JUDGMENT : REKHA BORANA, J. 1. The present appeal has been preferred against the order dated 25.01.2019 passed by the Commercial Court, Jodhpur (hereinafter referred to as ‘the learned Court below’) in Civil Misc. ‘A’ Case No. 46/2018 (NCV no. 32/2018) whereby the objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the Act of 1996’) preferred by the appellant-State against the award dated 04.12.2014 passed by learned Arbitrator have been rejected. Vide the award, the learned Arbitrator had proceeded on to pass an award for an amount of Rs. 25,42,748/- qua price escalation in favour of the applicant-firm with interest @ 10% per annum and has proceeded on to reject the counter-claim as preferred by the non-applicants State Department. 2. The facts of the case are as under: An agreement was entered into between firm M/s Rameshwar Lal Manaram and the State for “Construction work of pumping station 3rd at Sahwa K.M. 63.200.” Vide the work order dated 27.10.1997, work valuing to Rs. 1,41,52,086/- was awarded to the applicant-firm and the stipulated period for completion of the work was 18 months. During the progress of work, an additional work valuing to Rs. 69,17,847/- was also allotted to the firm. The complete work could not be completed within the stipulated period of 18 months and was infact completed on 05.04.2003. The firm then applied for extension of time and vide order dated 06.11.2003, time extension up to the date of completion i.e. 05.04.2003 was granted by the Department with a penalty of 0.10% of the tender amount. In the circumstances, the firm raised a claim for an amount of Rs. 25,42,748/- along with interest qua price escalation. When the request/claim of the firm was not acceded to, it prayed for the dispute to be referred to arbitration and on its application under Section 11 of the Act of 1996, vide order dated 08.11.2013, sole arbitrator was appointed for adjudication of the dispute. 3. Before the learned Arbitrator following two claims were raised by the applicant-firm: (i) Rs. 25,42,748/- qua price escalation. (ii) Rs. 22,37,618/- qua interest on the principal amount from 21.09.2005 to 20.01.2014 + pendente lite and future interest. 4. In response to the claim of the firm, a counter-claim for an amount of Rs. 3. Before the learned Arbitrator following two claims were raised by the applicant-firm: (i) Rs. 25,42,748/- qua price escalation. (ii) Rs. 22,37,618/- qua interest on the principal amount from 21.09.2005 to 20.01.2014 + pendente lite and future interest. 4. In response to the claim of the firm, a counter-claim for an amount of Rs. 16,24,860/- was raised by the State Department qua the damages/loss caused to the State due to delay in execution of the work which was later amended to Rs. 1,59,45,028/-. 5. On basis of the pleadings as made by both the parties, the following nine issues were framed by the learned Arbitrator: “1. Whether the applicant firm is a registered partnership firm or not?........Applicant 2. Whether the applicant firm did not give the pro-rate progress as provided under clause-2 of the agreement? If not then what is effect of it on the claim?........Non-applicants 3. Whether the applicant failed to complete the work within stipulated period or extended period as required under clause 45 and 45-A of the agreement?........Non-applicants 4. Whether the respondents had allowed the price escalation benefit to the applicant for the period from 09.11.1997 to 08.11.2000. If yes then what is effect thereof?........Applicant 5. Whether the applicant had given the consent for the statement of time extension sent by the Engineer In charge to the state government for extension of time?........Non-applicants 6. Whether, the nominal penalty disentitled to the applicant for benefit of price escalation under clause-45 and 45-A of the agreement?........Non-applicants 7. Whether the applicant is liable to pay the damages to the respondents as claimed by the respondents in its counter claim?........Non-applicants 8. Whether the applicant is entitled to get the interest on the due amount? If yes, then for what period and on what rate?........Applicant 9. Relief?” 6. Learned Arbitrator proceeded on to decide all the issues except issue no. 4 in favour of the applicant-firm and consequently, passed the award as above mentioned in favour of the applicant firm. Aggrieved against the said award in favour of the applicant and rejection of its counter-claim, the State Department preferred objections under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 before the Commercial Court, Jodhpur, which have also been rejected vide order impugned dated 25.01.2019, against which the present appeal has been preferred. 7. Aggrieved against the said award in favour of the applicant and rejection of its counter-claim, the State Department preferred objections under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 before the Commercial Court, Jodhpur, which have also been rejected vide order impugned dated 25.01.2019, against which the present appeal has been preferred. 7. Learned Additional Advocate General Shri Pankaj Sharma appearing for the appellant-State submitted that the learned Court below has erred in rejecting the objections as preferred by the State in a wholly cursory manner without even going into the facts of the case and without analysing the issues in question. Learned AAG submitted that the learned Court below has not even dealt with the objections as raised by the Department and therefore, the order impugned deserves to be set aside. 8. So far as the impugned award is concerned, learned AAG submitted that the award qua price escalation has been granted in favour of the firm by learned Arbitrator in terms of clause 45 of the agreement whereas a bare reading of clause 45 would make it clear that the same would not even apply in the present matter. Learned counsel submitted that clause 45 comprised of 3 implied conditions: firstly, the stipulated period of contract ought to be more than 12 months; secondly, the valuation of the work ought to be above Rs.1 cr. and thirdly, the work ought to have been completed within the stipulated/extended period without any delay on part of the contractor. Herein, admittedly, the delay of 55 days was attributable to the contractor and therefore, all the conditions of clause 45 having not been fulfilled, the clause would not apply. Learned counsel further submitted that the basic and the most essential issue as to whom the delay in completion of the work was attributable, was not even framed by the learned Arbitrator and no finding on this specific aspect has been recorded by the learned Arbitrator. Therefore, in absence of a specific finding as to whom the delay was attributable, clause 45, which pre-supposes that no delay is attributable to the contractor, could not have been held to be applicable. 9. Therefore, in absence of a specific finding as to whom the delay was attributable, clause 45, which pre-supposes that no delay is attributable to the contractor, could not have been held to be applicable. 9. Next ground raised by learned counsel for the appellants is that the burden to prove the issues had been wrongly placed by the learned Arbitrator on the non applicants-State as the burden to prove Issue No. 3 (framed in negative) that the firm completed the work within the stipulated or the extended period was totally upon the applicant-firm and the burden to prove the same could not have been placed on the non applicant-Department. It has been submitted that the onus upon a party cannot be to prove the negative and therefore, the finding by the learned Arbitrator that the non-applicants failed to prove that the applicant-firm did not complete the work within the stipulated/extended period is totally contrary to the basic principles of law as well as the material available on record. 10. Learned counsel further submitted that it was an admitted fact on record that qua the delay of 55 days attributable to the contractor, a penalty @ 0.10% was imposed on the firm and the same was never challenged. Meaning thereby, the time extension was granted with a penalty and therefore also, clause 45 and 45-A of the agreement would not apply. Learned counsel submitted that the award is therefore, patently illegal and strictly in violation of Section 28(3) of the Act of 1996. In support of his contentions, learned counsel relied upon the Hon’ble Apex Court judgments in the matters of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. vs. SAW Pipes Ltd. (2003) 5 SCC 705 , Murlidhar Aggarwal and Another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (1974) 2 SCC 472 , Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited vs. Western GECO International Limited, (2014) 9 SCC 263 and State of Chhattisgarh and Others vs. Sal Udyog Private Limited, AIR 2021 SC 5503 . 11. Per contra, Shri Harish Purohit, learned counsel appearing for the respondent contractor/firm submitted that the award as passed by the learned Arbitrator is perfectly in consonance with the material available on record in so far as it was clearly proved on record that the stipulated period for completion of work was 18 months i.e. 546 days. 11. Per contra, Shri Harish Purohit, learned counsel appearing for the respondent contractor/firm submitted that the award as passed by the learned Arbitrator is perfectly in consonance with the material available on record in so far as it was clearly proved on record that the stipulated period for completion of work was 18 months i.e. 546 days. The work was completed in 1972 days with a delay of 1168 days out of which only 55 days was attributable to the contractor and the complete remaining delay was admittedly attributable to the State Department. Moreover, it is admitted on record that an additional work amounting to Rs. 69,17,907/- was awarded to the contractor and therefore, 267 extra days for completion of work ought to have been granted to the firm qua the additional work. Consequently, the stipulated period for completion of work ought to be 813 days (546 + 267) and after deducting 1168 days from 1972 days, the calculation comes out to be 804 days in which the work has been completed. Meaning thereby, 813 days were available to the firm for completion of work against which it has completed the work in 804 days. Therefore, by any extent, it cannot be held that the work was completed with a delay which could even be considered to be attributable to the firm. Therefore, learned Arbitrator rightly held the firm to be entitled for the price escalation amount and the objections against the award as passed by the learned Arbitrator have rightly been rejected by the Commercial Court. 12. Learned counsel further submitted that the findings as reached by the learned Arbitrator were based on documents of the Department itself wherein it was specifically admitted that the delay of 1168 days was attributable to the State Department and an additional time of 267 days ought to have been granted to the firm for completion of the work. Therefore, the Department being bound by its own documents cannot urge that the reliance of the learned Arbitrator on the said documents was bad. Learned counsel also urged that none of the objections as raised, fell within the purview of Section 34 of the Act and therefore too, their rejection being perfectly valid, deserves to be upheld. 13. Therefore, the Department being bound by its own documents cannot urge that the reliance of the learned Arbitrator on the said documents was bad. Learned counsel also urged that none of the objections as raised, fell within the purview of Section 34 of the Act and therefore too, their rejection being perfectly valid, deserves to be upheld. 13. In rejoinder, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the documents i.e. time extension application and the hindrance statement as relied upon by the learned Arbitrator were the internal communications between the officers of the Department in the nature of recommendation and the same were not the orders which could not have been considered to be a piece of evidence and therefore, could not have been relied upon by the learned Arbitrator to hold that the contractor was not responsible for the delay. 14. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 15. Before adverting into the adjudication on the grounds as raised, it is relevant to note that an application under Order 41 Rule 27, CPC has been preferred in the present appeal by the State Department with a prayer to take certain documents on record annexed as Annexure-A/1 along with the application. The said documents are five letters written by the Department to the firm during progress of the work whereby the firm was called upon to submit the price escalation bills, if any. It has been submitted that inspite of being called upon, the firm failed to submit any bill qua price escalation at the relevant point of time and therefore, its claim qua price escalation could not have been entertained by the learned Arbitrator subsequently. 16. Besides the above application, an application for amendment of the memo of appeal has also been preferred with the submission that as certain documents have been prayed to be taken on record, the pleadings qua the said documents needs to be made in the present appeal and therefore, the appellants be permitted to amend the present memo of appeal. 17. During the course of the arguments, learned AAG did not press both these applications and therefore, the same are dismissed as not pressed. 18. 17. During the course of the arguments, learned AAG did not press both these applications and therefore, the same are dismissed as not pressed. 18. Coming on to the ground as raised by learned AAG to the effect that clause 45 has wrongly been held to be applicable by the learned Arbitrator, there is no dispute regarding the first two conditions of the stipulated period of contract being more than 12 months and valuation of the work being above Rs. 1 crore. So far as the third condition is concerned, it stipulated that the work ought to have been completed within the stipulated/extended period without any delay on part of the contractor. The issue whether there was any delay on part of the contractor in completion of the work has been dealt by the learned Arbitrator while deciding Issue No. 3 and it has been specifically held that there was not a single day’s delay which could be attributable to the contractor. The said finding of the learned Arbitrator is based on the letters dated 01.10.2003 (Ex.20) and 06.10.2003 (Ex.5) whereby it has been specifically observed by the Superintending Engineer as well as the Chief Engineer that in view of the additional work allotted to the firm, an extra time of 267 days ought to have been granted for completion of the work and on computing the said additional days, the delay of not even a single day could be attributable to the contractor. In both these letters, it has also been specifically observed that the State Department did not incur any loss because of the delay in completion of the work. In view of the above two letters exhibited on record, the learned Arbitrator decided in favour of the applicant and held that clause 45 would be applicable and the contractor would be entitled to the price escalation amount in terms of the said clause. In view of the above two letters exhibited on record, the learned Arbitrator decided in favour of the applicant and held that clause 45 would be applicable and the contractor would be entitled to the price escalation amount in terms of the said clause. Letter dated 06.10.2003 (Ex.5) whereby the time extension case was forwarded/recommended read as under: ^^QeZ }kjk mDr ck/kkvksa ds dkj.k dk;Z iw.kZ djus esa dqy 1972 fnol dk le; fy;k x;k tcfd vuqcU/k ds vuqlkj dk;Z 546 fnu esa iw.kZ djuk FkkA vuqcU/k vuqlkj :i;s 1]41]52]086@& dk dk;Z vkoafVr Fkk ftls 546 fnu esa iw.kZ djuk Fkk ysfdu QeZ ls :i;s 2]10]69]933@& dk vfrfjDr dk;Z Hkh djok fy;k x;kA mDr vfrfjDr dk;Z ds fy;s QeZ dks 267 fnol dk le; vkSj fn;k tkuk pkfg;s FkkA bl Ádkj dk;Z 546$267¾813 fnol esa iw.kZ djuk FkkA dk;Z esa dqy 1168 fnol dh ck/kk mRiUu gqbZ gSA vr% QeZ }kjk dk;Z 1972&1168¾804 fnol esa iw.kZ fd;k gS tks fd mfpr gSA mijksDr of.kZr ck/kk,a mfpr ,oa Bsdsnkj ds fu;a=.k ls ckgj gSA v/kh{k.k vfHk;Urk@vf/k'kklh vfHk;Urk us ;g Áekf.kr fd;k gS fd dk;Z nsjh ls iw.kZ gksus esa jkT; ljdkj dks fdlh Ádkj dh gkfu ugha gqbZ gSaA** 19. Relying upon the above documents, the learned Arbitrator concluded his findings on Issue No. 3 as under: “I have considered the arguments raised by both the parties and perused the documentary evidence produced in this regard. According to the reply given by DW-1 in his cross examination it is admitted fact that the contents of the said letters Ex-5 and Ex-20 are correct and there is no averment of 55 days delay attributable on the part of the contractor in the said letters. In these circumstances, I am agree with the arguments of the applicant that he had completed the said work within 804 days excluding the delay of 1168 days attributable on the part of the government, while, the said work had to be completed within 813 days. Under this issue the non applicants have to prove that the applicant failed to complete the said work within stipulated period or within extended period. In this respect, it is an admitted fact that the state government have granted the time extension up to 05.04.2003. Thus, the extended period of the said work became up to 05.04.2003. Under this issue the non applicants have to prove that the applicant failed to complete the said work within stipulated period or within extended period. In this respect, it is an admitted fact that the state government have granted the time extension up to 05.04.2003. Thus, the extended period of the said work became up to 05.04.2003. There is no dispute between the parties that the work had been completed up to 05.04.2003. In this respect, the non applicants argued that the government extended time up to 05.04.2003 but with penalty of 0.10% of tender amount, which disentitled the applicant to get the benefit of price escalation. As regard the extended period, it is an admitted fact that the government had extended the time of the said work up to 05.04.2003, therefore, there is no dispute between the parties in this regard. As regard the effect of the penalty, the separate issue no. 06 has been framed, therefore, I will discuss this point under issue no. 06. In conclusion I hold that the non applicants have failed to prove that the applicant had not completed the said work within stipulated period or extended period. But the applicant completed the said work within extended period. Further, I hold that the applicant completed the said work within 804 days excluding the delay of 1168 days attributable on the part of the government. It is an admitted fact that said work had to be completed within 813 days while the applicant completed the said work 9 days before the stipulated period. Thus, the non applicants have failed to prove this issue in their favour. Hence, the issue no. 3 is decided against the non applicants.” (Emphasis supplied) 20. It is admitted on record that the total delay caused in completion of work was 1168 days out of which delay of only 55 days was attributable to the contractor. The application for extension of time along with hindrance statement as recommended by the Executive Engineer to the higher authorities had been placed on record by the applicant as Exhibit-A-16. A detailed and day-wise statement of delay caused and the reasons for such delay have been mentioned in the application. The application for extension of time along with hindrance statement as recommended by the Executive Engineer to the higher authorities had been placed on record by the applicant as Exhibit-A-16. A detailed and day-wise statement of delay caused and the reasons for such delay have been mentioned in the application. For ready reference, reproduction of the said details is made as under: Øe la[;k vojks/k vof/k ls rd fnu 1- Hkwfe dk eqvkotk u feyus ds dkj.k fdlkuksa }kjk dk;Z esa ck/kk igqapkus ds dkj.k 11-11-1997 5-12-1997 26 2- foHkkx }kjk ikuh rFkk LVhy miyC/k u djokus ds dkj.k 21-1-1998 11-3-1998 50 3- Earthing Arrangement dk dk;Z u gksus ds dkj.k 12-3-1998 30-4-1998 50 4- MªkbZax esa ifjorZu ds dkj.k 1-5-1998 21-5-1998 21 5- vkaf/k;ksa ls jkLrs can gksus ls eSfVjh;y dh dSfjt u gks ikus ds dkj.k 1-6-1998 15-7-1998 45 6- fMyhojh VSad dh MªkbZax Qkbuy gksus ls fMyhojh VSUd ds fu'kku u feyus ds dkj.k 1-8-1998 9-10-1998 70 7- foHkkx }kjk ikuh miyC/k u djokus ds dkj.k 7-12-1998 16-12-1998 10 8- dsUæh; m|ksx'kkyk [k.M }kjk Vsªl jsd ds pSuy fQV u djus ds dkj.k 30-12-1998 3-1-1999 5 9- foHkkx }kjk ikuh miyC/k u djokus ds dkj.k 18-4-1999 15-5-1999 28 10- foHkkx ds ikl ,yŒvksŒlhŒ dk vHkko gksus ls iwjk Hkqxrku u feyus ds dkj.k ¼/kheh Áxfr] 75 Áfr'kr ck/kk½ 61 xq.kk 75@100¾46 fnu 1-10-1999 30-11-1999 46 11- deZpkjh gM+rky dh otg ls batu can gksus ls ikuh miyC/k u gksus ds dkj.k 22-1-2000 28-2-2000 38 12- vkaf/k;ksa ls jkLrs can gksus ls eSfVjh;y dh dSfjt u gks ikus ds dkj.k 16-4-2000 30-8-2000 137 13- foHkkx ds ikl ,yŒvksŒlhŒ u gksus ds dkj.k 1-9-2000 31-10-2000 61 14- [k.Mh; LVksj esa lhesUV miyC/k u gksus ds dkj.k 1-11-2000 30-6-2001 242 15- vkaf/k;ksa ls jkLrs can gksus ls eSfVjh;y dSfjt u gks ldus rFkk foHkkx }kjk ikuh miyC/k u djokus ds dkj.k 1-7-2001 11-8-2001 42 16- foHkkx ds ikl ,yŒvksŒlhŒ dk vHkko gksus ds dkj.k Hkqxrku iwjk u feyus ds dkj.k ¼/kheh Áxfr 75 Áfr'kr ck/kk 162 xq.kk 75@100¾122 fnu½ 1-12-2001 11-5-2002 122 17- vkaf/k;ksa ls jkLrs can gksus ds dkj.k eSfVjh;y dh dSfjt u gks ldus ds dkj.k 12-5-2002 8-9-2002 120 18- Bsdsnkj }kjk /kheh xfr ls dk;Z djus ds dkj.k 55 dqy 1168 21. The recommendation as made by the concerned Executive Engineer on the above mentioned application for extension of time was as under: “Since the hindrance statement stated by contractor is partially genuine and beyond the control of contractor and department. Initially the land owners objected the work as land compensation was not given to them. After that drawings of pumping station was revised due to change in water allowance as the decision of state govt. Further in summer season heavy wind storms are common in this area due to which the roads generally get blocked and carriage of material becomes difficult. Many times supply of water is also interrupted. So in view of these reasons the hindrance statement is genuine. So extension in time limit up to 5-4-2003 is recommended with a token penalty of Rs. 10,000/- only. There is no loss to the deptt. In delayed completion of the work.” (Emphasis supplied) 22. A bare perusal of the above documents i.e. the hindrance statement and the recommendation of the concerned Executive Engineer relied upon by the learned Arbitrator leaves no doubt that the finding as reached by the learned Arbitrator is totally in consonance with the material available on record. In view of the specific admission of the Department itself that the work was delayed due to the reasons beyond control of the contractor or the State Department, the learned Arbitrator or the Commercial Court could not have reached to any other conclusion contrary to the said admissions of the Department itself. In the specific opinion of this Court firstly, there was no other conclusion/view possible in the present matter and secondly, even if any other/second conclusion/view is possible, as is the settled proposition of law, the same cannot be substituted in place of the conclusion/view as arrived/taken by the learned Arbitrator. 23. Consequently, the finding of the learned Arbitrator that clause 45 of the agreement would be applicable to the present matter and the contractor is entitled for the price escalation amount and the rejection of the objections as raised by the State qua the said finding by the Court below does not deserve any interference by this Court. 24. 23. Consequently, the finding of the learned Arbitrator that clause 45 of the agreement would be applicable to the present matter and the contractor is entitled for the price escalation amount and the rejection of the objections as raised by the State qua the said finding by the Court below does not deserve any interference by this Court. 24. So far as the ground raised by the learned AAG that the burden to prove that the firm had not completed the work within the stipulated or the extended period was wrongly placed on the State is concerned, it is clear on record that the claim qua price escalation as raised by the firm was denied by the State on the ground that the work was not completed within the stipulated period and therefore, clause 45 would not apply. It is the basic proposition of law that a party who pleads a fact is under an onus to prove the same. The fact of the firm having not completed the work within the stipulated period had been pleaded/averred by the respondent-Department and therefore, the onus definitely was on it to prove the same. The case of the firm was that it had completed the work within 804 days which was within the period of 813 days, the period which ought to have been computed/stipulated for completion of the original plus the additional work allotted to the firm. It was the defence of the State that the stipulated period was 546 days and the firm did not complete the work within the said period. Therefore, the onus to prove the said fact was rightly placed on the respondent-State who pleaded the same. Hence, the ground as raised by the learned AAG cannot be held to be tenable. 25. So far as the imposition of the penalty on the firm having not been challenged is concerned, the same cannot be also of any consequence as firstly, even if it is assumed that there was some delay in completion of the work on part of the firm, it was admittedly a delay of 55 days only. The total delay in completion of work in the present matter was of 1168 days out of which only 55 days were held to be attributable to the firm even by the Department. The total delay in completion of work in the present matter was of 1168 days out of which only 55 days were held to be attributable to the firm even by the Department. As held in P.M. Paul vs. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 1034 “Escalation” is a normal incident arising out of gap of time in this inflationary age in performing any contract. The purpose why a price adjustment/escalation clause is essential to be incorporated in agreements and why the said amount deserves to be granted was discussed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of National Highway Authority of India vs. M/s Progressivemvr (JV), (2018) 14 SCC 688 and it was observed as under: “.......After all, what is the purpose of giving price adjustment? The Clause relating to price adjustment indicates that certain component which go into the execution of the projects like labour component, cement component, steel component, plant and machinery and spares component, bitumen component etc. may not remain static insofar as their price is concerned. There is a possibility that from the date when the price of these components was quoted by the contractor in his bid, there may be increase or decrease in the said price from time to time during the execution of the contract. It is for this reason, Clause relating to price adjustment is provided so as to give effect to the rise or fall in the costs to the contractor.” 26. Admittedly, in the present matter, the delay of 1113 days was attributable to the Department and the firm could not have been denied the price escalation qua the said period. Even if it is held that the delay of 55 days was attributable to the firm, how could it have been denied the price escalation qua the huge period of 1113 days, the delay for which it could not have been held to be responsible. In Food Corporation of India vs. A.M. Ahmed and Company and Others, (2006) 13 SCC 779, the Hon’ble Apex Court specifically held that even in absence of an escalation clause in contract, the Arbitrator is within his jurisdiction to award escalation charges if the delay is not attributable to the contractor himself. In Food Corporation of India vs. A.M. Ahmed and Company and Others, (2006) 13 SCC 779, the Hon’ble Apex Court specifically held that even in absence of an escalation clause in contract, the Arbitrator is within his jurisdiction to award escalation charges if the delay is not attributable to the contractor himself. It being an admitted case on record that the delay of 1113 days was on part of the Department, the award of the claim qua price escalation to the contractor was a necessary corollary and the award of the same by the learned Arbitrator cannot therefore be termed to be perverse or illegal. The same therefore does not deserve any interference by this Court. 27. The ground regarding the Commercial Court having cursorily rejected the objections as raised by the Objector State also does not find any merit with this Court as a bare perusal of the order dated 25.01.2019 makes it clear that the Commercial Court has, after thoroughly discussing the ambit of Section 34 of the Act and after appreciating the findings of the learned Arbitrator with the available scope, reached to well reasoned conclusions on the objections. The Court below rightly held that none of the objections as raised, fell within the purview of Section 34 of the Act and therefore, the award impugned did not deserve any interference. 28. So far as the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the appellants are concerned, there is no dispute on the settled proposition of law that failure on the part of the Arbitrator to decide in accordance with terms of the contract governing the parties, would certainly attract the “Patent illegality ground.” There is no dispute even on the proposition of law that the award which is on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest and such award would definitely be termed to be patently illegal, thereby attracting the ground of being against the “public policy of India.” But then, the question is whether the said proposition of law would be applicable to the present matter. As observed in the preceding paras, the findings as arrived by the learned Arbitrator in the present matter are neither in breach of any of the conditions of the agreement nor are they contrary to the material available on record. As observed in the preceding paras, the findings as arrived by the learned Arbitrator in the present matter are neither in breach of any of the conditions of the agreement nor are they contrary to the material available on record. The findings are rather based on the specific admissions of the Department itself. Therefore, the same cannot, in terms of any provision of law, be termed to be perverse, patently illegal or against the fundamental policy of Indian law. The judgments as cited therefore, have no application to the present matter. 29. In view of above analysis, this Court does not find any ground to interfere with the award dated 04.12.2014 as passed by the learned Arbitrator and the order dated 25.01.2019 passed by the Commercial Court, Jodhpur. The present appeal being devoid of merits, is hence dismissed.