ORDER : This petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been filed against the order dated 08.06.2023 by which petitioner has been dismissed from service on the ground that he has been convicted for offence under Sections 420, 409/120B, 109 of IPC and under Section 6 of Madhya Pradesh Nikshepakon Ke Hiton Ka Sanrakshan. Adhiniyam, 2000 and has been sentenced to undergo R.I. for 5 years and fine of Rs.5000/-, in default 5 months R.I. 2. It is submitted by counsel for petitioner that after his conviction i.e. by judgment dated 28th of April, 2023 passed in S.T. No. 200074/2014, he was sent to jail but by order dated 22.09.2023 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 6444/2023, his sentence has been suspended. Therefore, he filed an application on 05.10.2023 for his reinstatement on the ground that his sentence has been suspended but no heed has been paid. Accordingly, it is submitted that the order dated 08.06.2023 (Annexure-P/3) be quashed or in the alternative, respondent No. 4 be directed to decide his representation dated 05.10.2023. 3. Per contra, the petition is vehemently opposed by counsel for State. It is submitted by counsel for State that the allegation against petitioner was that by alluring the innocent depositors, he persuaded, them to deposit their hard earned money in a company which was illegally floated without obtaining banking licence from the Reserve Bank of India and ultimately, the said amount was misappropriated. Since, the offence allegedly committed by petitioner involves a moral turpitude, therefore, he was rightly dismissed from service. Further it is submitted that the case in hand is duly covered by an order passed by this Court in the case of B.S. Saiyam Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, decided on 9th of October, 2023 in W.P. No. 25137/2023. 4. Heard counsel for parties. 5. Article 311 (2) of Constitutional of India reads as under :- “311. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, decided on 9th of October, 2023 in W.P. No. 25137/2023. 4. Heard counsel for parties. 5. Article 311 (2) of Constitutional of India reads as under :- “311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges: Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed: Provided further that this clause shall not apply— (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or (c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.” 6. The State Government has issued a circular dated 08.02.1999 and 26.05.1998 which reads as under:- lkekU; iz'kklu foHkkx ea=ky; Øekad&lh 6&2@98@3@1 Hkksiky] fnukad 8 Qjojh] 1999 izfr] 'kklu ds leLr foHkkx] v/;{k] jktLo e.My] e/;izns'k] Xokfy;j] leLr foHkkxk/;{k] leLr laHkkx;qDr] leLr ftyk/;{k] e/;izns'kA fo"k;%& Hkz"Vkpkj ds izdj.kksa esa U;k;ky; }kjk nks"kflf) gksus ij lacaf/kr 'kkldh; lsod ds fo:) Rofjr dk;ZokghA lanHkZ%& bl foHkkx dk ifji= Øekad lh&6&3@77@3@1] fnukad 15&9&77] Øekad lh&6&2@80@3@1] fnukad 6&10&80 ,oa lh&6&2@98@3@1] fnukad 26&5&98- bl foHkkx ds lanfHkZr ifji=ksa }kjk e/;izns'k flfoy lsok ¼oxhZdj.k] fu;a=.k ,oa vihy½ fu;e] 1966 ds varxZr ;s funsZ'k tkjh fd;s x;s Fks fd ;fn fdlh 'kkldh; lsod dks U;k;ky; }kjk ,sls vijk/k esa nks"kh ik;s tkus ds dkj.k nf.Mr fd;k x;k gS] ftlls ml 'kkldh; lsod ds uSfrd iru gksus dk vkHkkl gksrk gks vkSj mls 'kkldh; lsok esa j[kuk yksdfgr esa mfpr ugha gks rks] vuq'kklfud izkf/kdkjh mi;qZDr fu;e ds fu;e 19¼1½ ds varxZr ml 'kkldh; lsod ij mfpr 'kkfLr vf/kjksfir djus ds fy;s rqjUr dk;Zokgh djsA vFkkZRk~ vkijkf/kd vkjksiksa esa U;k;ky; }kjk nks"kfl) ik;s tkus ij 'kkldh; lsod ds fo:) ^^laf{kIr tkap** djus ds mijkar ekeys ds xq.knks"k ij fopkj dj mfpr 'kkfLr vf/kjksfir djsaA bl izdkj dh dk;Zokgh djus ds fy;s bl ckr dk dksbZ izfrca/k ugha gS fd ml 'kkldh; lsod us viuh nks"kfl) ds fo:) vihy nk;j dj nh gS blfy;s 'kkfLr vf/kjksfir ugha dh tk ldrhA 2- mDr Li"V funsZ'kksa ds ckotwn Hkh jkT; ljdkj ds le{k dqN ,sls izdj.k lkeus vk;s gSa ftlesa 'kkldh; lsod dks U;k;ky; }kjk vkijkf/kd izdj.k esa nks"kfl) ik;s tkus ij Hkh iz'kkldh; foHkkx@fu;qfDr@ vuq'kklfud izkf/kdkfj;ksa us lacaf/kr 'kkldh; lsod ds fo:) Rofjr vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh ugha dhA Hkfo"; esa bl izdkj ds izdj.kksa esa Rofjr dk;Zokgh dks lqfuf'pr djus ds fy;s fof/k foHkkx ds ijke'kZ ls leLr iz'kkldh; foHkkx@fu;qfDr izkf/kdkjh@vuq'kklfud izkf/kdkfj;ksa ds ekxZn'kZu ds fy;s fuEukuqlkj funsZ'k tkjh fd;s tkrs gS %& ¼d½ lsokjr~ 'kkldh; lsodksa ds ekeyksa esa %& 1- mDr Js.kh ds varxZr vkus okys 'kkldh; lsod ;fn fdlh vkijkf/kd izdj.k esa U;k;ky; }kjk nks"k fl) ik;s tkrs gSa ftlesa mudk uSfrd iru varoZfyr gks rks ;g vis{kk gS fd mls e/;izns'k flfoy lsok ¼oxhZdj.k] fu;a=.k ,oa vihy½ fu;e] 1966 ds fu;e 10 ¼ukS½ esa izko/kkfud ^^lsok ls inPpqr (dismissal) djus** dh 'kkfLr vf/kjksfir dh tkuk pkfg;sA 2- mDr izdkj ds izdj.kksa esa mPpre U;k;ky; ds U;kf;d n`"Vkar ds vuqlkj e/;izns'k flfoy lsok ¼oxhZdj.k] fu;a=.k rFkk vihy½ fu;e] 1966 ds fu;e 19 lgifBr fu;e 14 ,oa Hkkjrh; lafo/kku ds vuqPNsn 311 ¼2½¼v½ ds varxZr vipkjh 'kkldh; lsod ds fo:) foLr`r foHkkxh; tkap vko';d ugha gS] lkFk gh] lacaf/kr 'kkldh; lsod dks dk;Zokgh ds iwoZ dksbZ lwpuk nsuk Hkh vko';d ughas gSA vFkkZr~ n.Mkns'k lh/ks ikfjr ,oa tkjh fd;k tk ldrk gSA 3- ;fn lacaf/kr vipkjh 'kkldh; lsod dh fu;qfDr yksd lsok vk;ksx ds ek/;e ls gqbZ gks rks loZizFke foHkkxh; izLrko ij yksd lsok vk;ksx dk er izkIr dj fy;k tkosA foHkkxh; izLrko ij vk;ksx dh lgefr dh fLFkfr esa vafre n.Mkns'k iz'kkldh; foHkkx }kjk ikfjr fd;s tk ldrs gSA ;fn foHkkxh; izLrko ij vk;ksx lger ugha gksrk rks iz'kkldh; foHkkx }kjk izdj.k leUo; esa eq[;ea=h th dks izLrqr fd;k tkuk pkfg;s ftlesa vk;ksx ls vlgefr ds vk/kkj Li"V n'kkZ;s tkus pkfg;sA lacaf/kr 'kkldh; lsod dks n.Mkns'k ds lkFk vk;ksx ds er dh izfr nh tkuk pkfg;s rFkk vk;ksx ls vlgefr dh fLFkfr esa mlds vk/kkj Hkh n.Mkns'k esa n'kkZ;s tkuk pkfg;sA 4- izFke Js.kh vf/kdkfj;ksa ds ekeys esa e/;izns'k 'kklu ds dkedkth fu;eksa ds Hkkx 4 fu;e 10 ds v/khu tkjh fd;s x;s funsZ'k ¼N½ ds vuqlkj vafre n.Mkns'k ikfjr djus ds iwoZ leUo; esa eq[;ea=h th ds vkns'k izkIr fd;s tkosaA 5- ;fn lacaf/kr 'kkldh; lsod us viuh nks"kflf) vihyh; U;k;ky; esa ^^vihy** dh gS vkSj vihyh; U;k;ky; us nks"k flf) dks ^^LFkxu** u nsdj ek= ^^ltk** dks LFkfxr fd;k gS rks Hkh mDrkuqlkj 'kkfLr vf/kjksfir dh tk ldrh gSA 6- lacaf/kr lsod dks ^^n.Mkns'k** ikfjr djus ds lkFk gh] jkT; iz'kklfud vf/kdj.k esa ^^dsfo;sV** Hkh nkf[ky dj fn;k tkos rkfd vkjksih 'kkldh; lsod vf/kdj.k ls ^^,d i{kh;** LFkxu izkIr djus esa lQy u gksA ^^vf/kdj.k** }kjk ^^LFkxu** fn;s tkus ij mPp U;k;ky; esa ^^;kfpdk** nk;j dh tkosA mDr Js.kh ds varxZr vkus okys izdj.kksa esa izLrqr dh tkus okyh Vhi rFkk vafre n.Mkns'k dk izk:i Øe'k layXu ifjf'k"V d (I) rFkk [k (II) layXu gSA ¼[k½ ,sls lsokfuo`r 'kkldh; lsod ftuds fo:) foHkkxh; tkap izkjaHk ugha dh xbZ gks ,oa ftUgsa vkijkf/kd izdj.k esa nafMr fd;k x;k gks %& ,sls lsokfuo`Rr 'kkldh; lsod ftuds fo:) foHkkxh; tkap izkjaHk ugha dh xbZ gks ,oa ftUgsa vkijkf/kd izdj.k esa nf.Mr fd;k x;k gks mudh isa'ku e-iz- flfoy lsok ¼isa'ku½ fu;e] 1976 ds fu;e 9 ds mifu;e ¼,d½ ds varxZr LFkkbZ :i ls jksdus ds fy, 'kklu l{ke gS] ,sls izdj.kksa esa Hkh lacaf/kr 'kkldh; lsod dks iwoZ lwpuk nsuk vko';d ugha gS] isa'ku jksdus laca/kh vafre vkns'k eaf=&ifj"kn~ }kjk ikfjr fd;s tkosaxsA ,sls 'kkldh; lsodksa] ftudh fu;qfDr yksd lsok vk;ksx ds ek/;e ls gqbZ gS] ds fo"k; esa loZizFke vk;ksx dk er izkIr fd;k tkosxk] rRi'pkr~ vk;ksx ds er lfgr izdj.k eaf=&ifj"kn~ ds le{k izLrqr fd;k tkosxkA mDr Js.kh ds varxZr vkus okys izdj.kksa esa izLrqr dh tkus okyh Vhi rFkk isa'ku jksdus laca/kh n.Mkns'k dk izk:i Øe'k% layXu ifjf'k"V [k&1] [k&2 ij gSA ¼x½ ,sls 'kkldh; lsod ftuds fo:) foHkkxh; tkap vFkok vkijkf/kd izdj.k yafcr gSa vkSj lsokfuo`Rr gks x;s gSa vFkok gks jgs gSa %& ,sls 'kkldh; lsod tks lsokfuo`Rr gks x;s gSa vkSj mudh isa'ku Hkh vafre :i ls Lohd`r dh tk pqdh gS vkSj muds fo:) vkijkf/kd izdj.k@foHkkxh; tkap yafcr gS ;k ckn esa laLFkkfir gksrh gS rks e-iz- flfoy lsok ¼isa'ku½ fu;e] 1976 ds fu;e 9 ¼4½ ds izFke ijUrqd ds varxZr egkefge jkT;iky vFkkZr~ eaf=ifj"kn~ vkns'k }kjk foHkkxh; tkap@U;kf;d dk;Zokgh izkjaHk djus dh frfFk ls ,sls 'kkldh; lsod dks Lohd`r isa'ku esa vLFkkbZ :i ls 50 izfr'kr dh dVkSrh dh tk ldrh gSA mDr fu;e 9 ¼4½ ds f}rh; ijUrqd ds ^^,** ds vuqlkj ;fn foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh lafLFkr gksus ds fnukad ls ,d o"kZ esa iw.kZ ugha gksrh gS rks mi;qZDr ,d o"kZ dh vof/k O;rhr gks tkus ds i'pkr~ jksdh xbZ isa'ku dk 50 izfr'kr iqu%LFkkfir gks tk;sxkA blh izdkj fu;e 9 ¼4½ ds f}rh; ijUrqd ds ^^ch** ds vuqlkj ;fn foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh lafLFkr gksus dh fnukad ls nks o"kZ dh vof/k esa iw.kZ ugha gksrh gS rks mi;qZDr nks o"kZ dh vof/k O;rhr gksus ds i'pkr~ jksdh xbZ isa'ku dh iw.kZ jkf'k iqu%LFkkfir gks tk;sxhaA blh f}rh; ijUrqd ds ^^lh** ds vuqlkj foHkkxh; tkap dk vafre vkns'k isa'ku jksdus dk ikfjr gksus ij vkns'k foHkkxh; tkap izkjaHk gksus dh frfFk ls izHkko'khy ekuk tkosxkA yksd lsok vk;ksx ds ek/;e ls fu;qDr 'kkldh; lsod ds ekeys esa loZizFke ^^vk;ksx^^ dk er izkIr fd;k tk;sxk rRi'pkr~ izdj.k eaf=ifj"kn~ dks izLrqr fd;k tkosxkA mDr Js.kh ds varxZr vkus okys izdj.kksa esa izLrqr dh tkus okyh Vhi] lacaf/kr 'kkldh; lsod dks fn;s tkus okys dkj.k crkvks uksfVl vkSj vafre vkns'k dk izk:i Øe'k% layXu ifjf'k"V x&1] x&2 vkSj x&3 ij gSA 3- d`i;k vkijkf/kd izdj.kksa esa nks"k fl) ik;s x;s 'kkldh; lsodksa ds fo:) mDrkuqlkj dk;Zokgh izkFkfedrk ds vk/kkj ij dh tkos lkFk gh bu funsZ'kksa dk dBksjrk ds lkFk ikyu fd;k tkosA ,e-ds-oekZ mi&lfpo e/;izns'k 'kklu] lkekU; iz'kklu foHkkx] e/;izns'k 'kklu lkekU; iz'kklu foHkkx ea=ky;] oYyHk Hkou] Hkksiky Ø- lh&6&2&98&3&1 Hkksiky] fnukad 26 ebZ] 1998 izfr] 'kklu ds leLr foHkkx] bR;kfnA fo"k;%& Hkz"Vkpkj izdj.kksa esa U;k;ky; }kjk nks"k&fl) gksus ij Rofjr dk;ZokghA lanHkZ%& bl foHkkx dk ifji= Ø- lh- 6&3@77@3@1] fnukad 15&9&77 rFkk Øekad lh- 6&2@80@3@1] fnukad 6&10&80 lanfHkZr ifji=ksa }kjk bl foHkkx }kjk e/;izns'k flfoy lsok ¼oxhZdj.k] fu;a=.k ,oa vihy fu;e] 1966 ds fu;e 19 ¼1½ ds varxZr ;g funsZ'k tkjh fd;s x;s fd ;fn fdlh 'kkldh; lsod dks U;k;ky; }kjk ,sls vijk/k esa nks"kh ik;s tkus ds dkj.k nafMr fd;k x;k gS] ftlls ml 'kkldh; lsod ds uSfrd iru gksus dk vkHkkl gksrk gks rFkk mls 'kkldh; lsok esa j[kuk yksdfgr esa mfpr ugha gks rks vuq'kklfud izkf/kdkjh mi;qZDr fu;e ds fu;e 19 ¼1½ ds varxZr ml 'kkldh; lsod ij mfpr 'kkfLr vf/kjksfir djus ds fy;s rqjUr dk;Zokgh djsA vFkkZr~ vkijkf/kd vkjksiksa esa U;k;ky; }kjk nks"k&fl) ik;s tkus ij 'kkldh; lsod ds fo:) ^^laf{kIr tkap** djus ds mijkar ekeys ds xq.k&nks"k ij fopkj dj mfpr 'kkfLr vf/kjksfir djsaA bl izdkj dh dk;Zokgh djus ds fy;s bl ckr dk dksbZ izfrca/k ugha gS fd ml 'kkldh; lsod us viuh nks"k & flf) ds fo:) vihy nk;j dj nh gS blfy;s 'kkfLr vf/kjksfir ugha dh tk ldrhA vihy izLrqr gksus ij Hkh oLrqr% mDr 'kkfLr vf/kjksfir dh tk ldrh gSA ;fn vihy esa funksZ"k ik;s tkus ij fupys U;k;ky; ds fu.kZ; dks fujLr dj fn;k tkrk gS rks iwoZ ikfjr 'kkfLr laca/kh vkns'k Hkh fujLr fd;k tk ldrk gSA 2- jkT; 'kklu ds /;ku esa ,d ,slk izdj.k vk;k gS ftlesa U;k;ky; }kjk Hkz"Vkpkj ds izdj.k esa nks"k&fl) Bgjkus ds ckn 2 o"kksZa rd nks"kh 'kkldh; lsod ds fo:) dk;Zokgh ugha dh xbZA bl izdkj nks"kh 'kkldh; lsod dks ijks{k :i ls 'kkldh; lsok esa cus jgus dk okaNuh; ykHk izkIr gqvkA ;g fLFkfr vR;Ur [ksntud gSA foHkkx esa izkIr ,sls lHkh izdj.kksa ij Rofjr dk;Zokgh dh tkuk pkfg;sA ;fn dksbZ 'kkldh; lsod bu izdj.kksa ij Rofjr dk;Zokgh ugha djus dk nks"kh ik;k tkrk gS] rks mlds fo:) dM+h vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh dh tk;sxhA 3- d`i;k mi;qZDr funsZ'kksa dk dM+kbZ ls ikyu lqfuf'pr djsaA ,e-,e- JhokLro milfpo- 7. From the plain reading of circular dated 26.05.1998, it is clear that there is a reference of circular dated 15.09.1977 and 06.10.1980 which provided that in case if a person has been convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude and if it is not conducive for his continuation in Government Service, then action should be taken under Rule 19 of Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. 8. Similarly, circular dated 08.02.1999 specifically provides that if a person has been convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude, then he should be dismissed. 9. Rule 19 of Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 specifically provides that the provisions of Rule 14 to 18 would not apply where the penalty is imposed on a Government Servant on the ground of conduct which has lead his conviction on a criminal charge. Thus, the dismissal of the petitioner upon his conviction for offence under Sections 420, 409/120B, 109 of IPC is permissible without holding any departmental enquiry. 10. Now the only question which requires consideration is as to whether the allegations made against the petitioner involves a moral turpitude or not? 11. The petitioner has filed a copy of judgment passed by Ist Additional Session Judge, Burhanpur in S.T. No. 200074/2014, according to which the allegations made against the petitioner were that the petitioner had allured the honest and innocent investors to invest in Super Power Investment Services India Limited and later on, the said company misappropriated an amount of 2.5 crores and the amount of the innocent investors was never returned back. Undisputedly, the company was a shell company which was doing business without banking licence and other necessary approvals. 12. From the judgment it is clear that petitioner had remained in Jail from 06.09.2014 to 28.01.2015 as an under trial prisoner. Thereafter, he was sent to jail after the judgment was pronounced i.e. 28.04.2023 and was granted bail by order dated 22.09.2023 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 6444/2023. The conviction of the appellant has not been suspended. 13. The term moral turpitude is a vague term having different meaning in different context. The term has a general meaning i.e. contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals in contrary to what a man oust to the society in general. 14. The Supreme Court in the case of Pawan Kumar Vs. 13. The term moral turpitude is a vague term having different meaning in different context. The term has a general meaning i.e. contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals in contrary to what a man oust to the society in general. 14. The Supreme Court in the case of Pawan Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and Another, reported in 1996 (4) SCC 17 has held as under:- “12. Moral turpitude” is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity………..” 15. The Supreme Court in the case of Sushil Kumar Singhal Vs. Regional Manager, Punjab National Bank, reported in 2010 (8) SCC 573 has held as under:- “25. In view of the above, it is evident that moral turpitude means anything contrary to honesty, modesty or good morals. It means vileness and depravity. In fact, the conviction of a person in a crime involving moral turpitude impeaches his credibility as he has been found to have indulged in shameful, wicked and base activities.” 16. The Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India and others vs. P. Soupramaniane reported in (2019) 18 SCC 135 has held as under: “14. The other important factors that are to be kept in mind to conclude that an offence involves moral turpitude are : the person who commits the offence; the person against whom it is committed; the manner and circumstances in which it is alleged to have been committed; and the values of the society. 15. According to the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), a crime data collection system used in the United States of America, each offence belongs to one of the three categories which are : crimes against persons, crimes against property, and crimes against society. Crimes against persons include murder, rape, and assault where the victims are always individuals. The object of crimes against property, for example, robbery and burglary is to obtain money, property, or some other benefits. Crimes against society, for example, gambling, prostitution, and drug violations, represent society's prohibition against engaging in certain types of activities. Conviction of any alien of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for deportation under the Immigration Law in the United States of America. Crimes against society, for example, gambling, prostitution, and drug violations, represent society's prohibition against engaging in certain types of activities. Conviction of any alien of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for deportation under the Immigration Law in the United States of America. To qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude for such purpose, it requires both reprehensible conduct and scienter, whether with specific intent, deliberateness, wilfulness or recklessness. 16. There can be no manner of doubt about certain offences which can straightaway be termed as involving moral turpitude e.g. offences under the Prevention of Corruption of Act, the NDPS Act, etc. The question that arises for our consideration in this case is whether an offence involving bodily injury can be categorised as a crime involving moral turpitude. In this case, we are concerned with an assault. It is very difficult to state that every assault is not an offence involving moral turpitude. A simple assault is different from an aggravated assault. All cases of assault or simple hurt cannot be categorised as crimes involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, the use of a dangerous weapon which can cause the death of the victim may result in an offence involving moral turpitude. In the instant case, there was no motive for the respondent to cause the death of the victims. The criminal courts below found that the injuries caused to the victims were simple in nature. On an overall consideration of the facts of this case, we are of the opinion that the crime committed by the respondent does not involve moral turpitude. As the respondent is not guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude, he is not liable to be discharged from service.” 17. If, the allegations made against petitioner are considered, then it is clear that he has been convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude and accordingly his dismissal from service cannot be held to be illegal or unwanted. 18. Since, the conviction of the petitioner has not been stayed, therefore, it is clear that merely because his sentence has been suspended would not mean that his conviction has also been stayed. He still a convicted person and has to face the disqualification of his conviction. 19. 18. Since, the conviction of the petitioner has not been stayed, therefore, it is clear that merely because his sentence has been suspended would not mean that his conviction has also been stayed. He still a convicted person and has to face the disqualification of his conviction. 19. The Supreme Court in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh and another vs. B. Jagjeevan Rao reported in (2014) 13 SCC 239 has held as under: “6. It is not in dispute that the respondent was convicted by the Principal Special Judge for SPE & ACB cases for the offences punishable under the Act. The High Court, as the order would reflect, had only directed suspension of sentence. There was no order of stay of conviction. It is well settled in law that there is a distinction between suspension of sentence and stay of conviction. This has been succinctly stated in [Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang, (1995) 2 SCC 513 ] : (S. Nagoor Meera case [Director of Collegiate Education (Admn.) v. S. Nagoor Meera, (1995) 3 SCC 377 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 686 : (1995) 29 ATC 574 ], SCC pp. 380-81, para 7) “7. … ‘15. … Section 389(1) empowers the appellate court to order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended pending the appeal. What can be suspended under this provision is the execution of the sentence or the execution of the order. Does “order” in Section 389(1) mean order of conviction or an order similar to the one under Section 357 or Section 360 of the Code? Obviously, the order referred to in Section 389(1) must be an order capable of execution. An order of conviction by itself is not capable of execution under the Code. It is the order of sentence or an order awarding compensation or imposing fine or release on probation which are capable of execution and which, if not suspended, would be required to be executed by the authorities. … 16. In certain situations the order of conviction can be executable, in the sense, it may incur a disqualification as in the instant case. In such a case the power under Section 389(1) of the Code could be invoked. … 16. In certain situations the order of conviction can be executable, in the sense, it may incur a disqualification as in the instant case. In such a case the power under Section 389(1) of the Code could be invoked. In such situations the attention of the appellate court must be specifically invited to the consequence that is likely to fall to enable it to apply its mind to the issue since under Section 389(1) it is under an obligation to support its order “for reasons to be recorded by it in writing”. If the attention of the court is not invited to this specific consequence which is likely to fall upon conviction how can it be expected to assign reasons relevant thereto? … If such a precise request was made to the Court pointing out the consequences likely to fall on the continuance of the conviction order, the court would have applied its mind to the specific question and if it thought that case was made out for grant of interim stay of the conviction order, with or without conditions attached thereto, it may have granted an order to that effect.’ (Rama Narang case [Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang, (1995) 2 SCC 513 ], SCC pp. 524-25, paras 15-16)” 7. A similar view has been expressed in K.C. Sareen v. CBI [ (2001) 6 SCC 584 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1186].” 20. The Supreme Court in the case of Shyam Narain Pandey vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2014) 8 SCC 909 has held as under:- “4. A “convict” means declared to be guilty of criminal offence by the verdict of court of law. That declaration is made after the court finds him guilty of the charges which have been proved against him. Thus, in effect, if one prays for stay of conviction, he is asking for stay of operation of the effects of the declaration of being guilty. 5. It has been consistently held by this Court that unless there are exceptional circumstances, the appellate court shall not stay the conviction, though the sentence may be suspended. There is no hard-and-fast rule or guidelines as to what are those exceptional circumstances. 5. It has been consistently held by this Court that unless there are exceptional circumstances, the appellate court shall not stay the conviction, though the sentence may be suspended. There is no hard-and-fast rule or guidelines as to what are those exceptional circumstances. However, there are certain indications in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 itself as to which are those situations and a few indications are available in the judgments of this Court as to what are those circumstances. 6. It may be noticed that even for the suspension of the sentence, the court has to record the reasons in writing under Section 389(1) CrPC. Couple of provisos were added under Section 389(1) CrPC pursuant to the recommendations made by the Law Commission of India and observations of this Court in various judgments, as per Act 25 of 2005. It was regarding the release on bail of a convict where the sentence is of death or life imprisonment or of a period not less than ten years. If the appellate court is inclined to consider release of a convict of such offences, the Public Prosecutor has to be given an opportunity for showing cause in writing against such release. This is also an indication as to the seriousness of such offences and circumspection which the court should have while passing the order on stay of conviction. Similar is the case with offences involving moral turpitude. If the convict is involved in crimes which are so outrageous and yet beyond suspension of sentence, if the conviction also is stayed, it would have serious impact on the public perception on the integrity of the institution. Such orders definitely will shake the public confidence in judiciary. That is why, it has been cautioned time and again that the court should be very wary in staying the conviction especially in the types of cases referred to above and it shall be done only in very rare and exceptional cases of irreparable injury coupled with irreversible consequences resulting in injustice. 7. In Ravikant S. Patil v. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali [ (2007) 1 SCC 673 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 417], a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that: (SCC p. 681, para 16) “16.5. … the power to stay the conviction … should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances where failure to stay the conviction, would lead to injustice and irreversible consequences.” 8. … the power to stay the conviction … should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances where failure to stay the conviction, would lead to injustice and irreversible consequences.” 8. In Navjot Singh Sidhu v. State of Punjab [ (2007) 2 SCC 574 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 627], following Ravikant S. Patil case [ (2007) 1 SCC 673 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 417], at para 6, this Court held as follows: (Navjot Singh Sidhu case [ (2007) 2 SCC 574 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 627], SCC pp. 581-82) “6. The legal position is, therefore, clear that an appellate court can suspend or grant stay of order of conviction. But the person seeking stay of conviction should specifically draw the attention of the appellate court to the consequences that may arise if the conviction is not stayed. Unless the attention of the court is drawn to the specific consequences that would follow on account of the conviction, the person convicted cannot obtain an order of stay of conviction. Further, grant of stay of conviction can be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the special facts of the case.” 9. In State of Maharashtra v. Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar [ (2012) 12 SCC 384 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 784 : (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 201], referring also to the two decisions cited above, it has been held at para 15 that: (SCC p. 389) “15. … the appellate court in an exceptional case, may put the conviction in abeyance along with the sentence, but such power must be exercised with great circumspection and caution, for the purpose of which, the applicant must satisfy the court as regards the evil that is likely to befall him, if the said conviction is not suspended. The court has to consider all the facts as are pleaded by the applicant, in a judicious manner and examine whether the facts and circumstances involved in the case are such, that they warrant such a course of action by it. The court additionally, must record in writing, its reasons for granting such relief. Relief of staying the order of conviction cannot be granted only on the ground that an employee may lose his job, if the same is not done.” 10. The court additionally, must record in writing, its reasons for granting such relief. Relief of staying the order of conviction cannot be granted only on the ground that an employee may lose his job, if the same is not done.” 10. In State of Maharashtra v. Gajanan [ (2003) 12 SCC 432 : 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 459] and Union of India v. Atar Singh [(2003) 12 SCC 434 : 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 461], cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, this Court had to deal with specific situation of loss of job and it has been held that it is not one of exceptional cases for staying the conviction. 11. In the light of the principles stated above, the contention that the appellant will be deprived of his source of livelihood if the conviction is not stayed cannot be appreciated. For the appellant, it is a matter of deprivation of livelihood but he is convicted for deprivation of life of another person. Until he is otherwise declared innocent in appeal, the stain stands. The High Court has discussed in detail the background of the appellant, the nature of the crime, manner in which it was committed, etc. and has rightly held that it is not a very rare and exceptional case for staying the conviction.” 21. The Allahabad High Court in the case of Ram Kishan Vs. State of U.P. and Others, decided on 07.01.2020 in Writ Appeal No. 14570/2009 has held as under:-9. In Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and held as under:- "The second proviso will apply only where the conduct of a government servant is such as he deserves the punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. If the conduct is such as to deserve a punishment different from those mentioned above, the second proviso cannot come into play at all, because Article 311(2) is itself confined only to these three penalties. Therefore, before denying a government servant his constitutional right to an inquiry, the first consideration would be whether the conduct of the concerned government servant is such as justifies the penalty of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. Therefore, before denying a government servant his constitutional right to an inquiry, the first consideration would be whether the conduct of the concerned government servant is such as justifies the penalty of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. Once that conclusion is reached and the condition specified in the relevant clause of the second proviso is satisfied, that proviso becomes applicable and the government servant is not entitled to an inquiry." 10. In Shyam Narain Shukla vs. State of U.P., (1988) 6 LCD 530, a Division Bench of this court has considered similar question and held as under:- "In view of the above decision of the Supreme Court, it has to be held that whenever a Government servant is convicted of an offence, he cannot be dismissed from service merely on the ground of conviction but the appropriate authority has to consider the conduct of such employee leading to his conviction and then to decide what punishment is to be inflicted upon him. In the matter of consideration of conduct as also the quantum of punishment the employee has not to be joined and the decision has to be taken by the appropriate authority independently of the employee who, as laid down by the Supreme Court, is not to be given an opportunity of hearing at that stage." 11. Another Division Bench of this Court in Sadanand Mishra v. State of U.P. 1993 LCD 70 held that on conviction of an employee of a criminal charge, the order of punishment cannot be passed unless the conduct which has led to his conviction, is also considered. It was further held that the scrutiny or exercise of conduct of an employee leading to his conviction is to be done ex parte and an opportunity of hearing is not to be provided for this purpose to the employee concerned. 12. In Shankar Das v. Union of India, 1985 (2) SCR 358, Hon'ble Supreme Court while referring to power under Clause (a) of second proviso of Article 311(2)of the Constitution of India, has observed as under: - "Be that power like every other power has to be exercised fairly, justly and reasonably." 13. 12. In Shankar Das v. Union of India, 1985 (2) SCR 358, Hon'ble Supreme Court while referring to power under Clause (a) of second proviso of Article 311(2)of the Constitution of India, has observed as under: - "Be that power like every other power has to be exercised fairly, justly and reasonably." 13. Proviso (a) to Article 311 of the Constitution of India, is an exception to clause (2) of Article 311, which is applicable where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. In case of Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway Vs. T.R. Chellappan, 1976 (3) SCC 190 (para-21), Hon'ble Supreme Court considered Article 311(2), Proviso (a) and held that this provision confers power upon the disciplinary authority to decide whether in the facts of a particular case, what penalty, if at all, should be imposed on the delinquent employee, after taking into account the entire conduct of the delinquent employee, the gravity of the misconduct committed by him, the impact which his misconduct is likely to have on the administration and other extenuating circumstances or redeeming features, if any, present in the case and so on and so forth. The conviction of the delinquent employee would be taken as sufficient proof of misconduct and then the authority will have to embark upon a summary inquiry as to the nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee and in the course of the inquiry, if the authority is of the opinion that the offence is too trivial or of a technical nature it may refuse to impose any penalty in spite of the conviction. The disciplinary authority has the undoubted power after hearing the delinquent employee and considering the circumstances of the case to inflict any major penalty on the delinquent employee without any further departmental inquiry, if the authority is of the opinion that the employee has been guilty of a serious offence involving moral turpitude and, therefore, it is not desirable or conducive in the interests of administration to retain such a person in service. In Sushil Kumar Singhal vs. Regional Manager, Punjab National Bank, 2010 (8) SCC 573 (Paras-24 and 25), Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the meaning of the words 'moral turpitude' to mean anything contrary to honesty, modesty or good morals. 22. In Sushil Kumar Singhal vs. Regional Manager, Punjab National Bank, 2010 (8) SCC 573 (Paras-24 and 25), Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the meaning of the words 'moral turpitude' to mean anything contrary to honesty, modesty or good morals. 22. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case is made out warranting interference. 23. Petition fails and is hereby dismissed. 24. However, liberty is granted to the petitioner to move an application for his reinstatement in case if he is honorably acquitted.