while observing, “Then it is the burden of D2 to prove due execution of Ext.B6 by providing the original.” proceeded as if the original of the document is not produced. Infact, Ext.B6 is the original document. So also, an adverse inference is drawn against the defendants for non-production of Ext.A5 which is the prior deed, for comparison of the signature and thumb impression. However it is to be noticed that, there was no request by the plaintiffs for production of the document nor was there any circumstance to infer that the document was withheld/suppressed from the Court. Therefore, the finding of the trial court that Ext.A6 was not executed by Kochappan and Karumbi and the consequential declaration that Exts.B6 and A8 are void, cannot be sustained. The decree and judgment of the trial court is thus liable to be set aside. 16. The law in regard to presumption of execution and burden being as noticed supra, and the same having not been taken into consideration while trying the suit, and considering the facts and circumstances involved, it is deemed appropriate in the interests of justice that the suit be disposed of denovo. The parties could be granted a further opportunity to adduce evidence with regard to the genuineness of Ext.A6 document. Matter needs to be remanded to the trial court for the said purpose. A finding on the genuineness of Ext.A6 has a bearing on the other issues that call for adjudication in the suit. The parties could be granted a further opportunity to adduce evidence with regard to the genuineness of Ext.A6 document. Matter needs to be remanded to the trial court for the said purpose. A finding on the genuineness of Ext.A6 has a bearing on the other issues that call for adjudication in the suit. Since the matter is being sent back to the trial court, it is only appropriate that, except for confirming the finding of the trial court with regard to the marital status of the first plaintiff, and that defendants 4, 5 and 8th plaintiff are the children of late Thankappan, the son of Kunjipennu, all other contentions be left open for fresh adjudication. The findings on other issues are thus, set aside. The parties could be afforded opportunity to adduce further evidence. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed. The decree and judgment of the trial court are set aside. The suit is directed to be disposed of de novo after affording opportunity to the parties to adduce further evidence. It is clarified that the finding of the trial court in the impugned judgment that the first plaintiff is the wife of late Thankappan, the son of Kunjipennu and that defendants 4, 5 and 8th plaintiff are their children are affirmed and is not liable to be reopened. The suit being of the year 2010, I am sure that the trial of the suit will be expedited. Parties to appear before the trial court on 05.12.2023.