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2023 DIGILAW 929 (PNJ)

Ram Phal v. State of Haryana

2023-03-01

G.S.SANDHAWALIA, HARPREET KAUR JEEWAN

body2023
JUDGMENT Harpreet Kaur Jeewan, J. - The appellant-Ram Phal who is the first informant, has filed the present appeal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. against the judgment dated 11.12.2019 passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Rohtak, whereby respondent Nos.2 and 3 brother-in-law and sister-in-law of his daughter have been acquitted of the charges framed against them under Sections 120B, 201 and 302 of Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred as "IPC") in a FIR bearing No.618 dated 09.09.2017 registered at Police Station City Rohtak. 2. Since the present appeal has been filed by the victim without seeking leave to appeal, the same is found maintainable in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Joseph Stephen and others v. Santhanasamy and others, 2022, Live Law (SC) 83, wherein it was held that the right provided to the victim to prefer an appeal against the order of acquittal is an absolute right. The victim is not to pray for grant of special leave to appeal. The victim has a statutory right to appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C and the same does not stipulate any condition of obtaining special leave to appeal like sub-section 4 of Section 378 Cr.P.C. in a case wherein an order of acquittal is passed in a case instituted upon complaint. As such we proceed to hear the present appeal. 3. The prosecution story in brief is that appellant-Ram Phal, presented an application Ex.P-4 before Inspector SHO Rajesh Kumar, who was present at the place of occurrence, after receiving an information from the control room, Rohtak, regarding murder of a woman. The appellant alleged in the said information that he is blessed with five daughters and a son. He performed the marriage of his daughter Rinky with Chirag on 29.02.2016. Chirag was residing with his father and two brothers in a joint house. The daughter of the appellant was being harassed by her in-laws. The appellant tried to make his son-in-law Chirag and his family members to understand, but in vain. The son-in-law of the appellant, Chirag had illicit relationship with respondent No.2 who is his sister-in-law (bhabi). The daughter of the appellant tried to stop her husband from the said relationship but no fruitful results were found. All the accused persons i.e. respondent Nos.2 & 3 and Chirag made a plan to kill the daughter of the appellant. The son-in-law of the appellant, Chirag had illicit relationship with respondent No.2 who is his sister-in-law (bhabi). The daughter of the appellant tried to stop her husband from the said relationship but no fruitful results were found. All the accused persons i.e. respondent Nos.2 & 3 and Chirag made a plan to kill the daughter of the appellant. A telephonic information was given by Chand Ram (father-in-law of the deceased) to the appellant that all the accused persons have committed murder of Rinki. When appellant reached at the spot, he found that Chand Ram (father-in-law), Kamlesh (mother-in-law), Monika (sister-in-law), Manoj & Vikas (brothers-in-law) and Chirag (husband) of the deceased were carrying sharp edged weapons and were running here and there. 3.1 On the basis of the application given by the appellant, FIR was registered and the investigation was carried out. On 10.09.2017, accused Chirag and both respondent Nos.2 and 3 were arrested. Accused Chirag got recovered a knife and a burnt chunni on the basis of his disclosure statement. During the investigation, the remaining accused, namely Chand Ram, Kamlesh and Vikas were found innocent. After completion of the investigation, report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was presented against the accused Chirag and both the respondents i.e. Monika and Manoj. 3.2 The case was committed to the Court of Sessions after supplying copy of the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. along with the accompanying documents to the accused. 3.3 The trial Court framed charge under Section 120B, 302 read with Section 34 IPC, against all the accused persons to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 3.4 Prosecution examined 16 witnesses to prove the guilt of the accused i.e. Lady Constable Geeta, PW-1, Lady Constable Seema, PW-2, ESI Jagbir, PW-3, EASI Samit Kumar, PW-4, Ram Phal (father of the deceased), PW-5, Adesh Kumar, PW-6, EASI Suresh Kumar, PW-7, Vikram, PW-8, Dr. Sourabh Arora, (Medical Officer) PW-9, Inspector Jagbir Singh PW-10, L/ASI Banita PW-11, Constable Ajay Kumar as PW-12, ASI Pankaj PW-13, Head Constable Sunil Kumar PW-14, Head Constable Bijender PW-15 and Inspector Rajesh PW-16 and proved all the relevant documents. Thereafter, evidence of the prosecution was closed by the Prosecutor. Sourabh Arora, (Medical Officer) PW-9, Inspector Jagbir Singh PW-10, L/ASI Banita PW-11, Constable Ajay Kumar as PW-12, ASI Pankaj PW-13, Head Constable Sunil Kumar PW-14, Head Constable Bijender PW-15 and Inspector Rajesh PW-16 and proved all the relevant documents. Thereafter, evidence of the prosecution was closed by the Prosecutor. 3.5 The respondents alleged false implication when their statement was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and in their defence they had examined 06 witnesses i.e. Nanhu Ram (Clerk, Municipal Corporation, Rohtak), DW-1, Nirmala Devi DW-2, Arun Parkash, DW-3, Mukesh Kumar DW-4, Amardeep DW-5 and Chand Ram DW-6, thereafter, defence evidence on behalf of all the accused persons was closed by the counsel for the accused. 3.6 Trial Court held accused Chirag guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and accordingly convicted him whereas respondent Nos.2 and 3 were acquitted by giving them benefit of doubts. 4. While acquitting respondent Nos.2 and 3 namely Monika and Manoj, trial Court observed that as the daughter of the appellant was found murdered in her matrimonial house as such the appellant, due to his emotions, had named all the family members of the husband of the deceased. The dead body of the deceased was found in the house which was in possession of the accused Chirag and in that house, only Chirag was living with his wife. A part of the testimony of the appellant was found false that Chand Ram (father-in-law of the deceased) had told him telephonically about the plan of the accused to kill the deceased. Even the version of the appellant that when he reached at the spot, all the accused persons were found roaming here and there along with sharp edged weapons, was also rightly not believed by the trial Court since as per the testimony of the Investigating Officer (PW-16), he had only found and arrested accused Chirag, Manoj and Monika when he reached at the spot and he did not find any other person roaming here and there as named by the appellant-complainant. 5. The trial Court has further observed that respondent Nos.2 and 3 were living separately from accused Chirag. Reference to the testimony of Mukesh Kumar (DW-4) and Chand Ram (DW-6), was made while holding that accused Chirag was living in Sanjay Colony, Rohtak with the deceased (his wife) in a house which is in the name of Kamlesh (wife of Chand Ram). Reference to the testimony of Mukesh Kumar (DW-4) and Chand Ram (DW-6), was made while holding that accused Chirag was living in Sanjay Colony, Rohtak with the deceased (his wife) in a house which is in the name of Kamlesh (wife of Chand Ram). The trial Court has also made a reference to the compromise Ex.P-6 between the accused Chirag, deceased-Rinki and respondent Nos.2 & 3 namely Monika and Manoj, respectively, whereby it was decided that Chirag would not go to the house of his brother Manoj. As such trial Court held that both the respondents were living separately from accused Chirag and the deceased at the time of compromise dated 31.08.2017. The disclosure statement made by respondent Nos.2 and 3 was found to be inconsequential as it was pertaining to the place of occurrence which the Police Party was already aware and the said statement was found to be hit by the provisions of sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act. With the aforesaid reasons, the trial Court disbelieved the testimony of the complainant qua involvement of the respondents in the present occurrence as such both the respondents were acquitted of the charges levelled against them. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the role of respondent No.2 Monika, having illicit relationship with the accused Chirag has not been considered by the trial Court. The deposition of PW-5 (complainant) makes it clear that Monika is one of the main accused and her illicit relationship with the accused Chirag was the motive for causing the murder of the deceased. The acquittal of respondent Nos.2 and 3 led to miscarriage of justice, as such findings of the trial Court acquitting the respondents are liable to be set aside and both the respondents are liable to be convicted. 7. We have examined the paper-book with the help of learned counsel for the parties and considered the aforesaid submissions. 8. In Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala (SC) 2022(3) SCC(Cri) 436 The Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the catena of judgments regarding scope of appeal filed against the acquittal held as under: - "25 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Precedents: Mohan @ Srinivas @ Seena @ Tailor Seena v. State of Karnataka, [2021 SCC Online SC 1233] as hereunder: - "20. 8. In Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala (SC) 2022(3) SCC(Cri) 436 The Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the catena of judgments regarding scope of appeal filed against the acquittal held as under: - "25 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Precedents: Mohan @ Srinivas @ Seena @ Tailor Seena v. State of Karnataka, [2021 SCC Online SC 1233] as hereunder: - "20. section 378 CrPC, 1973 enables the State to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal, section 384 CrPC, 1973 speaks of the powers that can be exercised by the Appellate Court. When the trial court renders its decision by acquitting the accused, presumption of innocence gathers strength before the Appellate Court. As a consequence, the onus on the prosecution becomes more burdensome as there is a double presumption of innocence . Certainly, the Court of first instance has its own advantages in delivering its verdict, which is to see the witnesses in person while they depose. The Appellate Court is expected to involve itself in a deeper, studied scrutiny of not only the evidence before it, but is duty bound to satisfy itself whether the decision of the trial court is both possible and plausible view. When two views are possible, the one taken by the trial court in a case of acquittal is to be followed on the touchstone of liberty along with the advantage of having seen the witnesses. Article 21 of the Constitution of India also aids the accused after acquittal in a certain way, though not absolute. Suffice it is to state that the Appellate Court shall remind itself of the role required to play, while dealing with a case of an acquittal. 21. Every case has its own journey towards the truth and it is the Court's role undertake. Truth has to be found on the basis of evidence available before it. There is no room for subjectivity nor the nature of offence affects its performance. We have a hierarchy of courts in dealing with cases. An Appellate Court shall not expect the trial court to act in a particular way depending upon the sensitivity of the case. Rather it should be appreciated if a trial court decides a case on its own merit despite its sensitivity. 22. At times, courts do have their constraints. We have a hierarchy of courts in dealing with cases. An Appellate Court shall not expect the trial court to act in a particular way depending upon the sensitivity of the case. Rather it should be appreciated if a trial court decides a case on its own merit despite its sensitivity. 22. At times, courts do have their constraints. We find, different decisions being made by different courts, namely, trial court on the one hand and the Appellate Courts on the other. If such decisions are made due to institutional constraints, they do not augur well. The district judiciary is expected to be the foundational court and therefore, should have the freedom of mind to decide a case on its own merit or else it might become a stereotyped one rendering conviction on a moral platform. Indictment and condemnation over a decision rendered, on considering all the materials placed before it, should be avoided. The Appellate Court is expected to maintain a degree of caution before making any remark. 23. This court, time and again has laid down the law on the scope of inquiry by an Appellate court while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under section 378 CrPC, 1973. We do not wish to multiply the aforesaid principle except placing reliance on a recent decision of this court in Anwar Ali v. State of Himanchal Pradesh, (2020) 10 SCC 166 : 14.2. When can the findings of fact recorded by a court be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under : (Babu case [Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179]) "20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding mav also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality . (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn.. The finding mav also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality . (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn.. [Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn., (1984) 4 SCC 635 :1985 SCC (L&S) 131], Excise & Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons [Excise & Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312], Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 665], Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad, (2001) 1 SCC 501 ], Aruvelu [Arulxelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 288] and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P. [Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P., (2009) 10 SCC 636 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 372] )" It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429], that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. 14.3. In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh [Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586], this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of section 378 CrPC, 1973 and the interference by the High Court [State of Karnataka v. Vijay Mohan Singh, 2013 SCC Online Kar 10732] in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered a catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In para 31, it is observed and held as under: "31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in [Umedbhai Jadavbhai [Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State of Gujarat, (1978) 1 SCC 228 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 108]. In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in [Umedbhai Jadavbhai [Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State of Gujarat, (1978) 1 SCC 228 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 108]. In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: '10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to re-appreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case.' 31.1. In Sambasivan [Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320], the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: '8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: '8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Doshi case [Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972] viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this noncompliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court's judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.' 31.2. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.' 31.2. In K Ramakrishnan Unnithan [K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 309 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 410], after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 31.3. In Atley [Atley v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 807 :1955 CriLJ 1653, in para 5, this Court observed and held as under: '5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under section 417 CrPC, 1973 came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under section 417 CrPC, 1973 came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence. It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State [Surajpal Singh v. State, 1951 SCC 1207 : AIR 1952 SC 52 ]; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P. [Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P., 1951 SCC 898 : AIR 1953 SC 122 ]) In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions.' 31.4. In K Gopal Reddy [K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 305], this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule." N. Vijayakumar v. State of T.N., [ (2021) 3 SCC 687 ] as hereunder: - "20. Mainly it is contended by Shri Nagamuthu, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant that the view taken by the trial court is a "possible view", having regard to the evidence on record. It is submitted that the trial court has recorded cogent and valid reasons in support of its findings for acquittal. Under section 378 CrPC, 1973 no differentiation is made between an appeal against acquittal and the appeal against conviction. By considering the long line of earlier cases this Court in the judgment in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325 has laid down the general principles regarding the powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal. Para 42 of the judgment which is relevant reads as under: (SCC p. 432) "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded . (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law . (3) Various expressions, such as. "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions". "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. (3) Various expressions, such as. "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions". "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion . (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court . (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court ." 21. Further in the judgment in Murugesan [Murugesan v. State, (2012) 10 SCC 383 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 69] relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, this Court has considered the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal recorded by the trial court. In the said judgment, it is categorically held by this Court that only in cases where conclusion recorded by the trial court is not a possible view, then only the High Court can interfere and reverse the acquittal to that of conviction. In the said judgment, distinction from that of "possible view" to "erroneous view" or "wrong view" is explained. In clear terms, this Court has held that if the view taken by the trial court is a "possible view", the High Court not to reverse the acquittal to that of the conviction. xxx xxx xxx 23. Further, in Hakeem Khan v. State of M.P., (2017) 5 SCC 719 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 653 this court has considered the powers of the appellate court for interference in cases where acquittal is recorded by the trial court. xxx xxx xxx 23. Further, in Hakeem Khan v. State of M.P., (2017) 5 SCC 719 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 653 this court has considered the powers of the appellate court for interference in cases where acquittal is recorded by the trial court. In the said judgment it is held that if the "possible view" of the trial court is not agreeable for the High Court, even then such "possible view" recorded by the trial court cannot be interdicted. It is further held that so long as the view of the trial court can be reasonably formed, regardless of whether the High Court agrees with the same or not, verdict of the trial court cannot be interdicted and the High Court cannot supplant over the view of the trial court. Para 9 of the judgment reads as under: (SCC pp. 722- 23) "9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the trial court's judgment is more than just a possible view for arriving at the conclusion of acquittal and that it would not be safe to convict seventeen persons accused of the crime of murder i.e. under Section 302 read with Section149 of the Penal Code. The most important reason of the trial court, as has been stated above, was that, given the time of 6.30 p.m. to 7.00 p.m. of a winter evening, it would be dark, and, therefore, identification of seventeen persons would be extremely difficult. This reason, coupled with the fact that the only independent witness turned hostile and two other eyewitnesses who were independent were not examined, would certainly create a large hole in the prosecution story. Apart from this, the very fact that there were injuries on three of the accused party, two of them being deep injuries in the skull, would lead to the conclusion that nothing was premeditated and there was, in all probability, a scuffle that led to injuries on both sides. While the learned counsel for the respondent may be right in stating that the trial court went overboard in stating that the complainant party was the aggressor, but the trial court's ultimate conclusion leading to an acquittal is certainly a possible view on the facts of this case. While the learned counsel for the respondent may be right in stating that the trial court went overboard in stating that the complainant party was the aggressor, but the trial court's ultimate conclusion leading to an acquittal is certainly a possible view on the facts of this case. This is coupled with the fact that the presence of the kingpin Sarpanch is itself doubtful in view of the fact that he attended the Court at some distance and arrived by bus after the incident took place." (emphasis supplied) 9. In the light of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, we have examined the facts of the case as well as the evidence on record. As per the site plan Ex.P-3, the dead body was found at place Mark-A in the said site plan. The said place is indicated as house of accused Chirag s/o Chand Ram. The said site plan has been proved by the testimony of PW-4 EASI Samit Kumar (Draftsman, SP office, Rohtak), who has testified that on 16.09.2017 he visited the place and prepared the scaled site plan Ex.P-3. PW-16 Rajesh Kumar stated in his examination-in-chief that on the date of occurrence i.e. 09.09.2017, he inspected the place of occurrence and prepared rough site plan Ex.P-44. Perusal of the rough site plan prepared by the Investigating Officer on the day of occurrence also indicates the place where the dead body was found in the house. In the cross-examination, he has clarified that the house in which the occurrence took place was told to be belonging to accused Chirag and due to that he had mentioned his name in the rough site plan Ex.P-44. 10. In the statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., accused-respondent Manoj has alleged false implication and took the following defence :- "I am innocent and have been falsely implicated in the present case. I have nothing to do with the alleged offence. We all the brothers were/are residing separately from each other in separate houses. My parents used to reside with my brother Vikas in Shivaji Colony, Rohtak. Chirag and his wife were residing in the house where the occurrence took place. I along with mv wife and children were residing in our other house . We all the brothers were/are residing separately from each other in separate houses. My parents used to reside with my brother Vikas in Shivaji Colony, Rohtak. Chirag and his wife were residing in the house where the occurrence took place. I along with mv wife and children were residing in our other house . On 31.08.2017 my wife made a report against wife of Chirag to the police of Mahila Help Line and a compromise took place between us on the same day. During the time of occurrence, Chirag was residing at Delhi and used to ply his car as a taxi at Delhi. In the intervening night of 08/09.09.2017, when we were present at our house, we came to know about the murder of wife of Chirag at her house and due to that, being close relative, I along with my wife went to the house of Chirag and informed my parents, who also came there and police apprehended us at that very time and later on, falsely involved in this case. I did not make any disclosure statement to the police and nothing was recovered from me in pursuance of disclosure statement. We were falsely implicated in this case at the instance of the complainant. " (emphasis supplied) 11. Similarly, the respondent accused Monika has also alleged false implication in the statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and made a similar statement as made by her husband respondent Manoj. Even, though the accused Chirag took a plea of alibi, he also stated that Manoj and his wife along with their children were residing in the other house and he as well as his wife used to reside in the house whereby occurrence took place. 12. DW-1, Nanhu Ram, Clerk, Municipal Corporation, Rohtak, testified that H.No.357 is shown in the name of Chand Ram s/o Inder Singh, whereas H.No.160 is shown in the name of Kamlesh w/o Chand Ram in the Assessment Register maintained by the Corporation. DW-2, Ms. Nirmala Devi, Inspector, Office of Food and Supply, Rohtak brought the record pertaining to the Ration Card, reflecting respondent Manoj is having a separate Ration Card. Similarly, by examining the other defence witnesses an attempt was made to indicate that the respondents and the deceased were residing in separate houses. DW-2, Ms. Nirmala Devi, Inspector, Office of Food and Supply, Rohtak brought the record pertaining to the Ration Card, reflecting respondent Manoj is having a separate Ration Card. Similarly, by examining the other defence witnesses an attempt was made to indicate that the respondents and the deceased were residing in separate houses. Even Chand Ram, who appeared as DW-6 (father-in-law of the deceased) has testified this fact that the deceased was residing along with her husband Chirag and Manoj was residing in a separate house which was registered on his name. 13. From the above discussed evidence, it is concluded that the dead body of the deceased was found inside the matrimonial house of the deceased where she was residing along with his husband Chirag at the time of her death. 14. As per the medical evidence, it has been proved that death of the deceased was caused due to a cut throat injury. As per the testimony of PW-9, Dr. Saurabh Arora, Medical Officer, who has conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased, the cause of death in this case is due to cut throat injury which leads to shock and hemorrhage which is antimortem in nature and is sufficient to cause death in an ordinary course of nature . As per the testimony of the said witness, injury No.1 was on the throat which is as under: - "Injuries:- (1) Incised wound of size 14x3 cm over front of neck extending 9 cm to left from mid line and 5 cm on right from mid line, 4 cam below left angle of mandible and 7 cm below right angle of mandible, on dissection of neck Trachea and oesophagus are cut through and through, all the major vessels and neurovascular bundles are cut bilaterally. " 15. Even as per the inquest report, Ex.P-12, at the time when the Investigating Officer had seen the dead body who had immediately reached at the spot, he had found injuries inflicted on the neck with sharp edged weapon and this has been so recorded in column No. 10 of the inquest report Ex.P-12. 16. At present, we are only dealing with the appeal filed by the complainant regarding the acquittal of respondent Nos.2 and 3 who are brother-in-law and wife of the brother of the husband (Bhabi) of the deceased. 16. At present, we are only dealing with the appeal filed by the complainant regarding the acquittal of respondent Nos.2 and 3 who are brother-in-law and wife of the brother of the husband (Bhabi) of the deceased. As such the discussion herein is confined to the role attributed to the respondents who have been acquitted. 17. The appellant-Ram Phal (PW-5), has stated that all the accused were facing trial namely Chand Ram, Kamlesh, Chirag, respondent Nos.2 & 3 and other family members were residing under the same roof and they started harassing his daughter Rinki. He has categorically stated that all the accused were facing the trial and accused Chand Ram, Kamlesh and Vikas made a plan to liquidate his daughter and they committed murder of his daughter as such the appellant had taken a plea that the husband of the deceased and his other family members hatched a criminal conspiracy to commit the murder of the deceased. As such a specific charge under Section 120B IPC was also framed against the accused Chirag and respondent Nos.2 and 3. 18. The offence of criminal conspiracy has been defined under Section 120A IPC and in order to prove the said offence which is punishable under Section 120B IPC, the prosecution has to prove either of the following ingredients 1. An illegal act having been committed under an agreement by two or more persons, or 2. An act which is not illegal but it has been committed by illegal means under such an agreement between two or more persons. 19. Since there is no direct evidence in the present case as such, in order to bring home the guilt of the respondents, the prosecution was required to prove that the act of causing death of the deceased was caused under an agreement between accused Chirag and both the respondents namely Monika and Manoj. In order to prove the criminal conspiracy, such an agreement between the accused has to be brought home by the prosecution. Firstly, there was a previous dispute between the deceased and the respondent. The prosecution has relied upon the compromise Ex.P-6 which has been proved by the testimony of PW-7. Perusal of Ex.P-6 indicate that there was a dispute inter se respondent Monika and the deceased Rinky and they had an altercation with each other. Firstly, there was a previous dispute between the deceased and the respondent. The prosecution has relied upon the compromise Ex.P-6 which has been proved by the testimony of PW-7. Perusal of Ex.P-6 indicate that there was a dispute inter se respondent Monika and the deceased Rinky and they had an altercation with each other. The occurrence took place on 09.09.2017 and 09 days prior to the death of the deceased i.e. on 31.08.2017, an application Ex.P-6 was submitted before Police Post Incharge, Indira Colony, Rohtak, whereby both the brothers i.e. Chirag and Manoj (respondent No.3) and their wives namely Rinky(deceased) and Monika(respondent No.2), respectively, submitted a join compromise whereby this fact was admitted that respondent No.2-Monika and the deceased Rinky had an altercation with each other but then they had decided that accused-Chirag (husband of the deceased) will not go to the house of his brother Manoj who is one of the respondents in the present appeal. It was further settled between the parties that the deceased will reside with accused-Chirag and she will not use any abusive language with Jethani (Monika)-respondent No.2. The reference of mother-in-law and father-in-law is also there in the said compromise. 20. From the said compromise, the only influence can be drawn that few days before the occurrence, there was an altercation between the respondents and the deceased but the said dispute or compromise is not a conclusive proof of the fact that respondent Nos.2 and 3 were party to the conspiracy under which the deceased was killed, especially, when it has not been established by the prosecution that the said respondents were residing in the same house whereby deceased was residing along with her husband. 21. Secondly, the prosecution has relied upon the disclosure statement of the accused-respondent No.3 Manoj Ex.P27. The same reads as under:- "In the presence of following witnesses in the above case the above mentioned accused Manoj in police custody without any fear and coercion has suffered disclosure statement that Rinki w/o Chirag was made quarrel after imposing blame in regard of illicit relation between my wife Monika and Chirag and she gave filthy abuse to me. On 31-8-17 my grand aunt Nirmala came to Rinki and on this thing my aunt was made quarrel to my wife Monika. My wife gave this information on phone no. 1091 women help line. On 31-8-17 my grand aunt Nirmala came to Rinki and on this thing my aunt was made quarrel to my wife Monika. My wife gave this information on phone no. 1091 women help line. This decision was made on that day on the police post Indira Colony. Due to this grudge my wife, Monika, my brother Chirag and mine all of the three together has made plan to kill Rinki that the murder of Rinki has made as such, no any person let to know that who is committed the murder of Rinki. We send my brother Chirag to Delhi in pretend of work and made contact on his phone. On 7-9-17 as per plan my brother Chirag committed the murder of his wife Rinki during the night and returned back Delhi. In the morning at about 5:30 AM he told to us through telephone that the murder of Rinki has been committed. The true facts told to you. Disclosure statement of accused was prepared. The signatures of accused and witnesses were obtained on the memo of disclosure." 22. Perusal of the said disclosure statement indicates that it is in the shape of a confession and is alleged to have been made by the respondent No.3 during Police custody. The trial Court has rightly held the said disclosure statement as inadmissible, in view of the bar under Section 25 of the Evidence Act, 1872 which provides that no confession made to a Police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. 23. Nothing stopped the Investigating Officer to produce the accused before a Magistrate for recording of his confessional statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. which specifically makes a provision for recording of a confessional statement by a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate. The relevant part of the said Section is reproduced as under:- "164. 23. Nothing stopped the Investigating Officer to produce the accused before a Magistrate for recording of his confessional statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. which specifically makes a provision for recording of a confessional statement by a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate. The relevant part of the said Section is reproduced as under:- "164. Recording of confessions and statements.-(1) Any Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate may, whether or not he has jurisdiction in the case, record any confession or statement made to him in the course of an investigation under this Chapter or under any other law for the time being in force, or at any time afterwards before the enforcement of the inquiry or trial: [Provided that any confession or statement made under this sub-section may also be recorded by audio-video electronic means in the presence of the advocate of the person accused of an offence: Provided further that no confession shall be recorded by a police officer on whom any power of a Magistrate has been conferred under any law for the time being in force.] (2) The Magistrate shall, before recording any such confession, explain to the person making it that he is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, it may be used as evidence against him; and the Magistrate shall not record any such confession unless, upon questioning the person making it, he has reason to believe that it is being made voluntarily. (3) If at any time before the confession is recorded, the person appearing before the Magistrate states that he is not willing to make the confession, the Magistrate shall not authorize the detention of such person in police custody. (4) Any such confession shall be recorded in the manner provided in section 281 for recording the examination of an accused person and shall be signed by the person making the confession; and the Magistrate shall make a memorandum at the foot of such record to the following effect:- "I have explained no (name) that he is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, any confession he may make may be used as evidence against him and I believe that this confession was voluntarily made. It was taken in my presence and hearing and was read over to the person making it and admitted by him to be correct and it contains a full and true account of the statement made by him. (Signed) A.B. Magistrate." (5)XXXXXX (6) XXXXXX." 24. In view of the bar under Section 25 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and in view of the fact that the Investigating officer did not make any effort for production of the respondent No.3 for recording of the such a confessional statement by the Judicial Magistrate, such confessional statement of respondent No.3 has been rightly disbelieved by the trial Court. 25. In the absence of a cogent evidence having been found on record to hold that the act of causing death of the deceased was done under a conspiracy and both the respondents were part of the said conspiracy, the finding recorded by the trial Court cannot be interfered. As such, the conclusion recorded by the trial Court is the only possible view which could have been taken in the present case. 26. It is well settled that the prosecution has to prove the guilt of an accused beyond the shadow of doubt and no person can be convicted unless the prosecution is successful in proving his guilt beyond the shadow of doubt. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove that respondent Nos.2 and 3 were residing in the same house where the death took place. Apart from this, in the absence of a cogent evidence to establish any overt act on the part of the respondents, no inference can be drawn that they were part of the conspiracy, hence, they have been rightly given the benefit of doubt. 27. Consequent to the above discussion, we are of the considered opinion, that the present appeal is devoid of any merits as such the same is hereby dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.