JUDGMENT : The present writ petition has been filed for quashing Force Order No. 859 of 2014 as contained in memo No. 274 dated 17.10.2014 (Annexure-11 to the writ petition) issued by the respondent No.3 in Departmental Proceeding No. 21 of 2014 whereby the petitioner has been reverted to the basic pay of his post for a period of five years equivalent to three black marks. Further prayer has been made for quashing Force Order No. 698 of 2015 as contained in memo No. 1851 dated 10.08.2015 (Annexure-13 to the writ petition) issued by the respondent No.2 whereby the departmental appeal preferred by the petitioner has been rejected. The petitioner has also prayed for issuance of direction upon the respondents, particularly the respondent No.3, to forthwith revisit the order of punishment dated 17.10.2014 on the ground of quantum of punishment. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Hawaldar-Devashish Biswas and Hawaldar-Shambhu Charan Sawaiya filed complaint before the respondent No.3 against the petitioner alleging that he along with other persons beat them using filthy and abusive language. The respondent No.3 got the preliminary enquiry conducted through the In-Charge, Home Guard, namely, Dhanpati Sawaiya (Sub-Inspector), IRB-3, Camp-Piparwar, Chatra wherein it was found that on 09.09.2014 (night), the petitioner by hatching conspiracy, put the light off and assaulted his senior as well as used filthy language against him which shows indisciplined behaviour and dereliction of duty on his part. Thereafter, the respondent No.3 called for an explanation from the petitioner vide Charge Memo No. 575 dated 23.05.2014 to be submitted within seven days which was replied by him on 18.06.2014. However, the respondent No.3 issued formal charge sheet against the petitioner vide memo No. 686 dated 16.06.2014 and a departmental proceeding No. 21/14 was initiated against him. Thereafter, the enquiry officer called for an explanation from the petitioner which was replied by him denying all the allegations in the charge sheet. However, the enquiry officer submitted the enquiry report dated 08.08.2014 holding the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. The respondent No.3 then issued second show cause notice to the petitioner vide memo No. 198 dated 22.08.2014 which was replied by him on 13.09.2014. However, the enquiry officer submitted the enquiry report dated 08.08.2014 holding the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. The respondent No.3 then issued second show cause notice to the petitioner vide memo No. 198 dated 22.08.2014 which was replied by him on 13.09.2014. However, the impugned order of punishment as contained in memo No. 274 dated 17.10.2014 was passed reverting the petitioner to the basic pay of his post for a period of five years equivalent to three black marks. Aggrieved with the said order, the petitioner preferred departmental appeal before the respondent No.2, however, the same was rejected vide Force Order No. 698 of 2015, a copy of which was communicated to the petitioner vide memo No. 1851 dated 10.08.2015. 3. It is further submitted that the impugned order of punishment dated 17.10.2014 has been passed without application of mind as well as appreciation of evidence as no witness had taken the petitioner’s name. Moreover, in view of Rule 832 of the Jharkhand Police Manual [hereinafter referred to as ‘the said Manual’], the punishment of this nature should have been restricted to forfeiture of maximum one month’s pay and hence the impugned order of punishment dated 17.10.2014 is violative of the said Manual as well as is disproportionate to the charges levelled against the petitioner. 4. Per-contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the enquiry officer had recorded the statements of the witnesses in presence of the petitioner and he was also provided due opportunity to cross-examine the said witnesses, hence the impugned order of punishment dated 17.10.2014 has not been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and the same does not require any interference of this Court under the writ jurisdiction. It is also submitted that punishment of reduction to basic pay is altogether different punishment from the punishment of withholding or reduction or forfeiture of increment for which the pecuniary liability is limited to one month’s pay as provided under Section 7 of the Police Act. In fact, the petitioner has misconstrued the provisions of Rule 832 of the said Manual. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant materials available on record. In fact, the petitioner has misconstrued the provisions of Rule 832 of the said Manual. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant materials available on record. The petitioner is aggrieved with the order of punishment dated 17.10.2014 passed by the respondent No.3 whereby he has been reverted to the basic pay of his post for a period of five years which is equivalent to three black marks. He is further aggrieved with the appellate order passed by the respondent No.2 whereby the departmental appeal preferred by him has also been rejected. 6. Thrust of the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned order of punishment dated 17.10.2014 is not in accordance with Rule 832 of the said Manual. In support of the said argument, learned counsel for the petitioner has put reliance on a judgment rendered by learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of Police No. 72, Nandlal Das Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors. (L.P.A No. 407 of 2015). 7. To appreciate the said contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, I have perused Rule 832 of the Jharkhand Police Manual, which reads as under: “832. Order of reduction- (a) Every order reducing an officer to a lower post or to a lower stage in his time scale, or withholding an increment, shall state the period for which it shall be effective. In cases of exceptionally grave wrong doing in which a punishment less than dismissal or removal is considered adequate, the officer concerned may be retired compulsorily instead of being kept permanently reduced to a lower post as such punishments of permanent nature causes loss of all incentives to future good work. No officer shall be reduced to a lower rank than that to which he was directly recruited. Every order of withholding of increment or its reduction or forfeiture shall set forth the pecuniary penalty entailed thereby subject to a maximum of one month's pay as provided under section 7, Police Act.” 8. In view of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that when by an order, any officer is reduced to a lower post or to a lower stage in his time scale or an increment is withheld, the said order shall state the period for which the punishment shall be effective. In view of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that when by an order, any officer is reduced to a lower post or to a lower stage in his time scale or an increment is withheld, the said order shall state the period for which the punishment shall be effective. It has further been provided that the order of withholding of increment or its reduction or forfeiture shall state the pecuniary liability entailed thereby, subject to a maximum of one month’s pay as provided under Section 7 of the Police Act, 1861. Thus, the pecuniary liability is limited to one month’s pay only in cases where the order of punishment is for withholding of increment or its reduction or forfeiture. Here, the word “its reduction” means reduction of increment and not “the reduction to the basic pay” as has been inflicted upon the petitioner. Thus, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner cannot be beyond his one month’s pay is completely misconceived. 9. I have also perused the aforesaid judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner. In the said case, the punishment awarded to the appellant was for stoppage of six months' increment wherein the learned Division Bench having taken into consideration Rule 832 of the said Manual, held that admittedly, the impugned order did not speak about the pecuniary liability so as to indicate that the same could not have exceeded one month’s pay and as such the impugned order was modified to the extent as provided under Rule 832. 10. In the said case, the punishment was for stoppage of increment which was one of the punishments wherein the pecuniary liability was limited to maximum one month’s pay, whereas in the present case, the nature of punishment imposed upon the petitioner is reverting him to the basic pay wherein no such limitation is prescribed and as such the said judgment of the learned Division Bench will not be applicable in the present case. 11. It is well settled that the High Court exercising the power under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India in disciplinary matters is not supposed to re-appreciate the evidence, go into the adequacy and reliability of evidence and interfere with the conclusion of the enquiry officer, if the same has been done in accordance with law. 11. It is well settled that the High Court exercising the power under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India in disciplinary matters is not supposed to re-appreciate the evidence, go into the adequacy and reliability of evidence and interfere with the conclusion of the enquiry officer, if the same has been done in accordance with law. The High Court is also not supposed to interfere with the order passed by the disciplinary authority, if there is some legal evidence on which findings can be based. The correction of error of fact in the order passed by the disciplinary authority is also not to be made in exercise of power under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. If the disciplinary proceeding has been conducted by following due procedure of law, the High Court should be circumspect in interfering with the quantum of punishment imposed upon the delinquent employee on the basis of sympathy or sentiment, unless it is found by the Court that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the charges proved against the employee. 12. In the case in hand, it appears that the petitioner was provided due opportunity of hearing during enquiry as well as before the respondent No.3. It is also evident that during enquiry, the witnesses examined by the department, were duly cross-examined by the petitioner and he had also filed his reply to the show cause notice which was duly considered by the disciplinary authority while passing the impugned order of punishment dated 17.10.2014. Thus, this Court finds that the principles of natural justice have duly been complied in the present case. The quantum of punishment imposed upon the petitioner is also not found to be shockingly disproportionate to charges levelled against him so as to make any interference with the same. The appellate authority has also rejected the petitioner’s departmental appeal after due consideration of his contentions. 13. The present writ petition being devoid of merit is accordingly dismissed.