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2023 DIGILAW 956 (AP)

B. Veeranjaneyulu v. State of A. P.

2023-07-03

V.R.K.KRUPA SAGAR

body2023
ORDER : Accused No.3 in C.C.No.31 of 2018 on the file of learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kurnool filed this petition under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) seeking to quash the proceedings therein as against him. 2. Respondent No.1 is the State. Respondent No.2 is the de facto complainant. Despite notice being received, none entered appearance for respondent No.2. 3. Sri R.Ramanjaneyulu, learned counsel for petitioner and learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1 submitted arguments. 4. The following facts require attention here: At or about in the year 2008 for the purpose of use some drugs were purchased by D.M. and H.O., Kurnool. The Government of Andhra Pradesh launched Rajiv Arogyasri Programme in Kurnool District and it was at that time on 22.09.2008 certain news items were published in the newspapers about various travails suffered by the citizens because of absence of medicines and absence of proper treatment and absence of arrangements in that programme. Newspapers also reported misappropriation of funds on part of the authorities in purchase of drugs and other items. It was in that regard a vigilance enquiry was initiated and finally the report emerged indicating conscious spending of Rs.8,18,797/- as excess spending. In other words the drugs were purchased at a price that is higher than the market price. It was also found that the funds were misappropriated by some of the officers and further between the vendor of the medicines and the health department officers, there were negotiators and mediators who helped the authorities in doing this criminal act and these mediators also obtained 18% commission from the vendor as they helped in arranging the contract of sale and purchase of drugs. The vigilance report recommended for initiation of criminal cases and disciplinary proceedings. In pursuance of that on 23.01.2016 the then District and Medical Health Officer lodged written information with the Sub-Inspector of Police, III Town Police Station, Kurnool. Accordingly, that was registered as Crime No.24 of 2016. After due investigation, the Inspector of Police filed charge sheet before learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kurnool on 23.02.2017. The charge sheet was filed for the offences under Sections 409 and 420 read with 34 I.P.C. A.1 to A.4 are sought to be prosecuted by the said charge sheet. Accordingly, that was registered as Crime No.24 of 2016. After due investigation, the Inspector of Police filed charge sheet before learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kurnool on 23.02.2017. The charge sheet was filed for the offences under Sections 409 and 420 read with 34 I.P.C. A.1 to A.4 are sought to be prosecuted by the said charge sheet. A.3 in that charge sheet was a pharmacist during the year 2008 and in the charge sheet it is alleged that he was instrumental in procuring the drugs supply order from the authorities to the drugs supplier and he gained unlawful benefit in the form of commission and he was part of the cheating and criminal breach of trust. 5. It is that A.3 who filed this criminal petition. 6. Learned counsel for petitioner argued that the alleged offences took place in the year 2008 and during the relevant period for a period of 100 days A.3 was on leave and therefore, he could not have committed these offences. It is further contended that the offences took place in the year 2008 and F.I.R. was registered in the year 2016 and charge sheet was filed in the year 2018 and therefore, it is barred by limitation in terms of Section 468 Cr.P.C. It is on these two grounds, learned counsel for petitioner seeks quashment. 7. As against it, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submits that it was only after vigilance enquiry the crime was detected and the culprits were identified and thereafter investigation took place over the alleged crime and that resulted in filing of charge sheet and since the offences alleged are under Sections 409 and 420 I.P.C., Section 468 Cr.P.C. is not a bar. 8. This Court has considered the submissions made by both sides and considered the material available on record. 9. Section 409 I.P.C. provides punishment with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. 10. Section 420 I.P.C. provides punishment with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. 11. Section 469 Cr.P.C. provides the principles regarding commencement of the period of limitation. It states that in relation to an offender the period of limitation shall commence on the date of the offence. Section 420 I.P.C. provides punishment with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. 11. Section 469 Cr.P.C. provides the principles regarding commencement of the period of limitation. It states that in relation to an offender the period of limitation shall commence on the date of the offence. If the commission of offences was not known to the person aggrieved or to a police officer, the period of limitation shall commence from the day on which the offences come to the knowledge of such person or to the police officer. If the commission of offence is known but the offender is not known the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved or to the police officer, then the period of limitation commences. 12. In the case at hand, as per the averments in the charge sheet, the police officer gained knowledge of the offences alleged only when written information was lodged by D.M. and H.O. on 23.01.2016. The de facto complainant as per that written information, gained knowledge of the offences and the offender only by virtue of vigilance report dated 02.01.2014 and permissions from the superior officers granted on 07.01.2016. Soon after the said report and proceedings of the superiors, First Information Report was lodged. 13. It is Section 468 Cr.P.C. that is contended before me by the learned counsel for petitioner. For benefit, the provision is extracted here: “S.468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation. (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be- (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. (3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.” 14. (3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.” 14. A reading of the above provision would indicate that the periods of limitation are prescribed only for those offences which are punishable with imprisonment of three years and lesser than that. Thus, it is clear that offences punishable with imprisonment beyond the period of three years are not hit by Section 468 Cr.P.C. It is already seen that Section 409 I.P.C. could be visited with life imprisonment and Section 420 I.P.C. provides punishment which may extend upto seven years. Thus, for these two provisions, the period of limitation provided by Section 468 Cr.P.C. do not operate. Be it noted, periods of limitation are provided only with reference to Court which has to take cognizance of the offences. 15. The petitioner contends that eight years after the alleged offences F.I.R. was registered and that is hit by Section 468 Cr.P.C. Thus, the contention is about reporting the crime itself. A perusal of Section 468 Cr.P.C. does not show any reference to periods of limitation concerning registration of crimes. F.I.R. was registered in terms of Section 154 Cr.P.C. The said provision under Section 154 Cr.P.C. does not indicate any period of limitation for an informant to lodge information with police and for police to register the said information and to issue a First Information Report. Learned counsel for petitioner could not point out to any other provision of law or any legal authorities to substantiate his contention that a First Information Report could not be registered because of principles of limitation. 16. Learned counsel for petitioner cited State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1054 . That was a case under Section 406 I.P.C. It provides imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine or with both. It was in that context, their Lordships were pleased to consider Sections 468(2)(c) and 469(1)(a) and (b) of Cr.P.C. On facts their Lordships found that since the offence under Section 406 I.P.C. provides punishment which may extend upto three years and since charge sheet was laid beyond that period of three years, the same was barred by limitation. It was in that context, their Lordships were pleased to consider Sections 468(2)(c) and 469(1)(a) and (b) of Cr.P.C. On facts their Lordships found that since the offence under Section 406 I.P.C. provides punishment which may extend upto three years and since charge sheet was laid beyond that period of three years, the same was barred by limitation. It was in these circumstances, their Lordships approved the acquittal recorded by the High Court. This ruling does not help the cause of the petitioner herein since the present case is not concerned with Section 406 I.P.C., but it is concerned with Sections 409 and 420 I.P.C. As stated earlier, prosecution for these two offences has no periods of limitation provided for. 17. The contention of the petitioner that he was on leave during the relevant period and therefore, he should not be prosecuted has no merit. That the petitioner was on leave is a matter of fact and merely because he was on leave it is not a ground to say that the allegation of the prosecution mentioned in the charge sheet that he acted as a mediator and gained unlawfully and became instrumental in spending the money of the State cannot be considered. That is a matter of defence which he could canvass at an appropriate stage before the trial Court and that is never a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. 18. For the reasons mentioned above, this Court finds that there are absolutely no merits in this petition. The petitioner has to participate in the criminal proceedings. 19. In the result, this Criminal Petition is dismissed. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.